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Abstract 
The UN-sponsored international conventions on terrorism and organised crime 
deal with a specific type of criminality which spreads across national frontiers. 
The suppression of these crimes is possible through state cooperation in 
extradition and mutual legal assistance. Hence, the object of these conventions 
is to facilitate law enforcement cooperation. To achieve this aim, the 
conventions have established certain mandatory obligations in order to ensure 
harmony among the legal systems of states parties with a view to make them 
conducive to law enforcement cooperation.   
Harmony is needed to satisfy certain requirements of extradition and mutual 
legal assistance proceedings which necessitate similarity in the legal systems of 
the requesting and requested states. These requirements can be classified into 
distinct categories of conditions and procedure.  
 Conditions refer to conditions associated with the principle of reciprocity or 
exchange of comparable favours, upon which the laws and treaties on 
extradition and mutual legal assistance are based. It demands similar legal 
prescriptions or equivalent conceptions of justice under the laws of the 
requesting and requested state with respect to the act concerning which 
surrender or interrogation is sought. To enable the parties to satisfy conditions, 
the international conventions impose mandatory obligations to implement their 
rules concerning jurisdiction, criminalisation and fair treatment.  
Procedure implies the procedure of applying or executing the enforcement 
devices of aut dedere aut judicare and confiscation of the proceeds of crime. 
The application of both these devices necessitates similarity in the laws of the 
requesting and requested states with respect to procedure of enforcement. 
Similarity is needed to ensure that a foreign request may not be refused due to 
the requested state lacking enabling procedural rules or the request not being 
consistent with its procedural law. To establish similarity, the conventions 
impose mandatory obligations to implement the mechanisms of aut dedere aut 
judicare and confiscation of the proceeds of crimes. This thesis critically 
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examines the impact of these obligations on state cooperation in bringing to 
justice transnational offenders.   
The central argument of the thesis is that the mandatory obligations under the 
counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions are required to be 
implemented in accordance with and, to the extent permissible, under the 
national law of state parties. Accordingly, when they are translated 
domestically, they do not achieve a level of harmony, sufficient to facilitate the 
fulfilment of the requirements of extradition and mutual legal assistance, i.e. 
‘double conditions’ and procedural similarity needed to enforce aut dedere aut 
judicare and confiscation. Resultantly, discretion rests with the requested state 
to grant or refuse cooperation depending upon its political and diplomatic 
relations with the requesting state. This contradicts the objective of facilitating 
law enforcement cooperation in the specific context of borderless or 
transnational crimes. Following this approach, state cooperation concerning 
transnational crimes remains as discretionary and as unregulated as cooperation 
in regard to ordinary crimes. This calls into question the utility of reliance on 
mandatory obligations as tools to facilitate law enforcement cooperation. 
As an alternative, some bilateral/regional treaties and domestic laws adopt the 
strategy of relaxing ‘double conditions’ and simplifying the procedure of 
applying aut dedere aut judicare and confiscation. This strategy also aims at 
facilitating law enforcement cooperation; however, it takes the route of 
regulating the requirements of extradition and mutual legal assistance rather 
than harmonising national justice systems to make them conducive to their 
demands. Given that this system carries greater potential for facilitating law 
enforcement cooperation, this thesis recommends that the makers of the 
international counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions should 
substitute or complement the mandatory obligations with it. Significantly, states 
have, by agreeing not to apply political and fiscal offence exception to 
extradition and interrogation proceedings involving these crimes, shown their 
willingness to accept this approach of facilitating law enforcement cooperation 
in the specific context of transnational crimes.   
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Glossary 
 
 Aut Dedere Aut Judicare             Duty to Extradite or Prosecute. 
 Double criminality     The act in respect of which  
      extradition is sought must  
      constitute a crime under the  
      laws of both the requesting and  
      requested states. 
 Double punishability    The act in respect of which  
      extradition is sought must fulfil  
      the standards of criminal   
      responsibility of each cooperating 
      state.     
 forum conveniens                   Place most convenient to hold a  
      trial. 
 Jus Cogens                                   Peremptory norm of international 
      law. 
 Legality       No one shall be prosecuted or  
      punished without there being a   
      previous violation of law; it is  
      used inter-changeably for nullum 
      cimen.    
 nemo debet bis vexari                  No one to be tried or punished  
      twice for the same act. 
 nullum crimen sine lege               No crime without law. 
 Predicate Crime       The act through which the  
      proceeds of crime are generated   
 Refouler                                      A refugee shall not  be returned to 
      a state where his life is in danger. 
 Relator                                        A person whose extradition or  
      interrogation is sought by the  
      requesting state. 
 Res Judicata      A rule that a final judgement on  
      the merits by a court having  
      jurisdiction is conclusive between 
      the parties to a suit as to all  
      matters that were litigated or  
      that could have been litigated in 
      that suit.      
 Special use of double criminality   When the extradition is sought in 
      respect of a crime taking place  
      outside state territory, the theory 
      of jurisdiction applied by the  
      requesting state must correspond 
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      to the rules of jurisdiction applied 
      by the requested state. 
 Speciality      An extraditee shall not be  
      prosecuted for crimes   
      committed before extradition,  
      other than those for which his  
      extradition was granted.  
 Transnational crimes    Crimes spreading across national  
      frontiers in terms of perpetration 
      or nationality or location of the  
      victim or offenders. 
 Transnational offenders    The offenders involved in crimes  
      spreading across national frontiers 
 Value and Substitute Confiscation       Modern theories of confiscation  
      whereby the proceeds which  
      have been lost or converted into  
      new property can be confiscated. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
The UN-sponsored international conventions on terrorism and organised crime 
deal with a specific genre of crime which spreads across national frontiers.1 
Accordingly, the conventions have been collectively named by some scholars as 
‘transnational treaties’ and the crimes established by them ‘transnational 
crimes’.2  Although the nature and motivation of these crimes differ, the means 
adopted by the offenders to carry them out are more or less the same.3  For 
example, the offenders involved in these crimes purposely spread their 
operations in more than one state to defeat territorially restricted national laws. 
Furthermore, they paralyse administrative machinery of states through violence, 
corruption and obstruction of justice with a view to ensure non-enforcement of 
law.4 
Reflecting the similarity of the means adopted by the offenders to commit the 
crimes,5 the conventions establishing these crimes provide identical measures for 
their repression.6  The primary method relied upon by the conventions is state 
cooperation in law enforcement, which is required to be carried out through the 
                                         
1 See Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Effective National and International Action against Organised Crime and 
Terrorist Criminal Activities’ 4 Emory International Law Review (1990) 9 at 36; For relevant 
provisions of the counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions see (n 22) Chapter 2 
below.  
2 Carrie Lyn Donigan Guymon, ‘International Legal Mechanisms for Combating Transnational 
Organised Crime: The Need for a Multilateral Convention’ 18 Berkeley J. Int'l L (2000) 53 at 86-
87; See also Neil Boister, ‘Transnational Criminal Law’ 14 EJIL (2003) 953 at 953; Roger S. 
Clarke, ‘The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime’ 50 Wayne 
State Law Review (2004) 161 at 166 
3 Bassiouni (n 1) 10 
4 Guymon (n 2) 87 See also Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Policy Considerations on Interstate Cooperation in 
Criminal Matters’ 4 Pace Y.B. Int'l L.(1992) 123 at 127 
5 Bassiouni, ‘Effective Action’ (n 1) 13 
6 Boister (n 2); Guymon (n 2); D.W. Sproule and Paul St-Denis, ‘The UN Drug Trafficking 
Convention: An Ambitious Step’ 27 Canadian Yearbook of International Law (1989) 263 at 266; 
Kofi A Annan, Foreword to the Organised Crime Convention 2000 at iii; UNODC’s Technical 
Assistance Guide 2009 for the implementation of the UN Convention against Corruption 2003 at 
133 
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measures of extradition, mutual legal assistance, aut dedere aut judicare and 
confiscation of the proceeds of crime.7 
The laws and treaties regulating these measures require harmony in the legal 
systems of the requesting and requested states.8  The international counter-
terrorism and organised crime conventions do not supersede these laws and 
treaties. Instead, they aim to make national legal systems responsive to their 
demands through establishing harmony.9  To bring about harmony, the 
conventions establish certain mandatory obligations.10  The obligations represent 
a shift in the traditional role of international law which had previously been 
confined to establishing 'general obligations'. General obligations refer to 
provisions which do not require the parties to legislate; their purpose is to 
provide guidelines for the legislators.11  Hence, they are akin to statements of 
policy.12  As observed by Lambert, general obligations are based on the premise 
that ‘international law imposes obligation not of way but of result.’13  Mandatory 
obligations, on the other hand, imply binding duties whose non-compliance could 
entail state responsibility.14 
The extraordinary nature of these obligations has led some scholars to claim that 
the international counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions have 
established a new regime of state cooperation directed at subjecting sovereign 
                                         
7 The purpose of promoting state cooperation has been reiterated in a majority of international 
counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions under consideration. See (n 4) Chapter 3 
below 
8 Lech Gardocki, ‘Double Criminality in Extradition Law’ 27 Isr. L. Rev. (1993) 288 
9 See UNODC's Legislative Guide 2004 for implementing the Organised Crime Convention 2000 at 
130  
<http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/legislative_guides/Legislative%20guides_Full%20version.pdf> 
[date accessed 21/03/13] 
10 ibid  
11 Olympia Beku, ‘A Case for the Review of Article 88 of the ICC Statute: Strengthening a Forgotten 
Provision’ 12 New Criminal Law Review (2009) 468 at 475 
12 Vaughan Lowe, International Law (New York: Oxford University Press 2007) 119 
13 Joseph J Lambert, Terrorism and Hostages in International Law, A Commentary on Hostages 
Convention 1979 (Cambridge: Grotius Publications Limited 1990) 101    
14 Lowe (n 12) 
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discretion to collective law enforcement.15  This thesis looks into the impact of 
these obligations on state cooperation in law enforcement. 
The requirements of law enforcement cooperation which necessitate harmony in 
national legal systems can be classified into distinct categories of conditions and 
procedure. Conditions refer to ‘double conditions’ applicable to extradition and 
mutual legal assistance proceedings and procedure denotes the procedure of 
applying the enforcement devices of aut dedere aut judicare and confiscation. 
To establish harmony, the international conventions on terrorism and organised 
crime impose certain mandatory obligations. In keeping with the requirements of 
law enforcement cooperation necessitating harmony, the obligations established 
by the conventions can be classified into distinct categories of obligations 
responding to ‘double conditions’ and those concerning enforcement devices. In 
line with these, the thesis has been divided into two parts. I shall now provide 
an overview of each of the two parts and the issues disused thereunder. 
1.1) Introduction to part one: mandatory obligations to 
establish jurisdiction, criminalise offences and 
provide fair treatment 
Part one of the thesis concerns the mandatory obligations established by the 
international counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions to establish 
jurisdiction, criminalise offences and provide fair treatment. The obligations 
respond to a series of ‘double conditions’ applicable to extradition and mutual 
legal assistance proceedings necessitating similarity in national justice systems 
concerning areas such as jurisdiction, criminalisation and fair treatment.    
Extradition and mutual legal assistance proceedings are governed by the 
traditional principle of reciprocity.16 According to this principle, states provide 
assistance to each other on reciprocal basis with a view to ensure that if 
circumstances are reversed in future and the requested state steps into the 
shoes of requesting state, it must be entitled to obtain similar assistance with 
                                         
15 Sproule (n 6); Boister (n 2); Guymon (n 2) 
16 See Edward M Wise, ‘Some Problems of Extradition’ 15 Wayne State L. Rev. (1968-1969) 709 at 
713 
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respect to the act in question.17 Since there is no rule of general international 
law which compels a state to extradite or to provide mutual legal assistance in 
the absence of a treaty, these proceedings are carried out on the basis of 
bilateral treaties which are premised on reciprocity.18 The principle necessitates 
similar legal prescriptions or equivalent concepts of justice in the requesting and 
requested states, with respect to the act concerning which surrender or 
interrogation is sought. It is generally expressed in the form of a series of 
‘double conditions’ necessitating harmony in national legal systems with respect 
to areas such as jurisdiction, criminalisation and human rights.19 The double 
conditions are commonly referred to using the generic title of ‘double 
criminality’ and are found amongst the grounds for refusal of assistance in the 
laws and treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance.20 
The international counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions do not 
supersede these laws and treaties; instead they aim to make national legal 
systems responsive to their demands through establishing harmony. To facilitate 
the fulfilment of ‘double conditions’, the conventions establish mandatory 
obligations to implement their rules concerning jurisdiction, criminalisation and 
fair treatment. 
This thesis criticises the approach of satisfying ‘double conditions’ of extradition 
and mutual assistance proceedings through establishing mandatory obligations 
under the international conventions. Since the obligations are required to be 
implemented to the extent permissible under national law, when they are 
translated domestically, they reflect the diversity of national legal systems. As a 
result, enough discrepancies arise in the laws of the requested and requesting 
states to allow refusal of surrender or interrogation based upon non-fulfilment of 
‘double conditions’, which are applied in multiple ways as grounds for refusal of 
assistance under extradition and mutual assistance laws and treaties. 
                                         
17 ibid 
18 ibid 
19 Gardocki (n 8) 
20 ibid; See also SZ Fellar, ‘The Significance of the Requirement of Double Criminality in the Law of 
Extradition’ 10 Isr. L. Rev. (1975) 51 at 71-75 
5 
 
The satisfaction of various applications of ‘double conditions’ requires 
considerable harmony in the justice systems of cooperating states. This 
necessitates the establishment of mandatory obligations without any 
qualification or exception. However, states parties to the international 
conventions are unwilling to accept such absolute and overriding obligations.21 
Some bilateral and regional treaties adopt the technique of requiring the parties 
to relax the application of ‘double conditions’ considering the specific nature of 
transnational or borderless crimes.22  This strategy is also aimed at facilitating 
state cooperation in law enforcement; however, it takes the route of regulating 
the requirements of extradition and mutual legal assistance rather than 
harmonising national justice systems to make them conducive to their demands. 
This thesis recommends that the makers of the international counter-terrorism 
and organised crime conventions adopt this technique as a substitute or 
complement to the strategy of establishing mandatory obligations. 
1.2) Introduction to part two: mandatory obligations to 
implement enforcement devices of aut dedere aut 
judicare and confiscation of the proceeds of crime 
Part two of the thesis relates to mandatory obligations established by the 
international counter terrorism and organised crime conventions to implement 
law enforcement devices of aut judicare aut judicare and confiscation of the 
proceeds of crime. The two devices are specifically designed to promote inter-
state cooperation for bringing to justice transnational offenders. Aut dedere aut 
judicare refers to the obligation to extradite or prosecute, whereas, confiscation 
implies forfeiture of the proceeds of crime upon foreign request. 
Since the two devices are regulated by same laws and treaties which govern 
extradition and mutual legal assistance, their application makes similar 
demands, i.e. harmony in the laws of requesting and requested states. 
Nonetheless, in addition to harmony necessitated by ‘double conditions’ 
applicable to extradition and mutual assistance proceedings underlying these 
                                         
21 See for instance ICAO Doc 8979-LC/165-2 at 81, SA Doc. No.33, Rev.1 (1972) 
22 See also Guy Stessens, Money Laundering: A New International Law Enforcement Model (UK 
Cambridge University Press 2004) 291-292 
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devices, they also require harmony with respect to procedure of their 
enforcement. Procedural harmony is needed to ensure that a foreign request 
may not be refused due to the requested state lacking enabling procedural rules 
or the request not being consistent with its procedural law. To establish 
harmony, the counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions impose 
mandatory obligations upon the parties to implement the mechanisms of aut 
dedere aut judicare and confiscation of the proceeds of crimes upon foreign 
request.  
The thesis will explain that as per the existing scheme of the conventions, the 
procedure of applying aut dedere aut judicare and confiscation of the proceeds 
of crime is to be determined in accordance with the national law of the 
requested state party. Consequently, the obligations to implement these 
mechanisms may only bring harmony to the extent of their inclusion in national 
laws, which is insufficient to facilitate their application. For such facilitation to 
occur, it is essential that an elaborate procedure be provided for applying or 
executing these devices.  
In contrast to the counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions, some 
bilateral/regional treaties and domestic laws provide extensive guidelines on the 
procedure of applying aut dedere aut judicare and confiscation of the proceeds 
of crime upon foreign request.23  Guidelines on the pattern of these laws and 
treaties reduce dissimilarities in national laws and ensure that the requested 
state has enabling rules at its disposal to carry out the request. The thesis 
recommends that identical provisions should be imported into the international 
conventions in order to complement or replace their mandatory obligations. 
1.3) Counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions 
under consideration 
According to Bassiouni, there are over 200 international conventions dealing with 
the phenomenon of transnational crimes, however, for the purposes of this 
thesis only those conventions have been chosen which proscribe the acts of 
                                         
23 ibid 
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transnational terrorism and organised crime.24  The rationale of choosing these 
conventions is the similarity of the rules established by them. Their 
commonalities include: 
1. Regulation of crimes committed by non-state actors and reliance on 
domestic legal processes for repression of the crimes. In other words, 
there is no international court or tribunal vested with the jurisdiction to 
try these crimes and the conventions rely on domestic courts and legal 
processes for their prosecution and punishment.25  
2.  The crimes established by all these conventions spread across national 
frontiers in terms of their perpetration or nationality or location of the 
victims or offenders. Since it is not possible for any one state to prevent 
and punish these crimes single handedly, the objective of the conventions 
is to facilitate state cooperation in criminal law enforcement.26  
3.  Each of these conventions sets forth mandatory obligations for the 
parties to criminalise offences, establish jurisdiction, provide fair 
treatment and to implement law enforcement devices of aut dedere aut 
judicare and mutual legal assistance.27   
 Below is given a brief description of 13 Conventions chosen for the purposes of 
this thesis.        
1.3.1) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of 
Aircraft Signed at The Hague, on 16 December 1970 [hereinafter 
the Hague Convention 1970]28 
The Convention is concerned with preventing and punishing the unlawful acts of 
hijacking, i.e. seizure and control, directed against an aircraft in flight.29 
                                         
24 Cherif Bassiouni, ‘The Sources and Contents of International Criminal Law: A Theoretical 
Framework’ in 1 International Criminal Law: Crimes (2nd Edn…1999) at 32-33 & 62-69  
25 Bassiouni, ‘Policy Considerations' (n 4) 
26 See (n 1); See also (n 21-30 & 37-39) Chapter 5 below 
27 Legislative Guide for implementing Organised Crime Convention 2000 (n 9) 
28 ICAO Doc. 8920 / 860 UNTS 105 / [1972] ATS 16 / 10 ILM 133 (1971) 
29 See preamble of the Hague Convention 1970 
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1.3.2) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against 
the Safety of Civil Aviation, Signed at Montreal, on 23 
September1971 [hereinafter the Montreal Convention 1971]30 
The Convention responds to the acts against the safety of civil aviation. 
It establishes as criminal offences the acts of sabotage of aircraft committed in 
flight as well as directed from the ground through interference with air 
navigational facilities.31 
 
1.3.3) Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic 
Agents, Adopted by the General Assembly of United Nations on 
14 December 1973 [hereinafter the Protection of Diplomats 
Convention 1973]32  
The need for the Protection of Diplomats Convention 1973 was felt when it was 
realised that attacks against diplomatic agents and other internationally 
protected persons create a serious threat to the maintenance of normal 
international relations which are necessary for cooperation among states. It 
establishes as crimes the acts of violence committed against heads of states, 
their families, government representatives and diplomatic agents.33 
 
1.3.4) International Convention against the Taking of Hostages 
Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 17 
December 1979 [hereinafter the Hostages Convention 1979]34  
The Convention is aimed at preventing and punishing the act of taking of 
hostages, the act being targeted at compelling a state or an international 
organisation to do or abstain from doing something as a condition for the release 
of hostages.35 
 
                                         
30 ICAO Doc. 8966 / 974 UNTS 177 / [1973] ATS 24 / 10 ILM 1151 (1971) 
31 See article 1 (b) and (c) of the Montreal Convention 1971  
32 UNTS vol.1035 p.167 
33 See preamble and article 2 of the Protection of Diplomats Convention 1973 
34 1316 UNTS 205 / [1990] ATS 17/ 18 ILM 1456 (1979) 
35 See article 1(1) of the Hostages Convention 1979 
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1.3.5) Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, 
Signed at Vienna on 3 March 1980 [hereinafter the Nuclear 
Materials Convention 1980]36 
The Convention was adopted to avert the potential dangers posed by the 
unlawful taking and the use of nuclear material including its theft, robbery, 
illegal import, and export and trafficking.37 
 
1.3.6) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against 
the Safety of Maritime Navigation, concluded at Rome on 10 
March 1988 [hereinafter the Rome Convention 1988]38 
The Convention is designed to prevent and punish unlawful acts jeopardising the 
freedom of maritime navigation and the safety of the persons and property on 
board.39 
 
1.3.7) International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
Bombings, Signed at New York on 15 December 1997 [hereinafter 
the Terrorist Bombings Convention 1997]40 
The Convention aims at suppressing terrorist attacks involving the use of 
explosives or other lethal devices intended to provoke a state of terror in the 
general public for the achievement of political objectives.41 
 
1.3.8) International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism, Adopted by the General Assembly of 
United Nations on 9 December 1999 [hereinafter the Terrorism 
Financing Convention 1999]42 
The Convention focuses on combating the financing of terrorists and terrorist 
organisations. It establishes as crimes the acts of collecting and providing funds 
                                         
36 1456 UNTS 246 / 18 ILM 1419(1980) / [1987] ATS 16 
37 See article 7 of the Nuclear Materials Convention 1980 
38 1618 UNTS 201 / [1993] ATS 16 / 10 ILM 672 (1988) 
39 See preamble of the Rome Convention 1988 
40 2149 UNTS 256 / [2002] ATS 17 / UN Doc. A / RES / 52 /164 
41 See article 2 of the Terrorist Bombings Convention 1997 
42 2178 UNTS 197/39 ILM 270 (2000) / [2002] ATS 23 
10 
 
with the intention and knowledge that they will be used to carry out terrorist 
attacks.43 
 
1.3.9) International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of 
Nuclear Terrorism, Adopted at New York on 13 April 2005 
[hereinafter Nuclear Terrorism Convention 2005]44 
The Convention aims at preventing and punishing the use and possession of 
radioactive material or devices intended to cause death, injury, damage to 
property or to a nuclear facility in order to compel a state or an organization to 
do or abstain from doing something.45  
 
1.3.10) Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating 
to International Civil Aviation, Adopted at Beijing on 10 
September 2010 [hereinafter the Beijing Convention 2010]46 
The Convention deals with new kinds of threats to International Civil Aviation 
such as bio- terrorism and cyber terrorism that jeopardise the safety and 
security of the persons and property on board and affect the operation of air 
services.47 
 
1.3.11) United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988, Adopted at Vienna on 
20 December 1988 [hereinafter the Drugs Convention 1988]48 
The Convention is concerned with countering the illegal production of, demand 
for and traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.49   
 
                                         
43 See preamble and article 2 of the Terrorism Financing Convention 1999 
44 UN Doc. A / RES / 59 / 290 (2005) / [2005] ATNIF 20 
45 See article 2 of the Nuclear Terrorism Convention 2005 
46 Not yet in force 
47 See article 1 the Beijing Convention 2010; also see Ruwantissa Abeyratne, 'The Beijing 
Convention of 2010 on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil 
Aviation—an Interpretative Study' 4 Journal of Transport Security (2011) 131 at 135, 136 
48 UN Doc. E/CONF.82/15 (1988) / 28 ILM 493 (1989) 
49 See preamble of the Drugs Convention 1988 
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1.3.12) United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime, Adopted at New York on 15 November 2000 
[hereinafter the Organized Crime Convention 2000]50 
 
The Convention aims at defeating the organised criminality of any type by 
making unlawful the acts of participation in the activities of an organised 
criminal group with common purpose.51 
 
1.3.13) United Nations Convention against Corruption, Adopted at 
New York on 31 October 2003 [hereinafter the UN Convention 
against Corruption 2003]52  
The Convention responds to the phenomenon of transnational corruption which 
undermines democracies and creates political instability by depriving the 
affected nations of their resources and wealth.53 
 
In addition to similarities mentioned above, a majority of these conventions are 
widely ratified and hence are considered to have established obligations of 
universal scope.54  For example, out of 193 UN member states, 185 are party to 
the Hague Convention 1970,55 188 have ratified the Montreal Convention 1971,56 
168 are party to the Hostages Convention 1979,57 167 are party to the Protection 
of Diplomats Convention 1973,58 156 are party to the Rome Convention 1988,59 
                                         
50 40 ILM 335 (2001) / UN Doc. A / 55 / 383 at 25 (2000) / [2004] ATS 12 
51 See article 5 the Organized Crime Convention 2000 
52 UN Doc. A/ 58 / 422 (2003) / (2004) 43 ILM 37 
53 See preamble of the UN Convention against Corruption 2003 
54 M. Cherif Bassiouni & Edward M Wise, ‘Aut dedere Aut Judicare: The duty to extradite or 
prosecute in international law’ (Netherlands: Matinus Nijhoff Publishers 1995) 20, 21 
55 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Secretariat 
<http://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/List%20of%20Parties/Hague_EN.pdf>  [Date accessed 
21/03/13] 
56 Centre for International Law (CIL) National University of Singapore 
<http://cil.nus.edu.sg/1971/1971-convention-for-the-suppression-of-unlawful-acts-against-the-
safety-of-civil-aviation/> [Date accessed 21/03/13]  
57 United Nations Treaty Collection 
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-
5&chapter=18&lang=en> [Date accessed 21/03/13]  
58 United Nations Treaty Collection 
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XVIII-7&chapter=18&lang=en> 
[Date accessed 21/03/13]  
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142 are party to the Nuclear Materials Convention 1980,60 165 are party to the 
Terrorist Bombings Convention 1997,61 173 are party to the Terrorism Financing 
Convention 1999,62 188 are party to the Drugs Convention 1988,63 174 are party 
to the Organised Crime Convention 2000 64 and 165 have ratified the UN 
Convention against Corruption 2003.65 Only two of the selected conventions have 
lesser ratifications namely the Beijing Convention 2010 and Nuclear Terrorism 
Convention 2005. The former has three 66 parties and the latter 84 parties.67 
 
1.4) Distinction between Security Council's counter-
terrorism regime and the regime set forth by the 
international counter-terrorism and organised crime 
conventions 
Any discussion of the international conventions regulating the acts of 
transnational terrorism and organised crime is incomplete without mentioning 
the Security Council's counter-terrorism regime complementing the counter 
                                                                                                                           
59 Centre for International Law (CIL) National University of Singapore 
<http://cil.nus.edu.sg/1988/1988-convention-for-the-suppression-of-unlawful-acts-against-the-
safety-of-maritime-navigation/>  [Date accessed 21/03/13]  
60 Centre for International Law (CIL) National University of Singapore 
<http://cil.nus.edu.sg/1979/1979-vienna-convention-on-the-physical-protection-of-nuclear-
materials/>  [Date accessed 21/03/13] 
61 United Nations Treaty Collection 
<http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/mtdsg/volume%20ii/chapter%20xviii/xviii-9.en.pdf> [Date 
accessed 21/03/13] 
62 Centre for International Law (CIL) National University of Singapore 
<http://cil.nus.edu.sg/1999/1999-international-convention-for-the-suppression-of-the-financing-
of-terrorism/>  [Date accessed 21/03/13] 
63 Ratification status of the UN Convention against Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic substances 
1988<http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/mtdsg/volume%20i/chapter%20vi/vi-19.en.pdf>  
[Date accessed 21/03/13] 
64 United Nations Treaty Collection 
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-
12&chapter=18&lang=en>  [Date accessed 21/03/13] 
65 United Nations Treaty Collection 
<http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/mtdsg/volume%20ii/chapter%20xviii/xviii-14.en.pdf> [Date 
accessed 21/03/13] 
66 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Secretariat 
<http://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/List%20of%20Parties/Beijing_Conv_EN.pdf>  [Date accessed 
21/03/13] 
67 United Nations Treaty Collection 
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII%7E15&chapter
=18&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en>  [Date accessed 21/03/13] 
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terrorism conventions. The Security Council as the organ charged with primary 
responsibility of maintaining international peace and security has been the 
architect of UN's response to terrorism.68  Through a series of resolutions, the 
Security Council has established a comprehensive counter-terrorism regime. 
Resolution 1373 (2001) is of particular significance in this respect. It calls upon 
states to become parties to international conventions relating to terrorism.69 
Moreover, it obliges states to criminalise financing of terrorism, freeze assets 
belonging to terrorists and prohibit their nationals or legal entities operating in 
their territories from making funds available to terrorists.70  Additionally, it 
establishes a Committee to monitor the implementation of the resolution.71  
The thesis therefore makes explicit references to various resolutions of the 
Security Council including SCR 1373 (2001) supporting the obligations set forth 
by counter-terrorism conventions. However, the Security Council's regime differs 
fundamentally from the so called regime set forth by the international counter-
terrorism and organised crime conventions. The former seeks direct enforcement 
of international law by virtue of specific powers granted to the Security Council 
under chapter vii of the UN Charter; the latter, on the other hand, seeks to 
enforce international law indirectly, through domestic justice systems and 
domestic procedures. 
 For example, in resolution 1267, the Security Council determined that the 
Taliban's actions in Afghanistan of providing sanctuary to Bin Laden constituted a 
threat to international peace and security.72  Thus, acting under Chapter vii of 
the UN Charter, the Security Council established a sanctioning regime to freeze 
financial resources of Taliban and to enforce an air embargo against 
Afghanistan.73  
                                         
68 See article 24, the Charter of the United Nations Signed on 26 June 1945 at San Francisco 
[hereinafter the UN Charter]  
69 See Para 3(d) S / RES / 1373 (2001), adopted by the Security Council at its 4385th meeting, on 
28 September 2001 [hereinafter S/RES/1373(2001)] 
70 See Para 1 ibid 
71 See Para 6 ibid 
72 S / RES / 1267 (1999), Adopted by the Security Council at its 4051st meeting on 15 October 
1999 [hereinafter S / RES / 1267 (1999)]  
73 See Para 4 ibid 
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On the other hand, the measures of law enforcement set forth by the counter-
terrorism and organised crime conventions, such as extradition and mutual legal 
assistance are inherently bilateral and consent based processes. The 
enforcement of these measures depends upon the requested state having 
voluntarily undertaken the obligation to apply them, through the medium of a 
bilateral/regional treaty or unilateral legislation. Since these laws and treaties 
are based on the principle of reciprocity or exchange of comparable favours, 
they are not subject to the control of Security Council's counter-terrorism 
regime. The argument draws support from the wording of resolution 1373 which 
calls upon states to '[c]ooperate, particularly through bilateral and multilateral 
arrangements and agreements, to prevent and suppress terrorist attacks and 
take action against perpetrators of such acts.' 74 
The mandate of Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) established pursuant to SCR 
1373 is to bolster the capacity of states to fight terrorism.75  It includes 
monitoring of state compliance with the obligations to criminalise offences, 
establish jurisdiction, freeze assets and deny safe heavens; it does not however 
extend to supervising cooperative arrangements arrived at by states concerning  
extradition and mutual legal assistance. These arrangements are entrenched in 
the rules of comity and reciprocity, the supervision of which is beyond the 
control of CTC. Thus, it was held in the joint declaration of four judges of the 
ICJ in Lockerbie case that, in general international law there is no duty to 
extradite or prosecute in the absence of a bilateral/regional treaty.76 Other law 
enforcement measures outlined by the conventions such as confiscation are also 
governed by the same principle because they are recent in origin and borrow the 
rules applicable to extradition.77 
Since this thesis views the mandatory obligations set forth by the counter-
terrorism and organised crime conventions as attempts at facilitating state 
cooperation in law enforcement i.e. extradition and mutual legal assistance, an 
                                         
74 See Para 3(c) S / RES / 1373 (2001) 
75 Security Council, Counter Terrorism Committee < http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/> [date accessed 
21/03/13] 
76 See Joint Declaration of Judges Evensen, Tarassov,Guillaume and Aguilar Mawdsley in 
Lockerbie Case 1992 I.C.J 136 (Apr 14) Para 2 
77 M. Cherif Bassiouni, 'International Criminal Law, Volume II: Multilateral and Bilateral 
Enforcement Mechanisms' (3rdedn, Martinus Nijhoff, Netherlands, 2008) 17 
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in-depth study of the Security Council's counter-terrorism regime is outside its 
purview.   
1.5) Do international conventions on terrorism and 
organised crime establish a supra national regime?   
Scholars commenting upon the obligations set forth by the international counter-
terrorism and organised crime conventions can broadly be classified into two 
distinct groups: supra-national regime advocates and proponents of 
complementary and subsidiary regime. According to the first group, the 
obligations set forth by the conventions are designed to override national laws 
because the objective of the conventions is to bring sovereign discretion subject 
to collective law enforcement. This group comprises scholars like Shehu, Gurule, 
Boister, Guymon, Sproule and Abramovsky.78  The writings of these scholars 
suggest that they are disappointed at exceptions and safeguards included in the 
convention obligations pertaining to jurisdiction, criminalisation, human rights, 
aut dedere aut judicare and confiscation. To them, these exceptions have 
turned the obligations into hortatory or persuasive rules unlikely to produce the 
level of harmony needed to facilitate state cooperation in law enforcement.79 
Obviously, these scholars were expecting a broader regime targeted at 
facilitating law enforcement cooperation through establishing unqualified 
obligations.  
The second group consists of scholars such as Bassiouni, Blakesley, Galdocki, 
Wise, Fellar, Williams, Dugard and Abelson.80  According to this group, law 
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enforcement cooperation is an inherently consent-based process, embedded in 
the principles of comity and reciprocity. It is therefore unlikely that such 
uniformity could be brought in national legal systems by imposing international 
obligations as to limit the discretion available to states to refuse extradition or 
interrogation.  
In the opinion of these scholars, viewing the counter-terrorism and organised 
crime conventions as instruments directed at subordinating sovereign discretion 
amounts to suggesting that the conventions may transform the consent-based 
and reciprocal nature of law enforcement cooperation into an obligatory one, an 
argument refuted by the conventions themselves. Furthermore, when the 
conventions are viewed as instruments overriding national laws, the solutions 
which are presented to address various problems arising in the extradition and 
interrogation of offenders involved in crimes set forth by the conventions, do not 
take into account the reciprocal and consent-based nature of these measures. As 
a result, more often than not, such solutions turn out to be impracticable. For 
example, to resolve the issue of competing jurisdictions in the application of aut 
dedere aut judicare, it had been proposed that a system of priority be 
established in the bases of jurisdiction. This suggestion was put to vote and 
rejected by states parties to some counter-terrorism conventions.81  Similarly, a 
proposal of forfeiting the option not to extradite was also rejected.82  To 
paraphrase the words of Bassiouni and Wise, right of the states not to extradite 
is so deeply rooted in practice of states that there is something fundamentally 
wrong with the suggestion that it could be restricted by imposing international 
obligations.83  
                                                                                                                           
Compared to Traditional Derivative Protections Such as Double Criminality’ 91 Journal of 
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81 See (n 194-195) Chapter 5 below 
82 See (n 160) Chapter 5 below  
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The thesis while agreeing with the latter group of scholars, suggests that 
establishment of mandatory obligations may not produce the level of harmony 
needed to satisfy the requirements of law enforcement cooperation, i.e. ‘double 
conditions’ and similarity in the procedures of enforcing aut dedere aut judicare 
and confiscation. Since these requirements are governed by domestic laws and 
bilateral treaties, their application differs from state to state and region to 
region, necessitating unqualified obligations at the international level for their 
fulfilment through harmony. However, states parties have repeatedly shown 
their reluctance to accept such absolute obligations. Given the nature of these 
requirements, the best course is to simplify and relax them by regulating their 
use. 
Simplification does not mean that the requirements of law enforcement 
cooperation should be altogether abolished or replaced. This would be akin to 
suggesting that the international counter-terrorism and organised crime 
conventions can override bilateral treaties and domestic laws on extradition and 
mutual legal assistance. Instead, simplification means that the international 
conventions should regulate and clarify these requirements on the pattern of 
some bilateral/regional treaties and domestic laws with a view to ensuring their 
consistent application and providing better models for domestic legislation.  
1.5.1) Distinction between the existing and proposed techniques 
of facilitating law enforcement cooperation and willingness of 
states to accept proposed technique 
It can be argued that the proposed technique of facilitating law enforcement 
cooperation suffers from same weaknesses which are found in the existing 
technique. If the obligations of the conventions are ineffective in regard to 
making national legal systems conducive to the demands of extradition, mutual 
legal assistance, aut dedere aut judicare and confiscation they are unlikely to be 
productive in making states agree to collectively lower the barriers to law 
enforcement cooperation. 
The argument fails to take stock of the fact that the existing technique is 
directed at harmonising the ‘entire justice systems’ of states parties to make 
them conducive to extradition and mutual legal assistance. For example, it 
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requires states to implement convention obligations with respect to areas such 
as jurisdiction, criminalisation and treatment of offenders. This amounts to 
circumscribing the discretion available to states to conduct criminal proceedings 
in accordance with their local norms. On the other hand, the proposed 
technique impacts only one aspect of national justice systems i.e. state 
cooperation in law enforcement. Hence, it is less likely to be resisted by states. 
Furthermore, states have time and again shown their willingness to collectively 
lower the barriers to law enforcement cooperation in the specific context of 
transnational crimes. For example, by agreeing not to apply political and fiscal 
offence exception to extradition and mutual assistance proceedings involving 
these crimes, states have indicated that they are willing to dispense with the 
traditional hurdles in the specific context of transnational crimes. The proposed 
technique represents a step in that direction.     
Simplification of the traditional requirements of extradition and mutual legal 
assistance has also been advocated by some noted scholars. For example Dugard 
and Wyngaert maintain that international law is not well served by a system that 
allows a state to refuse surrender or interrogation for non-fulfilment of certain 
requirements but provides no common standards for application and 
interpretation of those requirements.84  Similarly, Bassiouni suggests that 
facilitation of law enforcement cooperation calls for international regulation of 
the ‘double conditions’ associated with the principle of reciprocity which tend 
to hinder extradition and mutual legal assistance on account of the disparity 
between national legal systems.85 
1.6) The fundamental issues discussed in the thesis  
As the aim of the international counter-terrorism and organised crime 
conventions is to facilitate state cooperation in law enforcement, the thesis 
looks into the usefulness of the mandatory obligations established by them in 
achieving this objective. The obligations are designed to bring harmony in 
national justice systems to enable the parties to satisfy the requirements of law 
enforcement cooperation. The thesis emphasises that the obligations appear to 
                                         
84 See Dugard and Wyngaert (n 80) at 66 
85 See Bassiouni 'Policy Considerations' (n 4) 128, 143, 144, Gardocki (n 8) 288, Bassiouni 
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be mandatory but in fact leave enough room for the parties to alter them in 
accordance with the demands of their legal systems. The recommendatory and 
permissive nature of these obligations is apparent from various exceptions and 
qualifications attached to them in the form of safeguard/savings clauses and by 
an allowance for making reservations.86 
By giving examples of national court cases, the thesis advances the argument 
that the non- fulfilment of ‘double conditions’ applicable to extradition and 
mutual legal assistance proceedings poses a significant hurdle in the surrender 
and interrogation of transnational offenders. Similarly, national law disparity in 
the procedures of applying aut dedere aut judicare and confiscation render 
these important devices ineffective.  However, the imposition of inconclusive 
mandatory obligations does not provide an adequate solution.87  The way 
forward is to relax ‘double conditions’ and simplify the procedure of applying 
aut dedere aut judicare and confiscation. Notably, states have shown their 
willingness to accept this technique by agreeing not to apply political and fiscal 
offence exception to the extradition and interrogation proceedings involving 
transnational crimes.  
1.7)  Objective of the thesis   
Scholarly work concerning the analysis of international counter-terrorism and 
organised crime conventions reveals one paradox. The majority of scholars view 
the conventions as instruments establishing a parallel system of law enforcement 
cooperation disconnected from laws and treaties on extradition and mutual legal 
assistance.88  However, an analysis of the conventions reveals that their rules 
are not meant to supersede these laws and treaties.89  Hence, the argument that 
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the international conventions establish an independent regime leads to the 
misconstruction of convention obligations.90 Furthermore, very little is said 
about the inconsistent manner in which ‘double conditions’ are applied in 
extradition and mutual assistance proceedings, or the total detachment of the 
international counter-terrorism and organised conventions from the regulation of 
their use.91 
 Some scholars do highlight the inconsistencies of national implementing laws; 
however, these studies are found wanting with respect to analysing their 
implications for state cooperation in law enforcement.92  Thus, detailed analysis 
of the relevant provisions of the conventions, national implementing laws and in-
depth legal investigation of ‘double conditions’ and procedure of applying aut 
dedere aut judicare and confiscation are all potentially important contributors 
to a clearer understanding of the mandatory obligations established by the 
international conventions to facilitate law enforcement cooperation.  
1.8)   Research question   
This thesis aims to address to a significant extent the gap in the demand for 
comprehensive research in this area of law with the principal aim of discovering 
the most appropriate strategy for facilitating state cooperation in bringing to 
justice transnational offenders. 
Therefore, the thesis answers the following primary research question: 
Does the technique adopted by the international counter-terrorism and 
organised crime conventions to establish mandatory obligations with a view 
to harmonising national justice systems represent an effective strategy for 
facilitating law enforcement cooperation in the specific context of 
transnational crimes?  
It will also address related questions such as:  
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Do the mandatory obligations to establish jurisdiction, criminalise offences 
and provide fair treatment result in a sufficient level of harmony to enable 
the parties to fulfil ‘double conditions’ applicable to extradition and mutual 
legal assistance proceedings? 
Do the multiple uses of ‘double conditions’ under the extradition and mutual 
legal assistance laws and treaties render ineffective the technique of 
facilitating law enforcement cooperation through establishing mandatory 
obligations at international level? 
To what extent does controlling the use of ‘double conditions’ represent a 
better strategy for facilitating law enforcement cooperation, as compared to 
the mandatory obligations and how far it would be acceptable to states? 
To what extent do the obligations to implement the enforcement devices of 
aut dedere aut judicare and confiscation of proceeds of crime facilitate their 
application? 
Do the obligations to implement aut dedere aut judicare and confiscation 
bring harmony to the extent of their inclusion in national laws and not in 
relation to their application or execution?  
Does the technique of regulating procedure of applying aut dedere aut 
judicare and confiscation represent a better strategy for facilitating their 
application? 
Are the mandatory obligations being implemented consistently at national, 
bilateral and regional level?  
How far do the obligations give latitude to the parties to modify them in 
accordance with the requirements of their national justice systems? 
What complications are likely to arise in extradition and mutual legal 
assistance as a result of inconsistent implementations of the mandatory 
obligations established by the international conventions? 
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What could be an effective alternative strategy for facilitating state 
cooperation in bringing to justice suspects involved in transnational crimes 
and how far it is likely to be accepted by states? 
The research question demands the analysis of the issue at different levels. 
Firstly, it requires the study of the nature of transnational criminality and the 
necessity of state cooperation for its repression. Secondly, it requires the 
examination of the mandatory obligations set forth by the international counter-
terrorism and organised crime conventions. Thirdly, it necessitates an inquiry 
into ‘double conditions’ applicable to extradition and mutual legal assistance 
proceedings. Fourthly, it requires the examination of the procedure of applying 
aut dedere aut judicare and confiscation. Fifthly, it requires the survey of the 
implementing laws, i.e. counter-terrorism and organised crime laws and 
bilateral treaties and domestic laws on extradition and mutual legal assistance. 
Sixthly, it demands the analysis of the situations culminating in the refusal of 
law enforcement cooperation based upon the non-fulfilment by the requesting 
state of ‘double conditions’ and lack of similarity in the procedures of enforcing 
aut dedere aut judicare and confiscation.    
1.9)  Novelty of the thesis  
The novelty of the thesis is reflected in its combined methodologies. The 
existing research and literature in this area focuses only on one aspect i.e. 
tracing dissimilarities in national implementing laws vis a vis the obligations 
established by the conventions, referring briefly to difficulties arising in the 
extradition and interrogation of the suspects as a result of these discrepancies.93  
This thesis comprehensively analyses three types of norms simultaneously 
involved in the process of state cooperation in bringing to justice transnational 
offenders: international conventions focusing on transnational crimes, national 
laws and bilateral/regional treaties on extradition mutual legal assistance and 
rules regarding aut dedere aut judicare and confiscation. It not only provides an 
overview of inconsistent domestic implementations of convention obligations, 
but also encompasses the topic of state cooperation in extradition and mutual 
legal assistance. Furthermore, it looks into difficulties posed by inconsistent 
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national laws in obtaining the surrender or interrogation of suspects involved in 
transnational crimes. It also gives examples of various court cases highlighting 
the problems likely to arise in the extradition and interrogation of transnational 
offenders as a result of inconsistent implementation of convention obligations. 
1.10)  Scope of the thesis 
As discussed above, there are over 200 international conventions dealing with 
the phenomenon of transnational crimes,94  for the purposes of this thesis, only 
those conventions have been chosen which deal with the crimes of international 
terrorism and organised crime. The reasons for choosing these conventions is 
similarity of the rules established by them to regulate crimes. For example, the 
conventions apply to those crimes only, which involve more than one state in 
terms of their perpetration or location or nationality of the offenders or victims. 
Furthermore, they establish mandatory obligations for the parties to implement 
their rules concerning jurisdiction, criminalisation and treatment of offenders. 
Likewise, they rely on law enforcement measures of extradition and mutual legal 
assistance for bringing the offenders to justice. Additionally, they require the 
parties to implement law enforcement mechanisms of aut dedere aut judicare 
and confiscation of the proceeds of crimes. Over and above, they share the 
common objective of facilitating state cooperation in law enforcement. 
The thesis however does not consider the protocols of these conventions. This is 
so because a majority of the protocols are optional and merely reproduce the 
rules established by the parent convention. Nevertheless, since the Organised 
Crime Convention 2000 does not by itself establish any principle crime and 
leaves it up to its protocols to define them, all three of its protocols will be 
discussed where appropriate.  
Moreover, the primary focus of the thesis is recent international conventions on 
terrorism and organised crime such as the Drugs Convention 1988, the Terrorism 
Financing Convention 1999, the Organized Crime Convention 2000 and the UN 
Convention against Corruption 2000. The reason is that these conventions lay 
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down extensive rules on extradition and mutual legal assistance and their 
provisions are considered explanatory of the earlier Conventions.95 
The discussion of the obligation to provide mutual legal assistance has been 
restricted to legal assistance in the confiscation of the proceeds of crime. 
Although modern international conventions such as Organised Crime Convention 
2000 and UN Convention against Corruption 2003 include several other measures 
of mutual legal assistance such as joint investigations, transfer of sentenced 
persons, transfer of criminal proceedings and the control of money movement, 
these are out with the scope of this study.96  The reason is that the first three 
measures have not been expressed in mandatory language and the fourth, i.e. 
control of money movement, involves administrative and financial aspects of 
money laundering.97 
To analyse the impact of the international conventions, selected national 
implementing laws on terrorism and organised crime as well as bilateral/regional 
treaties on extradition and mutual assistance will be considered. The thesis 
however does not purport to have covered the bilateral and regional treaties 
between all states parties to the international counter-terrorism and organised 
conventions; neither does it address the national implementing laws of each 
state party. Instead, the choice of these laws and treaties has been based on the 
lessons they offer. 
While choosing national laws, primary consideration has been given to laws of 
those states whose justice systems are said to have been kept in view while 
framing these conventions. According to Boister, the international counter-
terrorism and organised conventions contain rules derived from the justice 
systems of the developed states. Hence, these states take special interest in the 
implementation of the conventions with a view to ensure that their justice 
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system prevails in the matters of law enforcement cooperation.98 Accordingly, 
laws of the US, the UK, Canada and Australia have been included. The choice of 
bilateral and regional treaties also underlies the same consideration. For 
example, European Laundering Convention provides an example of a regional 
treaty among developed legal systems. Likewise, bilateral treaties involving the 
US, the UK, Australia and Canada reflect the justice systems of developed 
states. Obviously, these laws and treaties contain elaborate provisions on aut 
dedere aut judicare and confiscation of the proceeds of crime. Additionally, 
they include, innovative theories of jurisdiction, detailed provisions on 
criminalisation and more extensive safeguards with respect to human rights 
protection. 
At the same time, laws of some less developed states have also been taken into 
account, with a view to reflect their divergence from laws of developed states 
and complications arising in law enforcement cooperation as a result thereof. 
Accordingly, the laws of India and Pakistan on terrorism, organised crime, 
extradition and mutual legal assistance have been included. These laws reflect 
restrictive theories of jurisdiction, criminalisation provisions falling short of 
covering each offence proscribed by the conventions and less precise provisions 
on money laundering and confiscation of proceeds of crime.   
In selecting case laws, special consideration has been given to cases involving 
the US as a party. The reason is that the US despite being one of the key states 
whose legal system is presumed to have been kept view while framing these 
conventions, most frequently faces difficulties in extraditing and interrogating 
suspects due to the absence of compatible provisions under the laws of other 
states. For example, it has time and again faced difficulties in obtaining 
extradition of suspects involved in crimes such as thwarted conspiracies to 
import narcotics and Continuous Criminal Enterprise. Likewise, on several 
occasions its request for forfeiture remained unsatisfied due to the requested 
state lacking corresponding provisions on civil forfeiture.   
It must be emphasised that this is not a comprehensive treatise on international 
counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions or a detailed comparative 
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study of laws and treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance; it is 
concerned with a cluster of issues relating to inter-state cooperation in bringing 
to justice transnational offenders. The focus rests on the important topic of the 
mandatory obligations under the international counter-terrorism and organised 
crime conventions to facilitate state cooperation in law enforcement.  
Below is an outline of the thesis. 
Part one of the thesis concerns the mandatory obligations to establish 
jurisdiction, criminalise offences and provide fair treatment to the offenders. 
The obligations are designed to harmonise national legal systems with a view to 
facilitate the fulfilment of ‘double conditions’ applicable to extradition and 
mutual legal assistance proceedings. This part consists of chapter 2, 3 and 4. 
Chapter 2 relates to the mandatory obligation to establish jurisdiction over the 
crimes established by the conventions. The obligation is directed at facilitating 
the fulfilment of certain conditions of extradition laws and treaties which 
stipulate that when surrender is requested in respect of a crime taking place 
outside state territory, the requesting state must not only have jurisdiction over 
crime but the theory of jurisdiction applied by it must also correspond to the 
theory applied by the requested state with respect to the act in question.  
Chapter 3 relates to the obligation to legislate against universal definitions of 
crimes. The laws and treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance require 
that the act in respect of which cooperation is sought must constitute a crime 
under the laws of both the requesting and requested state. The condition is 
known as double criminality. To enable the parties meet this condition, 
international counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions impose duty on 
states to legislate against universal definitions of crimes.  
Chapter 4 relates to the obligation to provide fair treatment to persons facing 
extradition and mutual assistance proceedings. The obligation responds to a 
condition under extradition and mutual assistance laws which stipulates that the 
act in respect of which surrender or interrogation is sought must not be 
considered non punishable under the laws of either the requesting or the 
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requested state due to actual or possible violation of human rights of the 
offender.  
Part two of the thesis concerns the obligations under the international counter-
terrorism and organised crime conventions to implement the enforcement 
mechanisms of aut dedere aut judicare and confiscation of the proceeds of 
crime. The application of both these measures demands similarity in the laws of 
the requesting and requested states with respect to procedure of enforcement. 
To establish similarity, the international conventions impose mandatory 
obligations to implement these mechanisms. This part comprises chapter 5 and 
6. 
Chapter 5 of the thesis looks into the question of the extent to which the 
mandatory obligation to implement aut dedere aut judicare facilitates its 
application. The application of both alternative measures underlying the maxim, 
i.e. extradition and prosecution depends upon the requested state having 
enabling procedural rules or the request being consistent with its procedural 
law. To establish similarity in national laws, the international conventions oblige 
the parties to implement the mechanism.  
Chapter 6 analyses the question of the extent to which the obligation to 
implement the mechanism of confiscation upon foreign request facilitates its 
application. The application of confiscation upon foreign request depends upon 
the requested state having enabling procedural rules or the request being 
consistent with its national laws. To establish similarity in national legal 
systems, the international conventions impose mandatory obligations to 
implement the mechanism. 
Chapter 7 is the concluding chapter which evaluates the general conclusions 
made within the study at the end of each chapter. This includes suggestions for 
improving established provisions of the conventions with a view to make them 
more effective in facilitating state cooperation in law enforcement.   
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Chapter 2:  Facilitation of law enforcement 
cooperation through the obligation to establish 
extraterritorial jurisdiction 
 
Introduction 
 
The international conventions on terrorism and organised crime oblige the 
parties involved to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction. The objective of the 
conventions is to facilitate state cooperation in law enforcement because the 
crimes set forth by them transcend national frontiers in terms of their 
perpetration, nationality or location of victims and offenders. The element of 
transnationality, makes it difficult for any one state to single handedly prevent 
and punish these crimes. Hence, the conventions encourage states parties to 
cooperate with each other in prevention, suppression and prosecution of these 
crimes.    
To effectuate state cooperation, the conventions rely on law enforcement 
measures of extradition and mutual legal assistance. Both these measures 
require a state, seeking surrender or interrogation of a person with respect to a 
crime taking place outside its territory, to have laws with extraterritorial reach. 
Thus, the obligation to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction under the 
international conventions can be said to have been designed to enable states 
parties to meet jurisdictional requirements of extradition and mutual legal 
assistance laws concerning crimes spreading across national frontiers.   
There are three basic requirements of extradition and mutual legal assistance 
laws in regard to jurisdiction: 1- principle of legality 2- crime having occurred on 
state territory and 3- special use of double criminality. This chapter looks into 
the usefulness of the obligation to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
facilitating the fulfilment of these requirements.  
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 It will be argued that the obligation does facilitate the fulfilment of the 
principle of legality and the condition of crime having occurred on state 
territory; however, it provides little support with respect to the fulfilment of 
special use of double criminality. The reason is that the former conditions only 
require extraterritorial reach of national laws while the latter also requires 
harmony in national theories of jurisdiction. However, the obligation to establish 
extraterritorial jurisdiction allows diversity in national theories of jurisdiction. 
Consequently, a requested state applying special use condition in its extradition 
or mutual assistance laws remains free to reject a request for surrender or 
interrogation despite the imposition of an international duty to establish 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
Special use condition requires the requesting and requested states to have 
identical theories of jurisdiction when the assistance is sought in respect of a 
crime taking place outside the territory of the requesting state. A number of 
extradition requests have had to remain unsatisfied due to the non- fulfilment 
by the requesting state of special use of double criminality condition. For 
example, in Abu Daoud case, Israel requested extradition of an offender from 
France by asserting jurisdiction over his crime on passive personality basis. The 
crime in question was not punishable in France under the passive personality 
theory at the time of its commission. Consequently, Israel’s request for 
extradition had to be refused for lack of correspondence in the jurisdictional 
theories of the requesting and requested states.  Similarly, in Pinochet case, 
Spain requested extradition of General Pinochet from the UK under the 
universality theory in regard to the acts of torture committed since 1984. The 
UK criminalised torture under the universality theory in 1988. Accordingly, the 
House of Lords held that Pinochet could not be extradited for crimes committed 
prior to 1988 when torture was not punishable in the UK under the principle of 
universal jurisdiction.   
It will be suggested that in order to facilitate the fulfilment of the special use 
condition, the international conventions on terrorism and organised crime can 
recommend that parties relax the application of the special use condition in 
their laws and treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance to 
accommodate the inherently extraterritorial nature of the crimes established by 
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them. This technique has been adopted in some bilateral and regional treaties 
and appears more effective in facilitating extradition and mutual legal 
assistance as compared to the obligation to establish extraterritorial 
jurisdiction.   
The chapter has been divided into four sections. Section 1 will discuss the 
purpose of the obligation to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction under the 
international conventions on terrorism and organised crime.  Section 2 will 
consider the bases provided by the conventions to give extraterritorial effect to 
national laws and the impact of the obligation to implement those bases. Section 
3 will examine the effectiveness of the obligation to establish extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in facilitating the fulfilment of legality principle and the 
requirement of crime having occurred in state territory. Section 4 will analyse 
the usefulness of the obligation in facilitating the fulfilment of special use of 
double criminality condition.     
 Section 1:  Purpose of the obligation to establish 
extraterritorial jurisdiction under the international 
conventions on terrorism and organised crime 
1.1) Territoriality of crime no longer an option 
According to Professor Mann, the term jurisdiction refers to the competence of a 
state to make persons, events and goods subject to its laws and legal processes.1 
With respect to criminal jurisdiction, historically, there has been a consensus 
among states that the ambit of criminal law is primarily territorial.2 This implies 
that the legal authority to make a crime subject to national legal processes 
belongs to the state in the territory of which the crime has taken place.3  In the 
words of Lords Halsbury: 'All crime is local. The jurisdiction over the crime 
belongs to the country where it is committed.' 4 
                                         
1 F.A. Mann, ‘The Doctrine of Jurisdiction In International Law’ 111 Recuil Des Cours (1964) 1 at 9 
2 Geoff Gilbert, ‘Crimes Sans Frontiers: Jurisdictional Problems in English Law’ 63 BYBIL (1992) 
415 at 416 
3 ibid 
4 MacLeod v Attorney General for New South Wales [1891] AC 455, 458  
32 
 
With the advent of globalisation and modern technology, crime has started 
reflecting an inter-jurisdictional flavour.5  It became easier for the offenders to 
plan, organise or finance their crimes in one state and to carry them out in 
another.6  Just as faster means of communication facilitated global commerce, 
they also enabled offenders to evade territorially restricted national laws.7 
According to Sornarajah, electronic and other means of banking and commerce 
have diminished the significance of territorial boundaries. The proceeds of crime 
can now be generated in one state and transferred instantly to offshore banks. 
Accelerated means of transportation can now be used to smuggle narcotics and 
other contraband substances. Threats of terrorist activities have increased 
alarmingly as a result of the interlinking of the politics of separate regions.8 
Criminal groups previously operating in one region have found it profitable to 
establish worldwide networks.9 
Due to the rise of this new form of criminality, which spreads across national 
frontiers, a strictly territorial view of jurisdiction has become out-dated.10  The 
ensuing situation demanded the extraterritorial reach of criminal laws.11 As 
observed by Lord Griffith, ‘unfortunately, in this century, crime has ceased to be 
largely local in origin and effect. Crime is now established on an international 
scale and common law must face this new reality’.12 
                                         
5 M.Sornarajah, ‘Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction: British, American and Commonwealth 
Perspectives’ 2 Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law (1998) 1 at 1, 4 
6 ibid at 1 
7 ibid at 6 
8 ibid 
9 ibid 
10 Neil Boister, ‘Treaty Crimes, International Criminal Court?’ 12 New Criminal Law Review (2009) 
341 at 342 
11 Christopher L. Blakesley, ‘Wings For Talon: The Case for Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Over Sexual 
Exploitation of Children Through Cyberspace’ 50 Wayne State L. Rev (2004) 109 at 119; See 
also Anthony J. Colangelo, ‘Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction’ 48 HJIL (2007) 
121 at 128 
12 Somchai Liangsiriprasert v. United States Government [1990] 2 ALL ER 866 at 878 
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1.1.1) Lotus Case 
The most famous international case concerning the legality of jurisdiction 
beyond state territory was the Lotus case of 1927.13  According to the facts, the 
French steamer, Lotus collided in high seas with the Turkish vessel, Boz-Kurtz, 
killing eight persons on board the latter.14  Thereafter, when Lotus entered 
Turkish territorial waters, Turkish authorities arrested its captain and charged 
him with the crime of manslaughter under its national law.15  France took the 
matter to the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), where it 
challenged Turkish jurisdiction on the ground that the crime had occurred in a 
French vessel and the alleged offender held French nationality. Therefore, 
France argued it had exclusive jurisdiction to try the captain.16  The PCIJ 
dismissed France’s claim in view of its failure to show any prohibitory rule of 
international law which prevented Turkey from applying its own criminal law 
beyond Turkish territory.17  Since the result of the crime had occurred on a 
Turkish vessel, Turkey was entitled to establish concurrent jurisdiction over the 
crime.18  On the basis of this ruling, many consider international law to be 
permissive with respect to the extraterritorial application of criminal laws.19 
1.2)   Significance of extraterritorial jurisdiction for 
combating crimes established by the international 
conventions on terrorism and organised crime 
The crimes established by the international conventions on terrorism and 
organised crime essentially include the element of extraterritoriality. A prime 
example of these crimes is international drug trafficking which may involve as 
many as three states, i.e. the producer state, the transit state and the consumer 
                                         
13S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk) 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 
(Sept.7)<http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1927.09.07_lotus.htm> [Date accessed 
21/03/13] 
14 ibid at Para 14-23   
15 ibid    
16 ibid at Para [28] 3 
17 ibid at Para 73  
18 ibid at Para 86 
19 See Roger O'Keefe, ‘Universal Jurisdiction - Clarifying the Basic Concept’  2 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice (2004) 735 at 740; See also Blakesley (n 11) 114, 141 
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state.20  Similarly, acts of international terrorism can be plotted, prepared and 
financed in one state and executed in another.21  Therefore, majority of the 
conventions under consideration establish these crimes as a distinct genre of 
crimes by providing that the conventions will have no application when each 
element of the crime takes place in a single state. For instance, article 13 of the 
Hostages Convention 1979 provides: 
 This Convention shall not apply where the offence is committed 
within a single State, the hostage and the alleged offenders are 
nationals of that State and the alleged offender is found in the 
territory of that State.22 
Thus, for the application of these conventions, it is necessary that either the 
crime takes place in more than one state or the victim or offenders hold 
nationalities of states other than the one where the crime is committed or are 
found outside its territory. In view of this, a number of scholars have coined the 
term ‘transnational crimes’ to refer to the offences established by these 
conventions.23 
Since it is not possible to bring these crimes under national legal processes by 
relying on a strictly territorial view of jurisdiction, the conventions regulating 
these crimes oblige the parties to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction.24  That is 
to say, the reach of their laws must not be confined to national territories; it 
                                         
20 D.W. Sproule and Paul St-Denis, ‘The UN Drug Trafficking Convention: An Ambitious Step’ 27 
Canadian Yearbook of International Law (1989) 263 at 266 
21 Nathan Rasiah, ‘To Prosecute or to Extradite? A Duty to Consider the Appropriate Venue in 
Cases of Concurrent Criminal Jurisdiction' Law Reform Essay Competition 2008 1 at 2 
<www.barcouncil.org.uk/media/61922/nathan_rasiah__32_.pdf>  [ Date accessed 21/03/13] 
22 See article 13 the Hostages Convention 1979. Also see, article 3 the Nuclear Terrorism 
Convention 2005, article 3 the Terrorist Bombing Convention 1997, article 3 the Terrorism 
Financing Convention 1999, article 5 Beijing Convention 2010 and article 3(2) the Organised 
Crime Convention 2000. In the conventions dealing with crimes committed in aircrafts and 
vessels, their applicability to transnational crimes is expressed differently. According to their 
wording, the Convention applies only if the crime takes place in the aircraft or vessel destined 
for a country other than the one which represents the place of their departure or registration. 
See article 4(1) the Rome Convention 1988, article 4(2) the Montreal Convention 1971 and 
article 3(3) of the Hague Convention 1970. For definition of transnationality, see Chapter 3 (n 
26) below. 
23 See Neil Boister, ‘Transnational Criminal Law’ 14 EJIL (2003) 953 at 953; See also Philip C 
Jessup quoted in Roger S. Clarke, ‘The United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organised Crime’ 50 Wayne State Law Review (2004) 161 at 166; Carrie Lyn Donigan 
Guymon, ‘International Legal Mechanisms for Combating Transnational Organised Crime: The 
Need for a Multilateral Convention’ 18 Berkeley J. Int'l L (2000) 53 at 86-89 
24 See Boister ‘Treaty Crimes’ (n 10) 342 
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must rather extend to any area beyond their borders where a crime having an 
impact on their territory has taken place.25 
The obligation is meant to ensure that the offenders may not escape punishment 
by benefiting from territorially restricted national laws.26  Another objective 
could be to enable the parties to punish individual parts of crimes.27 
As observed by the Privy Council in Somchai Liangsiriprasert v. United States 
Government:  
 Their Lordships can find nothing in precedent, comity or good sense 
that should inhibit the common law from regarding as justiciable in 
England inchoate crimes committed abroad which are intended to 
result in the commission of criminal offences in England.28 
1.3)  Meanings of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
1.3.1) Argument that extraterritorial jurisdiction includes 
legislation, enforcement and adjudication 
The academic debate concerning the various meanings of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction divides scholars into two rival camps. On one side are commentators 
such as Shubber and Sornarajah who maintain that extraterritorial jurisdiction 
embraces all three aspects of jurisdiction: legislative, adjudicatory and 
enforcement.29  To support their view, they refer to various clauses of the 
international conventions on terrorism and organised crime. First of all, they 
argue that preambles of several conventions indicate that one of their objectives 
is to punish the offenders.30  Since punishment is an attribute of law 
enforcement, the term jurisdiction, wherever used in the conventions, should be 
                                         
25 M. Cherif Bissouni, ‘Theories of Jurisdiction and their Application in Extradition Law and Practice’ 
5 Cal W. Int’l L.J 1 (1974-75) 1 at 1; see also Sami Shubber, ‘Aircraft Hijacking under the Hague 
Convention 1970 - A New Regime?’ 22 ICLQ (1973) 687 at 706-707; O’Keefe ( n 19) at 736 
26 See UNODC’s Legislative Guide 2004 for implementation of the Organised Crime Convention 
2000 at 104 
<http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/legislative_guides/Legislative%20guides_Full%20version.pdf> 
[Date accessed 21/03/13] 
27 ibid 
28 Somchai Liangsiriprasert (n 12) 
29 According to Sornarajah, it is wrong to suggest that extraterritorial criminal law enforcement is 
unlawful in all offences. See Sornarajah ( n 5) at 31; See also Shubber (n 25) at 707 
30 Shubber (n 25) 707 
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deemed to include the authority to enforce laws.31  Secondly, they suggest that 
the bases of jurisdiction outlined by the conventions include the basis of the 
offender’s presence in state territory. In other words, the conventions require 
states to establish jurisdiction when the offender arrives in their territory after 
committing his crimes abroad. This basis further obliges a state in the territory 
of which the offender is found to either prosecute him itself or extradite to a 
state having jurisdiction over crime and willing to prosecute. Since, these two 
actions pertain to adjudicatory and enforcement aspects of jurisdiction, the 
requirement to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction must be understood to 
encompass both.32 
The claim of these scholars is not without support in state practice. For 
example, in the US, national courts are competent to determine the limits of the 
extraterritorial operation of its national laws.33  On more than one occasion, 
they upheld the legality of the trial of an offender who had been abducted from 
abroad, through undertaking an extraterritorial enforcement operation.34 
1.3.2)  Argument that extraterritorial jurisdiction refers to the 
legislative jurisdiction alone 
The second group includes scholars like O’Keefe and Bassiouni who maintain that 
the term jurisdiction, when used in extraterritorial sense, refers to legislative 
jurisdiction only, that is, the authority of states to enact laws having 
extraterritorial scope.35  To substantiate their claim, they allude to the 
impermissibility of extraterritorial police powers.36  The police of one state may 
not investigate crimes and arrest suspects in the territory of another state. 
Similarly, the courts of one state may not sit in another state to examine 
witnesses in the absence of an express agreement with the territorial 
                                         
31 ibid 
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33 See Colangelo (n 11) 159 
34 See for instance US v. Alvarez Machain  504 US 655 (1992); See also US v. Yunis (1988) 681 F. 
Supp (D.D.C) 909   
35 O'Keefe (n 19) 740; See also Bassiouni (n 25) 2 
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sovereign.37  The argument finds support from the facts of the Lotus case 
according to which Turkey did not take the offender into custody straightaway 
when the collision took place in the high seas. Rather, Turkey waited for the 
French steamer to enter Turkish territorial waters and whereupon it enforced its 
laws by charging the captain of the Lotus with the crime of manslaughter and 
took him into custody.38  The ensuing judgement of the PCIJ confirmed the view 
that although states were competent to extend the application of their laws and 
jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory, 
they were not entitled to enforce their laws in a foreign territory. The relevant 
parts of the judgement are reproduced below: 
[45] Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international 
law upon a State is that – failing the existence of a permissive rule to 
the contrary – it may not exercise its power in any form in the 
territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly 
territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory [p19] 
except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from international 
custom or from a convention. 
[46] It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a 
State from exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of 
any case which relates to acts which have taken place abroad, and in 
which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of international law. 
Such a view would only be tenable if international law contained a 
general prohibition to States to extend the application of their laws 
and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts 
outside their territory, and if, as an exception to this general 
prohibition, it allowed States to do so in certain specific cases. But 
this is certainly not the case under international law as it stands at 
present. Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that 
States may not extend the application of their laws and the 
jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside their 
territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion, 
which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards 
other cases, every State remains free to adopt the principles which it 
regards as best and most suitable.39 
The writings of publicists also endorse the argument that international law 
prohibits enforcement of laws in foreign territories. For example, when the US in 
                                         
37 ibid; See also Charles Doyle, ‘Extraterritorial Application of American Criminal Law’ CRS Report 
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Alvarez 40 and Israel in Eichman41 enforced their laws in foreign territories by 
abducting offenders, their actions were condemned by the majority of 
scholars.42  The criticism was mainly centred on article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
which prohibits the UN members from violating the political independence and 
territorial integrity of any state. It is often seen as classic example of Jus Cogens 
or peremptory norm of international law. The term Jus Cogens was used by the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) with reference to article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter in Nicaragua case.43 
Significantly, this peremptory norm also appears in a number of international 
conventions on terrorism and organised crime. For example, article 2(2) of the 
Drugs Convention 1988 provides:   
 The parties shall carry out their obligations under this Convention in 
a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and 
territorial integrity of states and that of non-intervention in the 
domestic affairs of other states.44 
More specifically, article 2(3) provides: 
 A Party shall not undertake in the territory of another Party the 
exercise of jurisdiction and performance of functions which are 
exclusively reserved for the authorities of that other Party by its 
domestic law.45 
                                         
40 US v. Alvarez Machain  (n 34) 
41 A.-G. Israel v. Eichmann, (1968) 36 ILR 5 (District Court, Jerusalem)  
42 See Blakesley (n 11) 140; See also Abraham Abramovsky, ‘Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The 
United States Unwarranted Attempt to Alter International Law’ 15 Yale J. Int’l L. (1990) 121; M. 
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June1986 [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 188 
44 See article 2 of the Drugs Convention 1988; For comparable provisions, see article 4 the UN 
Convention against Corruption 2003; article 4 the Organised Crime Convention 2000 and article 
20 the Terrorism Financing Convention 1999 
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It is thus clear that the enforcement of laws in foreign territories without the 
consent of the territorial sovereign has been designated by the international 
conventions on terrorism and organised crime as in violation of territorial 
sovereignty. Hence, it is difficult to defend the argument that the conventions, 
when using the term jurisdiction, always refer to all three aspects of jurisdiction 
(legislative, adjudicative and enforcement). The inescapable conclusion is when 
the conventions require the parties to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction, they 
envisage prescriptive jurisdiction only, i.e. the authority to enact laws having 
extraterritorial scope.46 It does, however, include the subject matter jurisdiction 
of national courts, which means the extraterritorial acts made punishable by a 
domestic law shall be triable by the national courts of the legislating state, once 
the offender arrives in its territory. According to O.Keefe, in the context of 
criminal law, the distinction between legislative and adjudicatory jurisdiction is 
generally unnecessary because ‘the application of a state's criminal law is simply 
the exercise of actualisation of prescription: both amount to an assertion that 
the law in question is applicable to the relevant conduct.’47  
1.4)  Rationale of having extraterritorial laws without 
power to enforce 
The proponents of the view that extraterritorial jurisdiction includes the 
authority to enforce, challenge the logic of having extraterritoriality without the 
power to enforce. For instance, Shubber asks, what can be the purpose of 
requiring the enactment of laws having extraterritorial scope, when the parties 
would be lacking the authority to enforce them? 48 
To answer this question, one must look into the statements of purpose of various 
international conventions on terrorism and organised crime. Their most common 
theme is that the aim of the convention is to promote inter-state cooperation in 
law enforcement. For example, article 1(b) of the UN Convention against 
Corruption 2003 states that the purposes of the Convention are '[t]o promote, 
                                         
46 O'Keefe (n 19) 736; See also Colangelo (n 11) 123; Joseph J. Lambert, Terrorism and Hostages 
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facilitate and support international cooperation and technical assistance in the 
prevention of and fight against corruption, including in asset recovery.'49 
Similarly, the preamble of the Terrorism Financing Convention 1999 provides: 
 The States Parties to this Convention…[b]eing convinced of the 
urgent need to enhance international cooperation among States in 
devising and adopting effective measures for the prevention of the 
financing of terrorism, as well as for its suppression through the 
prosecution and punishment of its perpetrators…[h]ave agreed as 
follows…50 
Considering the explanation above, it is plain that the international conventions 
on terrorism and organised crime have been designed to facilitate state 
cooperation in law enforcement. For this purpose, they rely on law enforcement 
measures of extradition and mutual legal assistance.51  The laws and treaties 
regulating these measures demand that requesting states have jurisdiction over 
the crime in respect of which surrender or interrogation is sought.52  Since the 
conventions establish crimes which spread across national frontiers, the demand 
in relation to these crimes translates into extraterritorial jurisdiction or the 
competence of states to punish conduct taking place outside their territory.53  
This necessitates the enactment of laws having extraterritorial scope.54 
It can be argued therefore that the obligation to establish extraterritorial 
jurisdiction under the international conventions on terrorism and organised 
crime is designed to enable the parties to meet jurisdictional requirements of 
                                         
49 See article 1(b) the UN Convention against Corruption 2003; See also article 2(1) the Drugs 
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extradition and mutual assistance laws with respect to crimes transcending 
national frontiers.55 
Up to this point, the focus has been on the purpose of the obligation to establish 
extraterritorial jurisdiction under the international conventions on terrorism and 
organised crime. I have explained that the prosecution and punishment of the 
crimes established by these conventions call for state cooperation in extradition 
and mutual legal assistance and the laws and treaties regulating these measures 
demand extraterritorial reach of national laws. Hence, the obligation to 
establish extraterritorial jurisdiction under these conventions can be said to 
have been designed to facilitate extradition and interrogation of the offenders 
involved in cross-country crimes. 
I will now discuss the bases provided by the international conventions to give 
extraterritorial effect to national laws and the impact of the obligation to 
implement those bases upon national laws. 
 
 Section 2:  Bases provided by the international 
counter-terrorism and organised crime 
conventions to give extraterritorial effect to 
national laws and the impact of the obligation to 
implement those bases  
2.1)  Grounds customarily relied on by states to assert 
jurisdiction over crime 
In 1935, the Harvard Research Draft was prepared by noted lawyers and scholars 
of international law.56  This draft convention is not a legally binding instrument 
but is based on extensive research of international law, hence, is considered 
                                         
55 Christopher C. Joiner, 'Countering Nuclear Terrorism: A Conventional Response' 18 EJIL (2007) 
225 at 236; See also Sproule (n 20) 276 
56 See Introductory Comment, 'Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime-Research in International Law' 
29 AJIL (1935) Supp. 443, 445.  
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declaratory of customary international law.57  It pointed out certain bases 
traditionally relied upon by states to claim jurisdiction over crime.  The five 
bases identified by it are: territoriality, nationality, protection, passive 
personality and universality. The common denominator of the first four is that 
the state wishing to prosecute must have a substantial link with the event 
required to be regulated. The last one is grounded on the concept of universal 
condemnation of crimes.58 
2.1.1)  Territoriality 
The territorial theory is based on the principle that every state has unrestricted 
authority to regulate the events occurring within its territorial boundaries.59 
According to Bassiouni, '[t]he power of a state to proscribe conduct within its 
territory… is concomitant to the principle of sovereignty and enjoys universal 
recognition.' 60  Hence, each state is vested with sovereign right to make 
punishable the crimes committed within its geographical limits by its nationals, 
residents, non-residents and legal entities.61 
The theory has a number of extensions and applications including the principles 
of objective and subjective territoriality. By virtue of these, the territorial 
theory can be applied to assert jurisdiction over crimes taking place beyond 
state territory.62  Whereas the subjective territoriality activates jurisdiction 
when a crime begins in state territory but culminates abroad, the objective 
territoriality triggers it when a crime originates abroad but ends in state 
territory.63  Furthermore, it is usually advanced that aircrafts and ships carrying 
the flag of a state or registered in it 64 represent the floating pieces of that 
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state’s territory.65  Hence, the crimes committed in these objects can be made 
punishable by giving wider interpretation to territorial theory.66  While the 
subjective territoriality and flag state principles are universally recognised, the 
application of the objective territoriality remains controversial. The controversy 
surrounds its conflicting interpretations at national level.67 
2.1.2)  The active personality or nationality theory 
The nationality theory entails that every state has a right to prosecute and 
punish the crimes committed by its nationals, irrespective of the place of 
commission.68  Its rationale is that nationals of a state enjoy the protection of its 
laws wherever they are. Hence, they have corresponding obligation to respect 
those laws within and outside state territory.69  It has been argued that 
jurisdiction over nationals, like jurisdiction over territory, is corollary of state 
sovereignty.70  Hence, the theory is not only universally recognised but is also 
declaratory of customary international law.71 
2.1.3)  The passive personality theory 
The theory of passive personality enables a state to make punishable the crimes 
committed by aliens against its nationals in foreign territories.72  Since the 
welfare of a state depends on the welfare of its citizens, a state is presumed to 
have ample interest in the prosecution of those who commit crimes against its 
nationals.73  The theory is fraught with controversy and a major objection to it 
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concerns its foundation on a very weak link between the proscribing state and 
the event.74 
2.1.4)  The Protective principle 
The protective theory allows a state to criminalise the acts committed by 
foreigners outside state territory, when they are designed to threaten its vital 
national interests.75  The theory has traditionally been applied to assert 
jurisdiction over a range of extraterritorial acts impacting the national security 
and diplomatic relations of the state concerned.76  Although it enjoys 
widespread recognition, it is deserving of criticism if it is interpreted broadly, 
that it covers almost every event with only a remote effect on the interests of 
the proscribing state.77 
2.1.5)  The Universality Principle 
All the above theories require a link between the proscribing state and the 
event, offender or the victim. There are however certain offences, which due to 
their seriousness, are deemed to affect the interests of all states, even if 
committed at a specific place or against a given victim or interest.78  For 
prosecution of these crimes, no territorial or nationality link is required because 
the offender is considered to be enemy of the entire human race.79  Thus, any 
state that apprehends the offender may prosecute and punish him under the 
universality theory which is designed to protect the universal values and 
interests of mankind.80  Although the theory has been applied to assert 
jurisdiction over a range of crimes including, slave trade, genocide, torture and 
hijacking, most common and least controversial application relates to the crime 
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of piracy.81  Hence, its recognition depends on the crime in relation to which it 
is applied. 
In the light of above, it is clear that the territoriality (subjective and flag state) 
and nationality theories have universal recognition, the protective and 
universality theories are recognised in a more limited way and the passive 
personality and objective territoriality theories are most controversial.82 
 I will now analyse the bases provided by the international counter-terrorism and 
organised crime conventions to give extraterritorial effect to national laws. The 
analysis will focus mainly on the question of the extent to which these bases 
reflect universally agreed theories of jurisdiction and how far they depart from 
them. It will be suggested that although the obligation to establish jurisdiction 
under these conventions remains confined to universally agreed theories, the 
permissive bases provided by them lay down controversial and less recognised 
theories. Since there is no system of priority between permissive and mandatory 
bases, the unifying effect of the obligation to establish jurisdiction can be said 
to have been counter balanced by permissive bases. This contradicts the aim of 
facilitating extradition and mutual legal assistance because one condition 
applicable to these proceedings, namely special use of double criminality, 
requires harmony in national theories of jurisdiction.   
 
2.2)  Bases of jurisdiction under the international 
conventions on terrorism and organised crime 
The international counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions require the 
parties to give extraterritorial effect to their laws on a variety of jurisdictional 
grounds. These can broadly be classified into primary and secondary groupings. 
Primary bases refer to the grounds which enable the parties to make punishable 
an extraterritorial crime, right from its beginning; the secondary bases allow 
them to regulate the crime, once the offender is found in their territory after 
                                         
81 See Bassiouni ibid; See also Blakesley ibid at 133 
82 Bissouni 'Theories of Jurisdiction' (n 25) 
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the commission of his crime.83  Primary bases can be further sub-divided into 
mandatory and permissive categories. The mandatory bases embody universally 
recognised theories of jurisdiction; the permissive bases represent less-
recognised or controversial theories. In other words, the mandatory bases 
concern the states directly affected by crime;84  the permissive bases involve the 
states less directly affected.85  
2.2.1)  Primary bases of jurisdiction provided by the counter-
terrorism conventions 
2.2.1.1)  The Hague Convention 1970  
Article 4 of the Convention obliges a state party to make punishable the offences 
set forth by it: (i) when they are committed on board an aircraft registered in 
that state86 (ii) when the aircraft in respect of which the crime is committed 
lands in its territory with the offender still on board 87 and (iii) when the aircraft 
in which the crime is committed is leased to a lessee and the lessee has his 
principal place of business or permanent residence in that state.88  The 
obligation of the state of registration is based on flag state principle,89  the 
obligation of the state of the charterer’s residence represents an extension of 
the territorial theory90  and the obligation of state of landing embodies the 
universality theory.91 
                                         
83 See Abeyratne (n 58) 38-39; See also AB Green; 'Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents: An analysis' 
14 Virginia Journal of International Law (1973-74) 703 at 715-716 
84 See Lambert (n 46) 133 
85 Abeyratne (n 58) 38, 39 
86 See article 4(1)(a) the Hague Convention 1970  
87 See article 4(1)(b) ibid  
88 See article 4(1)(c) ibid  
89 Gary N. Horlick, 'The Developing Law of Air Hijacking' 12 Harv.Int’l. L. J.(1971) 33 at 36  
90 See Abeyratne (n 58) 50; See also Shubber (n 25) 710-711 
91 Commonwealth Implementation kits for the International Counter Terrorism Conventions at 51 
<http://www.thecommonwealth.org/internal/38061/documents/> [Date accessed 21/03/13] 
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2.2.1.2)   The Montreal Convention 1971 
 In addition to reproducing the bases supplied by the Hague Convention 1970, 
article 5 of the Montreal Convention obliges a party to establish jurisdiction 
when the crime takes place in its territory.92 
2.2.1.3)  The Protection of Diplomats Convention 1973  
Article 3 of the Convention obliges a party to make punishable the offences 
proscribed by it: (i) when they are committed in its territory or on board an 
aircraft registered in it93 (ii) when the offender is a national of that state94 and 
(iii) when the victim is a national of that state.95  The first two bases reflect the 
application of the territoriality and nationality theories; the third embodies the 
passive personality theory.96 
2.2.1.4)  The Hostages Convention 1979  
Article 5 of the Convention provides two kinds of primary bases, mandatory and 
permissive. The mandatory bases comprise the territoriality97 and nationality 
theories.98  Furthermore, a new mandatory basis obliges a party which has been 
the subject of coercion to make punishable the act of hostage taking, regardless 
of the place of its commission.99  It demonstrates an application of the 
protective theory.100  Under the permissive bases, a party is recommended to 
establish jurisdiction when the offence is committed against its nationals101 or by 
                                         
92 See article 5(1)(a) the Montreal Convention 1971  
93 See article 3(1)(a) the Protection of Diplomats Convention 1973 
94 See article 3(1)(b) ibid 
95 See article 3(1)(c) ibid 
96 Interestingly, the Protection of Diplomats Convention 1973 represents the only convention under 
consideration, which sets forth mandatory obligation to establish jurisdiction on this basis. 
97 See article 5(1)(a) the Hostages Convention 1979 
98 See article 5(1)(b) ibid 
99 See article 5(1)(c) ibid 
100 The argument that right of the state which is being coerced, to establish jurisdiction, represents 
an application of protective theory finds support from Lambert’s work on the Hostages 
Convention 1979.  According to Lambert, in the Achillo Lauro incident, Israel was being 
compelled to release certain terrorists imprisoned in its national detention centres as a condition 
for the release of hostages. Since the demand was likely to affect Israel’s national security or 
vital national interests, Israel was within its right to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction under the 
protective principle. See Lambert (n 46) 150 
101 See article 5(1)(d) the Hostages Convention 1979 
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a person habitually residing in its territory.102  The former exemplifies passive 
personality and the latter a less-recognised extension of the nationality 
theory.103 
2.2.1.5) The Nuclear Materials Convention 1980   
Article 8 of the Convention obliges a party to make punishable the offences, 
when they are committed: (i) in its territory104  (ii) on board a ship or aircraft 
registered to it105  and (iii) by its national.106  Clearly, the Convention does not 
go beyond the universally recognised links of territoriality and nationality.   
 2.2.1.6)  The Rome Convention 1988  
Article 6 of the Convention obliges a party to establish jurisdiction, when the 
offence is committed: (i) on board a ship flying its flag107 (ii) within its territory 
including territorial sea 108 and (iii) by its national.109  In addition, the 
Convention authorises the criminalisation of the offences by a state: (i) when 
they are committed by an offender habitually residing in its territory110 (ii) when 
the victim is a national111  and (iii) when the offences are committed to compel 
to do or abstain from doing something.112  The Convention takes the standard 
approach of obliging the parties only when the link between the proscribing 
state and the event is direct and universally recognised. 
                                         
102 See article 5(1)(b) ibid 
103 Michael Akehurst, 'Jurisdiction in International Law' 46 BYBIL (1972-73) 145 at 157 
104 See article 8(1)(a) the Nuclear Materials Convention 1980 
105 ibid  
106 See article 8(1)(b) ibid 
107 See article 6(1)(a) the Rome Convention 1988 
108 See article 6(1) (b) ibid; keeping in view the possibility of the crime occurring in a ship found in 
coastal area, the makers of the Rome Convention have widened the jurisdiction of territorial / 
coastal state by adding the words territorial sea while requiring establishment of jurisdiction on 
territorial basis.   
109 See article 6(1)(c) the Rome Convention 1988 
110 See article 6(2)(a) ibid 
111 See article 6(2)(b) ibid 
112 See article 6(2)(c) ibid 
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2.2.1.7)  The Terrorist Bombing Convention 1997 
Article 6 of the Convention obliges a party to make punishable the offences, 
when they are committed (i) in its territory113 (ii) on board a vessel or aircraft 
registered in it114  and (iii) by its national.115  Moreover, the Convention 
authorises the criminalisation of the offences by a state: (i) when the victim is a 
national116 (ii) when the offences are committed to compel it to do or abstain 
from doing something 117 (iii) when the offences are committed on board an 
aircraft operated by its government118  (iv) when they are committed against its 
facility abroad including its diplomatic premises119  and (v) when they are 
committed by a stateless person having his habitual residence on the territory of 
that state.120  Again, the mandatory bases represent the universally agreed links 
of territoriality and nationality whereas the permissive bases embody less 
recognised links such as a victim’s nationality and state security. The right of the 
state whose buildings or infrastructure abroad has been targeted to establish 
jurisdiction can be said to reflect the application of the protective theory.121 
2.2.1.8)  The Terrorism Financing Convention 1999   
Article 7 of the Convention obliges a state party to establish jurisdiction when 
the act of financing is committed: (i) in its territory122  (ii) on board a vessel or 
aircraft registered to it123  and (iii) by its national.124  Since the offences covered 
by the Convention are victimless, it could not possibly have duplicated the 
jurisdictional bases provided by the other counter-terrorism treaties.125  It 
                                         
113 See article 6(1)(a) the Terrorist Bombings Convention 1997 
114 See article 6(1)(b) ibid 
115 See article 6(1)(c) ibid 
116 See article 6(2)(a) the Terrorist Bombings Convention 1997 
117 See article 6(2)(d) ibid 
118 See article 6(2)(e) ibid 
119 See article 6(2)(b) ibid 
120 See article 6(2)(c) ibid 
121 Samuel M. Witten, 'International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings' 92 AJIL 
(1998) 774 at 778 
122 See article 7(1)(a) Terrorism Financing Convention 1999 
123 See article 7(1)(b) ibid 
124 See article 7(1)(c) ibid 
125 See Roberto Lavelle, 'The International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of 
Terrorism' 60 Heidelberg Journal of International law (2000) 492 at 506 
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therefore adopts an innovative approach while providing permissive bases. 
Accordingly, it authorises a state party to criminalise the offence of financing, 
wherever committed, when it is directed towards carrying out a terrorist attack: 
(i) in the territory or against a national of the state concerned126  (ii) against its 
governmental facility abroad including diplomatic premises127  (iii) in order to 
compel the state to do or refrain from doing something128  (iv) by a stateless 
person who has his or her habitual residence in the territory of that State129  and 
(v) on board an aircraft which is operated by the government of that state.130 
Evidently, the mandatory bases are characterized by universally recognised links 
whereas permissive bases comprise both less recognised and controversial links. 
Thus, even the indirect approach adopted by the Convention takes into account 
the traditional theories of jurisdiction.131 
2.2.1.9)  The Nuclear Terrorism Convention 2005 
Article 9 of the Convention obliges a state to make punishable the offences, 
when they are committed: (i) in its territory132 (ii) on board an aircraft or vessel 
registered to it133 and (iii) by its nationals.134  Furthermore, it authorises a state 
party to criminalise the offences when they are committed: (i) against a national 
of that state135 (ii) against a government facility abroad, including diplomatic 
premises136 (iii) by a person having his habitual residence on that state’s 
territory137 (iv) in order to compel that state to do or to refrain from doing 
                                         
126 See article 7(2)(a) the Terrorism Financing Convention 1999 
127 See article 7(2)(b) ibid 
128 See article 7(2)(c) ibid 
129 See article 7(2)(d) ibid 
130 See article 7(2)(e) ibid 
131 Lavelle (n 125) 
132 See article 9(1)(a) the Nuclear Terrorism Convention 2005 
133 See article 9(1)(b) ibid 
134 See article 9(1)(c) ibid 
135 See article 9(2)(a) ibid 
136 See article 9(2)(b) ibid 
137 See article 9(2)(c) ibid 
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something138  and (v) on board an aircraft operated by the government of that 
state.139 
2.2.1.10)   The Beijing Convention 2010   
Article 8 of the Convention obliges a state party to establish jurisdiction, when 
the offences are committed: (i) on its territory140 (ii) on board an aircraft 
registered in that state141 (iii) by its nationals142  (iv) in the territory of 
charterer’s place of residence or place of business143  and (v) when the aircraft 
lands in its territory with the offender still on board.144  Furthermore, it 
authorises the criminalisation of the offences by a state party when they are 
committed (i) against its national145  and (ii) by a person habitually residing 
there.146 
2.2.2)  Primary bases of Jurisdiction under the organised crime 
conventions 
2.2.2.1) The Drugs Convention 1988 
Article 4 of the Convention obliges a state party to make punishable the offences 
set forth by it when they are committed (i) in its territory147 and (ii) on board an 
aircraft or vessel registered in that state.148  Moreover, it authorises a party to 
criminalise offences when they are committed (i) by its national149  or (ii) by a 
person habitually residing in that state.150  Additionally, it lays down two 
previously unknown permissive bases. According to the first, a party is allowed 
                                         
138 See article 9(2)(d) ibid 
139 See article 9(2)(e) ibid 
140 See article 8(1)(a) the Beijing Convention 2010 
141 See article 8(1)(b) ibid 
142 See article 8(1)(e) ibid 
143 See article 8(1)(d) ibid 
144 See article 8(1)(c) ibid 
145 See article 8(2)(a) ibid 
146 See article 8(2)(b) ibid 
147 See article 4(1)(a)(i) the Drugs Convention 1988 
148 See article 4(1)(a)(ii) ibid 
149 See article 4(1)(b)(i) ibid 
150 ibid   
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to establish jurisdiction when the offences are committed on board a vessel in 
relation to which it has an agreement with the state whose flag the vessel is 
bearing, to inspect it and to be on board.151  Secondly, the convention 
recommends that parties criminalise extraterritorial conspiracies designed to 
commit drug trafficking or money laundering crimes within state territory.152  
The former is based on the agreement between states parties and the latter 
typifies the objective territoriality theory.153 
2.2.2.2)  The Organised Crime Convention 2000  
Article 15 of the Convention obliges a state party to criminalise the offences set 
forth by it, when they are committed: (i) in its territory154  and (ii) on board a 
vessel or aircraft registered in that state.155  Moreover, it authorises the 
establishment of jurisdiction by a state party, when the offences are committed: 
(i) by its national156  (ii) against its national 157 or (iii) by a person habitually 
residing in that state.158 Additionally, the Convention recommends that parties 
make punishable the extraterritorial acts of planning or conspiracy designed to 
commit a serious crime within state territory.159  Furthermore, the parties are 
allowed to criminalise extraterritorial conspiracies intended to carry out money 
laundering crimes within state territory.160 The former represents the 
application of the protective theory; latter, the objective territoriality theory.161 
                                         
151 See article 4(1)(b)(ii) & (iii) ibid 
152 See article 4(1)(b)(iii) ibid; In the words of Clarke, ‘this is an attempt to prevent narcotics 
importation by asserting jurisdiction over thwarted conspiracies occurring beyond national 
borders’ See Clarke (n 23) 169; See also Sproule (n 20) 276  
153 See Clarke ibid at 179 foot note 85 
154 See article 15(1)(a) the Organized Crime Convention 2000 
155 See article 15(1)(b) ibid 
156 See article 15(2)(a) ibid 
157 See article 15(2)(b) ibid 
158 ibid 
159 See article 15(2)(c)(i) ibid 
160 See article 15(2)(c)(ii) ibid 
161 See Blakesley 'US Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Crime' (n 57) 1111, 1112 
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2.2.2.3)  UN Convention against Corruption 2000 
Article 42 of the Convention provides bases of jurisdiction identical to the 
Organized Crime Convention 2000.162 
2.2.3)  Secondary basis 
Apart from primary bases, each convention under consideration obliges a party 
to make punishable the crimes committed abroad by an offender who may 
subsequently be found in its territory.163  It illustrates the application of 
universality theory which enables any state apprehending the offender to 
prosecute him without any territorial or nationality link.164  Its purpose is to 
ensure that the offender may not find refuge in the territory of any state party 
to the relevant convention.165  Although it is described as secondary basis, its 
secondary status by no means renders it inferior to the other bases because 
there is no inter se priority among the bases provided by the conventions.166 
2.3)  Mandatory bases - a move towards uniformity 
The above overview reveals that the international conventions on terrorism and 
organised crime impose a duty to establish jurisdiction only when there is a 
universally recognised, territorial or nationality link between the prosecuting 
state and the event or the offender. On the rare occasions when they do oblige 
the parties to make punishable the offences in the absence of such links, it is 
precisely because the nature of the offence so demands. For example, in the 
Protection of Diplomats Convention 1973, it was necessary to oblige the state of 
the victim’s nationality to establish jurisdiction otherwise the offender could 
                                         
162 See article 42 of the UN Convention against Corruption 2003 
163 See article 4(2) the Hague Convention 1970, article 5(2) the Montreal Convention 1971, article 
3(2) the Protection of Diplomats Convention 1973, article 5(2) the Hostages Convention 1979, 
article 8(2) the Nuclear Materials Convention 1980, article 6(4) the Rome Convention 1988, 
article 6(4) the Terrorist Bombing Convention 1997, article 7(4) the Terrorism Financing 
Convention 1999, article 9(4) the Nuclear Materials Convention 2005, article 4(2) the Drugs 
Convention 1988, article 15(4) the Organised Crime Convention 2000, article 42(3) the UN 
Convention against Corruption 2003 and article 8(3) the Beijing Convention 2010.  
164 Abraham Abramovsky, 'Multilateral Conventions for Suppression of Unlawful Seizure and 
Interference with Aircraft Part 1: Hague Convention' 13 Colum. J. Transnat’l L.(1974) 381 at 397  
165 Shubber (n 25) 713; See also Commonwealth Implementation Kits (n 91) 52 
166 Omer Y. Elegab, 'The Hague as the Seat of Lockerbie Trial: Some Constraints' 34 The 
International Lawyer (2000) 289 at 296 
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have escaped punishment due to the disinterest of other states.167  Similarly, in 
cases involving hostage taking, the state which is being coerced is likely to have 
greater interest in the prosecution of the offender than the territorial or 
nationality state, because the purpose of the crime is to get something done by 
that state.168 Accordingly, the Hostages Convention 1979 sets forth a mandatory 
obligation to establish jurisdiction on this basis. Likewise, in the Hague 1970, the 
Montreal 1971 and the Beijing 2010 Conventions, it was considered desirable to 
oblige the state of landing to make the offence punishable because the landing 
state represents the most appropriate forum of trial, in view of the presence of 
the offender and availability of witnesses and evidence.169 
Apart from these exceptions, nowhere do the conventions appear to oblige the 
parties to establish jurisdiction in the absence of a universally recognised link. 
The instances of departure being rare and justifiable, it can be argued that the 
makers of the conventions did not want to go beyond the sacrosanct principles 
of jurisdiction while imposing the duty to establish jurisdiction.170  This can be 
seen as a move towards harmonising national laws, which, it will be explained 
later, marks an attempt at facilitating state cooperation in extradition and 
mutual legal assistance.171 For present purposes, suffice it to refer to the 
observation made by the Dutch representative during the drafting of the Hague 
Convention 1970, 'states with mandatory bases at least bear a moral 
responsibility to seek extradition of offenders'.172  
 
2.4)  Permissive bases - A move towards diversity 
The approach adopted by the makers of the conventions in providing permissive 
bases, stands in stark contrast to the one taken in the listing of mandatory 
                                         
167 See Lambert (n 46) at 153; See also UN Doc. A/8710/Rev.1 at p.311; Report of the ILC on the 
work of its 24th session < www.un.org/law/ilc/index/htm> [ Date accessed 21/03/13]  
168 See Lambert ibid at 150 
169 Commonwealth Implementation Kits (n 91) 51 
170 Sproule (n 20) 278  
171 Legislative Guide for implementing the Organised Crime Convention 2000 (n 26) at 130 
paragraph 261 
172 See UN GAOR, 34th Sess.(13th mtg.) p.9,para 40,UN Doc A/C.6/SR.13 (1979); See also Lambert 
(n 46) at 143 
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bases. As opposed to relying on direct links between the proscribing state and 
the event or offender, the makers have introduced rules grounded on less direct 
or remote links such as the victim’s nationality, state security, universality and 
objective territoriality. 
The listing of several permissive bases founded on less recognised theories of 
jurisdiction is likely to produce disharmony in national theories of jurisdiction, in 
particular when their implementation is optional. Since there is no priority 
between mandatory or optional bases, the unifying influence of the mandatory 
bases can be said to have been effectively counter-balanced by the permissive 
bases.173  It will be suggested in section IV below that this arrangement is ill-
suited to the aim of facilitating state cooperation in extradition and mutual legal 
assistance, which on account of its reciprocal nature, demands similarity in the 
national theories of jurisdiction. 
In view of the above, it is evident that the international conventions on 
terrorism and organised crime oblige the parties involved to make punishable 
the acts proscribed by them on several bases of extraterritoriality. Some of 
these bases reflect universally agreed theories of jurisdiction; the others 
represent less recognised or controversial theories. The purpose of the 
obligation is to expand the extraterritorial reach of national laws to make them 
conducive to the requirements of extradition and mutual legal assistance, with a 
view to bringing to justice transnational offenders. I shall now analyse the 
counter-terrorism and organised crime laws of the US, the UK, Pakistan and India 
to see the extent to which they have been impacted by the obligation. 
2.5)  Impact of the obligation to establish extraterritorial 
jurisdiction on national laws 
2.5.1)  Laws of Pakistan and India on terrorism and organised 
crime 
National laws have witnessed a surge towards extraterritoriality since 1970 when 
the first international convention174  regulating transnational crimes, namely the 
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Hague Convention 1970, came into force. The analysis of the domestic laws of 
the four states of Pakistan, India, the US and UK reveal that all four have 
widened the net of their criminal laws to cover offences occurring outside their 
territory. For example, the penal codes of both India and Pakistan now apply to 
crimes occurring beyond their territory.175  The extraterritorial reach of these 
laws, however, remains confined to the principles of nationality and flag 
state.176 
This is not however the case as regards their laws implementing the 
international conventions on terrorism and organised crime. These laws have 
been made applicable to extraterritorial crimes on such broad theories of 
jurisdiction as national security, objective territoriality and universality. For 
example, Pakistan's law on drug trafficking criminalises the attempt and 
conspiracy to import narcotics into Pakistan from a place outside Pakistan.177  It 
exemplifies the application of objective territoriality theory as contained in the 
Drugs Convention 1988.178  Similarly, the Indian anti-terrorism law makes 
extraterritorial conduct punishable when it is designed to threaten the security, 
integrity and sovereignty of India by means of damaging Indian property located 
                                         
175 See Sc.3 of the Indian Penal Code 1860, Act No.45 of 1860 [hereinafter the Indian Penal Code 
1860]: 
Punishment for offences committed beyond but which may by law may be tried within India: Any 
person liable, by any 7*[Indian law], to be tried for an offence committed beyond 5*[India] shall 
be dealt with according to the provisions of this Code for any act committed beyond 5*[India] in 
the same manner as if such act had been committed within 5*[India].  
See also Sc. 3 of Pakistan Penal Code, Act XLV of 1860 [hereinafter Pakistan Penal Code 1860] 
176 See Sc. 4 of the Indian Penal Code 1860: 
Extension of Code to Extraterritorial Offences: The provisions of this code apply also to offences 
committed by (1) any citizen of India in any place without and beyond India, (2) any person on 
any ship or aircraft registered in India wherever it may be.  
See also Sc. 4 Pakistan Penal Code 1860: 
Extension of Code to Extra-Territorial Offences: The provisions of this Code apply also to any 
offence committed by:-1[(1) any citizen of Pakistan or any person in the service of Pakistan in 
any place without and beyond Pakistan;] (4) any person on any ship or aircraft registered in 
Pakistan wherever it may be. 
177 See Sc. 14 Control of Narcotics Substances Act (CNSA)1997,Act No.XXV of 1997 [hereinafter 
the Control of  Narcotics Substances Act 1997 of Pakistan] 'No one shall within or outside 
Pakistan, participate in, associate or conspire to commit, attempt to commit, aid, abet, facilitate, 
incite, induce or counsel the commission of an offence under this Act.'  For prohibition on the 
import, export and transport of Narcotics, see Sc.7 Control of Narcotics Substances Act 1997 of 
Pakistan. Also see Sc. 8 of the corresponding law of India, the Narcotics Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances Act 1985, Act No.61 of 1985 [hereinafter the Narcotics Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances Act 1985 of India]  
178 See article 4(1)(b)(iii) the Drugs Convention 1988 
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abroad or by compelling India to do or refrain from doing something through 
injuring or threatening to injure its nationals.179  It manifests the application of 
protective theory conjoined with passive personality as contained in the 
Terrorist Bombings and Financing Conventions.180  Likewise, the Indian anti-
hijacking law makes punishable the crimes committed abroad by a person who 
may subsequently be found in India.181  It provides an example of universality 
theory as embodied in each convention under consideration.182  Additionally, the 
law regulates crimes committed in an aircraft leased to a lessee having his 
permanent place of business or residence in India, as well as crimes committed 
in aircraft landing in India with the offender still on board.183  The two provisions 
incorporate the extended territoriality and universality theories respectively as 
laid down by the Conventions relating to aircraft terrorism.184  Apart from these, 
the anti-money-laundering laws of India and Pakistan apply to the offences made 
criminal under the foreign enactments.185  These can be said to reflect the 
application of the objective territoriality theory as contained in the Organised 
Crime Convention 2000 and UN Convention against Corruption 2003.186 
2.5.2)  US laws on terrorism and organised crime  
The US law on transnational terrorism makes punishable the extraterritorial acts 
of killing, injuring or kidnapping a person who is a member of the US armed 
                                         
179 See Sc. 15 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967, Act No.37 of 1967 as amended in 
2008 [hereinafter the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967 of India] 
180 See Report of the ILC on the work of its 24th session, UN Doc. A/8710/Rev.1 at 311 
<www.un.org/law/ilc/index/htm> [ Date accessed 21/03/13]; See also FA Mann quoted in 
Lambert (n 46) 152 foot note 78; See also article 6(2)(a)(b)(d) the Terrorist Bombings 
Convention 1997 and article 7(2)(a)(b)(c) the Terrorism Financing Convention 1999  
181 See Sc. 6 of the Anti- Hijacking Act 1982, Act 65 of 1982 [hereinafter the Anti- Hijacking Act 
1982 of India]  
182 See, for instance, article 4(2) of the Hague Convention 1970, article 5(2) of the Montreal 
Convention and article 8(3) of the Beijing Convention 2010 
183 ibid 
184 See article 4(1)(b)&(c) the Hague Convention 1970, article 5(1)(c)&(d) the Montreal Convention 
1971and article 8(1)(d)&(c) the Beijing Convention 2010 
185 See Sc. 8 Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act 1985; See also Sc. 2(I) Anti-
Money Laundering Act 2010, Act No. VII of 2010 [hereinafter Anti-Money Laundering Act 2010 
of Pakistan] 
186 See article 42(2)(c) the UN Convention against Corruption 2003 and article 15(2)(c)(ii) the 
Organized Crime Convention 2000   
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forces or an official or employee of its legislature, executive or judiciary.187  It 
exemplifies the application of passive personality theory as contained in a 
majority of the conventions under consideration.188  The enactment further 
criminalises the extraterritorial acts of terrorism directed against the buildings 
and superstructure leased to the US in foreign territories.189  It represents the 
application of protective theory as contained in the modern counter-terrorism 
conventions.190  Additionally, the law regulates conspiracies hatched abroad to 
commit terrorist crimes within the US territory.191  It implements the protective 
theory as contained in the Organised Crime Convention 2000.192  In like manner, 
the US law on financing of terrorism applies to the extraterritorial acts of 
terrorist funding, when the act is committed by its nationals, a habitual resident 
or by a person found on US territory.193  It illustrates the application of 
nationality, extended nationality and universality theories as embodied in the 
Terrorism Financing Convention 1999. The enactment further outlaws the acts of 
financing, wherever committed, with a view to committing terrorist crimes, 
involving the destruction of buildings and superstructure leased to the US in a 
foreign state or to compel the US to do or abstain from doing something.194  It 
manifests the application of protective theory as expressed in the Financing 
                                         
187 See United States Code, Title 18 - Crimes and Criminal Procedure [hereinafter 18 U.S.C.], 
Chapter 113B-Terrorism, Sc.2332b, Acts of Terrorism Transcending National Borders; For a 
different version of passive personality under US law see Sc. 2332 f- (Bombing of places). 
188 See article 3(1)(c) the Protection of Diplomats Convention 1973, article 5(1)(d) the Hostages 
Convention 1979, article 6 (2)(b) the Rome Convention 1988, article 7(2)(a) the Terrorism 
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Financing 1999 
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193 18 U.S.C. Sc. 2339A, Providing Material Support to Terrorists; See also 18 U.S.C. Sc. 1203, 
Hostage Taking  
194 18 U.S.C Sc. 2339A, Providing Material Support to Terrorists  
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Convention 1999.195  Likewise, the US law on drug trafficking makes punishable 
conspiracies hatched abroad to import narcotics into the US.196  It implements 
the objective territoriality theory as laid down in the Drugs Convention 1988.197 
2.5.3)  Laws of the UK on terrorism and organised crime 
The English anti-terrorism laws create extra-territorial offences based both on 
the nationality of the offenders and the nationality of the victims.198  Moreover, 
its Aviation Security Act 1982 applies to offences occurring in aircrafts registered 
in the UK as well as to offences occurring in any aircraft flying over the airspace 
of the UK.199  In the same way, the UK’s Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 makes 
punishable any extraterritorial act, whether only a part of which takes place in 
the UK or although no part occurs there at all, if it relates to a crime having 
taken place or liable to be prosecuted in the UK.200  It demonstrates the 
application of the objective territorial theory as contained in the conventions 
relating to organised crime.201  Likewise, its anti-bribery law makes punishable 
the crime when the offender is one of its nationals or the commission of the 
offence involves the participation of a legal entity registered in the UK.202  It 
implements the nationality theory as embodied in the UN Convention against 
Corruption 2003.203 
Clearly the international conventions on terrorism and organised crime have 
significantly impacted national laws in terms of expanding their extraterritorial 
reach. As argued earlier, the extraterritoriality required by the conventions is 
directed towards facilitating state cooperation in extradition and mutual legal 
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203 See article 42(2)(b) & 26 UN Convention against Corruption 2003 
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assistance. It is thus appropriate now to focus to the conditions of extradition 
and mutual legal assistance sought to be fulfilled by the international 
conventions through the obligation to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction. In 
section III, the conditions of legality and crime having occurred on state territory 
will be discussed and in section IV the condition of special use of double 
criminality will be considered. It will be suggested that the obligation to 
establish extraterritorial jurisdiction under the international conventions does 
facilitate the fulfilment of the former conditions, however, it provides little 
support with respect to the fulfilment of the latter. The reason is that the 
conditions of legality and crime having occurred on state territory only require 
extraterritorial reach of national laws while the condition of special use of 
double criminality also requires harmony in national theories of jurisdiction. 
However, the obligation to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction allows diversity 
in national theories of jurisdiction.     
 
 Section 3: Fulfilment of legality principle and the 
condition of crime having occurred on state 
territory through the obligation to establish 
extraterritorial jurisdiction    
There are three fundamental conditions relating to jurisdiction which are 
commonly found in the laws and treaties on extradition and mutual legal 
assistance. These include the principle of legality, the requirement that the 
crime must have occurred in the territory of the requesting state and the special 
use of double criminality. I will now discuss the first two of these in order to 
analyse how far the obligation to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction under the 
international counter- terrorism and organised crime conventions facilitates 
their fulfilment. The third will be discussed in part IV below.  
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3.1)  Principle of Legality 
The principle of legality is based on the ancient maxim of nullum crimen sine 
lege which means 'no crime without a previous law.’204  It means punishability of 
an act depends on there being a previous legal provision declaring it to be a 
penal offense, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts of the 
proscribing state.205  Hence, the principle not only requires the existence of a 
law proscribing the crime but also competence of the national courts to punish 
it.206  Its object is to give timely notice to the accused of the law he will be 
subjecting himself to by committing his crime.207 
Applying the principle to extraterritorial crimes, it is required that national laws 
proscribing the relevant conduct must be given extraterritorial effect at the 
time of its commission and not afterwards. In the words of O’Keefe: 
 The exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction on the basis of a 
jurisdictional nexus established subsequent to the commission of the 
offence is a form of ex post facto criminalisation and, therefore, 
repugnant ...208 
In the context of extradition and mutual legal assistance, legality demands that 
jurisdiction of the requesting state to punish the crime in respect of which inter-
state assistance is sought, must exist at the time of its commission.209  If it is 
established subsequent thereto, the surrender or interrogation will amount to 
violation of the prohibition against non-retroactivity of criminal laws. 
                                         
204 Christopher L. Blakesley, 'A Conceptual Framework for Extradition and Jurisdiction over 
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The principle is widely applied in the laws and treaties on extradition and 
mutual legal assistance.  For instance, article II (1) of Canada-Spain Extradition 
Treaty 1989 provides: 
 For the purpose of this treaty, extradition shall be granted for 
conduct which is punishable under the laws of both contracting 
States, both at the time of the commission of the offence and at the 
time of the extradition request…210 
The significance of extraterritorial jurisdiction can hardly be over-emphasised as 
regards the fulfilment of legality in extradition and mutual assistance 
proceedings involving transnational crimes. The rule of legality demands that the 
requesting state must have criminalised the act in respect of which surrender or 
interrogation is sought, right from its beginning. When the act constitutes an 
extraterritorial crime, legality further demands that the law making it 
punishable must have been given extraterritorial effect at the time of its 
commission. Since the acts of transnational terrorism and organised crimes 
essentially involve the element of extraterritoriality, the international 
conventions regulating these crimes oblige the parties to make them punishable 
on several grounds of extraterritoriality. Thus, the obligation to criminalise 
offences on grounds such as nationality, state security and passive personality 
enables the requesting state to fulfil the legality condition of the requested 
state’s law while obtaining the extradition or interrogation of transnational 
offenders. 
3.2) Requirement of crime having occurred in the territory 
of the requesting state 
Another requirement of extradition proceedings is that the crime in respect of 
which surrender is being sought must have occurred in the ‘territory’ of the 
requesting state. For instance, article 1 of the India-Nepal Extradition Treaty 
1953 provides: 
 The two Governments hereby engage on a basis of strict reciprocity 
to deliver up to each other those persons, who, being accused, or 
                                         
210 See Article II (1) of Spain and Canada Treaty of Extradition. Signed at Madrid on 31 May 1989 
[hereinafter Canada-Spain Extradition Treaty 1989] 
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convicted, of a ‘crime committed in the territory’ of one Government, 
shall be found within the territory of the other  Government...211 
Some bilateral treaties use the word ‘jurisdiction’ instead of ‘territory’. For 
example, Hong Kong, Singapore-China Extradition Treaty 1997 provides that the 
surrender shall be granted for crimes committed within the 'jurisdiction' of the 
requesting state.212  Apparently, this formulation increases the possibility of 
surrender because it makes all those crimes extraditable which fall within 
jurisdiction of the requesting state.   
However, a number of extradition rulings indicate that the term 'jurisdiction' has 
been interpreted by some national courts to mean 'territory'.  For instance, In re 
Stupp, Germany requested from the US, extradition of its national who had 
committed murder and robbery in Belgium. The extradition proceedings between 
the two states were governed by the treaty between the United States and the 
Kingdom of Prussia of June 16, 1852 which provided that extradition should be 
allowed for crimes committed within the 'jurisdiction' of the requesting party. 
Germany asserted jurisdiction on the basis of the active nationality principle. 
The US District Court held that the words committed within 'jurisdiction' in the 
extradition treaty implied 'territory' of the requesting state.213  Consequently, 
the extradition was rejected for the crime in question not having taken place on 
German territory.214 
Obviously, the condition creates difficulties in situations where the commission 
of crime involves more than one state and the requesting state claims 
jurisdiction on a theory other than territoriality. The makers of the international 
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conventions on terrorism and organised crime have attempted to facilitate the 
fulfilment of this condition by employing a legal fiction.215  According to this 
fiction, the crime must not only be considered to have taken place in the 
territory of the state where it actually occurs, but also in the territory of each 
state having established jurisdiction under any of the bases provided by the 
conventions. For example, article 13 (4) of the Nuclear Terrorism Convention 
2005 reads: 
 If necessary, the offences set forth in article 2 shall be treated, for 
the purposes of extradition between States Parties, as if they had 
been committed not only in the place in which they occurred but also 
in the territory of the States that have established jurisdiction in 
accordance with article 9, paragraphs 1 and 2.216 
According to Abramovsky, the provision is designed to increase the number of 
states qualified to be requesting states, so that if the requested state is 
unwilling to surrender the fugitive to a territorial state, it may have other 
options to fall back upon.217  For example, in the current political situation, Iran 
might not be willing to surrender a fugitive to the US. However, if the condition 
of territoriality does not stand in its way and some other state such as Russia is 
equally competent to demand surrender, Iran might be willing to accede to the 
request, in order to fulfil its convention obligations.218  It can thus be argued 
that this legal fiction has optimised the chances of surrender of transnational 
fugitive offenders.219 
In the light of above, it can be argued that the obligation to establish 
extraterritorial jurisdiction under the international counter-terrorism and 
organised crime conventions appears effective to the extent of facilitating the 
compliance of those conditions of extradition and mutual assistance proceedings 
which require the extraterritorial reach of national laws. I will now analyse the 
effectiveness of the obligation in relation to that condition which requires 
                                         
215 See Lambert (n 46) at 243 
216 See article 13(4) the Nuclear Terrorism Convention 2005 
217 See Abramovsky, 'Multilateral Conventions Hague Part I (n 164) 404  
218 ibid  
219 Abraham Abramovsky, 'Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure and 
Interference with the Aircraft Part II- The Montreal Convention' 14 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. (1975) 
268 at 297,298; See also Abramovsky  'Multilateral Conventions Hague Part 1' (164) 404  
65 
 
harmony in national theories of jurisdiction. The condition is known as special 
use of double criminality and is widely applied in extradition and mutual 
assistance laws. It will be suggested that the obligation to establish 
extraterritorial jurisdiction is unlikely to produce a level of harmony sufficient to 
satisfy special use condition. The reason is that the bases of jurisdiction outlined 
by the international conventions are non-exhaustive and are open to multiple 
interpretations. Accordingly, when they are implemented domestically, they 
reflect the diversity of national legal systems of states parties.  In view of this, 
the better way to facilitate law enforcement cooperation is to relax the 
application of special use condition.  
 
 Section 4: Fulfilment of special use of double 
criminality through the obligation to establish 
extraterritorial jurisdiction 
4.1)  Special use of double criminality 
The rule of double criminality represents one of the most widely applied 
conditions of extradition and mutual legal assistance laws.220  It requires that 
the act in respect of which surrender or interrogation is sought must constitute a 
crime under the laws of both the requesting and the requested state.221  Over 
the years, in view of the specific nature of multi-jurisdictional crimes, a special 
use of double criminality has evolved.222  It stipulates that when the request 
relates to an extraterritorial crime, in addition to the usual requirement of the 
act constituting a crime under the laws of two states, the theory applied by the 
requesting state to give extraterritorial effect to its law must be accepted or 
correspond to the national legal principles of the requested state.223  This means 
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that the requesting state must present a mutually acceptable jurisdictional 
theory in order to satisfy dual criminality requirement.224 
Although, unlike double criminality, its special use has not yet acquired the 
status of customary law,225  it is nonetheless frequently applied in the laws and 
treaties on extradition and is considered to be one of the major hurdles in the 
surrender of fugitives involved in transnational crimes.226  For instance, Article 
IV (5) of the 1989 Extradition Treaty between Canada and Spain provides that 
extradition may be refused: 
when the offence was committed outside the territory of requesting 
state and the law of requested state does not in corresponding 
circumstances provide for the same jurisdiction. 227 
Likewise, article 2(4) of US-South Africa extradition treaty 1999 provides that 
with regard to offences committed outside the territory of the requesting state, 
extradition shall be granted where the laws in the requested state provide for 
punishment of an offence committed outside its territory in similar 
circumstances.228 
In the same way, article 7(2) of the European Convention on Extradition 1957 
reads: 
 When the offence for which extradition is requested has been 
committed outside the territory of the requesting Party, extradition 
may only be refused if the law of the requested Party does not allow 
prosecution for the same category of offence when committed outside 
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the latter Party's territory or does not allow extradition for the 
 offence concerned.229 
Significantly, the principle also finds expression under the UN Model Treaty on 
Extradition which provides that extradition may be refused: 
 If the offence for which extradition is requested has been committed 
outside the territory of either Party and the law of the requested 
State does not provide for jurisdiction over such an offence 
committed outside its territory in comparable circumstances…230 
The special use condition, like all other conditions derived from the principle of 
reciprocity, seeks to ensure that, if circumstances are reversed and the 
requested state steps into the shoes of the requesting state, it must be entitled 
to obtain similar assistance in respect of the act in question. Another purpose 
could be to ensure that if extradition becomes impracticable and the requested 
state decides to prosecute the offender pursuant to aut dedere aut judicare 
rule, it must have jurisdiction to conduct the trial of the crime in question.231 
Scholarly opinion varies with respect to the rationale of special use condition. 
For example, one scholar notes that the condition protects the offender from 
being extradited for an act not made criminal by, or not subject to the 
jurisdiction of, the requested state.232  According to Wise, it serves the dual 
purposes of safeguarding the offender's rights and ensuring that the criminal 
justice system of the requested state prevails in matters of state cooperation.233   
Williams suggests that the special use condition is a product of reciprocity which 
demands that extradition must be viewed as an exchange of comparable favours 
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based on the shared opinion of the community of states about acts of certain 
kinds.234  If the requested state is convinced that the act should not be punished, 
the extradition ought to be denied.235  Considering the fact that many 
extradition laws and treaties explicitly state that their underlying basis is 
reciprocity, this view appears most convincing.   
Besides its recognition in extradition treaties, the theory has also been applied 
in certain landmark court decisions. For example, In Re Ryat the surrender of 
the fugitives was requested by Canada of the UK in connection with the planting 
of a bomb on board a Canadian airliner which resulted in two Japanese baggage 
handlers being killed while the aircraft was in Japan.236  In order to obtain the 
surrender, the Canadian government had to prove not only that its courts were 
competent to prosecute the offenders for deaths in Japan, but also, that if the 
UK were substituted for Canada, the fugitive would be subject to English 
jurisdiction for their extraterritorial crimes.237  In the same way, the principle 
was applied by the House of Lords in Pinochet 3.238  In this case the Extradition 
Act 1989 of the UK was held to require that the offence must not only constitute 
a crime under the law of the UK but the basis of jurisdiction applied by the 
requesting state to give extraterritorial effect to its law must also be accepted 
or correspond to British national legal principles.239  The extradition of General 
Pinochet was requested by Spain on the basis of universality theory for acts of 
torture committed in Chile. Torture was subjected to universal jurisdiction 
under article 5(2) of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) 1984.240  The UK did not recognise 
torture as a crime subject to universal jurisdiction until 1988 when it 
implemented CAT into its domestic law through the enactment of Criminal 
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Justice Act 1988. On account of the non-existence of a corresponding theory of 
jurisdiction under the UK law on the relevant date, the House held that 
extradition could only be granted for crimes committed subsequent to 1988.241 
4.1.1) Lack of harmony in national theories of jurisdiction and its 
implications for state cooperation in law enforcement 
As noted by Blakesley, bases of jurisdiction are essential concepts for the 
purposes of state cooperation in law enforcement.242  The decision to deny or 
grant extradition often depends on the theory of jurisdiction applied by the 
requesting state and its recognition under the laws of the requested state.243  
Thus, confusion over these bases risks disagreement and denial of extradition for 
non-fulfilment of the special use of double criminality.  
Since the aim of the international conventions on terrorism and organised crime 
is to facilitate state cooperation in law enforcement, their rules should be 
directed towards harmonising national theories of jurisdiction, so that no 
occasion arises for the requested state to block surrender or interrogation due to 
the incompatibility of jurisdictional theories. It is pertinent, however, to note 
that the national laws implementing the international conventions reflect 
significant variation in the interpretation and application of the bases provided 
by the conventions. 
I will now analyse some of these inconsistencies in order to advance the 
argument that the obligation under the international counter-terrorism and 
organised crime conventions to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction is ill-suited 
for facilitating the fulfilment of the special use of double criminality condition 
under extradition law. The analysis will focus mainly on the rules relating to 
objective territoriality, active nationality and passive personality because 
majority of the disputes concerning non- fulfilment of the special use condition 
revolve around these theories. 
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4.1.1.1) Objective territoriality basis 
The objective territoriality rule enables states to make punishable an offence 
which, though entirely consummated abroad, has had its effects in the 
proscribing state’s territory or which was intended to have such effect.244  The 
rule appears in three organised crime conventions which authorise the parties to 
criminalise conspiracies hatched abroad to commit money laundering, drug 
trafficking or corruption or other organised crimes within their territory.245 
The national laws implementing the counter-terrorism and organised crime 
conventions reflect telling discrepancies in the interpretation and application of 
the objective territoriality rule. For example, France gives extraterritorial effect 
to its laws on the basis of territoriality and its variants when at least a part of 
the crime occurs in French territory.246  On the other hand, the UK asserts 
jurisdiction on this basis when, although the offence entirely takes place abroad, 
it relates to a crime liable to be prosecuted in the UK or having already taken 
place in its territory.247 A few states, such as India, Pakistan and the US, go even 
further and assert jurisdiction when the crime neither partially occurs nor 
relates to a prosecutable crime, but was only ‘intended’ to produce effects in 
state territory.248  Some examples of situations where conflicting interpretations 
of objective territoriality led to complications in extradition proceedings are 
given immediately below. 
a)  Kirk W. Munroe extradition case249 between the US and Canada 
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In 1996, the US requested from Canada the extradition of a suspect on the 
charges of a failed money laundering sting which occurred entirely in Canada.250 
Although the offender was a Canadian national, had never travelled to the US 
and had never collected any money there-from, the US demanded his extradition 
for violating a local narcotics law which criminalised extraterritorial money 
laundering conspiracies, entirely thwarted abroad but intended to produce 
effects in the US territory.251  The concerned court rejected the request because 
Canadian law did not make punishable conspiracies that were entirely thwarted 
abroad, while the relevant extradition treaty demanded compatibility in the 
theories of jurisdiction applied by the requesting and requested state.252 
Subsequently, the Canadian Supreme Court granted extradition by treating the 
act in question as an 'attempt', which did constitute a crime under Canadian 
national law and subject to extraterritorial jurisdiction.253  It can however be 
argued that the Supreme Court had to satisfy the requirement of double 
criminality by altering the nature of the offence.  
b)  The NatWest Three Case 
In this case, the US requested extradition of suspects from the UK on charges of 
fraud in violation of its national law.254  The only link between the US and the 
crime was that the alleged fraud impacted its financial market by causing the 
collapse of an energy company based in the US.255  The extradition was, 
however, granted despite every part of the crime having taken place in the UK 
and the offenders holding UK nationality and working for a bank based in the 
UK.256 
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The decision sparked countrywide protests by human rights groups based in the 
UK.257 The protesters demanded urgent re-negotiation of US-UK extradition 
arrangements.258  This resulted in promulgation of the ‘forum bar law’ according 
to which, when the majority of the acts constituting a crime take place in the 
UK, the crime must be tried by its national courts. The law was never put into 
force.259  The episode nonetheless makes it clear that if the theory of 
jurisdiction has no recognition under the laws of the requested state, even if 
extradition is granted, it causes public resentment and creates difficulties for 
future extraditions. 
4.1.1.2) Passive personality principle 
The rule of passive personality allows a state to make punishable an offence 
when the victim happens to be its national, irrespective of the place of 
commission or nationality of the offender.260  The rule appears in all counter-
terrorism treaties apart from those concerning aircraft terrorism.261 
Furthermore, it finds expression in each organised crime treaty under 
consideration except the Drugs Convention 1988.262 
Despite its inclusion in majority of the counter-terrorism and organised crime 
conventions, its implementation at national level remains far from consistent. 
For example, Indian law gives recognition to passive personality when it 
converges with the protective principle. Thus, a terrorist attack against civilians 
abroad will be subjected to Indian jurisdiction only if it is directed to compel 
India or any other state to do or abstain from doing something.263  To the 
contrary, the US law attaches no such condition regarding the application of 
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261 Beijing Convention is an exception to aircraft terrorism treaties as it recommends the parties to 
establish jurisdiction on passive personality basis. See article 8(2)(a) Beijing Convention 2010 
262 For provisions of the counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions requiring the 
establishment of jurisdiction on passive personality basis, see (n 188) above 
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passive personality,264 while, the principle has no recognition under the counter-
terrorism and organised crime laws of Pakistan.265 
a) Abu Daoud Case 
An example of the refusal of extradition on the grounds of dissimilar national 
approaches towards passive personality is Abu Daoud case of 1977.266 According 
to its facts, Israel requested from France the extradition of Abu Daoud, an alien, 
who was found to have been involved in the murder of Israeli nationals on 
German territory, during the Munich Olympic massacre. The French court 
refused to grant extradition because the relevant bilateral treaty demanded 
compatible theories of jurisdiction and the theory applied by Israel to make 
punishable the crime was not recognised by France.267  The only link between 
Israel and the crime was the murder of its nationals by some aliens in German 
territory.268  French law had no identical basis of jurisdiction at the time of the 
commission of the offence. Thus, the court ruled that the arrest of Abu Daoud, 
upon Israel’s extradition request would be tantamount to punishing the offender 
for an act not made criminal under the national law of France.269  Although, 
after the offences in question, passive personality was made a basis of 
jurisdiction under French law, this was not relied upon by the Court because to 
do so would have violated prohibition against non-retroactivity of criminal 
laws.270 
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Recent French Extradition Cases' 3 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review (1980) 
265 at 284; The Abu Daoud Affair, 'The Note' 11 J.Int'l L.& Econ (1977) 539 at 540-545  
267 Article 2 of Extradition Treaty Between Israel and France signed in 1958, ratified by France in 
1971 [hereinafter Israel-France Extradition Treaty 1971] 
268 Abu Daoud case (n 266) 
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4.1.1.3) Nationality principle  
According to the nationality principle, a state is entitled to make punishable the 
acts committed by its nationals regardless of the place of their commission. This 
principle appears in nearly all counter-terrorism and organised crime 
conventions under consideration.271  Counter- terrorism conventions set forth 
mandatory obligation to establish jurisdiction on this basis, whereas organised 
crime treaties only recommend the parties to do so.272 
Similar to objective territoriality and passive personality, a request for 
extradition based on active nationality theory is fraught with difficulties when 
put to the test regarding the special use of double criminality. The reason is that 
several states, including those belonging to continental Europe, do not allow the 
extradition of their nationals.273  States not permitting extradition of nationals 
generally assert much wider jurisdiction over crimes committed by their 
nationals.274  For example, French Extradition law of 1927 prohibits the 
extradition of nationals.275  Accordingly, its Penal Code asserts jurisdiction over 
crimes committed abroad by French nationals on widest possible bases. For 
instance, it asserts jurisdiction even if nationality was acquired subsequent to 
the commission of crime.276  Moreover, the Code applies to crimes committed 
anywhere by French citizens including those occurring in the territory of states 
with which France has no extradition treaty.277  This may be compared with the 
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US law which does not allow such broad interpretation of nationality principle 
except in cases involving threats to national security.278  Nonetheless, the 
extradition treaty to which both the US and France are parties provides that 
extradition shall only be granted for offences committed outside the territory of 
the requesting state, when the law of the requested state makes the offence 
punishable in similar circumstances.279  Keeping in view the different versions of 
nationality theory applied by the two states, the French request to the US for 
extradition of a French national who obtained French nationality subsequent to 
the commission of crime or who committed his crime in a non-party state, 
remains under the threat of being refused. 
Other discrepancies in national laws concerning the application of nationality 
theory include regulation by some states of crimes committed by habitual 
residents and legal entities under this theory. For example, the US law on 
terrorism makes punishable crimes committed by stateless persons, habitually 
residing in the US.280  Similarly, the anti-bribery law of the UK interprets the 
term ‘nationals’ to include legal entities and corporations.281  However, the 
corresponding laws of India and Pakistan do not permit such broad 
interpretations of nationality.282  In the words of Sproule and Dennis, 'habitual 
residence also lends itself to varied interpretations that could well lead to 
disputes between the requesting and requested state.'283 
4.1.1.4) Inconsistencies with respect to other bases of Jurisdiction 
The US and Indian counter- terrorism laws make punishable attacks against 
buildings and infrastructure located abroad, under the theory of state security or 
protection. However, this jurisdictional theory has no equivalent in the 
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corresponding law of Pakistan.284  Significantly, all three states have ratified 
Terrorist Bombings and Financing Conventions which recommend that parties 
establish this basis of jurisdiction.285 
Similar discrepancies can be viewed in national interpretations of secondary 
basis of jurisdiction, as found in each counter-terrorism and organised crime 
convention under consideration.286  For example, Indian law makes punishable 
the acts committed abroad by an offender who is subsequently found in India if 
the offender is an Indian national or when the crime is committed in an aircraft 
or vessel registered in India.287  By contrast, the US law regulates such crimes 
regardless of any territorial or nationality link.288  Furthermore, it proscribes 
these crimes even if the offender was ‘brought’ to the US.289  For example, the 
US law on Providing Material Support to Designated Terrorists makes punishable 
the acts committed abroad by an offender subsequently ‘brought’ to the US.290  
In the same way, Indian hijacking law criminalises acts committed on board an 
aircraft landing in India, under the theory of universality as found in the 
conventions relating to aircraft terrorism. This theory has no application in the 
parallel legislation of Pakistan.291 
4.1.2)  Inconsistent theories of jurisdiction- A contradiction of the 
aim of facilitating state cooperation in law enforcement 
Clearly, national approaches towards the bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
provided by the international counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions 
reflect disunity and disharmony. While this appears to be in accord with the 
observation made in the Lotus judgement that no rule of international law 
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prohibits states from applying their laws to extraterritorial events,292 it may 
however lead to complications in law enforcement cooperation due to the non-
fulfilment of special use of double criminality.293 
 
The dissimilarity in the national theories of jurisdiction affords opportunity to 
the requested state to refuse extradition for non-fulfilment of special use of 
double criminality. Although extradition may still be granted in spite of 
dissimilar theories, the same will depend on discretion of the requested state, 
likely to be exercised in view of political and diplomatic considerations.294  This 
denies the objective of facilitating state cooperation in bringing to justice   
transnational offenders.295  Following this approach multilateral cooperation vis 
a vis transnational crimes remains as discretionary as bilateral cooperation 
concerning ordinary crimes.296 
In bilateral cooperation, states tend to raise or lower the barriers of extradition 
depending on their political and diplomatic relations with the requesting 
state.297  For example, the French court’s judgement in Abu Daoud case was 
criticised for having political flavouring.298 According to Carbonneau, the fugitive 
had strong connection with certain Middle-Eastern states and the France 
government did not want to annoy them by extraditing him to Israel.299 
Therefore, the Court raised the barrier of double criminality to block 
extradition.300  Similarly, the UK’s extradition arrangements with the US are 
often seen with disapproval for carrying lesser safeguards for the offenders to be 
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extradited from the UK to US as compare to those to be extradited from the 
latter.301 
4.1.3)  Flexibilities in the obligation to establish extraterritorial 
jurisdiction 
4.1.3.1)  Permissive nature of the new bases introduced by the conventions 
The international counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions 
recommend that parties give extraterritorial effect to their laws on several 
grounds previously unknown to many of them.302  All these grounds are derived 
from less recognised or controversial theories of jurisdiction such as national 
security, universality and objective territoriality. In view of their non-consensual 
nature, reliance on them is permitted under the laws of some states only. 
Therefore, uniformity with respect to their application could have been brought 
only by imposing mandatory obligations. This would have forced the parties to 
amend their laws. However, the conventions have merely recommended the 
parties to implement these bases. Consequently, the new bases are likely to be 
adopted only by those states whose existing legal systems allow them to do so.  
4.1.3.2) Savings Clause  
Each counter-terrorism and organised crime convention under consideration 
includes a residual provision which provides that the bases of jurisdiction laid 
down by these conventions in no way supersede the other bases recognised by 
the domestic law of state parties.303 This implies that any basis of jurisdiction 
set forth by the domestic law shall be acceptable and preserved. The clause can 
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be invoked to justify the existence in domestic law of the less-familiar 
interpretations of the traditional theories of jurisdiction.   
For example, in the Babar Ahmad case, the extradition of the offender was 
sought by the US from the UK on the ground that he used a web-server based in 
the US to seek funding for Jihadist activities in Chechnya.304  Similarly, in Gary 
McKinnon, extradition was requested for the crime of hacking the computer 
system of the US Military, while operating from the UK.305  In both these cases, 
the US gave the broadest interpretations to the objective territoriality and 
protective theories. They cannot, however, be considered repugnant to the 
international counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions because their 
savings clause indemnifies any theory recognised by national law.306 
4.1.3.3) Offences to be defined in accordance with national law  
The organised crime conventions explicitly provide that the offences are to be 
defined in accordance with national legal principles.307  This authorisation is 
implicit in counter- terrorism conventions.308  Since extraterritorial jurisdiction 
entails the competence to enact laws with extraterritorial scope, the ability to 
define offences locally also includes the authorisation to give them 
extraterritorial effect. Therefore, by defining offences in a specific manner, 
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states can give extraterritorial effect to their laws on any ground chosen by 
them, whether or not the same corresponds to the bases provided by the 
conventions.  
For example, one of the elements of the definition of the crime of ‘transnational 
terrorism’ under the US law is that the act in question involves the utilization of 
the US mail or any facility of inter-state commerce.309  The enactment extends 
the operation of the US law abroad on the grounds of the offender having used 
local mail or transportation facilities. Although the definition underlies two 
unusual theories of jurisdiction, it cannot be said to have contravened the 
international counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions in view of the 
right given to the parties to define offences domestically. Therefore, inherent in 
the permissibility to define offences locally is the authorisation to give them 
extraterritorial effect on any grounds permissible under national laws.  The 
argument finds support in a report entitled ‘the Barker Report’ and presented to 
the UK’s Home Secretary on the review of the US-UK extradition arrangements. 
In this report it was observed that the offences of wire fraud, mail usage and 
extraterritorial bribery have been defined under the US law in such a way that 
the US can prosecute even if its link to the crime is very remote.310 
As such, it is quite plain to see that the international conventions on terrorism 
and organised crime impose no restriction on the parties with respect to giving 
extraterritorial effect to their national laws under any theory of jurisdiction. To 
justify this approach, it can be argued that jurisdictional rules of the 
conventions are derived from customary international law and since custom 
imposes no restraint on extraterritoriality of national laws, the rules derived 
there from may not either. The argument however discounts the fact that the 
makers of the conventions have already adopted a non-traditional approach in 
establishing mandatory obligations.311  The oft-quoted justification of these 
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obligations is that states are required to surrender a portion of their sovereignty 
to combat 'collectively' the phenomenon of borderless crimes.312 Arguably, 
therefore, states could, through treaty law, have evolved consensual 
interpretations of traditional theories of jurisdiction to be effective amongst the 
parties to conventions only.313 
The celebrated case of Strassheim v. Daily provides an excellent example of a 
domestic court establishing the parameters of an otherwise open-ended 
objective territoriality rule. In this case, it was held that assertion of jurisdiction 
will be enforced as proper in either state and extradition will be approved 
pursuant to either state's theory of jurisdiction so long as the offence itself, its 
results or effects or any of the constituent elements actually occur within the 
territory of requesting state. The relevant part of the judgement reads: 
Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and 
producing detrimental effects within it, justify a state in punishing 
the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the effect if the 
state should succeed in getting him within its power.314  
The wording ‘and producing detrimental effects’ effectively excludes 
controversial theories like 'intended effects' from the scope of the objective 
territoriality rule.    
4.2)  Alternatives to Uniformity 
It has been argued that the international conventions have allowed inconsistent 
interpretations of the bases of jurisdiction provided by them in order to preserve 
the diversity of national legal systems and with a view to obtain the maximum 
number of ratifications.315  This argument calls into question the technique of 
facilitating law enforcement cooperation by imposing mandatory obligations. If 
preserving diversity was the objective, then imposing mandatory obligations 
appears futile because mandatory obligations are directed towards harmonising 
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national legal systems to make them conducive to demands of extradition and 
mutual legal assistance.  
Nonetheless, it is possible to reconcile desire to preserve diversity with the aim 
of facilitating law enforcement cooperation. This would require a shifting of 
focus from the harmonising national theories of jurisdiction to the regulating of 
the special use of double criminality condition. According to Bassiouni, 
facilitation of state cooperation calls for international regulation of the double 
conditions associated with the principle of reciprocity which tend to hinder 
extradition and mutual legal assistance on account of the disparity between 
national legal systems.316 
The regulation of the special use condition is not something alien to states. 
Rather, it has been done in some bilateral treaties and domestic court cases.  
The condition is usually expressed in these words: 
 When the offence has been committed outside the territory of the 
Requesting State, the Requested State shall grant extradition 
according to the provisions of this Treaty if its laws would provide for 
the punishment of such an offence committed in similar 
circumstances.317 
Some of the modern extradition treaties modify this requirement with the effect 
of clarifying that refusal of extradition on this ground is optional and discretion 
vests with the executive authorities of the requested state to grant extradition 
in spite of its law not making punishable the offence in similar circumstances. 
For example, article 2(4) of the US-UK Extradition Treaty 2003 provides:  
 …If the laws in the Requested State do not provide for the 
punishment of such conduct committed outside of its territory in 
similar circumstances, the executive authority of the Requested 
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State, in its discretion, may grant extradition provided that all other 
requirements of this Treaty are met.318 
Similarly, in the Assarsson case involving the US and Sweden, a US court held 
that extradition can be granted, regardless of the dissimilar theories of 
jurisdiction, if the language of the extradition treaty is permissive as regards the 
expression of double criminality.319  According to the Court, when the relevant 
treaty uses words like extradition need not to be granted, it should be 
considered permissive. If the treaty includes expression such as extradition shall 
not be granted, the fulfilment of double criminality should be deemed essential.  
A more radical way of regulating special use condition is to make it inapplicable 
altogether. For example, article 2(4) of the US-India Extradition Treaty 1997 
provides, ‘[e]xtradition shall be granted for an extraditable offense regardless of 
where the act or acts constituting the offense were committed.’320  According to 
this provision, the requested state shall be bound to grant extradition if the 
offence is ‘extraditable’. It would be irrelevant which theory of jurisdiction has 
been applied by the requesting state to make the offence punishable.321 
Conclusions 
The international conventions on terrorism and organised crime set forth 
offences which spread across national frontiers, the prosecution of which 
demands the extraterritorial reach of national laws. Hence, the conventions 
oblige the parties to enact laws which have extraterritorial scope. At the same 
time, the conventions prohibit states from enforcing those laws in foreign 
territories without the approval of territorial sovereign. Accordingly, if the 
offender is found outside state territory, or the evidence of his crime is located 
abroad, the parties, despite having extraterritorial laws, are left with no option 
                                         
318 See article 2(4), Extradition Treaty between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America. Signed at 
Washington 31 March 2003 [hereinafter US-UK Extradition Treaty 2003] 
319 Assarsson case, 635 F.2d 1237 (7th Cir 1979); See also Blakesley 'A Conceptual Framework of 
Extradition'  (n 204) 748 
320 See article 2(4) of Extradition Treaty between United States of America and India. Signed at 
Washington on June 25,1997 [hereinafter US-India Extradition Treaty 1997] 
321 An Extraditable offence has been defined under article 2(1) of the US-India Extradition Treaty 
1997 as an offence punishable under the laws of two states with deprivation of liberty of one 
year or longer. 
84 
 
but to wait for the offender to return voluntarily or to request his extradition or 
interrogation. Since the aim of the conventions is to promote state cooperation 
in law enforcement, it is safe to assume that the obligation set forth by them to 
establish extraterritorial jurisdiction is meant to facilitate extradition and 
mutual assistance proceedings. 
Extradition and mutual legal assistance are carried out in accordance with 
national laws and bilateral treaties. These laws and treaties lay down certain 
conditions with respect to jurisdiction. The foremost amongst them are legality, 
special use of double criminality and the crime having occurred in the requesting 
state's territory. The obligation to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction under 
the international conventions clearly facilitates the fulfilment of the first and 
the last of these conditions. As regards the second condition, i.e. special use of 
dual criminality, the obligation provides little support. The reason for this is that 
while the conditions of legality and crime having occurred on state territory 
require the extraterritorial reach of national laws, special use of double 
criminality also demands similarity in national theories of jurisdiction. However, 
the obligation under the international conventions to establish extraterritorial 
jurisdiction produces diversity in national theories of jurisdiction. Although 
extradition may still be granted in spite of dissimilar theories of jurisdiction, the 
same will depend upon the discretion of the requested state, likely to be 
exercised in view of diplomatic and political consideration. This contradicts the 
scholarly assertion that the international conventions on terrorism and organised 
crime evidence the emergence of a new treaty regime which is aimed at 
promoting state cooperation in the specific context of transnational crimes. 
Following this approach state cooperation in regard to transnational crimes 
remains as discretionary as cooperation concerning ordinary crimes 
In order to facilitate the fulfilment of the special use of double criminality 
condition, two courses might be adopted. Firstly, national theories of 
jurisdiction could be harmonised by providing universal interpretation of the 
traditional theories of jurisdiction and then obliging the parties to implement 
them without exception. Alternatively, the condition of special use of double 
criminality can be relaxed in the extradition and mutual legal assistance 
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proceedings involving transnational crimes, with a view to accommodating the 
inherently extraterritorial nature of these crimes.  
The adoption of the first option might be impracticable in view of the fact that 
international law imposes no limit on the right of states to apply their laws 
extraterritorially. Hence, it is suggested that makers of the international 
conventions on terrorism and organised crime should focus on the second option. 
This technique has been used in bilateral and regional treaties and strikes a 
balance between the aim of facilitating law enforcement cooperation and the 
constraint of preserving diversity of national legal systems.  
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Chapter 3:  Promoting law enforcement 
cooperation through the obligation to legislate 
against universal definitions of crime 
Introduction 
Modern international conventions on terrorism and organised crime impose the 
duty on states to legislate against universal definitions of crimes. The aim of the 
conventions is to facilitate state cooperation in extradition and mutual legal 
assistance. Both these measures require similarity in the national coverage of 
crimes. In other words, they demand that the act in respect of which surrender 
or interrogation is sought must constitute a crime under the laws of both the 
requesting and requested states. The requirement is known as ‘double 
criminality’ and is almost universally found in the laws and treaties on 
extradition and mutual legal assistance. 
On several occasions, the non-fulfilment of double criminality by the requesting 
state either led to extradition having been blocked or trial of the accused being 
restricted. For example, when the US requested Switzerland to extradite Adnan 
Khashoggi for the crime of racketeering and conspiracy to racket, obstruction of 
justice and mail fraud, Switzerland had to impose a restriction on the trial of 
Khashoggi because the acts of racketeering and conspiracy to racket did not 
constitute crimes under Swiss national law. When the offender was subsequently 
tried in the US, the US had to drop the charges with respect to which 
Switzerland had imposed restriction. Since the remaining offences of mail fraud 
and obstruction of justice were only remotely linked to the US, the offender had 
to be acquitted. Similarly, in Riley v. Commonwealth, the defendant raised 
objection against his extradition from Australia to the US on the ground that the 
act of Continued Criminal Enterprise (CCE) for which his extradition was 
requested by the US did not constitute a crime under Australian national law.  
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Since the crimes established by modern counter-terrorism and organised crime 
conventions had no domestic law parallels, without establishing an international 
duty to implement their exact definitions, it would have been difficult for the 
parties to satisfy the double criminality condition in extradition and mutual legal 
assistance proceedings involving these crimes. Therefore, to enable the parties 
to negotiate double criminality in their cooperative endeavors, the conventions 
imposed a duty upon states to legislate the exact definitions of the crimes. The 
rationale of the duty is to ensure that there remains no disparity in the national 
laws that might allow the requested state to refuse surrender or interrogation 
due to non-fulfillment of double criminality or non-existence of the crime under 
its national law. This chapter looks into the question of the extent to which the 
duty represents an effective technique of promoting state cooperation in 
extradition and mutual legal assistance. 
It will be argued that the implementation of the duty is subject to several 
qualifications and safeguards. The reason for this is that makers of the 
conventions wanted to preserve the diversity of national legal systems in order 
to gain maximum ratifications. As long as an unconditional obligation is not 
established, a requested state can always claim that the act in respect of which 
surrender or interrogation is sought does not constitute a crime under its 
national law. It is more likely in the case of crimes established by recent 
counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions because a majority of these 
crimes consist of several parts and, in view of the discretion afforded to states 
in the matter of implementation, national laws are likely to diverge in the 
coverage of one or more of their elements. Resultantly, despite imposing the 
duty to legislate, a request for extradition or interrogation remains under the 
threat of being refused due to disparity in national coverage of crimes. 
Since it is unlikely that the consensus may evolve amongst states with respect to 
accepting an unqualified obligation to legislate, the way forward is to shift the 
focus from harmonising the definitions of crimes to regulating the use of double 
criminality. Through this method, states can be encouraged to collectively relax 
the application of double criminality considering the inherently complex nature 
of crimes established by modern counter-terrorism and organised crime 
conventions. It provides a much better technique of facilitating extradition and 
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mutual legal assistance as compared to inconclusive obligations to implement 
the exact definitions of the crimes.  
The paper has been divided into four sections. Section 1 will discuss the crimes 
established by the international conventions on terrorism and organised crime, 
the object of their international criminalisation and the relevance of dual 
criminality for their suppression. Section 2 will consider the duty to legislate, 
the conventions establishing that duty and the complications arising in state 
cooperation as a result of dissimilar definitions of crime. Section 3 will analyse 
the impact of the duty to legislate on domestic laws on counter-terrorism and 
organised crime as well as bilateral treaties on extradition and mutual legal 
assistance. Section 4 will look into the controlled use of dual criminality as a 
substitute to the duty to legislate. 
 Section 1: Crimes established by the international 
conventions on terrorism and organised crime, the 
object of their international criminalisation and 
relevance of dual criminality for their suppression 
1.1)  Acts criminalised under the international 
conventions on terrorism and organised crime 
Historically, international law has been less concerned with crimes committed 
by non-state actors.1  For example, non-state sponsored terrorism involving 
violence by individuals against civilian populations had formerly remained the 
exclusive domain of national law.2  However, when non-state actors operating in 
one state started to threaten peace and security of other states, international 
law had to intervene. The Charter of the UN, one of the primary sources of 
international law, focuses on the perseveration of international peace and 
security.3  Accordingly, non-state sponsored crimes spreading across national 
frontiers were subjected to UN sponsored multilateral suppression conventions, 
                                         
1 Christian Walter, Salja Voneky et al, Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law: 
Security versus Liberty (Max-Planck Germany-2004) 791     
2 ibid   
3 ibid; See also Article 38(1)(a) of the Statute of International Court of Justice; Article 1, Chapter 1 
of the UN Charter 1945. 
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the object of which was to promote state cooperation in criminal law 
enforcement.4 
With respect to counter-terrorism, the impetus for international criminalisation 
came from the growing number of incidents of hijacking and their adverse effect 
on the international civil aviation industry.5  In relation to organised crime, 
trafficking in narcotic drugs and its negative fallout on state economies was the 
reason for bringing these crimes subject to international control. 6 
1.1.1) Principal crimes under the counter-terrorism conventions 
Principal crimes under counter-terrorism conventions can be classified into three 
broad groups: (1) attacks against civilian populations (2) crimes against specific 
targets and (3) crimes involving the means to commit acts of terrorism. The first 
group includes crimes of terrorist bombing 7 and nuclear terrorism.8  The second 
group comprises attacks against internationally protected persons,9  the taking 
of hostages,10  attacks against ships,11  the hijacking of aircrafts,12  crimes 
                                         
4 The purpose of promoting state cooperation has been reiterated in each counter-terrorism and 
organised crime convention under consideration with exception of the Hague Convention 1970 and 
the Montreal Convention 1971.  See for instance, preamble of the Terrorism Financing Convention 
1999:  
BEING CONVINCED OF the urgent need to enhance international cooperation among States in 
devising and adopting effective measures for the prevention of the financing of terrorism, as 
well as for its suppression through the prosecution and punishment of its perpetrators...  
See also article 1(b) the UN Convention against Corruption 2000. The object of the Convention is 
‘[t]o promote, facilitate and support international cooperation and technical assistance in the 
prevention of and fight against corruption, including in asset recovery.'  
For corresponding provisions, see article 2(1) the Drugs Convention 1988 and article 1 the 
Organized Crime Convention 2000. See also preambles of the Beijing Convention 2010, the 
Nuclear Terrorism Convention 2005, the Terrorist Bombing Convention 1997, the Rome 
Convention 1988, the Protection of Diplomats Convention 1973, the Nuclear Materials 
Convention 1980 and the Hostages Convention 1979.   
5 Abraham Abramovsky, ‘Multilateral Conventions for Suppression of Unlawful Seizure and 
Interference with Aircraft part 1: Hague Convention’ 13 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. (1974) 381  
6 D.W Sproule and Paul St-Denis, ‘The UN Drug Trafficking Convention: An Ambitious Step’ 27 
Canadian Yearbook of International Law (1989) 263 at 264 
7 See article 2, the Terrorist Bombings Convention 1997 
8 See article 2, the Nuclear Terrorism Convention 2005 
9 See article 2(1), the Protection of  Diplomats Convention 1973 
10 See article 1, the Hostages Convention 1979 
11 See article 3, the Rome Convention 1988 
12 See article 1, the Hague Convention 1970  
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against the safety of civil aviation13  and the theft of nuclear materials.14  The 
third group contains the crime of financing terrorism which includes financing of 
all acts of terrorism as mentioned in the other two groups.15  Features common 
to all these crimes include the involvement of more than one state in their 
perpetration or impact16  and the achievement of a political goal as the 
motivation behind their commission.17 
1.1.2) Principal crimes under the organised crime conventions 
The principal crimes under organised crime conventions can be classified into 
two categories: specific and ancillary crimes. Specific crimes include drug 
trafficking,18  migrant smuggling,19  human trafficking,20  weapons trafficking 21 
and corruption.22  Ancillary crimes consist of participation in an organised 
criminal group,23  money laundering 24  and the obstruction of justice.25  Their 
                                         
13 See article 1,the Montreal Convention 1971; See also article1,the Beijing Convention 2010 
14 See article 7(1), the Nuclear Materials Convention 1980  
15 See article 2, the Terrorism Financing Convention 1999 
16 See for example, article 3 Terrorist Bombing Convention 1997:  
This Convention shall not apply where the offence is committed within a single State, the alleged 
offender and the victims are nationals of that State, the alleged offender is found in the territory of 
that State and no other State has a basis under article 6, paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, of this 
Convention to exercise jurisdiction, except that the provisions of articles 10 to 15 shall, as 
appropriate, apply in those cases.  
Identical provisions can be seen in almost all conventions under consideration. See (n 22) Chapter 
2 above 
17 M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Effective National and International Action against Organised Crime and 
Terrorist Criminal Activities’ 4 Emory Intl L. Review (1990) 9 at 10 
18 See article 3, the Drugs Convention 1988  
19 See article 6, 2006 Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrant by Land, Sea and Air, 
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime; 40 ILM 
384 (2001) / UN Doc. A55/383 (Annex III P.62) / [2004] ATS 11 [hereinafter the  Migrant 
Smuggling Protocol to the Organized Crime Convention 2000] 
20 See article 3, 2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organised Crime; 40 ILM 335(2001)/ UN Doc. A/55/383 (Annex II, p.53) / [2005] ATS 27 
[hereinafter the Human Trafficking Protocol to the Organized Crime Convention 2000]   
21 See article 5, 2001 Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their 
Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organised Crime; 40 ILM 335 (2001) / [2202] ATNIF 7 [hereinafter the Weapons 
Trafficking Protocol to  the Organized Crime Convention 2000] 
22 See articles 7, 12, 15, 16, 18, 20 and 22 of the UN Convention against Corruption 2003 
23 See article 5, the Organised Crime Convention 2000 
24 See article 3, the Drugs Convention 1988;  See also article 6, the Organized Crime Convention 
2000 and article 23, the UN Convention against Corruption 2003 
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common features include transnationality,26  involvement of an organised 
criminal group and the motive of profit maximization.27 
1.2) The object of international criminalisation 
Offenders involved in terrorism and organised crime spread their operations in 
more than one state in order to defeat territorially restricted national laws.28 
Hence, their prosecution and punishment call for state cooperation in law 
enforcement. Although organised crime and terrorism significantly differ with 
respect to their nature and motivation,29  the means adopted by the offenders to 
carry out these crimes are more or less the same. According to Guymon, means 
adopted by organised criminals to carry out drug trafficking are similar to those 
adopted by terrorists in committing nuclear smuggling.30  In view of this, similar 
law enforcement measures are used to prevent, suppress and control terrorism 
and organised crime.31  In order to coordinate national and international efforts 
in the application of these measures, the acts of cross -border terrorism and 
organised crime have been subjected to international treaty regimes.  
In the past, state cooperation was carried out on bilateral and regional basis.  
Since the acts of transnational terrorism and organized crime involve more than 
                                                                                                                           
25 See article 6, the Organized Crime Convention 2000 & article 23, UN Convention against 
Corruption 2003 
26 Transnationality has been defined under article 3(2) of the Organised Crime Convention 2000 in 
these words:  
This Convention shall apply, except as otherwise stated herein, to the prevention, investigation 
and prosecution of: (a) The offences established in accordance with articles 5, 6, 8 and 23 of this 
Convention; and(b) Serious crime as defined in article 2 of this Convention; where the offence is 
transnational in nature and involves an organised criminal group. 2. For the purpose of paragraph 
1 of this article, an offence is transnational in nature if: (a) It is committed in more than one State; 
(b) It is committed in one State but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or 
control takes place in another State; (c) It is committed in one State but involves an organised 
criminal group that engages in criminal activities in more than one State; or (d) It is committed in 
one State but has substantial effects in another State. 
27 Bassiouni (n 17) 10 
28 M. Sornarajah, ‘Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction’ 2 Singapore Journal of International and 
Comparative Law (1998)1 at 1, 4 
29 According to Bassiouni, what essentially distinguishes organised crime from terrorism is the 
'motive' of the actor. While organised crime is characterised by 'profit motive', terrorism is 
typified by an ideological motive. See Bassiouni (n 17) 10  
30 See Carrie Lyn Donigan Guymon, ‘International Legal Mechanism for combating Transnational 
Organised Crime’ 18 Berkley Journal of International Law (2000) 53 at 87; See also M. Cherif 
Bassiouni, ‘Policy Considerations on Interstate Cooperation in Criminal Matters’ 4 Pace Y.B.Int'l 
L. (1992) 123 at 127 
31 Bassiouni, 'Effective National and International Action'  (n 17) 13 
92 
 
one state which may or may not be having bilateral treaties, this approach of 
state cooperation started to prove ineffective. Hence, the rationale of 
subjecting these crimes to international treaty regimes was to facilitate 
cooperation among all states affected by them.32. This prompted some scholars 
to collectively label these crime as ‘transnational crimes’ indicating a kind of 
criminality that requires coordination of efforts at international and 
transnational rather than bilateral level.33 
 Besides transnationality, another reason for laying emphasis on state 
cooperation was the growing nexus between organised criminals and terrorist 
offenders. Several scholars are of the view that organised criminals and 
terrorists share the common goal of paralyzing national justice systems to ensure 
the non-enforcement of law.34  Significantly, this commonality has also been 
recognised by the UN Security Council which notes with concern in paragraph 4 
of its resolution 1373 (2001) a growing connection between international 
terrorism and organised crime.35  Similarly, resolution 1817 (2008) of the Security 
Council calls upon states to coordinate their efforts to respond to the threat 
posed by linkage between terrorism and organized crime. The relevant 
paragraph is reproduced below: 
Noting with concern the existing links between international security, 
terrorism and transnational organised crime, money-laundering, 
trafficking in illicit drugs and illegal arms, and in this regard 
emphasizing the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, 
                                         
32 See for instance, article 1 of the Organised Crime Convention 2000. 'The purpose of this 
Convention is to promote cooperation to prevent and combat transnational organised crime 
more effectively.' For Corresponding provisions of other transnational treaties, see (n 4) above 
33 See Kofi A Annan, Foreword to the Organised Crime Convention 2000 at p.iii; Neil Boister, 
'Transnational Criminal Law', 14 EJIL (2003) 953 at 953; Guymon (n 30) 86-87; Sproule (n 6) at 
266; UNODC’s Technical Assistance Guide 2009 for implementing UN Convention against 
Corruption 2003 at 133 
34 Louise Shelley, ‘The Unholy Trinity: Transnational Crime, Corruption and Terrorism’ 11 Brown J. 
World Aff. (2004-2005) 101; See also  Patricia Bibes, ‘Transnational Organised Crime and 
Terrorism - Columbia a Case Study’ 17 Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice (2001) 243 at 
244; Louis Shelly, ‘The Nexus of Organised Crime and Terrorism: Two Case Studies in 
Cigarette Smuggling’ 32 International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 
(2008) 1 at 15; John Rollins & Liana Sun Wyley, ‘International Terrorism and Transnational 
Crime, Security threats, US Policy & Considerations for Congress’ 
<www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41004.pdf> [Date accessed 21/03/13] 
35 See S/RES/1373 (2001) 
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sub-regional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a 
global response to this serious challenge.36 
Likewise, the UN General Assembly in its Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy 2006 
also emphasizes the need for closer cooperation between states with respect to 
the crimes that might be connected with terrorism, including drug trafficking 
and arms smuggling.37 
It is thus clear that the element of transnationality and growing nexus between 
the offenders, motivated the international community to subject the acts of 
cross border terrorism and organised crime to international treaty regimes, so 
that state cooperation may be promoted in regard to their suppression, at 
international rather than bilateral level.   
1.2.1) Measures of state cooperation are to be enforced subject to 
the Requesting state fulfilling the demands of principle of 
reciprocity   
To effectuate state cooperation, the international conventions on terrorism and 
organised crime rely on the enforcement modalities of extradition and mutual 
legal assistance. Both these measures being admixture of national and 
international law demand the fulfilment of certain traditional conditions, for 
their employment.38 In other words, the application of these measures requires 
the requesting state to fulfil certain conditions which are found, either in the 
domestic law of the requested state pertaining to extradition or mutual legal 
assistance or under the bilateral treaty to which both the requesting and 
requested states are parties. The international conventions on terrorism and 
organised crime do not supersede these bilateral treaties and domestic laws 
rather they aim to make national legal systems responsive to their demands 
through establishing harmony.39  
                                         
36 S/RES/1817(2008) Adopted by the Security Council at its 5907th meeting, on 11 June 2008 
[hereinafter S/RES/1817 (2008)] 
37 Plan of Action annexed to Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2006),paragraphs 5 & 6 on 
Measures to Prevent and Combat Terrorism. A/Res/60/288   
38 Abramovsky (n 5) 400 
39 See Sproule (n 6) 266; Technical Guide to UN Convention against Corruption (n 33) 
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Laws and treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance are based on the 
principle of reciprocity or exchange of comparable favours. According to this 
principle, the cooperating states must share equivalent concepts of justice or 
similar legal principles with respect to the act concerning which extradition or 
mutual legal assistance is sought. The rationale of the principle is to ensure that 
legal systems of cooperating states are similar enough to allow them to assist 
each other on reciprocal basis. In other words, the principle seeks to ensure that 
if circumstances are reversed and the requested state steps into the shoes of 
requesting state, it must be entitled to obtain similar assistance as regards the 
act in question. Thus, the principle lays down a set of double condition which 
are needed to be fulfilled by a requesting state in order to obtain surrender or 
interrogation.   
One traditional condition derived from the principle of reciprocity is the 
fulfilment of double criminality. According to this condition, the act in respect 
of which extradition or mutual legal assistance is sought must constitute a crime 
under the laws of both the requesting and requested state.40 To facilitate the 
fulfilment of this condition, the international conventions on terrorism and 
organised crime oblige the parties to legislate exact definition of crimes, so that 
surrender or interrogation may not be refused for non-existence of crime under 
the law of the requested state.41  I shall now discuss in detail the double 
criminality condition and its relevance for suppression of crimes set forth by the 
international conventions on terrorism and organised crime. 
1.3)  Relevance of double criminality for suppression of 
crimes established by the international conventions on 
terrorism and organised crime 
One of the most widely applied conditions in the domestic laws and bilateral 
treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance is the double criminality 
requirement.42  According to Williams, 'dual criminality rule is the one that is 
more or less uniformly applied in extradition law and process on a worldwide 
                                         
40 M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Criminal Law, Volume II: Multilateral and Bilateral Enforcement 
Mechanisms (3rd edn, Martinus Nijhoff, Netherlands, 2008) 324 
41 ibid 
42 See Edward M. Wise, ‘Some Problems of Extradition’ 15 Wayne State Law Review (1968-69) 
709 at 716 
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basis.' 43  It stipulates that a state, when seeking extradition or mutual legal 
assistance, must establish that the act in respect of which assistance is sought 
constitutes a crime under the laws of both the requesting as well as requested 
state. Scholarly opinion is divided about the purpose of dual criminality. While 
some argue that dual criminality is meant to protect the human rights of the 
offenders,44  others maintain that it is designed to safeguard the sovereign 
interests of the requested state.45  Still others claim that dual criminality is 
directed towards establishing reciprocal obligations between states.46 
According to the first view, the justification for dual criminality lies in the 
principle of legality or nullum crimen which applies to all criminal proceedings 
including extradition and mutual assistance.47  As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
principle requires that there can be no punishment without a prior violation of 
law.48  Since extradition and some forms of mutual legal assistance are steps 
towards punishment,49  no person could be subjected to them unless his deed is 
a crime under the law of both the requesting and requested state.50  The second 
view entails that states are the only subjects of international law and all 
individual rights are derivative of state sovereignty. Therefore, conditions such 
as dual criminality are limits that states impose on the requesting parties to 
insist on protection of their nationals.51  The third view implies that dual 
criminality is meant to give assurance to the requested state that it could obtain 
the cooperation of the requesting state as regards the offence in question if 
their roles were reversed.52 According to this view, double criminality condition 
represents an off shoot of principle of reciprocity which customarily governs 
                                         
43 Sharon A Williams, ‘The Double Criminality Rule and Extradition: A Comparative Analysis’ 15 
Nova Law Review (1991) 623 at 581 
44 Williams (n 43) 582 
45 Wise (n 42) 710-711; See also  Christopher L. Blakesley, ‘The Autumn of the Patriarch: The 
Pinochet Extradition Debacle and Beyond - Human Rights Clauses Compared to Traditional 
Derivative Protections Such as Double Criminality’ 91 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 
(200-2001) 1 at 5 
46 Lech Gardocki, ‘Double Criminality in Extradition Law’ 27 Isr. L. Rev (1993) 287 at 289 
47 Williams (n 43) 582 
48 See (n 204-207) Chapter 2 above 
49 Williams (n 43) 582 
50 ibid 
51 Blakesley (n 45) 3; See also Wise (n 42) 711 
52 Gardocki (n 46) 289 
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extradition and mutual assistance proceedings. Since there is no rule of general 
international law that compels a state to extradite an offender or to provide 
legal assistance with respect to his crime in the absence of a treaty, such 
proceedings are carried out traditionally on reciprocal basis. Double criminality 
ensures reciprocity by requiring states to provide assistance in respect of those 
crimes only, concerning which they can demand assistance in future.  
The status of the principle of dual criminality under international law is also 
disputed. Some commentators claim that dual criminality enjoys the status of 
customary international law; 53  others maintain that it is a product of treaty and 
does not bind a state automatically.54  In Factor v. Laubenheimer, the US 
Supreme Court held that that the principle is based not on custom but treaty.55 
Hence, a fugitive cannot raise the dual criminality question as a bar to 
extradition if the applicable treaty or statute is silent.56  There is a growing 
consensus that fulfilment of dual criminality is necessary only when the 
requesting state proposes to take a coercive action against the offender.57 
Two methods are generally used to reflect dual criminality in bilateral treaties 
and domestic laws on extradition and mutual assistance. The first is based on a 
listing of offences. According to this method, offences in respect of which state 
cooperation can be sought are specifically listed in the relevant treaty or law. 
For instance, article 1 of the Australia-Indonesia Mutual Assistance Treaty 1995 
provides, 'parties shall grant to each other assistance in investigations or 
proceedings in respect of crimes listed in the Annex to the treaty'. The Annex 
includes offences such as human trafficking, hijacking, drug trafficking, or 
                                         
53 M. Plachta, The Role of Double Criminality in International Cooperation in Penal Matters in N. 
Jareborg, ed., Double Criminality. Studies in International Criminal Law (Uppsala, 1989) 111 
54 Williams (n 43) 582 
55 Factor v. Laubenheimer 90 U.S. 276 
(1933)<http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/290/276/case.html> [Date accessed 21/03/13] 
56 ibid 
57 Guy Stessens, Money Laundering a New International Law Enforcement Model (UK Cambridge 
University Press 2004) 291 
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aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of, being an accessory 
to, attempting or conspiring to commit these offences.58 
The second way of expressing dual criminality is to state it plainly that an 
offence shall be extraditable only if it is punishable under the laws of both the 
requesting and requested states.59  Accordingly, article II (1) of the US-Italy 
Extradition Treaty 1983 provides '[a]n offence, however denominated, shall be 
extraditable only if it is punishable under the laws of both contracting parties by 
deprivation of liberty for more than one year or by a more severe penalty.' 60 
 In view of the above, it is clear that dual criminality necessitates the 
congruence of offences in the requesting and requested states to allow them to 
cooperate. To harmonise national laws with respect to coverage of crimes, 
modern international conventions on terrorism and organised crime oblige the 
parties involved to legislate exact definitions of crimes established by them. The 
nature, scope and purpose of the duty to legislate under these conventions and 
the extent to which it enables states to satisfy dual criminality, will be discussed 
below.   
 
Section 2   Duty to legislate under modern 
international conventions on terrorism and 
organised crime 
2.1)  Significance of the duty to legislate 
Modern international conventions on terrorism and organised crime impose a 
duty on states to legislate against universal definitions of crimes established by 
them. Its rationale is to ensure the exact fulfilment of the obligation, so that 
there remains no discrepancy in the laws of cooperating states leading to refusal 
                                         
58 See article 1 & Annex of Treaty between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters. Signed at Jakarta on 7 October 1995 [hereinafter Australia-
Indonesia Mutual Assistance Treaty]; See also article 2 Hong-Kong, China-Singapore 
Extradition Treaty 1997 
59 Wise (n 42) 716 
60 See United States of America and Italy Extradition Treaty. Signed at Rome on 13 October 1983 
[hereinafter US-Italy Extradition Treaty 1983] 
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of law enforcement cooperation based upon the non-satisfaction of dual 
criminality condition.61  It can be argued, therefore, that the duty is meant to 
circumscribe the discretion available to the requested state to block extradition 
or mutual legal assistance under the rule of double criminality.  
According to Bassiouni, state cooperation is necessary in order to combat crimes 
that involve border crossing as an essential element of criminal activity.62  To 
encourage cooperation, it is essential that national laws must exhibit a certain 
degree of uniformity.63  Uniformity provides a legal basis for detection, 
prevention and repression of crimes through state cooperation in mutual legal 
assistance and extradition.64  To bring about uniformity, imposition of a duty to 
legislate represents an effective technique.65 
Extradition signifies an area where uniformity of national laws plays a crucial 
role. A majority of states apply the principle of double criminality in their 
extradition laws, which requires identical definitions of crime under the laws of 
both the requesting and the requested state for the purposes of surrender.66 
Duty to legislate under the international counter-terrorism and organised crime 
conventions facilitates the fulfilment of double criminality by requiring each 
party to establish identical definitions of crimes.67  In the same way, the duty 
enables the parties to satisfy double criminality in cross-border investigation of 
                                         
61 Bassiouni ‘Policy Considerations’ (n 30) 125-126; See also Bruce Zagaris, ‘US Cooperation 
Against Transnational Organised Crime’ 44 Wayne State Law Review (1998-1999) 1401  at 
1425  
62 Bassiouni, ‘Effective Action’ (n 17) at 33 & 36  
63 UNODC’s Legislative Guide For Implementation of the Human Trafficking Protocol to the UN 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 2000 at 269 paragraph 35  
<http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/legislative_guides/Legislative%20guides_Full%20version.pdf>  
[date accessed 21/03/13] 
64 UNODC’s Legislative Guide for Implementation of the Organized Crime Convention 2000 at 39 
<http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/legislative_guides/Legislative%20guides_Full%20version.pdf> 
[date accessed 21/03/13] 
65 ibid 
66 UNODC’s Legislative Guide to the Universal Anti-Terrorism Conventions & Protocols (2003) at 8 
paragraph 18 <http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/terrorism/explanatory_english2.pdf>  [date 
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crimes, which is a key to success in global fight against transnational 
criminality.68 
Another important function of the duty is to prevent the states from failing to 
cooperate. If laws are available domestically, states cannot show their inability 
to cooperate due to the absence of enabling laws. It should be noted that in the 
early phases of the formation of ICTY, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) 
expressed its inability to cooperate on account of the absence of enabling 
national laws.69 
The international conventions on terrorism and organised crime by imposing a 
duty to legislate, promise to redefine the role of international law which thus far 
has been limited to laying down general obligations.70  General obligations refer 
to those provisions of multilateral treaties which do not require the parties to 
legislate in order to perform their international obligations.71  They rather leave 
the parties free to choose ways and means of performing their international 
obligations.72  Their purpose is to provide guidelines to legislators to ensure that 
national systems are capable enough to carry out treaty obligations;73 hence 
they are akin to statements of policy.74  According to Lambert, general 
obligations are based on the premise that ‘international law imposes obligation 
not of way but of result.’75  On the contrary, the duty to legislate establishes 
binding obligations whose non-compliance could entail state responsibility.76 
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69 Fourth Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible 
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2.2)  Evolution of the duty to legislate in the international 
conventions on terrorism and organised crime  
The duty to legislate has gradually emerged in the international conventions on 
terrorism and organised crime. The older counter-terrorism conventions merely 
define these crimes and require the parties to make them punishable under their 
national laws. However, modern conventions specifically oblige the parties to 
legislate them in their national laws. The duty to make a crime punishable is 
distinguishable from the duty to legislate as the former does not require the 
adoption of the exact definitions of crimes: states can comply with their 
obligation by making punishable domestic law counterparts of these crimes.77  
For instance, if national law makes punishable the acts of abduction, illegal 
confinement and coercion, the concerned state will be deemed to be in 
compliance with its obligation to penalise hostage-taking as per the 
requirements of the UN Convention against Taking of Hostages.78 According to 
Lambert, the reason for not imposing the duty to legislate in earlier treaties was 
the relatively simple nature of the crimes which rarely caused problems of dual 
criminality in extradition and mutual assistance proceedings.79 
However, when it was realised that criminalisation of domestic law equivalents 
was not sufficient to satisfy dual criminality requirement as regards complex 
aggregate crimes, the duty to make the offences punishable gave way to the 
duty to legislate. For instance, offences such as terror financing and money 
laundering represent an aggregate of several specialized offences; as such, 
either their domestic law counterparts did not exist or their constituent 
elements varied from one state to another.80  It was thus difficult for states to 
fulfil the dual criminality condition in extradition or interrogation proceedings 
without having legislated similar definitions of crime.81 
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2.2.1) Analysis of definitions of crimes under the older 
and modern counter-terrorism conventions 
A comparative analysis of the crimes set forth by the Hague Convention 1970 and 
the Terrorist Bombing Convention 1997 provides useful insights into the 
distinction between the duty to legislate and the duty to make offences 
punishable. It also sheds light on the reasons that compelled the drafters to 
impose a duty to legislate with respect to the offences set forth by the latter 
Conventions. Article 2 of the Hague Convention 1970 provides ‘Each Contracting 
State undertakes to make the offence punishable by severe penalties.’82 This 
may be compared to article 4 of the Terrorist Bombing Convention 1997 which 
provides:  
 Each state party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary: (a) 
To establish as criminal offences under its domestic law the offences 
set forth in article 2 of this  Convention; (b) To make those offences 
punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the grave 
nature of those offences.83 
Clearly, the Hague Convention 1970 simply requires that the offences be made 
punishable under national laws. By contrast, the Terrorist Bombing Convention 
1997, in addition to requiring penalisation of offences, further obliges the 
parties to establish them as criminal offences under their national laws.  
 Article 1 of the Hague Convention 1970 provides the following definition of the 
crime:  
 any person who (a) on board an aircraft in flight unlawfully, by force 
seizes, or exercises control of, that aircraft (b) is an accomplice of a 
person who performs or attempts to perform any such act commits an 
offence… 84 
Conversely, article 2 of the Terrorist Bombings Convention 1997 defines the 
offence as follows: 
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1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this 
Convention if that person unlawfully and intentionally delivers, 
places, discharges or detonates an explosive or other lethal device in, 
into or against a place of public use, a state or government facility, a 
public transportation system or an infrastructure facility: a) with the 
intent to cause death or serious bodily injury or b) with the intent to 
cause extensive destruction of such a place, facility or system, where 
such destruction results in or is likely to result in major economic loss. 
2. Any person also commits an offence if that person attempts to 
commit an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 of the present article. 
3. Any person also commits an offence if that person: a) Participates 
as an accomplice in an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 or 2 of the 
present article; or b) Organises or directs others to commit an offence 
as set forth in paragraph 1 or 2 of the present article; or 
 c) In any other way contributes to the commission of one or more 
offences as set forth in paragraph 1 or 2 of the present article by a 
group of persons acting with a common purpose; such contribution 
shall be intentional and either be made with the aim of furthering the 
general criminal activity or purpose of the group or be made in the 
knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the offence or 
offences concerned.85 
Evidently, the definition of terrorist bombing under the 1997 Convention is much 
more complex as compared to the definition of hijacking under the 1970 
Convention. While the latter only deals with the act of hijacking on board 
aircrafts, the former takes into its fold destruction of public places, 
transportation system, infrastructure facility and governmental facility. 
Moreover, the 1970 Convention provides only two inchoate offences, i.e. 
attempt and participation as an accomplice, whereas the 1997 Convention 
establishes a wide range of inchoate offences, including organisation, direction 
and contribution. 
The international criminalisation of these offences underlies the assumption that 
it will facilitate the extradition and interrogation of the offenders involved in 
borderless crimes. However, the non-existence of any of the elements of crimes 
under the national law of the requested state allows it to refuse cooperation due 
to a failure of the requesting state to fulfil the double criminality condition of 
its extradition or mutual legal assistance law. Since this possibility was always 
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present in extradition and interrogation proceedings involving complex crimes, 
the modern international conventions on terrorism and organised crime imposed 
a duty to legislate against their universal definitions with a view to bringing 
similarity in the national coverage of crimes. 
In a nutshell, it was felt that state cooperation in extradition and mutual legal 
assistance concerning complex crimes might not be facilitated merely by 
defining the offences at international level and requiring the parties to 
criminalise their domestic law counterparts. This realisation led to imposition of 
an international duty to implement exact definitions of crimes. Some instances 
of complications arising in law enforcement cooperation as a result of diverse 
national definitions of complex crimes are discussed immediately below. 
2.3) Complications arising in law enforcement 
cooperation as a result of diverse national definitions of 
crimes 
2.3.1)  Adnan Khashoggi case 
Several extradition cases demonstrate the necessity of imposing the duty to 
legislate in modern complex crimes. One of them is the 1989 case of Adnan 
Khashoggi between the US and Switzerland.86  Here, the US demanded 
extradition of Adnan Khashoggi, an international arms smuggler, from 
Switzerland on the charges of conspiracy and racketeering as well as obstruction 
of justice and mail fraud.87  The first two charges were based on the alleged 
violations of a US law, Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).88 
The domestic law counterpart of this enactment was not available under the 
Swiss legal system.89  Therefore, in order to satisfy the condition of dual 
criminality, the US had to drop these charges from its extradition request.90 
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When the accused was subsequently tried in the US, the rule of ‘specialty’ 
prevented it from adding further charges.91  The rule requires correspondence 
between the facts presented in the extradition request and charges brought 
against an offender once he is extradited.92  In other words, according to this 
rule, an extradited fugitive can be prosecuted for those offences only for which 
he was surrendered.93  If further charges are to be introduced after the 
extradition, the requesting state is obliged to seek permission of the requested 
state.94  The rule is universally applied in extradition and mutual legal assistance 
laws and treaties and is considered to represent customary international law.95 
In its bid to obtain the surrender of Khashoggi, the US agreed to drop the 
complex charges of conspiracy and racketeering from its extradition request. 
Since the remaining offences of mail fraud and obstruction of justice were only 
remotely linked to the US, the ensuing trial culminated in the acquittal of the 
accused.96  According to a news report, the jurors had doubts whether the 
remaining charges fell within the jurisdiction of the US courts.97  Arguably, in 
this case, the disparity of national laws resulting from the complexity of modern 
transnational crimes led to the acquittal of the offender.  
To forestall the recurrence of such happenings, article 5 of the Organised Crime 
Convention 2000 obliges the parties to legislate against universal definitions of 
conspiracy, planning and participation in the activities of an organised criminal 
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group, and the act of simply being a member of such group.98  The obligation 
effectively covers the charges of racketeering and conspiracy to racket. 
2.3.2)  Ross v Israel 
Another case relates to the US request for extradition of Ross, an Israeli 
national.99  In this case, the US demanded the extradition of Ross from Israel on 
charges of inter-state transportation of humans. It was alleged that the offender 
abducted a US national from its territory and then transported him abroad. The 
offender contended that the offence of inter-state transportation of humans was 
not covered by the US-Israel Extradition Treaty 1962.100  Moreover, he argued 
that, given that the crime did not exist under Israel’s penal law, the condition of 
dual criminality as required by its extradition law was not met.101  The Court 
however found that the extradition treaty between the US and Israel included 
the offence of abduction which if seen in the international context could be 
interpreted to embrace the interstate transportation of humans. According to its 
reasoning, the US law defined abduction to include the act of transportation. 
Since the US definition of a crime listed in the bilateral treaty was as binding on 
Israel as its own, Israel could not have construed the offence restrictively.102  As 
noted by Feller, the judgment was unconvincing because the definition of 
abduction under the relevant extradition treaty clearly fell short of covering the 
crime of inter-state transportation.103  Under this judgement, an unusual 
approach was adopted to determine the fulfilment of double criminality, i.e. 
considering one party’s definition of crime relevant for the purposes of 
interpreting an offence listed in the extradition treaty.104  To avoid such 
complications in the extradition and interrogation of offenders, the Organised 
Crime Convention 2000 has now imposed a duty on states to legislate against 
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universal definitions of inter-state human trafficking and human smuggling which 
covers the act of inter-state transportation of human.105 
2.3.3)  Riley v. the Commonwealth 
A similar situation arose in the famous Australian case of Riley v. the 
Commonwealth.106  In this case, the custody of fugitives was sought by the US 
for the offence of Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) under 21 USC 848. The 
fugitives were involved in a series of offences regarding the import of drugs, 
making them liable to be prosecuted in the US under the cumulative charge of 
CCE.  The schedule of the offences appended with the relevant Extradition 
Treaty had no CCE offence.107  However, the court opted for a test of double 
criminality which was based on the assessment of whether the acts comprising 
CCE would be considered criminal in Australia if committed there.108  Although 
CCE had no exact parallel in Australian law, the acts of the accused taken 
individually did constitute crimes under it, albeit with different names and 
elements. Hence, the extradition was granted on the ground that the conduct in 
question would have been criminal, if committed in Australia.109   To paraphrase 
the words of Gobert, this kind of liberal approach towards application of dual 
criminality could be fairly useful in the extradition of offenders involved in 
complex crimes.110 
The offence of Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) now stands criminalised 
under the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime 2000 111  and 
each state party is bound to legislate it under its national law. It is thus 
expected that the parties should be able to negotiate dual criminality in their 
cooperative efforts involving this crime.     
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The above analysis indicates that national courts tend to take different 
approaches while interpreting the dual criminality requirement. Whereas some 
courts interpret it to mean exact similarity of offences,112  others are of the 
view that it is sufficient that elements of the offence should be a crime in two 
states.113   A few maintain that offences need only be substantially similar.114 
However, there appears to be a broad consensus that the non-existence of the 
crime in relation to which the extradition is sought under the national law of 
either state means the offender may raise dual criminality objection and the 
requested state is under no obligation to extradite. Thus, it was observed by the 
Canadian Supreme Court in R v. Parisien:  
 Most [extradition] treaties are limited to crimes therein listed. This 
ensures that a state to which a request to surrender a person is made 
is not obliged to surrender its citizens and other persons within its 
allegiance and protection for prosecution in the requesting state for 
behaviour not considered criminal in the requested state.115 
Since modern complex crimes never really existed under the national laws of a 
majority of states, it was difficult to satisfy even the minimum threshold of dual 
criminality, i.e. that the offence be a crime under the national law of both, the 
requesting and requested states. Hence, it can be argued that the duty to 
legislate was imposed in response to the complexity of modern transnational 
crimes, the non-availability of whose domestic law parallels caused 
complications of dual criminality in extradition and mutual assistance 
proceedings.The conventions establishing duty to legislate and specific features 
of the crimes set forth by them will be analysed below. 
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2.4)  The international conventions establishing duty to 
legislate 
2.4.1)  Counter-Terrorism Conventions 
2.4.1.1)  The Terrorism Financing Convention 1999  
The Convention establishes the crime of providing funds to commit terrorist 
offences with the intention and knowledge that the funds will be so used.116 
Article 4 provides that 'Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be 
necessary:(a)[ t]o establish as criminal offences under its national law the 
offences set forth in article 2.' 
2.4.1.2)  The Terrorist Bombing Convention 1997  
The Convention establishes the crime of using explosives and other lethal 
devices in public places with intent to kill or cause injury or destruction of 
public places.117 Article 4(a) obliges a party to establish as criminal offences 
under its national law the offences set forth by the Convention.  
2.4.1.3) The Nuclear Terrorism Convention 2005  
The Convention proscribes the act of possessing or using radioactive material or 
a device producing radioactivity, with intent to cause death, injury, damage to 
property or the environment, in order to compel a state to do or to refrain from 
doing an act.118 Article 5 provides that ‘Each State Party shall adopt such 
measures as may be necessary: (a)[ t]o establish as criminal offences under its 
national law the offences set forth in article 2.’ 
2.4.2)  Organised Crime Conventions 
2.4.2.1) The Drugs Convention 1988  
The Convention proscribes the acts of manufacture, production, sale, 
transportation and cultivation of narcotics drugs.119 Article 3(1) obliges each 
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state party to establish as criminal offences under its national law the offences 
set forth by the Convention.  
2.4.2.2) The UN Convention against Corruption 2003  
The Convention establishes the crimes of bribery in both public120 and private121 
sectors as well as bribery involving national and foreign public officials and 
officials of international organizations.122  It further criminalises solicitation and 
acceptance of bribe123  as well as embezzlement,124  trading in influence,125 
illicit enrichment and associated inchoate offences. Articles 15 to 27 oblige each 
state party to take such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to 
make the offences set forth in the Convention criminal offences under its 
national laws. 
2.4.2.3) The Organised Crime Convention 2000  
Article 5 of the Convention requires that each State Party shall adopt such 
legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal 
offence the act of being member of an organised criminal group regardless of 
the nature of its activities.126  Three of its protocols require the criminalisation 
of human trafficking,127  migrant smuggling128  and weapon trafficking.129 
2.5)  Distinguishing features of the conventions 
establishing duty to legislate 
Features that distinguish the counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions 
establishing duty to legislate from their older counter-parts include their specific 
focus on inchoate offences and ancillary crimes.  
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2.5.1)  Inchoate offences 
The initial focus of the counter- terrorism and organised crime conventions was 
to criminalise principal acts only. Hence, the older conventions such as the 
Hague,130  the Montreal,131  the Protection of Diplomats,132  and the Hostages133  
Conventions did not define any inchoate offence besides attempt and 
participation as an accomplice. However, modern conventions such as the 
Terrorism Financing and the Drugs Conventions establish a wide range of 
inchoate offences encompassing acts such as conspiracy, planning, financing, 
directing and organising.134  These are preparatory-type offenses, the 
criminalisation of which is directed towards facilitating law enforcement 
cooperation at planning stages of the crimes.135  The impetus for their 
criminalisation came from new forms of terrorism, such as suicide bombing.136  
As the offenders involved in these crimes were ideologically motivated, they 
were unlikely to be deterred by a fear of punishment. Discouraging such crimes 
was thus possible only by taking effective action at the planning stages.137 
Since these crimes were new to many states, with a view to bringing similarity in 
national laws in regard to their coverage, recent counter-terrorism and 
organised crime conventions imposed a duty on states to legislate against their 
universal definitions. Significantly, legislation of these crimes has also been 
required by Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001).138  Subsequent resolutions 
of the Council further expanded the range of inchoate offences against which 
states were required to legislate, including acts such as incitement to 
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terrorism.139  Now efforts are underway to criminalise religious indoctrination.140  
All these international efforts are directed towards bringing harmony to national 
laws in order to facilitate state cooperation in law enforcement. 
2.5.2)  Ancillary crimes 
In addition to inchoate offences, recent counter-terrorism and organised crime 
conventions also establish ancillary crimes. Ancillary crimes refer to the acts 
which make it possible for the offenders to carry out principal crimes. These 
are: obstruction of justice, money laundering, corruption and membership of an 
organized criminal group. Through obstruction of justice and corruption, the 
offenders seek to paralyse national justice systems to ensure non-enforcement 
of law and through money laundering and joining organised criminal groups they 
contribute to continuation of criminal enterprises. Like inchoate offences, these 
crimes were also either non-existent or their constituent elements varied in 
national laws. To bring about harmony in national laws and thereby to facilitate 
law enforcement cooperation, modern counter-terrorism and organised crime 
conventions imposed a duty on states to legislate against these crimes. A brief 
introduction to two ancillary crimes is given below. 
2.5.2.1)  Participation in an organised criminal group 
Article 5 of the Organised Crime Convention 2000 obliges the parties to 
criminalise the act of agreeing with one or more persons to commit a serious 
crime for the purposes of obtaining a material benefit. In other words, it refers 
to the act of being a member of an organised criminal group regardless of the 
nature of its activities.141  One commentator has described the crime as 
'umbrella criminality’ because it applies to participation in a group formed to 
carry out any type of criminal activity.142 
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2.5.2.2)  Money Laundering  
Another common feature of modern counter-terrorism and organised crime 
conventions is that they require the criminalisation of money laundering. This 
was first required by the UN Convention against Drugs 1988, followed by the 
Terrorism Financing Convention 1999, the Organised Crime Convention 2000 and 
the UN Convention against Corruption 2003.143  The requirement is directed 
towards depriving an offender of the benefit of his criminal activity.144 
Money laundering refers to an activity by which source and ownership of 
criminally derived wealth is changed to confer on it a perception of 
legitimacy.145  It is therefore not a single crime but a criminal process, the 
suppression of which calls for criminalisation of three inter-related acts.146 
Firstly, it requires the criminalisation of the concealment and disguise of the 
ownership and location of the proceeds of crime. Secondly, it demands 
criminalisation of predicate offences or acts through which the illicit proceeds 
are generated. Thirdly, it necessitates the criminalisation of the offences 
involving the participation of legal entities. Since these offences were previously 
unknown to a majority of states, which had only the conventions to define them, 
national laws might have diverged with respect to their implementation. 
Accordingly, mandatory obligations were imposed by modern counter-terrorism 
and organised crime conventions to establish these acts as criminal offences 
under national law.147 
In the light of above, it is evident that modern counter-terrorism and organised 
crime conventions are distinguishable from their older counter-parts on account 
of the complex nature of the crimes set forth by them. Since these crimes were 
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non-existent under national laws, it was difficult for states parties to satisfy dual 
criminality conditions in extradition and mutual assistance proceedings involving 
these crimes. Thus, the duty to legislate was imposed under these conventions 
to facilitate state cooperation in law enforcement with respect to complex 
aggregate crimes. However, the duty is not without its limitations.  
2.6)  Limitations of Duty to Legislate 
To accommodate divergent national interests, the duty to legislate has been 
subjected to several exceptions and safeguards that authorise states to depart 
from definitions of crimes as laid down by the conventions. The said exceptions 
will be analysed below in order to establish that, despite the mandatory wording 
of the duty, its implementation remains a prerogative of the states.   
2.6.1)  Offences are to be defined in accordance with national law 
of the states parties 
All organised crime conventions under consideration contain a common provision 
suggesting that notwithstanding the duty to legislate crimes, their exact 
definitions shall be determined in accordance with the national laws of states 
parties.148  The purpose of the provision is to allow the parties to criminalise the 
acts proscribed by the conventions in accordance with the fundamental 
principles of their national justice systems.149 
2.6.2)   Safeguard clauses 
Safeguard clauses150  were introduced to address the concerns of some states 
that criminalisation of a number of offences set forth by the conventions would 
                                         
148 See article 30(9) the UN Convention against Corruption 2003 and article 11(6) the Organised 
Crime Convention 2000. The provision lays down in unambiguous terms that: 
 Nothing contained in this Convention shall affect the principle that the description of offences 
established in accordance with this Convention and of the applicable legal defences or other 
legal principles controlling the lawfulness of conduct is reserved to the domestic law of state 
parties and that such offences shall be prosecuted and punished in accordance with that law. 
See also article 3(11) the Drugs Convention 1988 
149 Sproule (n 6) 270 
150 The phrase ‘safeguards clause’ has been used in the UNODC’s Legislative Guide for 
implementing the UN Convention against Corruption 2003 at p. 4 para 13 
<www.unodc.org/.../LegislativeGuide/UNCAC_Legislative_Guide_A.pdf ->[Date accessed 
21/03/13] 
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be inconsistent with the basic concepts of their national justice systems.151  
Thus, with a view to secure consensus, several offences set forth by the 
conventions such as possession and purchase of drugs,152 participation as an 
accomplice in the crime of human trafficking153  and possession and use of 
property derived through proceeds of crime, were subjected to the principles of 
national laws and constitutions.154 
2.6.3)  Reservations 
All counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions authorise the parties to 
make reservations.155  A state making a reservation is not bound as regards the 
provisions concerning which the reservation has been effected. Relying on a 
                                         
151 Sproule (n 6) 270 
152 Article 3(2) of the Drugs Convention 1988 provides:  
Subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system, each party shall 
adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence under its 
domestic law, when committed intentionally, the possession, purchase or cultivation of narcotic 
drugs or psychotropic substances for personal consumption contrary to the provisions of the 
1961 Convention, the 1961Convention as amended or the 1971 Convention. 
153 Article 5(2) of 2000 Human Trafficking Protocol to the Organised Crime Convention 2000 
provides: 
 Each State Party shall also adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to 
establish as criminal offences:(a) Subject to the basic concepts of its legal system, attempting to 
commit an offence established in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article; (b) Participating as 
an accomplice in an offence established in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article; and (c) 
Organising or directing other persons to commit an offence established in accordance with 
paragraph 1 of this article . 
154 See for instance article 3(1)(c)(i) the Drugs Convention 1988 
155 See for instance, article 23(2) the Nuclear Terrorism Convention 2005: 
 Each State may, at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance or approval of this Convention 
or accession thereto, declare that it does not consider itself bound by paragraph 1 of the 
present article. The other States Parties shall not be bound by paragraph 1 with respect to any 
State Party which has made such a reservation.  
Corresponding provisions can be found in all counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions 
under consideration. 
For Corresponding provisions, see article 12(2) the Hague Convention 1970, article 14(2) the 
Montreal Convention 1971, article 13(2) the Protection of Diplomats Convention 1973, article 
17(3) the Nuclear Materials Convention, article 16(2) the Hostages Convention 1979, article 
16(2) the Rome Convention 1988, article 20(2) the Terrorist Bombings Convention 1997, article 
24(2) the Terrorism Financing Convention 1999, article 32 (4) the Drugs Convention 1988, 
article 35(3) the Organized Crime Convention 2000, article 66(3) the UN Convention against 
Corruption 2000 and article 20(2) the Beijing Convention 2010.   
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reservation clause, many states have shown their inability to consider as crimes 
the acts of terrorism committed in the course of freedom movements.156 
2.6.4)  Use of the words ‘unlawful’ and ‘intentional’ in definitions 
of offences 
Both counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions stipulate that the 
conduct proscribed by them is required to be criminalised only when it is 
unlawful and intentional.157  Nevertheless, the terms ‘unlawful’ and ‘intentional’ 
have not been defined by the conventions. Hence, their inclusion in the 
definitions of crimes makes it possible for states to introduce exceptions and 
defences.158 
2.6.5)  Discretion in the matter of establishing predicate crimes 
As suggested above, predicate crimes are the acts through which the proceeds of 
crime are generated. In order to forfeit assets upon foreign request, it is not 
sufficient that the requested state makes punishable the act of laundering.159  It 
further necessitates the criminalisation of the acts through which the illicit 
proceeds are generated. The fulfilment of double criminality in forfeiture 
proceedings demands correspondence in the predicate crimes set forth by the 
requesting and requested states. In other words, it requires that the act through 
                                         
156 For instance, while ratifying Terrorist Bombing Convention 1997, government of Pakistan 
recorded its reservation that nothing in this Convention shall be applicable to acts committed in 
the course of exercising right of self-determination (Government of Pakistan’s declaration dated 
13 August 2002 to Terrorist Bombings convention 1997). Similarly, Egypt recorded its 
reservation with respect to Terrorist Financing Convention 1999 that it does not consider that 
act of national resistance in all its forms constitute acts of terrorism within the meanings of 
article 2(1)(b) of the Convention(Egypt’s declaration to Terrorist Financing convention 1999 
dated 1 march 2005).Likewise, Syria observed in its reservation that the acts of resistance to 
foreign occupation are not included under acts of terrorism (Syria’s declaration to Terrorist 
Financing convention 1999 dated 24th April 2005). See problematic reservations and 
declarations to counterterrorism conventions  <www.unodc.org> [date accessed 21/0313] 
157 Words ‘unlawfully’ and ‘intentionally’ appear in almost all counter-terrorism and organised crime 
conventions. See for instance, article 3(1)(a) of the Rome Convention 1988 ‘Any person commits 
an offence if that person unlawfully and intentionally: (a) seizes or exercises control over a ship by 
force or threat thereof or any other form of intimidation.’ See also article 2 (1) the Terrorist Bombing 
Convention 1997: 
 Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person unlawfully 
and intentionally delivers, places, discharges or detonates an explosive or other lethal device in, 
into or against a place of public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system 
or an infrastructure facility… 
158 Lavalle (n 80) 500 
159 See text to (n 145-147) above 
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which illicit proceeds are generated must constitute a crime under the laws of 
both the requesting and requested state. Therefore, along with establishing the 
obligation to criminalise money laundering, the counter-terrorism and organised 
crime conventions further oblige the parties to establish as criminal offences 
under their national laws, the acts proscribed by them as predicate crimes.160 
The Drug Convention 1988, which represents the forerunner of the conventions 
establishing money laundering provisions, requires the criminalisation of only 
one offence as predicate crime, i.e. drug trafficking.161  This model is replicated 
in the Terrorism Financing Convention 1999.162  A state following this approach 
can only assist another in the forfeiture of proceeds, if the proceeds are derived 
by committing the designated crime. Fortunately, this approach has been 
revisited in modern conventions like the Organized Crime Convention 2000 and 
the UN Convention against Corruption 2003. Under these Conventions, states are 
required to apply their money laundering laws to the widest range of predicate 
crimes.163   However, both conventions restrict the obligation to legislate, to the 
offences expressly set forth by them.164   In relation to other crimes, they 
merely recommend the parties establish them as predicate crimes.165   Even the 
so-called obligation to legislate is subject to the fundamental principles of 
domestic law of state parties.166   Furthermore, the obligation is subject to the 
                                         
160 See article 6(2)(b) of the Organised Crime Convention 2000 ‘[e]ach State Party shall include as 
predicate offences all serious crime as defined in article 2 of this Convention and the offences 
established in accordance with articles 5, 8 and 23 of this Convention.’ Articles 5, 8 and 23 
establish the crimes of money laundering, obstruction of justice and corruption whereas article 2 
defines the term serious crime as any criminal activity punishable with maximum deprivation of 
liberty of four years or more. See also article 23(2)(b) of the UN Convention against Corruption 
2003 
161 Article 3(1)(b)&(c) the Drugs Convention 1988 
162 See article 8 the Terrorism Financing Convention 1999; According to this provision, the funds 
can be seized when they are directed towards financing the acts of terrorism or have been 
derived as a result of an act of terrorism.  
163 For instance, the Organised Crime Convention 2000 enjoins the parties to establish as 
predicate offence any serious crime of organised nature involving the element of border 
crossing or transnationality. Moreover, both the Organised Crime Convention 2000 and the UN 
Convention against Corruption 2003 recommend that parties should consider applying their 
money laundering laws to the widest range of predicate offences. See  article 6(2)(a) & (b) the 
Organised Crime Convention 2000 and  article 23(2)(a) & (c) the UN Convention against 
Corruption 2003.   
164 See article 6(2)(b) the Organised Crime Convention 2000. See also article 23(2)(b) the UN 
Convention against Corruption 2003 
165 See article 6(2)(a) the Organised Crime Convention  2000; See also article 23(2)(a) the UN 
Convention against Corruption 2003 
166 See article 6(1) the Organised Crime Convention 2000 
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rule that the description of offences is exclusively reserved to the domestic law 
of the state parties.167   Additionally, the obligation is governed by the general 
provision that the conventions are required to be implemented to the extent 
permissible under national law.168  Consequently, the duty to legislate predicate 
crimes is unlikely to have the desired harmonising impact on national laws. 
In the light of the above, it is evident that the duty to legislate crimes is not 
absolute and is subject to a number of exceptions and safeguards. Several 
scholars are of the view that these exceptions have rendered the duty hortatory 
or recommendatory.169  The purpose of imposing a duty to legislate was to 
facilitate state cooperation in law enforcement with respect to complex 
aggregate crimes having no parallels in national laws. However, the above 
exceptions point to the fact that states are entitled to implement the duty to 
the extent permissible under their national laws.170  This arrangement is likely to 
produce disharmony in domestic coverage of crimes. 
According to the rule of double criminality, the advancement of state 
cooperation in law enforcement depends upon the existence and recognition of 
the crime in the national law of the requested state, with respect to which 
cooperation is sought. Pursuant to above exceptions, states are competent to 
adopt so much of the definitions of crimes as are permissible under their 
national law. The resultant disharmony ensures that the leverage available to 
the requested state to block surrender or interrogation due to the non-fulfilment 
of double criminality remains intact. The discretion of the requested state could 
have been circumscribed through establishing unqualified obligations to legislate 
                                         
167 See article 11(6) the Organised Crime Convention  and article 30(9) the UN Convention against 
Corruption 2003 
168 See article 65 the UN Convention against Corruption 2003 and article 11(6) the Organised 
Crime Convention 2000 
169 For instance, Sproule remarks that he ‘fails to understand’ the purpose of these concessions in 
the treaties which are supposed to be establishing binding obligations. See Sproule (n 6) 272; 
Bassiouni takes the view that if states are allowed to have their own definitions, they are likely to 
create exceptions blurring the distinction between international and domestic crimes. See 
Bassiouni, ‘Effective Action’ (n 17) 9, 19; Mark Peith states that exceptions can be used to 
introduce selective legislation sparing certain individuals or groups, the legislators want to 
protect. See Mark Pieth, ‘Criminalizing the Financing of Terrorism’ 4 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice (2006) 1074 at 1080. Philipa Webb notes that exceptions are being used as a 
convenient means to avoid international obligations with impunity. See Philipa Webb, ‘The UN 
Convention against Corruption: Global achievement or missed opportunity’ 8 Journal of 
International Economic Law (2005) 191 at 206. 
170 Sproule (n 6) 
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under the counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions. However, this 
course was avoided in order to gain maximum ratifications.171 
Section 3:   Impact of duty to legislate 
The duty to legislate under the international conventions on terrorism and 
organised crime is aimed at bringing harmony in national definitions of crimes in 
order to facilitate extradition and mutual legal assistance proceedings involving 
these crime.172 The acts proscribed by the conventions are criminalised under 
national laws on terrorism and organised crime. Additionally, they are also listed 
in bilateral treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance.173 Thus, the 
impact of the duty to legislate will be analysed at the level of both, national 
laws on terrorism and organised crime and bilateral treaties on extradition and 
mutual legal assistance.    
3.1)  Impact of duty to legislate on national 
counter-terrorism and organised crime laws 
3.1.1)  counter-terrorism laws 
The counter-terrorism conventions establishing duty to legislate include the 
Terrorist Bombing Convention 1997, the Terrorism Financing Convention 1999 
and the Nuclear Terrorism Convention 2005. In response to legislative obligations 
imposed by them, Pakistan enacted the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997.174  India has 
enacted the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967 as amended in 2008.175 
Both Acts provide definitions of terrorist activities and make them punishable 
with severe penalties.176 
                                         
171 Legislative Guide for implementing Organised Crime Convention 2000 (n 64) at 130 
172 .See (n 228) below 
173 See for example Sc. 2 of Israel’s Extradition Law 1954 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Archive/Communiques/1995/EXTRADITION%20IN%20ISRAEL 
174  See Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 of Pakistan; For full citation see (n 265) Chapter 2 above 
175 The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967 of India; For full citation see (n 179) Chapter 2 
above 
176 See section 6, the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 of Pakistan:  
Whoever, to strike in the people, or any section of the people, or to alienate any section of the 
people or adversely affect harmony among different sections of the people, does any act or 
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The two enactments, however, do not include separate provisions for each 
criminal activity prohibited by the conventions. The Indian definition adequately 
covers all three activities subjected to duty to legislate, i.e. financing, bombing 
and nuclear terrorism. By contrast, Pakistan’s definition falls short of covering 
nuclear terrorism and financing of terrorism. Pakistan, nonetheless, claims to 
have covered financing of terrorism under its money laundering law which 
establishes the crime of generating the proceeds of crime through terrorist 
activities.177 
                                                                                                                           
thing by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive or inflammable substances, or fire-arms, or 
other lethal weapons or poisons or noxious gases or chemicals or other substances of a 
hazardous nature in such a manner as to cause, or to be likely to cause the death of, or injury 
to, any person or persons, or damage to or destruction of, property or disruption of any 
supplies of services, essential to the life of the community or displays fire-arms, or threatens 
with the use of force public servants in order to prevent them from discharging their lawful 
duties commits a terrorist act.  
See also section 7, the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 of Pakistan: 
 Whoever commits a terrorist act shall--- (1) if such act has resulted in the death of any person be 
punished with death; and (ii) in any other case be punishable with imprisonment for a term 
which shall not be less than seven years but may extend to life imprisonment, and shall also 
be liable to fine. 
 See also Section 15, the Unlawful activities(Prevention) Act 1967 of India:  
Whoever does any act with intent to threaten or likely to threaten the unity, integrity, security or 
sovereignty of India or with intent to strike terror or likely to strike terror in the people or any 
section of the people in India or in any foreign country (a) by using bombs, dynamite or other 
explosive substances or inflammable substances or firearms or other lethal weapons or 
poisonous or noxious gases or other chemicals or by any other substances (whether 
biological, radioactive, nuclear or otherwise) of a hazardous nature or by any other means of 
whatever nature to cause or likely to cause (i) death of, or injuries to, any person or persons; 
or (ii) loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, property; or (iii) disruption of any supplies or 
services essential to the life of the community in India or in any foreign country; or (iv) damage 
or destruction of any property in India or in a foreign country used or intended to be used for 
the defence of India or in connection with any other purposes of the Government of India, any 
State Government or any of their agencies; or (b) overawes by means of criminal force or the 
show of criminal force or attempts to do so or causes death of any public functionary or 
attempts to cause death of any public functionary; or (c) detains, kidnaps or abducts any 
person and threatens to kill or injure such person or does any other act in order to compel the 
Government of India, any State Government or the Government of a foreign country or any 
other person to do or abstain from doing any act, commits a terrorist act.  
See also section 16, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967 of India: 
 (1) Whoever commits a terrorist act shall (a) if such act has resulted in the death of any person, 
be punishable with death or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine; (b) in any 
other case, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years 
but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine. 
177 See preamble of the Anti-Money Laundering Act 2010 of Pakistan: 
 Whereas it is expedient to provide for prevention of money laundering, combating financing of 
terrorism and forfeiture of property derived from or involved in money laundering or financing 
of terrorism and for matters connected therewith and incidental thereto. 
See also section (ix) of the schedule to Anti-Money Laundering Act 2010 of Pakistan which 
includes all offences proscribed under Anti-terrorism Act 1997 of Pakistan as predicate offences 
to terrorism. 
120 
 
According to the House of Lords, this approach blurs the distinction between 
money laundering and terror financing.178  While the former is concerned with 
the concealment of proceeds of crime, the latter involves making the funds 
available to terrorists.179  To maintain this distinction, Indian law created the 
two separate offences of holding proceeds of terrorism180  and raising funds for 
terrorist acts.181  Moreover, Indian legislation makes a clear distinction between 
international and domestic terrorism, whereas Pakistan’s law makes no such 
distinction.182 
The anti-terrorism laws of the US183 and New Zealand184  include separate 
provisions on each terrorist activity prohibited by the counter-terrorism 
conventions. Furthermore, these laws make a clear distinction between 
international and local terrorism, and specifically criminalise the financing of 
terrorism.185 
These variations illustrate two distinct approaches at a national level for 
implementing counter-terrorism conventions. The first approach focuses on the 
enactment of separate provisions on each terrorist activity prohibited under the 
                                         
178 See 19th  Report of the House of Lords ( n 145) 
179 ibid 
180 See section 21 The Unlawful activities (Prevention) Act 1967 of India: 
Whoever knowingly holds any property derived or obtained from commission of any terrorist act or 
acquired through the terrorist fund shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may 
extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine. 
181 See section 17 The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967 of India: 
Whoever, in India or in a foreign country, directly or indirectly, raises or collects funds or provides 
funds to any person or persons or attempts to provide funds to any person or persons, 
knowing that such funds are likely to be used by such person or persons to commit a terrorist 
act, notwithstanding whether such funds were actually used or not for commission of such act, 
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but 
which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine. 
182 See section 15 The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967 of India: ‘Whoever does any act… 
in India or in any foreign country’. See also section 6 the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 which makes 
no reference to terrorist acts involving foreign countries.  
183 The US law on counter terrorism (18 U.S.C Chapter 113-B) criminalizes terrorist bombing under 
section 2332-f, the use of radioactive dispersal devices under section 2332-a and financing of 
terrorism under section 2332-d. It includes a separate provision i.e. section 2332-b on the acts 
of terrorism transcending national boundaries.   
184  See Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, Act No. 34 of 2002 [hereinafter Terrorism Suppression 
Act 2002 of New Zealand].The Act establishes the crimes of terrorist bombing under section 7, 
terrorist financing under section 8 and nuclear terrorism under section 13 E. Moreover, it makes 
itself applicable to extraterritorial crimes under sections 14 to 19. 
185 See 18 USC Chapter 113-B Sc. 2332- d; See also section 8 of the Terrorism Suppression Act 
2002 of New Zealand 
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conventions. The second approach is based on enacting a single provision 
purportedly covering all terrorist activities for which states have a duty to 
legislate. The latter approach has the disadvantage of omitting certain crimes 
which may lead to difficulties in the fulfilment of the double criminality 
condition. Nevertheless, states following this approach cannot be said to have 
violated their duty to legislate because they are entitled to implement the 
conventions to the extent permissible under their national laws.  
In any case, the above analysis reveals that states are largely in compliance with 
their duty to implement the crimes set forth by counter-terrorism conventions. 
However, the compliance appears to be more a result of binding resolutions of 
the Security Council than the duty to legislate.186  This argument finds support 
from the fact that a number of states have submitted their reports to the 
Security Council concerning the enactment of implementing laws pursuant to 
SCR 1373.187  Furthermore, domestic laws of some state expressly state that the 
purpose of their enactment is to implement SCR 1373. For example, the 
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967 of India as amended in 2008 contains a 
provision to this effect.188 
                                         
186 Binding resolution 1373 of the Security Council calls upon states to implement Universal 
Counter-Terrorism Conventions. See S/RES/1373(2001). Besides it, the United Nations Global 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy 2006 also encourages the UN member states to adopt Universal 
Counter-Terrorism Conventions. See A/RES/60/288. The International Community's 
seriousness in combating terrorism can be ascertained from the fact that terrorism finds place in 
ILC's Draft Code of Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind. See article 20(f) (iii) & (iv) 
Draft Code of Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind 1996. See U.N. GAOR, 51ST 
Sess., Supp. No.10, at 9 U.N. Doc. A/ 51/10 (1996). 
187 See for example Letter dated 19 December 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the 
Chairman of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning Counter-
Terrorism. The letter suggests that pursuant to SCR 1373(2001) the UK has implemented Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. See S/2001/1232  
<http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/46d571150.pdf> [Date accessed 21/03/12].   
See also Supplementary Report of the Republic of Cyprus to the Counter-Terrorism Committee 
(CTC) established pursuant to the Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) concerning 
Counter-Terrorism, in reply to the letter dated 1 April 2002 from the Chairman of the CTC. See 
S/2002/689 
<http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/F91E0D83B87C299CC22571D3002497CB/$file/Te
rrorism%20Report%202.pdf> [Date accessed 21/03/12]   
188 See preamble of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967 of India as amended in 2008: 
 [w]hereas the Security Council of the United Nations in its 4385 meeting adopted Resolution 
1373 (2001) on 28 September, 2001, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations 
requiring all the States to take measures to combat international terrorism...And whereas the 
central government in exercise of powers conferred by section 2 of the United Nations 
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3.1.2)  organised crime laws 
Instances of departure from definitions of crimes provided by the conventions 
are more visible in the national laws on organised crime. For example, the UN 
Convention against Corruption 2003 requires criminalisation of active and passive 
bribery189  as well as private sector corruption.190  The term active bribery refers 
to the act of giving a bribe, whereas passive bribery means acceptance of a 
bribe by a public official.  Both these crimes have been duly legislated against 
under national law of the UK.191 However, India and Pakistan do not criminalise 
active bribery and private sector corruption.192  Since both of these states apply 
the dual criminality principle in their laws on extradition, a request for 
extradition from the UK to Pakistan or India involving these offences remains 
under the threat of being rejected.193 
Similarly, article 5 of the Organised Crime Convention 2000 requires 
criminalisation of the act of simply being a member of an organised criminal 
group.194  Nonetheless, a majority of states consider it a crime only when a step 
                                                                                                                           
(Security Council) Act, 1947,has made the prevention and suppression of terrorism 
(Implementation of Security Council Resolutions) Order, 2007.    
189 See article 15 of the UN Convention against Corruption 2003: 
Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to 
establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally: (a) The promise, offering or 
giving, to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or 
herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the 
exercise of his or her official duties; (b) The solicitation or acceptance by a public official, 
directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person 
or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official 
duties. 
190 See article 12 the UN Convention against Corruption 2003. ‘Each State Party shall take 
measures, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, to prevent 
corruption involving the private sector…’ 
191 See sections 1 & 2 of the Bribery Act 2010 of UK on active and passive bribery; See also 
section 7 on private sector corruption. 
192 The criminalization provisions of Indian Anti-Corruption law are found in Ss. 7-13 of the 
Prevention of Corruption Act 1988, Act No.49 of 1988 [hereinafter the Prevention of Corruption 
Act 1988 of India]. Those of Pakistan’s Ant-Corruption law are found in Sc. 9 of the National 
Accountability Bureau (NAB) Ordinance 1999, Act XVIII of 1999 as modified on 26-03-2010 
[hereinafter National Accountability Bureau Ordinance 1999 of Pakistan]. Neither these laws 
criminalize active bribery nor private sector corruption. Significantly, both Pakistan and India 
have signed and ratified the UN Convention on Corruption 2003; See Signatories to the UN 
Convention against Corruption 2003 <www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html> 
[Date accessed 21/03/13] 
193 See Sc. 2(1) (a) of the Extradition Act, 1972, Act No. XXI of 1972 [hereinafter the Extradition Act 
1972 of Pakistan]; See also section 2(3)(c) Indian Extradition Act 1962  
194 See article 5 of the Organised Crime Convention 2000: 
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is taken in furtherance of the objectives of the gang. For instance, the human 
trafficking law of Pakistan provides enhanced punishment if the offence is 
committed by an organised criminal group.195  However, it does not penalise the 
act of simply being a member of such a group.196  On the other hand, the RICO 
(Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) Act197 of the US symbolises 
one of the rare domestic law parallels of the Organised Crime Convention 2000 
as it does criminalise the membership of an organised criminal group.198 
According to Wise, due to the absence of RICO’s equivalents in other legal 
systems, the US has successively faced difficulties in extraditing fugitives 
involved in this crime.199 
Likewise, all organised crime conventions require the parties to criminalise 
predicate offences.200  However, apart from drug trafficking, national laws do 
not reflect uniformity in the coverage of other predicate crimes.201  For 
example, the Canadian law on money laundering applies to all types of 
                                                                                                                           
1. Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to 
establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally: (a) Either or both of the following 
as criminal offences distinct from those involving the attempt or completion of the criminal 
activity: (i) Agreeing with one or more other persons to commit a serious crime for a purpose 
relating directly or indirectly to the obtaining of a financial or other material benefit and, where 
required by domestic law, involving an act undertaken by one of the participants in furtherance 
of the agreement or involving an organised criminal group; (ii) Conduct by a person who, with 
knowledge of either the aim and general criminal activity of an organised criminal group or its 
intention to commit the crimes in question, takes an active part in: (a) Criminal activities of the 
organised criminal group; b) Other activities of the organised criminal group in the knowledge 
that his or her participation will contribute to the achievement of the above-described criminal 
aim… 
195 See Sc. 4 Prevention and Control of Human Trafficking Ordinance, 2002 [hereinafter Human 
Trafficking Ordinance 2002]: 
Offences committed by organised criminal groups. ---Where an organised criminal group is guilty 
of any offence under clauses (i), (ii), (iii) or (iv) of section 3, the term of imprisonment for each 
member of such group involved in the commission of such offence shall not be less than ten 
years imprisonment and may extend to fourteen years where the purpose of trafficking of a 
victim is exploitative entertainment and shall also be liable to fine. 
196 ibid 
197 See 18 USC Sc.1961-68 
198 Edward W. Wise, ‘Rico and its Analogues: Some Comparative Considerations’ 27 Syracuse J. 
Int’l L. & com (2000) 303 at 321 
199 ibid at 303  
200 See article 6 the Organised Crime Convention 2000, article 23 the UN Convention against 
Corruption 2003, article 3(1)(b)&(c) the Drugs Convention 1988 and article 8 the UN Convention 
against Financing of Terrorism 1999 
201 Wise ‘Rico & its Analogues’ (n 198) at 305 
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enterprise crimes through which proceeds can be generated.202  Similarly, the 
Australian203  and UK laws make punishable all indictable offences as predicate 
crimes.204  Likewise, the US law on money laundering applies to a broad range of 
offences including sexual exploitation of children, terror financing, corruption, 
drug trafficking and racketeering activities.205  Conversely, Pakistan’s law on 
money laundering does not cover the predicate crimes of conspiracy to commit 
drug trafficking, active bribery, human trafficking, nuclear theft and terrorism, 
attacks against diplomats and enterprise crime.206  In the same way, the Indian 
law does not cover the predicate crimes of active bribery and private sector 
corruption.207   These dissimilarities in the national coverage of predicate crimes 
lead to difficulties in satisfying the double criminality condition in forfeiture 
proceedings.  
To counter these difficulties, some states, such as the US, apply a civil forfeiture 
mechanism which enables a state to forfeit assets even in the absence of any 
predicate crime.208  This concept is, as yet, alien to a majority of states.209 
Hence, on several occasions, the US requests for civil forfeiture have had to 
remain unsatisfied due to non-existence of the corresponding law in the 
requested states.210 
It is thus clear that national laws evidence a great deal of variation as regards 
implementation of the crimes set forth by the organised crime conventions. Drug 
trafficking represents the only exception concerning which national laws reflect 
                                         
202 See Sc.462.3, Part XII.2, Criminal Code, RSC 1985, cC-46 [hereinafter the Criminal Code of 
Canada 1985] 
203 Sc.4(1),14(1) Proceeds of Crimes Act 1987 (CWLTH), Act No.87 of 1978 as amended on 3 
march 2005 [hereinafter Australian Proceeds of Crime Act 1987] 
204 Sc.71 (a) (c) & Sched. 4, 12 Criminal Justice Act of 1988, 1988 Chapter 33 Halsbury’s 
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a considerable amount of uniformity.211  As noted by Bassiouni, the prevalence 
of organised crimes in a society depends on its tolerance towards a particular 
criminal activity which is viewed by its members as a provider of employment 
and earner of bread.212  It is therefore perplexing that instead of targeting 
greater harmony in respect of these crimes, the organised crime conventions 
give wider latitude to the parties as regards their implementation. This is 
obvious from a common provision of the organised crime conventions which 
stipulates that the description of the offences is reserved for the domestic law 
of states parties.213 
This approach has resulted in the enactment of inconsistent crime definitions 
which may lead to increased complications of dual criminality in the extradition 
and forfeiture proceedings involving these crimes. According to Bassiouni, even 
the limited uniformity discernible with respect to drug trafficking owes more to 
the customary status of the prohibition rather than to the duty to legislate under 
the counter- terrorism and organised crime conventions.214 
3.2)  Impact of the duty to legislate on bilateral treaties 
The international counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions imposing a 
duty to legislate include a common provision suggesting that all existing and 
future bilateral treaties between state parties shall stand modified to include 
the offences set forth by them.215  This provision has the effect of making all 
crimes established by the conventions extraditable and subject to mutual legal 
assistance.  
Bilateral treaties take two different approaches to the implementation of this 
obligation. The first approach calls for a general declaration that the treaty shall 
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apply to all those offences which have been proscribed by the international 
conventions and to which the aut dedere aut judicare obligation applies. The 
US-Italy Extradition Treaty 1983 represents this approach.216  The second 
approach envisages the inclusion of a list of offences within the treaty in respect 
of which extradition and mutual assistance can be provided.  For instance, the 
Mutual Assistance Treaty between Australia and Indonesia of 1995 includes 
offences such as human trafficking, hijacking, civil aviation and drug trafficking 
as well as aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring, attempting and conspiring to 
commit these crimes.217 
However, bilateral treaties are meant to list only those offences which are 
already crimes under the national laws of states parties. According to Wise, the 
listing approach duplicates the offences under the national law because an 
offence is not likely to appear in a bilateral treaty unless it is found in the 
national laws of both parties.218  Thus, some recent extradition treaties 
categorically declare that surrender shall be granted for any offence listed in 
the treaties, provided that the offence is punishable under the national law of 
state parties. The 1997 Extradition Treaty between Hong Kong, China and 
Singapore adopts this approach.219 
This implies that the inclusion of the offence in a bilateral treaty does not 
guarantee surrender of fugitives. The same further requires that the offence in 
question must constitute a crime under the national law of both the requesting 
and requested states. If this view is taken as correct, the declaration under the 
counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions with respect to the 
modification of the existing bilateral treaties becomes meaningless because 
notwithstanding the inclusion of the new offences in bilateral treaties, the grant 
or refusal of extradition would rest on the recognition of the crime under the 
national laws of the parties concerned. Arguably, therefore, the international 
counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions are in need of clarification 
                                         
216 See article V (2) Italy-US Extradition Treaty 1983; See also article 3(1) (c) of 2004 Treaty on 
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with respect to a situation when the bilateral treaty has been modified as a 
result of the entry into force of a new international convention but the national 
laws are yet to reflect the offences set forth by it. 
The issue of a crime having been included in the national law but not finding 
place in a bilateral treaty arose in the Mega upload Extradition Case (2012).220  In 
this case, the offender was charged by the US with the crimes of racketeering 
and conspiracy to commit copy-right infringement.221  The US-New Zealand 
Extradition Treaty did not contain this offence.222  When the defence counsel 
requested bail for the accused based upon the non-existence of the crime under 
the relevant bilateral treaty, the prosecutor opposed it by relying on the 
extradition law of New Zealand. He argued that the Extradition Act of New 
Zealand allows extradition for each crime set forth by the Organised Crime 
Convention 2000, which covers under its article 5, racketeering and conspiracy 
to commit any organised crime including copy- right violations.223  The Court 
however granted bail on the ground that the offender posed no risk of flight as 
his assets had been frozen.224  The episode indicates that the inclusion of a 
crime in a bilateral treaty will be of little consequence if the crime does not 
appear in domestic laws of state parties. 
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Section 4: Controlled use of dual criminality as an 
alternative to duty to legislate 
Gardocki remarks that uniformity of national definitions of crimes is relevant 
only for the purposes of comparing the penal provisions of two legal systems in 
order to come to conclusion that scope of criminalisation differs.225  In reality, 
there can never be a uniform national criminal code.226  Clarke supports this 
view by stating that there is a limit on how far harmonisation of domestic legal 
systems must go.227  The argument questions the technique of promoting law 
enforcement cooperation by establishing the duty to legislate against universal 
definitions of crimes.  
The above analysis makes it clear that national definitions continue to reflect 
disharmony despite the imposition of the duty to legislate under the 
international counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions, and dual 
criminality remains as significant a hurdle in extradition and mutual legal 
assistance proceedings as it was before the imposition of the duty. Whatever 
harmony is achieved owes more to extraneous reasons such as Security Council 
resolutions and customary international law, rather than duty to legislate. 
Therefore, it is clear that the technique of facilitating law enforcement 
cooperation through establishing mandatory obligations under the international 
conventions needs to be revisited.  
The current approach is focused on harmonising definitions of crimes only, 
without giving necessary attention to conditions of state cooperation such as 
dual criminality.  Accordingly, when the conventions provide that the conditions 
of extradition and mutual assistance shall be determined in accordance with the 
national law of the requested state,228  such a state may apply any version or 
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228 See for example, article 44(8) the UN Convention against Corruption 2003: 
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interpretation of dual criminality for the purposes of providing inter-state 
assistance in law enforcement. It may choose to apply a flexible version, 
ignoring minor discrepancies to accommodate the request of a friendly state or 
may insist upon the exact similarity of offences. Therefore, under the current 
scheme of the conventions, advancement of state cooperation depends on the 
discretion of the requested state. This contradicts the scholarly claim that the 
international conventions on terrorism and organised crime have established a 
new regime of state cooperation subordinating sovereign discretion to collective 
law enforcement.  
This technique of facilitating state cooperation may have worked if the duty to 
legislate was accepted by states without any exception or qualification. Only 
then would national definitions of crime have been harmonious enough to satisfy 
any use of, or interpretation of, double criminality. However, the concessions 
and safeguards afforded to the states in the matter of implementation 
effectively precluded this possibility. Under these circumstances, the 
international regulation of double criminality condition provides the best route 
to facilitate state cooperation in law enforcement.229 Examples of some bilateral 
treaties which regulate the use of double criminality are discussed below.   
4.1)  Totality of the acts shall be considered for 
satisfaction of dual criminality 
Article II (3) of the Canada-Spain Extradition Treaty 1989 provides: 
                                                                                                                           
A request [for Mutual Legal Assistance] shall be executed in accordance with the domestic law of 
the requested State Party and, to the extent not contrary to the domestic law of the requested 
State Party and where possible, in accordance with the procedures specified in the request 
For Corresponding provisions, see articles 8(2) & 10(1) the Hague Convention 1970, articles 8(2) & 
11(1) the Montreal Convention 1971, article 8(2) & 10(2) the Protection of Diplomats Convention 
1973, articles 10(2) & 11(2) the Hostages Convention 1979, articles 11(2) & 13(2) the 
Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials 1980, articles 11(2) & 12(2) the Rome 
Convention 1988, articles 9(2) & 10(2) the Terrorist Bombings Convention 1988, articles 11(2) & 
12(5) the Terrorism Financing Convention 1999, articles 13(2) & 14(2) the Nuclear Terrorism 
Convention 2005, articles 6(5) & 7(12) the Drugs Convention 1988, articles 16(7), 18(6) &(17) of 
the Organised Crime Convention 2000 and articles 12 (2) & 17 of the Beijing Convention 2010.  
229 Cherif Bassiouni, ‘The “Political Offence Exception” Revisited: Extradition between the US and 
the UK- A Choice between Friendly Cooperation among Allies and Sound Law and Policy’ 15 
Denv. J. Int’l L. Pol’y (1986-1987) 255 at 260 
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For the purposes of this article, in determining whether an offence is 
an offence against the laws of both Contracting States, the totality of 
the acts or omissions alleged against the person whose extradition is 
requested shall be taken into account without reference to the 
elements of the offence prescribed by the law of the Requesting 
State.230 
This provision implies that it is not essential for extradition that each act alleged 
against the fugitive should constitute a crime under the laws of the requesting 
and requested states. It is sufficient if the totality of his acts is criminal under 
the laws of two states. 
4.2)  An offence to be extraditable irrespective of different 
terminology used by the cooperating states with respect 
to its expression 
Article 2(2) of the Australia-Germany Extradition Treaty 1988 provides:  
 For the purpose of this Article it shall not matter whether the laws 
of the Contracting Parties place the acts or omissions constituting the 
offence within the same category  of offence or denominate the 
offence by the same or similar terminology.231 
The provision clarifies that extradition shall not be refused on the ground that 
the laws of contracting states describe the offence with different terminology.232 
4.3)  Where an offence is extraditable, attempt, 
conspiracy, planning and abetment are also extraditable 
Article 2(2) of the US-UK Extradition Treaty 2003 provides:  
 An offense shall also be an extraditable offense if it consists of an 
attempt or a conspiracy to commit, participation in the commission 
of, aiding or abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of, or 
                                         
230 See Article II (3) of Canada-Spain Extradition Treaty 1989; See also article 2(3) of Hong Kong, 
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2008 and article 2(3) US-India Extradition Treaty 1997 
131 
 
being an accessory before or after the fact to any offense described in 
paragraph 1 of this Article.233 
Article 2(1) defines an extraditable offence as an offence punishable with 
deprivation of liberty of one year or more under the laws of both the requesting 
and requested state.234  Accordingly, the provision implies that extradition of a 
person involved in an attempt, conspiracy or abetment of an extraditable crime 
cannot be refused on the grounds of these crimes not having been made 
independently punishable under the laws of the requested state. They shall be 
deemed to be extraditable by virtue of this provision.  
4.4)  Non-Application of dual criminality in mutual legal 
assistance 
There is a growing consensus among states that dual criminality should be 
applied in those matters only where the requesting state proposes to take 
coercive action against the offender.235  If the object of dual criminality is to 
protect the human rights of offenders, it should only be invoked when proposed 
action is likely to affect those rights.  For example, extradition, confiscation and 
enforcement of foreign penal judgments are steps towards punishment. Hence, 
state cooperation in all these matters should be subject to the satisfaction of 
dual criminality.236  On the other hand, because measures such as asset freezing 
and information sharing are investigatory in nature and do not involve infliction 
of punishment as such, they should be exempted from a requirement of dual 
criminality.237  Thus, several bilateral treaties and regional Conventions on 
mutual legal assistance exempt certain measures from the application of dual 
criminality. For instance, the European Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance 
1959 does not require dual criminality. However, it clarifies that the Convention 
does not apply to extradition and enforcement of foreign penal judgements.238 
Similarly, the US-France Mutual Assistance Treaty 1998 does not include a dual 
criminality condition. Nonetheless, it makes clear that the treaty does not apply 
                                         
233 See article 2(2) US-UK Extradition Treaty 2003 
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to requests for provisional arrests and enforcement of criminal judgements.239  
By contrast, the international counter-terrorism and organised crime 
conventions make no such distinction between coercive and non-coercive 
measures and include a general provision to the effect that mutual legal 
assistance might be declined for non-fulfilment of dual criminality.240  According 
to Stessens, a requirement to establish congruence of offences with respect to 
measures having no bearing on the rights of the offenders, amounts to needlessly 
burdening the requesting state.241 
4.5)  Making non- Retroactivity less relevant 
Some uses of double criminality require that the act in respect of which 
surrender or interrogation is sought must not only be a crime under the laws of 
the requesting and requested states at the time when the request for inter-state 
assistance is made, but also at the time of its commission.242  In other words, the 
crime must not have been created subsequent to commission of the act, 
otherwise it will violate the prohibition against non-retroactivity of criminal 
laws. For example, in the Pinochet case the House of Lords observed that the 
principle of dual criminality could not be satisfied with respect to the acts 
Pinochet committed prior to 29 September 1988, when the Criminal Justice Act 
1988 was enforced in the UK incorporating the crime of torture in respect of 
which his extradition was sought.243  This application of double criminality 
prevents the requested state from extraditing a fugitive whose acts were made 
crimes under its national law subsequent to their commission. It is rooted in the 
ancient maxim of nullum crimen sine lege which means 'no crime without a 
previous law.’ The maxim denotes that punishability of an act depends on there 
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being a previous legal provision declaring it to be a penal offense, subject to the 
jurisdiction of the national courts of the proscribing state.244 
 Several bilateral treaties remove this hurdle by declaring that states may grant 
extradition even if the relevant act was made a crime at the time the request 
for extradition was received. For example, article 2(4) of the Hong Kong, China- 
Singapore Extradition Treaty 1997 provides that an offence shall be an offence 
according to the laws of the requested state if the act constituting the offence 
was committed at the time a request for surrender was made. This provision 
gives another example of the facilitation of law enforcement cooperation 
through relaxed application of dual criminality.  
In view of the above, it can be argued that the approach of controlling the use 
of double criminality appears far more effective in facilitating law enforcement 
cooperation, as compared to the imposition of an inconclusive duty to legislate. 
Nonetheless, it can only be made to have global effect by introducing it under 
the international conventions regulating transnational crimes.  
Conclusions 
The duty to legislate represents a technique employed by modern counter- 
terrorism and organised crime conventions to facilitate state cooperation in 
extradition and mutual legal assistance. As the crimes set forth by these 
conventions are complex and had been less well-known, either their domestic 
law parallels are non-existent or the definitions of their several parts differ from 
state to state. The non-existence of the crimes, or the variation with respect to 
their constituent elements affords opportunity to the requested state to block 
surrender or interrogation for non- fulfilment of double criminality condition or 
non- existence of crimes under its national law. A number of extradition 
requests have had to remain unsatisfied when the act in issue constituted a 
complex crime, and the requested state did not have its counter-part under its 
national law.  
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134 
 
To establish harmony in the national coverage of crimes, the counter-terrorism 
and organised crime conventions imposed a duty on states to legislate exact 
definitions of crimes set forth by them.  Along with imposing the duty, the 
conventions gave several concessions to the states authorising them to modify 
crime definitions in accordance with their domestic requirements. As a result, 
the national implementation of these crimes does not reflect the legislative 
harmony for which the duty was imposed.  
Consequently, the discretion available to the requested state to refuse surrender 
or interrogation based upon non-fulfilment of double criminality remains intact. 
This contradicts the objective of the conventions to promote state cooperation 
in bringing to justice transnational offenders. Following this approach, law 
enforcement cooperation concerning transnational crimes remains as 
unregulated and as discretionary as cooperation in relation to ordinary crimes. It 
also refutes the scholarly assertion that the international counter-terrorism and 
organised crime conventions are meant to promote consensual sharing of 
authority at the expense of sovereign discretion. It rather reaffirms the view 
that the authority of states in the matter of providing inter-state assistance in 
law enforcement is subject to no restraint. Significantly, the duty has been 
abolished in some recent counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions 
such as the Beijing Convention 2010 and replaced with the old methodology of 
defining the crimes internationally and authorising the parties to make 
punishable their domestic law equivalents.245 
As an alternative strategy, some bilateral treaties pay attention to relaxing the 
application of the double criminality in extradition and mutual legal assistance 
proceedings. This technique does away with the requirement of having an exact 
similarity of offences. It thus offers the twin advantage of circumscribing the 
discretion available the requested state while preserving the diversity of 
national legal systems. The adoption of this strategy requires a shift of focus 
from harmony in the definitions of crimes to collective lowering of the barriers 
to law enforcement cooperation. The growing number of the bilateral treaties 
                                         
245 See article 3, the Beijing Convention 2010 ‘Each State Party undertakes to make the offences 
set forth in Article 1 punishable by severe penalties.’ The reversion to previous formulation is 
perplexing in view of the fact that the Beijing Convention sets forth as complex crimes as Cyber 
Terrorism and Biological Terrorism. See article 1(d)(g)(h)(i) of the Beijing Convention 2010   
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subscribing to this methodology provides evidence of its acceptability amongst 
states. Nonetheless, to give it an international impact, it is necessary that the 
technique be tested in the international counter-terrorism and organised crime 
conventions. Significantly, an attempt has been made in the UN Convention 
against Corruption 2003 to encourage the parties to relax the double criminality 
condition in extradition proceedings.246  However, it loses its essence in view of 
the use of qualifiers such as ‘a state party whose law so permits’.247  Needless to 
say, if counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions are to be more 
productive in facilitating law enforcement cooperation, their makers will have to 
abandon the approach of leaving the conditions of extradition and mutual legal 
assistance entirely up to state parties. 
                                         
246 See article 44 (2) of the UN Convention against Corruption 2003: 
 Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article, a State Party whose law so permits 
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are not punishable under its own domestic law. 
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Chapter 4:  Promoting law enforcement 
cooperation through the obligation to provide fair 
treatment 
Introduction 
 The international counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions aim to 
facilitate state cooperation in bringing to justice the offenders involved in 
borderless crimes. For this purpose, the conventions rely on enforcement 
measures of extradition and mutual legal assistance. Both these measures being 
amalgam of national and international law require for their application, the 
fulfilment of certain traditional conditions, which necessitate harmony in the 
justice systems of cooperating states.   
One such condition is double punishability. It requires that the act in respect of 
which extradition or mutual legal assistance is sought must fulfil the standards 
of criminal responsibility of each cooperating state. In other words, the act must 
not be deemed non-punishable under the laws of either the requesting or 
requested state. The actual or anticipated violation of human rights represents 
one of the major grounds for considering a crime non-punishable under national 
constitutions and criminal codes. Correspondingly, human rights violations are 
applied as grounds for refusal of assistance in bilateral treaties and domestic 
laws on extradition and mutual legal assistance. Thus, possibility of human rights 
violations in the requesting state allows a requested state to refuse surrender or 
interrogation for non-fulfilment of double punishability. 
Human rights violations have time and again led to surrender or interrogation 
having been blocked. For example, in Abu Salem Case, Portugal imposed a 
restriction on the extradition of the fugitive to India that he shall not be 
awarded death penalty. Subsequent to surrender, when the Indian government 
charged the fugitive with crime of terrorism which attracted death penalty 
under Indian national law, the concerned Portuguese Court cancelled the 
extradition order. Similarly, in James Anderson’s case, the US bid to obtain the 
extradition of a fugitive from Canada for the crime of murder remained 
unsuccessful because the offender pleaded that he committed the crime in the 
US to secure his release from slavery.  Since escape from slavery constituted a 
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valid defence against criminal liability in Canada, Canada showed its inability to 
surrender the fugitive for an act not constituting a crime under its national law.  
Evidently, the absence of corresponding human rights safeguards in the legal 
systems of cooperating states result in refusal of extradition and mutual legal 
assistance. Since the purpose of counter-terrorism and organised crime 
conventions is to facilitate state cooperation and disparity in national legal 
systems leads to its denial, the conventions adopt the strategy of harmonising 
national legal systems with respect to protection of human rights. The objective 
is to ensure that the requesting state's failure to guarantee these rights may not 
provide justification to the requested state to refuse surrender or interrogation.  
To establish harmony, the conventions oblige the parties to provide fair 
treatment to the relators.1  This chapter looks into the question of the extent to 
which the obligation has led to harmonisation of national legal systems and 
facilitation of state cooperation in extradition and mutual legal assistance.  
It will be argued that the technique of facilitating state cooperation through 
establishing harmony in national human rights protection overlooks the fact that 
human rights are applied in multiple ways as grounds for refusal of assistance 
under the laws and treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance. The 
varying applications of these rights as grounds for refusal afford opportunity to a 
requested state to block extradition or mutual legal assistance on the basis of its 
laws demanding additional protection or not recognising the protection 
guaranteed by the requesting state. Hence, a general obligation to provide fair 
treatment under the international conventions is insufficient to produce the 
level of harmony needed to satisfy every application of human rights as grounds 
for refusal of assistance. As long as the use of human rights as grounds for 
refusal is not regulated, facilitation of state cooperation may not be actualised. 
While the omission to regulate their use as grounds for refusal may have little 
relevance for cooperative endeavours relating to ordinary crimes, it poses a 
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significant risk of the failure of state cooperation in transnational crimes, owing 
to their specific nature.  
The Chapter will recommend that the makers of the international conventions 
replace or complement the obligation to provide fair treatment with the 
technique of controlling the use of human rights as grounds for refusal of 
assistance. The regulation of their use as grounds for refusal is not something 
alien to states rather it has been done in some bilateral treaties and domestic 
laws on extradition and mutual assistance. Nonetheless, to make this approach 
work at international level, it is desirable to introduce this technique in 
international conventions directed at promoting state cooperation in law 
enforcement.   
The chapter has been divided into four sections.  Section 1 will provide an over-
view of the requirement of harmony for enforcing the measures of extradition 
and mutual legal assistance, the double punishability requirement and use of 
human rights violations as grounds for refusal of assistance.  Section 2 will 
discuss the obligation to provide fair treatment under the international 
conventions, its interpretation and significance in the context of state 
cooperation in extradition and mutual legal assistance.  Section 3 will analyse 
the unifying effect of the fair treatment obligation as regards protection of due 
process rights and its usefulness in facilitating the surrender or interrogation. 
Section 4 will consider the harmonising effect of the fair treatment obligation 
with respect to protection of fundamental human rights and its utility in 
facilitating surrender and interrogation.  
 
 Section 1: Requirement of harmony for 
extradition and mutual legal assistance and use 
of human rights violations as grounds for 
refusal of assistance 
In the words of Piragoff and Kran, ‘contemporary criminal activity knows no 
territorial boundaries and as a result sovereign states are increasingly obliged to 
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cooperate in the criminal justice area.’2  Since the acts of transnational 
terrorism and organised crime fall into this category of crimes, the object of the 
international conventions focusing these crimes is to facilitate state cooperation 
in law enforcement. For this purpose, the conventions adopt the technique of 
harmonising national legal systems through establishing mandatory obligations.3 
Harmony is needed owing to the fact that laws and treaties on state cooperation 
are based on the principle of reciprocity or mutuality of obligations necessitating 
the adoption of common legal principles by states wishing to cooperate.4  The 
principle is explained by Williams in these words, ‘When a state enters into an 
extradition treaty, based on reciprocity with another state, this seems to imply 
an understanding that the parties have more or less equivalent conceptions of 
the fundamentals of criminal justice.’5 The rationale of the principle is to ensure 
that cooperating states must be in a position to provide assistance to each other 
on reciprocal basis. This means, if circumstances are reversed and the requested 
state steps into the shoes of the requesting state, it must be entitled to obtain 
similar assistance in relation to the crime in question. Since there is no rule of 
general international law that compels a state to provide law enforcement 
cooperation in the absence of a treaty, such assistance is provided traditionally 
on the basis of bilateral treaties premised on the principle of reciprocity.  For 
example, Chinese extradition law provides, ‘[t]he People's Republic of China 
cooperates with foreign states in extradition on the basis of equality and 
reciprocity.’6 
With a view to enabling the parties to fulfil the demands of reciprocity in state 
cooperation proceedings, the international conventions on terrorism and 
organised crime establish mandatory obligations. Thus, UNODC’s legislative 
                                         
2 Donald K Piragoff & Marcia V.J Kran, ‘The Impact of Human Rights Principles on Extradition from 
Canada and the US: Role of National Court’ 3 Crim Law Forum (1992) 225 at 225 
3 See (n 1-7) Chapter 1 above 
4 Lech Gardocki, ‘Double Criminality in Extradition Law’ 27 Isr. L. Rev. (1993) 288 
5 Sharon A Williams, ‘Human Rights Safeguards and International Cooperation in Extradition: 
Striking in Balance’ 3 Criminal Law Forum (1992) 191 at 200  
6 See article 3 of Extradition Law of the People's Republic of China (Order of the President No.42 of 
2000); See also Sec. 2, Israel's  Extradition Regulations 1970 (Law Procedures and Rules of 
Evidence in Petitions) 5731  
<https://www.imolin.org/doc/amlid/Israel/Israel_Extradition_Law_1954.pdf> [Date accessed 
21/03/13] 
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guide to the Organised Crime Convention 2000 provides that the aim of 
establishing universal obligations under this convention is to harmonise national 
legal systems with respect to criminalisation, jurisdiction, prosecution and 
treatment of offenders, in order to facilitate the coordination of the national 
and international efforts to combat transnational criminality.7 
Although the crimes established by the conventions differ significantly with 
respect to their nature and the motivation of the individual committing them,8  
owing to their shared feature of transnationality, the conventions provide 
identical modalities of law enforcement for their suppression.9  These are 
extradition and mutual legal assistance.10  Laws and treaties governing these 
measures require states to fulfil a range of double conditions to enforce them.11 
These include double criminality, double possibility of criminal proceedings, 
double penal policy standards and double punishability.12  All these conditions 
are derived from principle of reciprocity, and their purpose is to ensure that 
cooperating states share a certain set of values and legal prescriptions about the 
act in respect of which surrender or interrogation is sought.13   The international 
                                         
7 See UNODC's Legislative Guide 2004 for implementing the Organised Crime Convention 2000 at 
130 
<http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/legislative_guides/Legislative%20guides_Full%20version.pdf> 
[Date accessed 21/03/13]  
8 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Effective National and International Action against Organised Crime 
and Terrorist Criminal Activities’ 4 Emory Intl L. Review (1990) 9 at 10 
9 Typically, international law instruments deal with any of the six mechanisms to combat criminality 
at the international level. These are (1) Recognition of foreign penal judgements (2) transfer of 
penal proceedings (3) extradition (4) mutual legal assistance in criminal matters (5) transfer of 
prisoners and (6) seizure and forfeiture of illicit proceeds of crime. Out of these, extradition, 
mutual legal assistance and forfeiture are the very essence of enforcement and without them, 
international, transnational, and even national crimes would be deprived of international 
enforcement methods. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Policy Considerations on Interstate 
Cooperation in Criminal Matters’ 4 Pace Y.B.Int'l L. (1992) 123 at 126-127  
10 The enforcement modalities of Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance appear in the following 
Conventions on transnational crime: The Hague convention 1970 ( articles 9 & 10), the Montreal 
Convention 1971 (articles 8 &11), the Protection of Diplomats Convention 1973 (articles 8 & 
10), the Hostages Convention 1979 (articles 10 & 11), the Nuclear Materials Convention 1980 
(articles 11 & 13), the Rome Convention 1988 (articles 11 &12), the Terrorist Bombing 
Convention 1997 (articles 9&10), the Terrorism Financing Convention 1999 (articles 11 &12), 
the Nuclear Terrorism Convention 2005 (articles 13 &14), the Drugs Convention 1988 (articles 6 
&7), the Organized Crime Convention 2000 (articles 16 &18), the UN Convention against 
Corruption 2003 (articles 44&46) and the Beijing Convention (articles 12 &17).  
11 See Edward M Wise, ‘Some Problems of Extradition’ 15 Wayne L. Rev. (1968-1969) 709 at 713; 
See also Gardocki (n 4) 288 
12 Gardocki ibid; See also SZ Fellar, ‘The Significance of the requirement of Double Criminality in 
the Law of Extradition’ 10 Isr. L. Rev. (1975) 51 at 71-75 
13 Gardocki ibid 
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conventions do not purport to abolish these conditions; rather they aim to make 
national legal systems responsive to their demands through establishing 
harmony.  
1.1) Double punishability condition 
One traditional condition entrenched in the principle of reciprocity or mutuality 
of obligation is the double punishability requirement.14  It stipulates that the act 
in respect of which extradition or mutual legal assistance is sought must fulfil 
the standards of criminal responsibility of each cooperating state.15  In other 
words, the act must not be deemed non-punishable under the laws of either the 
requesting or requested state. 
John Anderson’s case of 1860-61 provides a classic example of the application 
double punishability in extradition proceedings.16  Here, the extradition of the 
fugitive was requested by the US from Canada, on charges of stabbing and killing 
a US citizen Diggs in Massiouri.  Although murder was an extraditable crime as 
per the terms of the applicable bilateral treaty,17 the fugitive claimed that he 
had committed the crime in order to secure his release from slavery.18  The 
applicable bilateral treaty stipulated that sufficient evidence of criminality 
existed such that according to the laws of the requested state the apprehension 
and trial of the fugitive would be warranted, had the crime been committed 
there.19  Since slavery was prohibited in Canada, the criminal liability of the 
offender was deemed to have been excluded under the Canadian law.20  The 
court held that although Anderson did stab and kill Diggs, it would be an 
insufficient statement in an indictment for murder in any of the Canadian 
                                         
14 Gardocki  ibid; See also Fellar (n 12) 
15 Gardocki ibid 
16 In re John Anderson, 20 U.C.Q.B.R. 124 (1860); See also Paul Finkelman, ‘International 
Extradition and Fugitive Slaves: The John Anderson Case’ 18 Brook. J. Int’l L. (1992) 765  
17 A treaty to settle and define the boundaries of the US and the possessions of Her Britannic 
Majesty in North America for final suppression of African slave trade and for giving up criminals, 
fugitives from justice in certain cases, Aug 9, 1842, US-UK, article X, 8 Stat.572,12 Bevans 82 
[hereinafter Webster Ashburton Treaty 1842]  
18 In re John Anderson (n 16) at Para 124, 145-150, 174 & 186 (1860); See also Finkelman (n 16) 
787,778,766 
19 See article X Webster Ashburton Treaty 1842 
20 In re John Anderson (n 16); See also Finkelman (n 16) 787 
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courts.21  The requirement that there must be such evidence of crime as would 
justify the trial of a fugitive in the requested state represents the dual 
punishability principle.22 
1.2) Use of human rights violations as grounds for refusal of 
assistance 
A major ground for making an offence non-punishable or excluding criminal 
responsibility is the actual or anticipated violation of human rights of the 
offender.23  Human rights violations as circumstances excluding criminal 
responsibility or making an offence non-punishable are generally reflected 
amongst defences to criminal liability in national constitutions and criminal 
codes. Correspondingly, they are applied as grounds for refusal of assistance in 
domestic laws and bilateral treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance. 
For instance, UN Model Treaty on Extradition 1990 requires the parties to refuse 
surrender when there are grounds for believing that the person whose 
extradition is sought would be subjected in the requesting state to torture, 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.24  Similarly, 1995 Mutual 
Assistance Treaty between Australia and Indonesia obliges the parties to refuse 
cooperation when the request for assistance appears to be motivated by a desire 
to prosecute or punish the offender on account of his racial, religious, ethnic or 
political affiliations.25 
Both these provisions illustrate the application of ‘fundamental human rights’ as 
ground for refusal of assistance. According to Plachta, the concept of 
fundamental human rights is based on the understanding that, out of all human 
rights a group has been recognised as non-derogable in all universal and regional 
                                         
21 ibid 
22 Gardocki (n 4);Fellar (n 12) 
23 J.Dugard and Christine Van den Wyngaert, 'Reconciling Extradition with Human Rights' 92 AJIL 
(1998) 187 at 188 
24 See 3(f) UN Model Treaty on Extradition 1990 
25 See article 4(1)(c) of the 1995 Mutual Assistance Treaty between Australia and Indonesia 
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instruments and, therefore, has to be protected regardless of distinction 
between trial, extradition and mutual legal assistance proceedings.26 
Apart from these, laws and treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance 
apply rights relating to trial proceedings or ‘due process rights’ as grounds for 
refusal of assistance. These rights are connected with the proceeding that has 
led to conviction or sentencing of the offender in the requesting state, on the 
basis of which extradition or mutual legal assistance is requested.27  The actual 
or potential violation of these rights allows a requested state to refuse surrender 
or interrogation. For example, US-Italy Extradition Treaty of 1983 obliges the 
parties to refuse surrender when the person sought has been convicted or 
acquitted or pardoned or has served his sentence for the same acts for which 
extradition is requested.28 The provision exemplifies the application of double 
jeopardy or successive punishments as a ground for refusal of assistance. In the 
same way, the European Convention on Extradition 1957 obliges the parties to 
refuse extradition when the person claimed has become immune from 
prosecution due to the amount of time that has elapsed between the act and 
prosecution or punishment.29  The provision characterises the use of prescription 
or time barred prosecution as a ground for refusal of assistance. The term 
prescription denotes a statute of limitation that restricts the time within which 
legal proceedings may be brought against an offender.30  Once the limitation has 
expired, the court lacks jurisdiction to try or punish an offender.31   
Since rights relating to trial proceedings or due process rights are not considered 
non-derogable, some commentators maintain that it is optional for states to 
apply them in extradition and mutual legal assistance proceedings.32 
                                         
26 M. Plachta, ‘Contemporary Problems of Extradition: Human Rights, Grounds for Refusal and 
Principle of Aut dedere’ 114th International Training Course Visiting Experts Papers at 65  
<www.or.jp/english/pdf/PDF_rms/no57/57-16pdf>  [Date accessed 21/03/13]    
27 ibid at 66 
28 See article VI US-Italy Extradition Treaty of 1983 
29 See article 10, the European Convention on Extradition 1957 
30 See the Free Dictionary by Farlex 
<http://legal dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Period+of+prescription>  [Date accessed 21/03/13] 
31 ibid 
32 Plachta 'Contemporary Problems of Extradition' (n 26) 66   
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In view of the above, it is clear that principle of double punishability applicable 
to extradition and mutual legal proceedings requires that the act in respect of 
which the surrender or interrogation is sought must fulfil the standards of 
criminal responsibility of each cooperating state. In other words, the act in 
question must not be considered non- punishable under the laws of either the 
requesting or requested state. National constitutions and criminal codes identify 
certain human rights whose actual or anticipated violation makes an offence 
non-punishable. Correspondingly, theses rights are applied as grounds for refusal 
of assistance in laws and treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance. It is 
therefore important that harmony should exist in national legal systems with 
respect to giving protection against violations of these rights, so that the 
requesting state’s omission to guarantee a right may not allow the requested 
state to block surrender or interrogation. To bring about harmony, the 
international conventions establish the obligation to provide fair treatment.  
I will now consider the obligation to provide fair treatment under the 
international conventions on terrorism and organised crime and its effectiveness 
in bringing harmony in national legal systems with respect to protection of 
human rights. 
 
 Section 2:  Obligation to provide fair treatment, its 
interpretation and significance in the context of 
state cooperation in extradition and mutual legal 
assistance 
2.1)  Introduction to Fair Treatment Obligation 
A provision common to a majority of the international conventions on terrorism 
and organised crime requires that parties provide fair treatment to the 
offenders. The counter-terrorism conventions containing the obligation comprise 
the Hostages Convention 1979,33 the Protection of Diplomats Convention1973,34  
                                         
33 See article 8(2) the Hostages Convention 1979 
34 See article 9 the Protection of Diplomats Convention 1973 
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the Nuclear Materials Convention 1980,35 the Rome Convention 1988, the 
Terrorist Bombings Convention 1997,36 the Terrorism Financing Convention 
1999,37 the Nuclear Terrorism Convention 2005 38 and the Beijing Convention 
2010.39 The organised crime conventions establishing the obligation include the 
UN Convention against Corruption 2003 and the Organised Crime Convention 
2000.40 
Earlier conventions, such as the Protection of Diplomats Convention 1973 and 
the Nuclear Materials Convention 1980, feature a shorter version of the 
provision, leaving it unclear as to what kind of fair treatment is required to be 
provided to the relators.41  For example, article 12 of the Nuclear Materials 
Convention 1973 reads: 
 Any person regarding whom proceedings are being carried out in 
connection with any of the offences set forth in article 7 shall be 
guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of the proceedings.42 
By contrast, modern conventions such as the Terrorism Financing Convention 
1999, the Terrorist Bombing Convention 1997, the Nuclear Terrorism Convention 
2005 and the Beijing Convention 2010 lay down fuller versions of the provision 
explaining plainly that parties are required to provide all those rights to the 
relators which are guaranteed under national and international law, including 
human rights law. For example, article 17 of the Terrorism Financing Convention 
1999 reads: 
 Any person who is taken into custody or regarding whom any other 
measures are  taken or proceedings are carried out pursuant to this 
                                         
35 See article 12 the Nuclear Materials Convention 1980 
36 See article 10 (2) of the Rome Convention 1988 and article 14 the Terrorist Bombings 
Convention 1997 
37 See article 17 the Terrorist Financing Convention 1999 
38 See article 12 the Nuclear Terrorism Convention 2005 
39 See article 11 the Beijing Convention 2010 
40 See article16 (13) the Organised Crime Convention 2000 and 44(14) the UN Convention against 
Corruption 2003 
41 AB Green, 'Convention on Protection and Punishment of Diplomatic Agents and Other 
Internationally Protected Persons: An Analysis' 14 Virginia Journal of international law (1973-
1974) 703 at 721 
42 See article 12 the Nuclear Materials Convention 1980; See also article 9 the Protection of 
Diplomats Convention 1973 
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Convention shall be guaranteed fair treatment, including enjoyment 
of all rights and guarantees in conformity with the law of the State in 
the territory of which that person is present and applicable provisions 
of international law, including international human rights law.43 
2.1.1)  Interpretation of the obligation 
According to the Commonwealth Implementation Kits of the UN counter-
terrorism conventions, the obligation to provide fair treatment has no particular 
significance as it does nothing more than reaffirm the rights already protected 
under international human rights instruments and national constitutions.44  A 
closer look at the provision, however, reveals that it lays down a ground-
breaking rule which may have significant impact on extradition and interrogation 
of the offenders involved in transnational crimes.45  The obligation has three 
important elements, i.e. ‘any proceedings', 'fair treatment' and 'in accordance 
with national and international, including human rights law'. Each of these will 
be discussed below in order to determine the nature of the obligation.     
2.1.1.1)  'any proceedings' 
In the first place, the provision declares that offenders facing ‘any proceedings’ 
under these conventions shall be guaranteed fair treatment in accordance with 
national and international law, including human rights law. The phrase ‘any 
proceeding’ presumably refers to extradition, mutual legal assistance and 
prosecution in lieu of extradition, because the enforcement mechanism of all 
conventions under consideration revolves around these three measures. 
Accordingly, each convention establishes mandatory obligation to extradite or 
prosecute the offenders and to provide mutual legal assistance with respect to 
                                         
43 See article 17 the Terrorism Financing Convention 1997; See also article 14 the Terrorist 
Bombing Convention 1997, article 12 the Nuclear Terrorism Convention 2005, article 11 the 
Beijing Convention 2010, article 8(2) the Hostages Convention 1979 and article 10(2) the Rome 
Convention 1988.  
44 Commonwealth Implementation Kits of the UN Counter-Terrorism Conventions at 144 
<http://www.thecommonwealth.org/shared_asp_files/uploadedfiles/%7B8AE4DB15-88A5-46F2-
8037-357DFF7D3EC1%7D_Implementation%20Kits%20for%20Counter-Terrorism.pdf> [Date 
accessed 21/03/13] 
45 According to Rozaqis, the provision sets forth a very vital obligation since it makes the parties 
accountable for possible misuses of their jurisdictional authority. See Christos L Rozaqis, 
'Terrorism and the Internationally Protected Persons in the Light of ILC’s Draft Articles' 23 ICLQ 
(1974) 32 at 61  
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their crimes.46  Owing to this, the conventions are sometimes referred to as 
‘international agreements establishing the obligation to extradite or prosecute’ 
or ‘universal mutual assistance and extradition agreements’.47 
It is thus clear that when the conventions oblige the parties to provide fair 
treatment to offenders in ‘any proceedings’, they refer to extradition, trial and 
mutual assistance proceedings. The argument lends credence from the 
observation of Lambert concerning the rationale of the obligation in the 
Hostages Convention 1979: 
 The proceedings during which fair treatment must be guaranteed 
would presumably include all measures which may be taken with 
respect to the alleged offender, including preliminary custody, 
extradition hearings, trial and sentencing.48 
2.1.1.2)  'fair treatment' 
The term ‘fair treatment’ has been used as a substitute for ‘fair trial’ in order to 
bring within the ambit of the obligation not only trial proceedings but also other 
proceedings mandated by the conventions such as extradition and mutual legal 
assistance.49  Had the makers of the conventions used the expression ‘fair trial’ 
instead of ‘treatment’, the parties may have considered that guaranteeing of 
rights is essential only when the offender is facing trial proceedings. The 
                                         
46 For provisions of the conventions on extradition and mutual legal assistance, see (n 10) above.  
The obligation to prosecute in lieu of extradition refers to the duty to extradite or prosecute. See 
for instance, article 7 of the Protection of Diplomats Convention 1973: 
 The State Party in whose territory the alleged offender is present shall, if it does not extradite 
him, submit, without exception whatsoever and without undue delay, the case to its competent 
authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with the laws of 
that State. 
See also article 7 the Hague Convention 1970, article 7 the Montreal Convention 1971, article 8 the 
Hostages Convention 1979, article 10 the Nuclear Materials Convention 1980, article 10 the 
Rome Convention 1988, article 8 the Terrorist Bombing Convention 1997, article 10 the 
Terrorism Financing Convention 1999, article 11 the Nuclear Terrorism Convention 2005, article 
10 the Beijing Convention 2010, article 6(9) the Drugs Convention 1988, article 16(10) the 
Organised Crime Convention 2000 and article 44(11) the UN Convention against Corruption 
2003.     
47 See article III (1)(b) Canada-Spain Extradition Treaty 1989; See also Carrie Lyn Donigan 
Guymon, ‘International Legal Mechanisms for Combating Transnational Organised Crime: The 
Need for a Multilateral Convention’ 18 Berkeley J. Int'l L (2000) 53 at 55; Bassiouni, 'Effective 
Action' (n 8) 33 
48 Joseph J Lambert, Terrorism and Hostages in International Law, A Commentary on Hostages 
Convention 1979 (Cambridge: Grotius Publications Limited 1990) at 206 
49 See Plachta 'Contemporary Problems of Extradition' ( n 26) 66 
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argument draws support from the commentary of International Law Commission 
(ILC) on the Protection of Diplomats Convention 1973: 
 The expression ‘fair treatment’ was preferred because of its 
generality, to more usual expressions such as due process, fair hearing 
or fair trial which might be interpreted in a narrow technical sense…50 
2.1.1.3)  'in accordance with national and international, including human 
rights law' 
The wording ‘in accordance with national and international including human 
rights law’ implies that the conventions require the parties to provide all those 
rights to the offenders which have been recognised under national constitutions, 
statutory law, bilateral treaties and international human rights instruments.51  
On account of this, the ILC noted in its commentary to the Protection of 
Diplomats Convention 1973: 
 The expression ‘fair treatment’ is intended to incorporate all the 
guarantees generally recognised to a detained or accused person. An 
example of such guarantees is found in article 14 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.52 
Considering the explanation above, it is clear that the obligation to provide fair 
treatment requires the parties to comply with standards of human rights and 
justice as established by national and international law in all proceedings under 
the conventions including extradition and mutual legal assistance.53 
2.2)  Significance of the obligation 
National approaches can be classified in two opposing camps with respect to 
guaranteeing human rights to persons facing extradition and mutual assistance 
proceedings.54  The first camp represents cooperation-centred states such as 
Canada and the US. According to their view, extradition and mutual legal 
assistance, unlike domestic trials, are treaty matters creating rights and 
                                         
50 1972 Yearbook of the  International Law Commission (YBILC) Vol. II at 320 
51 William (n 5) 198  
52 YBILC (n 50) 
53 Rozakis (n 45) 61  
54 Williams (n 5) at 194 
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obligation for states only.55  Hence, individual rights ought to have restricted 
application in these matters.56  The second camp consists of human rights-
oriented states. These include states parties to the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) 1950.57  To them, international law is no longer concerned 
with states alone. After the dramatic development of human rights law, 
international law recognizes the capacity of individuals to acquire rights and 
obligations under it. Therefore, individual rights should be as effectively 
protected in extradition and mutual assistance proceedings as constitutional 
rights in domestic trials.58 
By establishing the obligation to provide fair treatment, the makers of the 
international conventions have rejected the argument that extradition and 
mutual assistance proceedings are not identical to trials and that persons facing 
these proceedings are not entitled to the rights available to suspects under trial. 
They have made it abundantly clear that, for the purposes of providing human 
rights, there exists no difference between a suspect facing trial and a person 
facing extradition or mutual assistance proceedings. 
 
 Section 3: Effectiveness of the fair treatment 
obligation in facilitating the fulfilment of due 
process rights as grounds for refusal of assistance 
As explained above, the obligation to provide fair treatment requires that 
parties provide two kinds of rights to the offenders: rights relating to due 
process and fundamental human rights.’59 This section concerns the former 
category of rights.  
                                         
55 ibid 
56 ibid at 198-199 
57 See European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 1950; the UK is excluded from the category 
of states following human rights approach to state cooperation. See Williams ibid at 193, 199 
58 Williams (n 5) 223 
59 See Plachta 'Contemporary Problems of Extradition' (n 26) 66 
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3.1)  Right to be protected against double jeopardy 
The principle of double jeopardy is derived from the Latin maxim nemo debet 
bis vexari which means no one shall be prosecuted or punished more than once 
for the same conduct.60  It affords protection to the offenders against successive 
punishments or prosecutions.61  Being embedded in national constitutions, 
bilateral treaties and international human rights treaties, the principle has two 
uses, domestic as well as international.62  At domestic level, it gives protection 
to a person facing trial, against violation of his constitutional right to be immune 
from successive punishments or prosecutions.63  At international level, it enables 
a person facing extradition or mutual legal assistance to resist these proceedings 
by claiming that they will expose him to double punishment or prosecution in the 
requesting state.64  Due to its widespread application in extradition and mutual 
assistance laws, it is considered to be one of the foremost grounds for refusal of 
inter-state assistance in law enforcement.65 Therefore, harmony is needed in 
national systems with respect to giving protection against it, so that the 
requesting state's failure to guarantee that right may not give justification to the 
requested state to block surrender or interrogation. 
To harmonise national legal systems, the international conventions on terrorism 
and organised crime establish the obligation to provide fair treatment to the 
offenders facing ‘any proceedings’ under the treaties. Since the obligation 
requires that parties provide all those rights which are available under national, 
                                         
60 James A Ballentine, A Law Dictionary of words, terms, abbreviations and phrases (New Jersey: 
The Law book exchange Ltd 2005) 325 
61 ibid  
62 Christine van den Wyngaert and Guy Steesens, 'The International Non Bis In Idem Principle: 
Resolving Some of the Unanswered Questions' 48 ICLQ (1999) 779 at 780 
63 See for instance article 13 (a) The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 12th April 1973 
[hereinafter the Constitution of Pakistan 1973]. 'Protection against Double Punishment and Self 
Incrimination. No person:- shall be prosecuted or punished for the same offence more than 
once…'  
64 Wyngaert & Stessens (n 62) 781; See also article 12 of Extradition Act 2003, 2003 Chapter 41 
[hereinafter Extradition Act 2003 of UK]:  
Rule against double jeopardy - A person’s extradition to a category 1 territory is barred by reason 
of the rule against double jeopardy if (and only if) it appears that he would be entitled to be 
discharged under any rule of law relating to previous acquittal or conviction on the assumption 
— (a) that the conduct constituting the extradition offence constituted an offence in the part of 
the United Kingdom where the judge exercises jurisdiction; (b) that the person was charged 
with the extradition offence in that part of the United Kingdom.  
65 See Wyngaert & Stessens (n 62) at 779 
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international and human rights law, right to be protected against successive 
punishments or prosecutions, which has the status of a general principle of law, 
naturally finds its place under it.66  The hope is that with all states guaranteeing 
protection, there will be no occasion for the requested state to refuse surrender 
or interrogation for breach of the rule against double jeopardy.67 
This approach however disregards the fact that there are several applications of 
double jeopardy as a ground for refusal of assistance under the laws and treaties 
on extradition and mutual legal assistance. It is thus possible that the requested 
state's way of applying it as a ground for refusal may not accord with the 
requesting state’s manner of giving protection against its violation. This may 
lead to refusal of surrender or interrogation notwithstanding the requesting 
state having guaranteed protection as required by the obligation to provide fair 
treatment under the international counter-terrorism and organised crime 
conventions.68  To illustrate this point, three aspects of the double jeopardy rule 
will be discussed concerning which the national approaches diverge. The 
divergence necessitates international regulation of the manner in which double 
jeopardy is used as a ground for refusal under bilateral treaties and domestic 
laws on extradition and mutual legal assistance.  
3.1.1) Dissimilarities in national approaches concerning 
the use of double jeopardy as a ground for refusal of 
assistance 
3.1.1.1)  Recognition of the principle in extradition and mutual 
legal assistance proceedings 
The disagreement begins with the recognition of double jeopardy in extradition 
and mutual assistance proceedings. Double jeopardy blocks extradition or 
mutual legal assistance when the requested state comes to know that the 
                                         
66 See Wyngaert & Stessens (n 62) 780. Double jeopardy is acknowledged as a 'general principle 
of law'. 
67 See Abdullah Y. Shehu, 'International Initiatives against Corruption and Money Laundering: An 
Overview' 12 Journal of Financial crime (2005) 221 at 231. 
68 See Bassiouni, 'Ideologically Motivated Offences' (n 1); Also see Bassiouni, Policy 
Considerations' (n 9) 132,144;  Christopher L. Blakesley, 'The Autumn of the Patriarch: The 
Pinochet Extradition Debacle and Beyond - Human Rights Clauses Compared to Traditional 
Derivative Protections Such as Double Criminality' 91 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 
(200-2001) 1  
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offender has previously been convicted or acquitted for the conduct concerning 
which the request for assistance has been made.69  On a number of occasions, 
national courts refused to consider previous conviction relevant for the purposes 
of extradition and mutual legal assistance. For example, in Schmidst v. Canada, 
the Canadian Supreme Court observed that protection against double jeopardy in 
Canada is derived from the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which only 
applies to trials held in Canada.70  In extradition, since the violation of double 
jeopardy take places in a foreign country, i.e. the requesting state, it cannot be 
raised as a ground to resist extradition proceedings held in Canada because the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has no extraterritorial application.71  
In other words, extradition proceedings are not identical to trials and the rule of 
double jeopardy blocks trials, not the extradition of suspects.72  A different 
approach is taken under Extradition Act 2003 of the UK. Section 12 of the Act 
requires the Judge conducting an extradition hearing to reject extradition if the 
offender, had he been tried in the UK, would have been immune from 
prosecution under the rule of double jeopardy.73 
  It is thus clear that national approaches differ with respect to recognition of 
double jeopardy in extradition and mutual legal assistance proceedings.  The 
international conventions on terrorism and organised crime attempt to bring 
harmony in national approaches by clarifying that offenders facing ‘any 
proceedings’, including extradition and interrogation, are entitled to fair 
treatment which brings into the fold protection against double jeopardy. 
Nevertheless, the conventions are only meant to supplement and not override 
national laws and bilateral treaties.74  Hence, it cannot be said that by 
establishing the obligation to provide fair treatment, the international 
conventions have harmonised national approaches with respect to recognition of 
double jeopardy in extradition and mutual legal assistance proceedings. 
                                         
69 See for instance article 6 of Extradition Treaty between the Government of United States of 
America and the Government of the Republic of South Africa, Signed at Washington on 
September 16,1999 [hereinafter US-South Africa Extradition Treaty 1999] 
70 See Canada v. Schmidt [1987] 1 S.C.R 500 AT 501-502 (CAN) 
71  ibid 
72 See Williams (n 5) at 215 
73 See article 12 Extradition Act 2003 of UK (n 64) 
74  See (n 228) Chapter 3 above 
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3.1.1.2)  Forum of previous conviction 
Another dissimilarity in national approaches concerning the use of double 
jeopardy as a ground for refusal of assistance relates to the forum of previous 
conviction. National laws and bilateral treaties on extradition and mutual legal 
assistance are divided as regards the state where previous conviction should 
have occurred for the purposes of blocking surrender or interrogation under the 
rule of double jeopardy.75  Some states require that previous conviction occurs 
in the requested state, others stipulate that occurrence of previous conviction in 
either the requesting or requested state operates as a bar, while a few provide 
that previous conviction in any state precludes extradition or interrogation under 
the rule of double jeopardy. For instance, the China-Korea Extradition Treaty 
2002 obliges the parties to refuse extradition if the surrender is sought in 
respect of an offence concerning which judgement of acquittal or conviction has 
been passed in the 'requested state'.76  By contrast, the 2004 Mutual Assistance 
treaty among eight far-eastern states obliges the parties to compulsorily refuse 
assistance if the previous conviction or acquittal occurred in the 'requesting and 
requested state'.77  This may be compared with Singapore’s extradition law, 
which provides that a person shall not be surrendered to a foreign state in 
respect of an offence if he has been convicted, acquitted or pardoned by a 
competent tribunal or authority in 'any country'.78 
It has been argued that states following the first approach, i.e. barring 
extradition only if a previous conviction occurs in the requested state, give 
preference to state cooperation over human rights because the smaller the 
number of states whose conviction is likely to bar subsequent prosecution, the 
smoother the surrender of suspects from one state to another will be.79  The 
Joseph Aumeier case from 1980 provides an example of how extradition can be 
facilitated by considering a previous conviction to be a ground of refusal only 
                                         
75 See Wyngaert & Stessens (n 62) 783  
76 See article 3(2) of China-Korea Extradition Treaty 2002 
77 See article 3(1) (d) of Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters. Signed on 29 
November 2004 in Kuala Lampur, Malaysia [hereinafter 2004 Mutual Legal Assistance treaty 
among eight far-eastern states] 
78 See article 7(4) of Singapore’ Extradition Act 1968 ( Act 14 of 1968 as amended in 2000) 
79 See Wyngaert & Stessens (n 62) 783  
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when it took place in the ‘requested state’.80  In this case, the offender was 
convicted and sentenced to a one year custodial sentence by a Dutch court for 
the offence of drug trafficking across the border of Germany and the 
Netherlands. His extradition was requested by Germany but was rejected by the 
Netherlands on the ground that Dutch law prohibited extradition of suspects who 
had previously been convicted for the same offence by the requested state.81 
Subsequently, the offender went to Belgium, where his extradition was again 
requested by Germany for the offence in respect of which he had been convicted 
earlier by the Netherlands. This time the extradition was granted because 
Belgian law only precluded extradition if the previous conviction took place in 
Belgium. Since the previous conviction had occurred in the Netherlands, Belgium 
was under no obligation to consider it an obstacle to extradition under the 
double jeopardy rule.82 
Notwithstanding its suitability for bringing to justice transnational offenders, the 
policy of restricting the protection against double jeopardy to those instances 
only where previous conviction occurs in the requested state has been criticized 
by a number of scholars advocating a human rights approach to state 
cooperation. For instance, Wyngaert and Stessens maintain that restricting 
double jeopardy protection to those instances only where previous conviction 
occurs in the requested state, amounts to depriving the offender of his right to 
be immune from extradition in respect of conduct concerning which at least one 
state may have previously rendered its judgement.83  Similarly, Williams states 
that 'double jeopardy safeguard should be broadened to encompass acquittals 
and convictions in the requested, requesting or third states…' 84 
In light of foregoing, it is plain that national approaches diverge concerning the 
use of double jeopardy as a ground of refusal, in terms of the forum of the 
previous conviction. According to Wyngaert and Stessens, since the domestic 
laws of many states do not always recognise the res-judicata effect of foreign 
                                         
80 Joseph Aumeier’s case of 1980 involving Belgium and Germany (Laatste Nieuws, 5 Nov. 1990) 
cited in Wyngaert & Stessens (n 62) at 785 
81Wyngaert & Stessens ibid 
82 ibid 
83 ibid at 786 & 803 
84 Williams (n 5) at 216 
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criminal judgments, efforts are needed to create an international double 
jeopardy system.85 
 The international conventions on terrorism and organised crime were expected 
to harmonise national approaches by providing a universal formula as regards the 
forum, the previous judgement of which may operate as a bar to extradition or 
mutual legal assistance. Two reasons gave rise to this expectation. Firstly, the 
conventions gave jurisdictional competence over the crimes set forth by them to 
more than one state. This made it more likely in transnational crimes, as 
compared to ordinary crimes, that the offence charged in the extradition or 
interrogation request may have previously been adjudicated upon by one or 
more parties involved.86  Secondly, the conventions purport to establish a 
cooperative network amongst states following distinct legal systems which may 
or may not have bilateral treaties with each other.87  To synchronise their 
approaches, it was necessary to provide a consensual rule with respect to the 
forum of previous conviction. However, the  conventions fell short of the 
expectation, as they left it entirely up to the requested state to determine the 
conditions of  surrender or interrogation, including the application of double 
jeopardy as a ground for refusal of assistance and hence determination as to the 
suitability of the previous forum.88 
Interestingly, the Extradition Treaty between France and Canada 1988 provides a 
workable solution to the controversy surrounding the forum, the previous 
judgements of which may operate as a bar to extradition or interrogation. 
                                         
85 See Wyngaert & Stessens (n 62) 786 & 803 
86 See for instance article 6 of the Terrorist Bombing Convention 1997. It contains a non-exhaustive 
list of states competent to exercise jurisdiction over the offences including states of active and 
passive nationality, territoriality and state of registration of the ship or aircraft. Identical 
provisions can be seen in all transnational treaties under consideration. See also Chapter 2 
above. 
87 See for instance, article 44 the UN Convention against Corruption 2003. The article binds only 
those states which do not make extradition conditional on the existence of bilateral treaties, 
whereas states making extradition conditional on such treaties are only recommended to 
consider the Convention as legal basis of extradition. For corresponding provisions, see article 
9 the Hague Convention 1970, article 8 the Montreal Convention 1971, article 8 the Protection 
of Diplomats Convention 1973, article 10 the Hostages Convention 1979, article 11 the Nuclear 
Materials Convention 1980, article 11 the Rome Convention 1988, article 9 the Terrorist 
Bombing Convention 1997, article 11 the Terrorism Financing Convention 1999, article 13 the 
Nuclear Terrorism Convention 2005, article 6 the UN Convention against Drugs 1988, article 16 
the Organised Crime Convention 2000 and article 12 the Beijing Convention 2010.  
88 See (n 228) Chapter 3 above 
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According to that treaty, if a previous conviction occurs in the requested state, 
it constitutes a mandatory ground for refusal. On the other hand, if it takes 
place in the requesting or a third state, it represents an optional ground for 
refusal.89  The approach centres on controlling the use of double jeopardy as a 
ground for refusal and appears far more effective in facilitating state 
cooperation in extradition and mutual legal assistance as compared to the 
general obligation to provide fair treatment. 
3.1.1.3) Offences or facts 
Another controversy surrounding the use of double jeopardy as a ground for 
refusal, relates to the scope of the previous judgement.90  It raises the issue 
whether surrender or interrogation should be barred only when the offender has 
previously been tried for precisely the 'same offence' to which the request for 
extradition or mutual legal assistance relates or should it also be precluded if 
the request relates to a different charge but arises out of the 'same 
transaction.'91  Put differently, can a person found guilty of theft in country A, 
be subsequently extradited to country B under the aggravated charge of robbery 
arising out of the same conduct which led to his earlier conviction or acquittal.92 
National approaches are again at odds concerning this aspect of the double 
jeopardy rule. For instance, the UK-UAE Extradition Treaty 2008 obliges the 
parties to refuse extradition when the request relates to an ‘offence’ for which 
the accused has previously been convicted or acquitted.93  This may be 
contrasted to 1997 Extradition Treaty between China and Singapore which 
obliges the parties to refuse extradition if the offender has previously been tried 
for the offence to which request for extradition relates or for ‘any other offence 
constituted by the same act’.94  The latter approach reflects prioritization of 
                                         
89 See Article 4 & 5 Canada-France Extradition Treaty 1988 
90 Wyngaert & Stessens (n 62) 789 
91 ibid 
92 ibid at 779 
93 See article III (3) UK-UAE Extradition Treaty 2008 
94 See article 5(2) of Hong-Kong, China-Singapore Extradition Treaty 1997. See also article 7(4) of 
Singapore Extradition Act 1968 : 
A person shall not be liable to be surrendered to a foreign State in respect of an offence if he has 
been acquitted or pardoned by a competent tribunal or authority in any country, or has 
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human rights over state cooperation because it blocks extradition for every 
offence arising out of the conduct which led to previous judgement.95 
The disagreement surrounding the application of double jeopardy to facts or 
specific crimes poses a considerable challenge in bringing to justice 
transnational offenders because many of these offences constitute complex 
aggregate crimes.96  The features of complexity and aggregation imply that 
either several individual facts form part of one scheme or the criminal situation 
continues to develop.97   For example, a person involved in drug trafficking 
across the border of two states can be charged with export of narcotics in one 
state and their import in the other. Furthermore, he may as well be charged 
with inter-state transportation of narcotics and their unauthorised possession by 
either of the two states.98  Thus, four different offences can be carved out of a 
single transaction. Suppose he is convicted for the minor offence of unauthorised 
possession 99 and his extradition is later requested for the aggregate crime of 
inter-state transportation.100  If the requested state applies double jeopardy to 
the entire transaction, the extradition will have to be refused resulting in 
impunity for more serious offences.  
                                                                                                                           
undergone the punishment provided by the law of, or of a part of, any country, in respect of 
that offence or of another offence constituted by the same act or omission as that offence.  
< http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/44/39368700.pdf> [Date accessed 21/03/13] 
95 Williams (n 5) 213 
96 Bruce Zagaris, 'US Cooperation against Transnational Organised Crime' 44 Wayne State Law 
Review (1998-1999) 1401 at 1425-1426   
97 ibid   
98 The Drugs Convention requires the criminalization of all four offences of import, export, 
transportation and possession of Drugs. See article 3(1)(a)(i) and (c)(i) of the UN Drugs 
Convention 1988 
99 The Drugs Convention provides that the offence of possession can be criminalized subject to 
national Constitutions and basic legal principles. See article 3(1)(C)(i) of the Drugs Convention 
1988; According to Taylor, this provision can be interpreted to mean, states are entitled to 
provide  minor punishments for possession, particularly when its purpose is consumption. See 
David R. Bewley-Taylor, ‘Challenging the UN Drug Control Conventions: Problems and 
Possibilities’ 14 International Journal of Drug Policy (2003) 171 at 171. A number of states while 
implementing this provision make the act of possession punishable with lesser penalties such 
as simple fine. For example, article 9(a) of Control of Narcotics Substances Act 1997 of 
Pakistan provides two years maximum imprisonment for possession and simple fine as 
minimum punishment.   
100 Transportation of Drugs is generally considered much serious offence as compare to 
possession or consumption. For example, Pakistan’s Law on drug trafficking provides death 
sentence as maximum punishment for transportation of drugs and 14 years imprisonment as 
minimum punishment. See article 9(c) of Control of Narcotics Substances Act 1997  
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Similarly, the crime of human trafficking includes the offences of abduction and 
transportation of individuals beyond national borders for commercial 
exploitation.101  When these crimes are committed by organised criminal groups, 
different tasks are usually assigned to individual members of the group. Let us 
assume that some members are entrusted with the task of abduction and 
transportation in one state and the others with the commercial exploitation in 
another. The conviction of the former for abduction alone may preclude their 
extradition or interrogation for the aggregate crime of human trafficking, 
provided the requested state applies double jeopardy to entire criminal 
transaction in its extradition and mutual assistance laws. 
Accordingly, it has been argued that application of double jeopardy to specific 
offences, rather than to the entire transaction, appears desirable in cases 
involving transnational crimes. If the rule is applied to the entire transaction, 
the offender may avoid punishment for more serious crimes which might be 
discovered subsequently and relate to the same transaction.102  However, the 
international conventions on terrorism and organised crime provide no such 
guideline, in spite of the fact that crimes proscribed by them are prone to 
aggregation and complication. 
Obviously, the criterion of states applying double jeopardy to facts differs from 
those applying it to specific offences. In case, extradition or mutual legal 
assistance is to take place between states following these two conflicting 
approaches, surrender or interrogation will be deemed barred in one state but 
not in the other. This leaves the matter effectively into the hands of requested 
state, the subordination of whose discretion is said to be the primary aim of the 
regime set forth by the international counter-terrorism and organised crime 
conventions. 
                                         
101 See article 3(a) Human Trafficking Protocol to the Organised Crime Convention 2000: 
Trafficking in persons shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of 
persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of 
fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or 
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over 
another person, for the purpose of exploitation...  
102 Wyngaert & Stessens (n 62) 792 
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3.2)  Right to be protected against time-barred 
prosecutions 
The principle of prescription or time-barred prosecutions constitutes another 
ground for making an offence non-punishable or excluding criminal 
responsibility. It protects an offender from long delayed prosecutions that may 
prejudice his human rights.103  In the words of Doyle, ‘the purpose of a statute 
of limitation in a criminal case is to ensure the prompt prosecution of criminal 
charges and thereby spare the accused of the burden of having to defend against 
stale charges after memories may have faded or evidence is lost’.104 
Lapse of time bars prosecution under the national statutes of limitation that set 
a maximum time after an event within which legal proceedings based on that 
event must be brought.105  For instance, US federal law provides a limitation of 
eight years for bringing criminal proceedings against non-violent violations of 
terrorism-associated statutes.106  However, no limitation is provided for bringing 
action against violent violations.107  In general, limitation periods are longer for 
more serious offenses.108 
 
The principle at domestic level prevents an accused from trial for time barred 
charges. At international level, it precludes a requested state from extraditing a 
fugitive or providing legal assistance with respect to his crime, if the prosecution 
of the crime has become barred by lapse of time. For example, article 5 of the 
US-Switzerland Extradition Treaty 1990 obliges the parties to refuse extradition 
                                         
103 Williams (n 5) 216 
104 Charles Doyle, 'Statutes of Limitation in Federal Criminal Cases: An Overview' CRS Report for 
Congress (April 9, 2007) < http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31253.pdf> [Date accessed 
21/03/13] 
105 Doyle (n 104) 
106 See 18 U.S.C. 3286 (a) Extension of Statutes of Limitation for certain Terrorism Offences 
107 ibid 
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when the prosecution of the person sought would be barred by lapse of time 
under the domestic law of the Requesting Party.109 
Although the principle is not universally applied in criminal proceedings, it is 
widely applied in bilateral treaties and domestic laws on extradition and mutual 
legal assistance as a ground for refusal of assistance. For instance, the principle 
appears in article 10 of the European Convention on Extradition 1957, article 
8(6) of the Chinese Extradition Law 2000 and article 4(1)(c) of the Australia-
Indonesia Mutual Assistance Treaty of 1995. Notably, it also finds expression 
under article 3(f) of the UN Model Treaty on Extradition 1990. Therefore, 
harmony is needed in national systems with respect to giving protection against 
time- barred prosecutions, so that the requesting state’s failure to guarantee 
that right may not give opportunity to the requested state to block surrender or 
interrogation. 
To bring harmony, the international conventions on terrorism and organised 
crime oblige the parties to provide fair treatment to the offenders in accordance 
with national, international and human rights law. Since the right to be 
protected against time-barred prosecutions enjoys widespread recognition in 
national constitutions and criminal codes, the right may be said to be implied in 
the obligation to provide fair treatment.110  This view draws support from 
several provisions of the conventions which recommend that parties provide 
longer statutes of limitation for crimes established by the conventions.111 
The fair treatment obligation is directed towards making national justice 
systems harmonious with respect to the provision of human rights to offenders. 
However, the potential for conflict lies in the application of these rights as 
                                         
109 See article 5 of the Extradition Treaty between the Government of United States of America and 
the Government of Swiss Confederation. Signed at Washington on November 14, 1990 
[hereinafter US-Switzerland Extradition Treaty 1990] 
110 YBILC (n 50); See also Rozakis (n 45); Plachta, 'Contemporary Problems of Extradition' (n 26) 
111 See for instance, article 11(5) of the Organised Crime Convention  2000:  
Each State Party shall, where appropriate, establish under its domestic law a long statute of 
limitations period in which to commence proceedings for any offence covered by this 
Convention and a longer period where the alleged offender has evaded the administration of 
justice. 
For corresponding provisions, see article 29 of the UN Convention against Corruption 2003 and 
article 3(8) the Drugs Convention 1988 
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grounds for refusal of assistance in extradition and mutual assistance 
proceedings. Thus, even if each party guarantees protection against time- 
barred prosecutions, surrender or interrogation can still be refused where the 
requested state applies the right differently as a ground for refusal under its 
extradition and mutual assistance laws, from the way of its protection is 
guaranteed by the requesting state. 
3.2.1) Dissimilarities in national approaches concerning the use 
of time-barred prosecution as a ground for refusal of assistance  
States parties to the international conventions on terrorism and organised crime 
can be classified into two distinct groups. States relying on bilateral treaties for 
the provision of assistance and states depending on international conventions 
themselves.112  It will be argued, in relation to both of these groups, the 
obligation, under the international conventions, to provide fair treatment, falls 
short of producing enough harmony in national rules on human rights protection, 
as to enable the parties to satisfy multiple applications of time barred 
prosecutions as a ground for refusal of assistance. As a result, complications 
arise in bringing to justice transnational offenders.  
3.2.1.1) Disparity with respect to applicable limitation law    
The rule against time barred prosecutions excludes criminal responsibility or 
makes an offence non-punishable, if prosecution for the offense charged, or 
enforcement of the penalty, has become barred by lapse of time under the 
applicable limitation law.113  Bilateral treaties diverge as regards the law 
deemed relevant for blocking surrender or interrogation on the ground of time 
barred prosecutions. In some treaties the applicable limitation law is that of the 
requested state; in others it is that of the requesting state. Under a few 
treaties, either state’s statute of limitations is deemed relevant for the purposes 
of blocking extradition or mutual legal assistance. For example, China-Korea 
Extradition Treaty 2002 provides that extradition shall be refused when the 
person sought has, under the law of 'either party', become immune to 
                                         
112 See (n 87) above 
113 Charles Doyle (n 104) 
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prosecution by lapse of time.114  Conversely, India-Australia extradition treaty 
2008 precludes extradition if the prosecution has become time barred under the 
law of the 'Requesting State'. 115  On the other hand, Canada-Spain Extradition 
Treaty 1989 obliges the parties to refuse extradition when the prosecution is 
time barred under the 'Requested State’s' statute of limitation.116 
In 1980, Australia requested extradition of Kamrin from the US on charges of 
fraud committed in 1974. Under US law, the offence committed in Australia was 
time- barred for the purposes of prosecution. The offender challenged his 
extradition on this ground. The 9th Circuit Court rejected the objection by 
observing that according to the applicable bilateral treaty it was the requesting 
state’s law (Australia’s) that was relevant for the purposes of blocking 
extradition under the rule against time barred prosecutions.117 Since Australian 
law did not attach any time limitation for prosecution of the crime in question, 
extradition was granted.118  This case provides an example of a requesting 
state’s limitation law being deemed relevant for the purposes of barring 
extradition under the rule of time barred prosecutions. 
The Kamrin case reveals that conflicting national approaches towards 
‘applicable limitation law’ pose no real difficulties in situations where state 
cooperation is to take place between two states, having a single bilateral treaty 
between them. However, in transnational crimes where the crime spreads across 
national frontiers, in terms of its perpetration or nationality or location of the 
victim or offender, it is possible that that the crime takes place in one state, the 
evidence is located somewhere else and the offender is found in yet another 
state. For example, in money laundering cases, the crime through which illegal 
proceeds are generated is committed in one state, the conversion of unlawful 
wealth takes place in another, while the offender might be found somewhere 
else.119   In such cases, more than one bilateral treaty might be in operation with 
                                         
114 See article 3(3) of China-Korea Extradition Treaty 2002; See also article 10 of the European 
Convention on Extradition 1957; See also article 3(e) UN Model Treaty on Extradition 1990 
115 See article 4(1)(b) of India-Australia Extradition Treaty 2008 
116 See article III (4) of Canada-Spain Extradition Treaty 1989 
117 Jeffrey Phillip Kamrin v. United States of America, 725 F.2d 1225, Decided by United States 
Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit on  Feb 14, 1984 
118 ibid 
119 For definition of Money Laundering, see article 3(b) of the Drugs Convention 1988  
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respect to a single crime. Each bilateral treaty could provide different rule for 
blocking state cooperation on the basis of time barred prosecutions. The 
situation obviously leads to difficulties in securing the surrender of fugitives or 
obtaining evidence with respect to a fugitive’s crime.  
For example, the Australia-India Extradition Treaty 2008 mandates the refusal of 
extradition when the prosecution or punishment is barred under the law of the 
‘requesting state’.120  Conversely, the Australia-Indonesia Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaty 1995 provides that assistance shall be refused where it is 
barred by lapse of time under the law of the ‘requested state’.121  If Australia 
claims extradition of a fugitive from India, it is Australian limitation law which 
will be deemed relevant for the purposes of limitation. However, in case the 
evidence of his crime is located in Indonesia, Australia will have to comply with 
the Indonesian limitation law for the purposes of mutual legal assistance. 
Supposing prosecution is time- barred under Indonesian law, the fugitive will 
have to be set free for the want of evidence.  
The above complications have led some states to adopt a different approach, 
according to which neither state’s limitation law, should be deemed relevant for 
the purposes of blocking extradition or mutual legal assistance on the ground of 
time barred prosecutions. For example, Article 6 of the Extradition Treaty 
between the UK and US 2003 provides, ‘[t]he decision by the Requested State 
whether to grant the request for extradition shall be made without regard to any 
statute of limitations in either State.'122  This approach underlies the 
advancement of state cooperation at the expense of human rights.123  
Accordingly, the treaty was subjected to severe criticism in view of its disregard 
for human rights.124  For example, the cross-party joint committee on human 
rights of the UK called for the urgent renegotiation of the treaty.125 
                                         
120 See article 4(1)(b) India-Australia Extradition Treaty 2008 
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3.2.1.2) States not applying statutes of limitation to criminal proceedings 
The International Conventions on terrorism and organised crime purport to 
establish a cooperative network among a variety of national justice systems. 
Some of these systems do not even apply statutes of limitation to criminal 
proceedings, yet they are required to observe the limitation laws of their treaty 
partners in extradition and mutual assistance proceedings. The reason is that the 
conventions conclusively declare that conditions of state cooperation, including 
grounds of refusal, shall be determined in accordance with the national law of 
the requested state.126  For example, the Limitation Act 1908 of Pakistan does 
not apply to criminal proceedings.127  In the same way, the Limitation Act 1980 
of the UK only relates to civil claims.128  If either of the two states seeks 
extradition or mutual legal assistance from France, assuming both Pakistan and 
UK have no bilateral treaty with France, the requesting state will have to abide 
by the limitation law of France because the latter duly applies limitation to 
criminal proceedings.129 
It is thus obvious that states relying on the international conventions as legal 
basis for cooperation are obliged to observe the limitation statutes of the 
requested state regardless of the dictates of their own law. Consequently, if the 
requested state does not apply such statutes to crime, the due process rights of 
the offender will be compromised,130  and if it does but the requesting state 
does not, the interests of the requesting state will suffer.131 
The mutual assistance efforts between Pakistan and Switzerland in relation to 
the recovery of the former’s embezzled wealth, provides but one example of 
how the interests of the requesting state could be imperilled if it does not apply 
statutes of limitation to criminal proceedings but the requested state does. 
                                         
126 See (n 228) Chapter 3 above 
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In 1997, Pakistan sought assistance from Switzerland for the return of $60 
million frozen by the Swiss government on charge of money laundering.132  The 
money was frozen in compliance with a judgement delivered by a Swiss local 
court holding that the money was derived from the crime of corruption involving 
two Swiss companies, the late Prime Minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto and her 
husband.133  Since Pakistan had no mutual assistance treaty with Switzerland, 
assistance was sought in 1997 through diplomatic channels.134  In 2007, then 
President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan promulgated an amnesty law entitled 
National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) 2007 withdrawing all criminal charges 
against the late Prime Minister and her husband, including the asset recovery 
proceedings in Switzerland.135  Consequently, the government of Pakistan filed a 
petition before the relevant Swiss court requesting the withdrawal of the 
application regarding the asset recovery proceedings.136 
In 2008, the husband of the late Prime Minister Bhutto, Asif Ali Zardari, became 
the President of Pakistan and, as such, was vested with sovereign immunity 
against all criminal proceedings by virtue of article 248 of the Constitution of 
Pakistan 1973.137  In 2010, the Supreme Court of Pakistan, after declaring the 
controversial amnesty law (NRO) unconstitutional, directed the government to 
write a letter to Swiss authorities requesting the revival of asset recovery 
proceedings.138  The government however claimed it was unable to comply with 
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Leaves Office?’ The Nation Pakistan (June 27 2012)<http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-
newspaper-daily-english-online/national/27-Jun-2012/will-swiss-cases-follow-zardari-when-he-
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this direction on the ground that the applicable treaty between Pakistan and 
Switzerland, the UN Convention against Corruption 2003, required the requesting 
party under article 61 to obtain a domestic judgement as regards the predicate 
offence before seeking the assistance of a foreign state for recovery of assets.139 
Since domestic proceedings were barred under the constitutional immunity 
enjoyed by the President, this pre-requisite could not be met.140  In other words, 
the government claimed that proceedings for recovery of assets could not be 
initiated in Switzerland so long as Pakistan itself did not render criminal 
judgement concerning the offence through which proceeds were generated.  
Pakistani courts were, however, precluded from delivering such judgement until 
October 2013, when the constitutional immunity of the President would come to 
an end along with his term in office.141 
Because section 97 of the Swiss criminal code provided a fifteen year time limit 
for bringing asset recovery proceedings142  and since Pakistan originally 
approached Switzerland in 1997, the Swiss time limit was considered to have 
elapsed in September 2012, well in advance of the President losing his 
immunity.143 
The position taken by the government did not satisfy the Supreme Court of 
Pakistan, which held the government guilty of contempt and disqualified then- 
Prime Minister, Yousuf Raza Gilani as punishment for wilful disobedience of its 
order.144  Subsequently, the government wrote a letter to Swiss authorities 
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calling for the reopening of the asset recovery cases.145  In reply, the Attorney- 
General, of Geneva, Switzerland stated that the money laundering cases against 
President Zardari could not be reopened, on the ground that the statutory 
limitation period of fifteen years had expired and no new evidence or facts had 
been revealed.146 
It is therefore clear that although Pakistan did not apply statutes of limitation to 
criminal proceedings, it was obliged to observe Swiss limitation law in regard to 
asset recovery proceedings. This was so because the UN Convention against 
Corruption 2003, which constituted the legal basis of cooperation between the 
two states, stipulated that conditions and procedures of state cooperation shall 
be determined in accordance with the domestic law of the requested state.147 
Obviously, this arrangement disregards the interest of the requesting state which 
happens to be the actual victim of the crime in the case in hand. 
To safeguard the interests of the requesting states, the international 
conventions on terrorism and organised crime could have borrowed a provision 
from domestic statutes of limitation suggesting that time limitation shall not 
apply where delay is caused by the offender’s own misconduct.148  Such a 
provision would have addressed the concerns of both, states applying statutes of 
limitation to crime and states not applying them. However, no such middle 
ground can be found in the conventions.  
It is thus apparent that fair treatment obligation may fail to address the 
complications arising in extradition and mutual legal assistance pursuant to 
multiple applications of time-barred prosecutions as grounds for refusal of 
assistance. As regards states relying on bilateral treaties, the obligation is found 
deficient with respect to providing any consensual rule concerning the limitation 
law deemed relevant for applying time barred prosecutions as a ground of 
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refusal. In relation to states depending on the international conventions, the 
obligation fails to provide any mechanism to safeguard the interests of a 
requesting state which does not apply statutes of limitation to crime. Hence, the 
establishment of only a general obligation to provide fair treatment can hardly 
be expected to make national legal systems harmonious enough to overcome the 
hurdle of time barred prosecutions. As a result, the discretion of the requested 
state to refuse state cooperation remains intact. This denies the scholarly claim 
that the mandatory obligations evidence the emergence of a new treaty regime 
subjecting sovereign discretion to collective law enforcement. 
Up to this point, the effectiveness of fair treatment obligation in harmonising 
national approaches towards provision of due process rights has been discussed. 
In the next section, I shall discuss the usefulness of the obligation in unifying 
national approaches towards provision of fundamental human rights and its 
impact on facilitating state cooperation in extradition and mutual legal 
assistance.   
Section 4: Effectiveness of the fair treatment 
obligation in facilitating the fulfilment fundamental 
human rights as grounds for refusal of assistance  
4.1) Right to be protected against torture   
Right to be protected against torture safeguards an offender from being 
subjected to physical distress. At domestic level, evidence obtained through 
torture vitiates the trial, at international level, possibility of torture allows a 
requested state to block extradition or mutual legal assistance, when it has 
reason to believe that if surrendered or allowed to be interrogated, the suspect 
would be tortured in the requesting state. Therefore, harmony is needed in 
national justice systems with respect to giving protection against torture, so that 
the requesting state’s failure to guarantee that right may not give justification 
to the requested state to refuse cooperation. 
To harmonise national systems, international convention on terrorism and 
organised crime impose mandatory obligation upon the parties to provide fair 
treatment to persons facing any proceedings under the treaties. Since the 
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obligation requires the parties to provide all those rights which are guaranteed 
by national and international law including human rights law, the right to be 
protected against torture, having the status of jus cogens, naturally finds its 
place under it. For example, it was held by the ICJ in Belgium v. Senegal, ‘[i]n 
the Court’s opinion, the prohibition of torture is part of customary international 
law and it has become a peremptory norm (jus cogens).’149 
Whereas rights such as protection against double jeopardy and time- barred 
prosecutions arise from statutory laws and bilateral treaties, prohibition against 
torture derives from international human rights law.150  For instance, article 3 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) provides, 'No one shall be 
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment'.151  
Similarly, article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) states, 'No one shall be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment...'152 
As an off-shoot of this prohibition, article 3(1) of the UN Convention against 
Torture 1984 provides, ‘No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or 
extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for 
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.’153  The 
principle also finds its expression as a mandatory ground of refusal under article 
3(f) of the UN Model Treaty on Extradition 1990.154 
Scholarly opinion is near unanimous concerning the jus cogens status of 
prohibition against torture.155  In the words of Dugard and Wyngaert, 'If any 
human rights norm enjoys the status of Jus Cogens, it is prohibition on 
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torture'.156  Likewise, it has been suggested that a restriction on the extradition 
of a fugitive likely to face torture in the requesting state also represents a 
peremptory norm of international law.157  For example, Plachta maintains, in the 
context of extradition and mutual legal assistance, there are only a few human 
rights which are non-derogable, these include prohibition against torture.158  
This has led some commentators to observe that, even if the possibility of 
torture is not included as a ground for refusal under the relevant bilateral treaty 
or statutory law, an offender can still raise it as an objection to extradition 
under customary international law.159 
4.1.1) Need to reconcile the prohibition against torture with the 
severe punishment requirement of transnational criminality 
Despite the clear import of the obligation to provide fair treatment and despite 
the fact that the right to be immune from torture forms part of it, it is difficult 
to suggest that the obligation has led to harmonisation of national justice 
systems and facilitation of state cooperation in law enforcement. Since the 
international conventions on terrorism and organised crime do not provide 
definition of torture, states at times find it difficult to reconcile the right not to 
be subject to such treatment with the severe punishment requirement of crimes 
set forth by these conventions.  As a result, where the law of requesting state 
provides severe punishment for the crime in respect of which surrender or 
interrogation is sought, the requested state may refuse cooperation, 
notwithstanding, the requesting state having guaranteed protection in 
compliance with the obligation to provide fair treatment. 
A number of states, while establishing prohibition against torture, clarify that 
the prohibition also applies to cruel punishments. For example, article 3 of the 
ECHR, in addition to establishing prohibition against 'cruel treatment', also 
outlaws 'cruel punishment'.160  In the same way, Chinese extradition law provides 
as mandatory ground of refusal, the possibility of the fugitive being subjected to 
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'cruel punishment' in the requesting state.161  Likewise, Bulgaria’s law of 
extradition requires the denial of extradition:  
if the person will be a subject of violence, torture or cruel, inhuman 
or humiliating penalty related with the prosecution and with the 
execution of the penalty as per the requirements of the international 
law in the applying country.162 
It is thus clear that right to be protected against torture has been interpreted by 
some jurisdictions to include protection against cruel punishments. Significantly, 
the approach has been approved by the UN Model Treaty on Extradition 1990, 
which provides that extradition shall be refused where the person whose 
surrender is requested is likely to be subjected in the requesting state to torture 
or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 'punishment'.163 
Since many of the crimes established by the international conventions on 
terrorism and organised crime comprise serious offences such as hijacking and 
drug trafficking,164  more often than not they are made punishable with severe 
punishments such as death or life imprisonment.165  These punishments have 
been held to be cruel in some national court decisions.166  Hence, their existence 
in the law of the requesting state provides the requested state with a ground for 
denial of assistance. 
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Since international conventions on terrorism and organised crime purport to 
establish a cooperative network amongst diverse legal systems, it is possible that 
some states might consider these punishments as cruel, while others might not. 
This leads to disharmony in the national grounds for refusal of assistance and 
possible failure of law enforcement cooperation. Therefore, further guidance is 
needed with respect to the application of the right to be immune from torture 
as a ground for refusal of assistance in the specific context of transnational 
crimes. However, instead of providing clear guidelines differentiating severe 
punishments from torture, the international conventions regulating the acts of 
transnational terrorism and organised crime impose a general obligation to 
provide fair treatment to the offenders. Obviously, the obligations is insufficient 
to facilitate the fulfilment of multiple applications of torture as a ground for 
refusal of assistance under extradition and mutual legal assistance laws. 
As a result, complications arise in the extradition of suspects whose crimes are 
punishable with death or life imprisonment in the requesting state. For example, 
when the ECtHR blocked the extradition of Abu Qatada from UK to Jordan on 
account of the offender having been convicted on the basis of evidence derived 
through torturing the co-accused, the British government regarded it an 
interference with its national justice system.167 
4.1.2) Dissimilar national and regional approaches with respect to 
considering severe punishments as torture 
4.1.2.1)  Regional courts and monitoring bodies 
The jurisprudence of regional courts and human rights monitoring bodies 
provides valuable insights into the view that the right to be protected against 
torture, inhuman treatment and cruel punishment might be violated if the 
fugitive is surrendered to a state which makes the offences charged in the 
extradition request punishable with death or life imprisonment. In the opinion of 
these courts and bodies, the prospect of a death penalty does not in itself 
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constitute violation of the prohibition.168  However, if the manner of execution is 
degrading to the physical and mental integrity of the extraditee, the same may 
amount to a breach of the right to be protected against inhuman and cruel 
punishment. Thus, the ECtHR observed in its landmark judgement in Soering v. 
UK that if the fugitive is likely to be put on death row and made to wait for a 
prolonged period for his execution in harsh conditions with ever present and 
mounting anguish of awaiting death, prohibition against cruel and inhuman 
treatment will be violated in his extradition.169  Similarly, the Human Rights 
Committee observed in Ng v. Canada, that Canada was in breach of its obligation 
under the ICCPR when it extradited Mr. Ng to a state which provided death by 
asphyxiation as a mode of punishment for the offence charged.170  According to 
the Committee, execution by gas asphyxiation would not meet the test of 'least 
possible physical and mental suffering' and would constitute cruel and inhuman 
treatment, in violation of article 7 of the Covenant.171 
In the same way, in Kafkaris v. Cyprus, the ECtHR held that the imposition of an 
irreducible life sentence may raise an issue under article 3 of the ECHR which 
establishes prohibition against torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment 
or punishment.172  Likewise, in Babar Ahmad and others v. UK, the extradition of 
five terror suspects including Babar Ahmad and Abu Hamza from the UK to US 
was halted by the ECtHR because the offence charged in the extradition request 
provided for life imprisonment in solitary confinement without the possibility of 
parole.173  The Court later ruled that although the conditions of imprisonment 
                                         
168 For instance, article 6(2) of the ICCPR provides that the countries applying death penalty should 
reserve it for most serious offences. This implies that the penalty is not altogether abolished but 
has been required to be used sparingly, though the death was prohibited under article 1 of the 
Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, adopted by the General Assembly with resolution 
44/128 of 15 December 1989 [Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR 1989] 
169 Soering v. The United Kingdom, 1/1989/161/217,Council of Europe: European Court of Human 
Rights, 7 July 1989 < http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b6fec.html> [Date accessed 
21/03/13] 
170 Chitat Ng v. Canada, Communication No. 469/1991 at para 16.4, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991 (1994) 
171 ibid 
172 Kafkaris v. Cyprus [GC], no. 21906/04 ECHR 2008 
173 Case of Babar Ahmad and Others v. the United Kingdom (Applications nos. 24027/07, 
11949/08, 36742/08, 66911/09 and 67354/09) ECtHR (Fourth Section) Admissibility Decision of 
6 July 2010. See also Vikram Dodd 'Abu Hamza Can Be Extradited to US, Human Rights Court 
Rules' The Guardian UK (10/04/2012) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/apr/10/abu-hamza-
extradited-us-court> [Date accessed 21/03/13].PA/Huffington Post UK 'Abu Hamza Extradition: 
Human Rights Judges Set To Rule Over Terrorist Charges' The Huffington Post UK 
174 
 
might not violate article 3 of the ECHR, it was still desirable in the interest of 
proper conduct of proceedings that the applicants should not be extradited.174 
As per the Court’s opinion, the imposition of an irreducible life sentence would 
not in itself constitute a breach of the right to be protected against torture 
unless it were grossly or clearly disproportionate to individual circumstances of 
the offender i.e. when further imprisonment would no longer be justified on any 
ground - whether for reasons of punishment, deterrence or public protection.175 
Thus, according to regional courts and monitoring bodies entrusted with the task 
of ensuring state compliance with human rights treaties, the possibility of a 
death sentence or life imprisonment in the requesting state may provide a 
ground for refusal of extradition when the mode of punishment is cruel. 
4.1.2.2) National approaches towards torture and severe punishment  
The above rule is not applied in bilateral treaties and national laws on 
extradition, many of which allow the refusal of surrender merely for the 
possibility of death sentence in the requesting state regardless of the manner of 
execution. For example, article 5 of the India-China Extradition Treaty 1997 
obliges the parties to refuse surrender when the offence for which extradition is 
requested is punishable by death in the requesting state but not under the laws 
of the requested state.176  The principle has also been applied in some national 
court decisions concerning extradition of suspects involved in transnational 
crimes. For example, in the Abu Salem case, the Portuguese Supreme Court 
rejected an Indian request to add charges of terrorism against a suspect who was 
extradited to India for the crime of murder and whose extradition was 
subsequently cancelled by a Portuguese court for violation of speciality rule on 
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the part of Indian government.177 The reason for rejection of Indian request was 
the attraction of the death penalty under Indian counter-terrorism laws.178  
Apparently, no consideration was given by the Portuguese Supreme Court to the 
manner of execution, the possibility of the death penalty being considered 
sufficient to disallow the addition of the new charges.179 
To bring about harmony in national approaches, it is desirable that the makers 
of international conventions on terrorism and organised crime should provide 
guidelines following the guidance of the ECtHR and the Human Rights Committee 
that extradition may only be refused when the mode of punishment is likely to 
be cruel and inhuman.  
The inclusion of such an explanation seems all the more justified in view of the 
fact that many states provide exemplary punishments for crimes such as 
hijacking and drug trafficking in order to produce deterrent effect.180 
Interestingly, the legal sanction for providing these punishments comes from the 
international conventions themselves, which in some instances oblige the parties 
to make the offences punishable with severe penalties.181  According to 
Lambert, the requirement of making offences punishable with 'severe penalties' 
under previous counter-terrorism treaties was replaced in the Hostages 
Convention with 'appropriate penalties' because a number of delegates raised 
the objection that the use of the term 'severe' could lead to a misuse of the 
Convention to infringe upon human rights.182 It shows that the conventions prior 
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to the Hostages Convention 1979 require the states parties to make the offences 
established by them punishable with severe punishments. 
In any case, the only inference that one can draw from the obligation to provide 
fair treatment is that the international conventions on terrorism and organised 
crime require the parties to provide protection to the offenders from the 
possibility of being subjected to torture, inhuman treatment and cruel 
punishment in the requesting state. What constitutes these factors for the 
purposes denying assistance, has been left to be determined by the requested 
state in accordance with its national law.183 
4.1.3)  Diplomatic assurance as an alternative  
Counter to the international conventions on terrorism and organised crime, some 
bilateral and regional treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance provide 
mechanisms better suited to balancing the right to be immune from torture with 
the severe punishment requirement of crimes established by these conventions. 
For example, article 6 of the UK-UAE Extradition Treaty 2008 allows the 
requested state to refuse extradition when the offence for which extradition is 
sought is punishable with death under the laws of the requesting state 'unless 
the requesting Party provides an assurance that the death penalty will not be 
imposed or, if imposed, will not be carried out.'184  The mechanism of seeking 
diplomatic assurance is also present in the Australia-China Extradition Treaty 
1993,185 the UK-US Extradition Treaty 2003,186 the European Convention on 
Extradition 1957 187 and many other bilateral treaties. 
This technique has also been applied in some domestic and regional court 
decisions. For example, in US v. Burns, the Canadian Supreme Court held that it 
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would be a violation of Canada’s constitution to extradite an accused without 
assurances from the United States that the death penalty would not be imposed, 
or, if imposed, would not be carried out.188 
Besides endorsing the rule of surrender subject to diplomatic assurance, some 
regional courts also lay down the mechanism of judicial scrutiny of a diplomatic 
assurance. For example, the ECtHR in 2008 case of Saadi v. Italy affirmed the 
principle that diplomatic assurances are subject to judicial review.189 According 
to the Court, a diplomatic assurance in itself may not provide adequate 
safeguard against torture and the courts of the requested state remain 
competent to declare it insufficient.190 As per the facts of the case, Italy decided 
to deport Saadi to Tunisia, where he had been convicted in absentia for the 
crimes of being member of a terrorist organisation and incitement to 
terrorism.191 Upon Italy’s request, Tunisia provided diplomatic assurance that it 
would observe the standards of human rights as outlined by its national law and 
the international treaties to which it was a party.192 Saadi challenged his 
deportation before the ECtHR. The court held that Tunisian diplomatic assurance 
was insufficient to ensure that the deportee would not be subjected to torture 
once surrendered.193 The reasons advanced by the ECtHR for arriving at this 
conclusion were: formal nature of the assurance given by Tunisia, conviction of 
Saadi in absentia and Amnesty International and Human rights watch reports of 
Torture and ill treatment of terror suspects.194 The judgement made it clear that 
while considering the adequacy of a diplomatic assurance, the courts of the 
requested state may look into the actions rather than words of the requesting 
state.195     
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In the same way, in the Abu Qatada case, the ECtHR identified the 
circumstances in which it could be lawful under the ECHR to extradite an 
individual to a state where the use of torture was prevalent. According to the 
Court, the arrangement entered into between the UK and Jordan requiring the 
latter to provide diplomatic assurance to guarantee human rights to deportees 
affords adequate safeguards against the violation of article 3 of the ECHR, which 
establishes prohibition against torture.196  The Court held further that it did not 
consider that the general human rights situation in Jordan excluded the 
acceptance of diplomatic assurance from the Jordanian Government.197 
In the light of above, it is clear that the mechanism of obtaining diplomatic 
assurances represents an effective technique of facilitating the surrender or 
interrogation of an offender who is faced with the possibility of torture in the 
requesting state. Apparently, it addresses the concerns of both cooperation-
centred and human rights oriented states. It therefore merits to be included in 
the international counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions because the 
crimes set forth by them are prone to raise the issue of torture in extradition 
and mutual assistance proceedings.  
4.2) Non Discrimination and freedom from persecution 
Another important ground for refusal of state cooperation in law enforcement is 
the possibility of discrimination and persecution in the requesting state. Article 
15 of the 1999 Terrorism Financing Convention elaborates it in these words: 
 Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an 
obligation to extradite or to afford mutual legal assistance, if the 
requested State Party has substantial grounds for believing that the 
request for extradition for offences set forth in article 2 or for mutual 
legal assistance with respect to such offences has been made for the 
purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of that 
person=s race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion 
                                         
196 See Abu Qatada Case (n 167) at para 187  
197 Despite these observations, the extradition of Abu Qatada was blocked for possible violation of 
article 6 of the ECHR which guaranteed fair trial to the accused. The court accepted  
defendant's claim that his extradition was requested on the basis of ex-parte convictions 
awarded by relying upon evidence obtained through torturing the co-accused and use of such 
evidence would violate his right to fair trial under the ECHR. See Abu Qatada case (n 167) at 
Para 193-194,267,268-291 
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or that compliance with the request would cause prejudice to that 
person=s position for any of these reasons.198 
This ground allows a requested state to refuse extradition or mutual legal 
assistance if it has reason to believe that in case of surrender or provision of 
assistance, the relator will be subjected to discrimination or persecution in the 
requesting state on racial, religious, ethnic or political grounds or his trial will 
be prejudiced because of any of these reasons. 
Besides its recognition in international conventions on terrorism and organised 
crime, non-discrimination also frequently appears, as a ground for refusal in 
domestic laws and bilateral treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance. 
For example, article 3(1) (b) of the Australia-Germany Extradition Treaty 1988 
provides, the assistance shall be refused if: 
 
the Requested State has substantial grounds for believing that the 
request for extradition has been made for the purpose of prosecuting 
or punishing the person claimed on account of his race, religion, 
nationality or political opinions or that he might, if extradited, be 
prejudiced at his trial, or punished, detained or restricted in his 
personal liberty, by reason of his race, religion, nationality or political 
opinion.199 
Similarly, article 5(2)(g) of the Extradition Act 1972 of Pakistan provides that no 
fugitive shall be surrendered if it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that 
‘he might if surrendered be prejudiced at his trial on racial, religious, national 
or political opinions’.200 
 Keeping in view the widespread application of discrimination as a ground for 
refusal of assistance, harmony is needed in national approaches with respect to 
giving protection against it, so that the requesting state’s failure to guarantee 
that right may not allow the requested state to refuse extradition or mutual 
legal assistance. To establish harmony, the international conventions on 
terrorism and organised crime oblige the parties to provide fair treatment to the 
                                         
198 See article 15 the Terrorism Financing Convention 1999. See also article 44(15) the UN 
Convention against Corruption 2003, article14 Beijing Convention 2010, article 6(6) the Drugs 
Convention 1988 and article 16(14) the Organized Crime Convention 2000 
199 See 3(1)(b) of the Australia-Germany Extradition Treaty 1988 
200 See article 5(2)(g) the Extradition Act 1972 of Pakistan 
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offenders. Since the obligation requires the parties to provide all those rights 
which are recognised by national and international law, including human rights 
law, the principle of non-discrimination, which is entrenched in human rights 
and extradition law, can be said to be implied.201 
In spite of the clear inference that the obligation to provide fair treatment 
includes protection against discrimination, it is difficult to suggest that the same 
is likely to produce enough harmony in national legal systems as to facilitate 
extradition or mutual legal assistance. A major reason for this is the absence of 
any guidelines under the international conventions concerning the use of 
discrimination as a ground for refusal of extradition or mutual legal assistance. 
Consequently, states are free to give any interpretation to it as per the dictates 
of their national law. The ensuing disparity in national legal systems with 
respect to manner of giving protection against discrimination and the way of 
applying it as a ground for refusal may result in denial of surrender or 
interrogation.    
I shall now discuss one aspect of non-discrimination rule with respect to which 
national approaches diverge necessitating international regulation of the use of 
discrimination as a ground for refusal of assistance. 
4.2.1) Absence of any universal standard to determine prejudice 
on account of political opinion 
The rule of non-discrimination provides that a requested state shall not be 
bound to surrender a fugitive or to provide mutual assistance if it has grounds 
for believing that the request has been made for the purposes of prosecuting or 
punishing a relator on account of his race, religion nationality or political 
opinion. While discrimination on the basis of race, religion, nationality or ethnic 
origin can be ascertained from unfair national laws, it would be more difficult to 
agree upon the existence of political persecution in the requesting state.202  For 
instance, when apartheid was practiced in South Africa, most states had severed 
their diplomatic ties with it, at the latter stages, at any rate. Since there was no 
                                         
201 The principle of non-discrimination appears in article 3(2) of the European Convention on 
Extradition 1957, article 4(1)(c) of the UN Model Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance 1990 and 
article 14(1) of the ICCPR 
202 Dugard & Wyngaert (n 23) 202 
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extradition arrangement, questions of racial discrimination never even had to be 
raised.203  However, when Libya showed its reluctance to extradite the Lockerbie 
suspects to either the US or UK, its argument on anticipated political 
persecution in the requesting states left the world court divided.204 
The Libyan claim was based on the possible negative media publicity that would 
be associated with a trial in the requesting states and the existence of adverse 
statements of government officials, some of whom demanded that Libya pay 
compensation to the victims. As per the Libyan argument, on account of these 
factors, the Lockerbie suspects were unlikely to receive a fair trial in either of 
the requesting states.205  While three judges in their separate and dissenting 
opinions concurred with the Libyan position, the rest did not.206  A possible 
explanation for this divide could be the founding of Libyan argument on abstract 
reasoning.207  To make everyone agree to it, the argument had to be based on 
generally agreed principles. Evidently, therefore, in order to achieve a 
consistent approach towards application of discrimination as a ground for refusal 
of assistance, international guidance is needed with respect to the factors 
constituting political persecution.  
The identification of these factors assumes greater significance in cooperative 
endeavours relating to terrorist offences because underlying all these offences is 
the motivation to achieve political aims.208  Whereas some states consider those 
aims to be legitimate, others do not. If states are given the freedom to make 
their own judgements as to what constitutes political persecution, extradition 
and mutual assistance will be blocked every time the motivation behind a crime 
is deemed lawful by the requested state. The tendency to justify terrorist 
                                         
203 Ibid 
204Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the 
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom),Provisional 
Measures,1992 ICJ 216 (Apr.14) Para 141,191 and148; See also Omer Y. Elegab, 'The Hague 
as a Seat of Lockerbie Trial: Some Constraints' 34 The International Lawyer (2000) 289 at 303 
205 ibid 
206 Lockerbie case ibid. Dissenting Judgements of Judges El-Khosheri and Ajibola and Separate 
opinions of Judge Shahabuddin and Bedjoui. See paragraphs 61-2, 141, 148 and 191; See also 
Elegab  ibid 
207 Dugard & Wyngaert (n 23) 202; See also Gary N Horlick, 'The Developing Law of Air-Hijacking' 
12 Harv. Int’l. L. J.(1971) 33 at 46 
208 Bassiouni (n 8) 10 
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offences on political grounds is evident from the fact that a number of states 
while ratifying counter-terrorism conventions made reservations to the effect 
that they did not consider the offences committed in the course of freedom 
struggles as terrorist offences.209 
Against this backdrop, a general obligation to provide fair treatment can hardly 
be expected to bring enough harmony to enable the requesting states to satisfy 
every use of discrimination as a ground for refusal of assistance. Even if each 
party guarantees protection, extradition or mutual legal assistance could be 
denied by applying the right differently, as a ground for refusal. Evidently, 
therefore, as per the existing arrangement, the discretion of the requested 
states to block extradition or mutual legal assistance based upon likelihood of 
discrimination in the requesting state is subject to no outside restraint.    
In view of this, it is important that the international conventions provide 
guidelines with respect to factors constituting political persecution. One 
commentator suggests that terrorist offenders can be classified into three 
categories: revolutionaries, self-determinist and anarchists.210  The last 
category, which features indiscriminate acts of violence, without any defined 
motive, should be excluded from the protection afforded under the rule of 
political persecution.211  This technique underlies the regulation of the use of 
discrimination as a ground for refusal of assistance and appears far more 
effective in facilitating extradition and mutual legal assistance as compared to 
general obligation to provide fair treatment. 
Conclusions 
 The international conventions on terrorism and organised crime aim to facilitate 
state cooperation in law enforcement through harmonisation of national justice 
systems. For this purpose, they adopt the technique of imposing mandatory 
obligations.  
                                         
209 See (n 155-156) Chapter 3 above 
210 Geoff Gilbert, 'Terrorism and Political Offence Exemption Reappraised'  34 ICLQ (1985) 695 at 
706-707 
211 Ibid 
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 Harmony is needed to overcome certain traditional hurdles associated with the 
principle of reciprocity which governs the laws and treaties on state 
cooperation, i.e. extradition and mutual legal assistance. These hurdles 
necessitate similarity of legal prescriptions in the laws of the requesting and 
requested state concerning the act with respect to which surrender or 
interrogation is sought. One such hurdle is the double punishability condition. It 
requires that the act charged against the offender must not be deemed non- 
punishable under the laws of either the requesting or requested state.  
Human rights violations constitute the primary grounds for making an offence 
non- punishable under national constitutions and criminal codes. 
Correspondingly, they are applied as grounds for refusal of assistance under 
domestic laws and bilateral treaties on extradition and mutual assistance. It is 
therefore important that national legal systems be harmonious with respect to 
giving protection against violations of these rights, so that the requesting state’s 
failure to guarantee the right might not provide an opportunity to the requested 
state to refuse surrender or interrogation. 
To establish harmony, the international conventions on terrorism and organised 
crime impose a mandatory obligation on the parties to provide fair treatment to 
persons facing ‘any proceeding’ under the conventions. The obligation is ground-
breaking in the sense that for the first time it recognises that all human rights 
available to a suspect facing trial should be extended to persons facing 
extradition and mutual assistance proceedings. Nevertheless, it may not provide 
a level of harmony sufficient to enable the parties to satisfy every use or 
application of human rights as a ground for refusal of assistance under 
extradition and mutual legal assistance laws and treaties. 
 The problem is explained by Dugard and Wyngaert in these words:  
 [I]nternational criminal law enforcement is not well served by a 
system that tolerates the refusal of extradition in some cases where 
human rights of the fugitives are at risk in requesting state but fails to 
provide the decision makers of the requested state clear standards or 
guidelines by which to make such a decision.212 
                                         
212 See Dugard & Wyngaert (n 23) 187-188 
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Since it is difficult to develop a universal standard of human rights protection, 
encompassing their every conceivable use as a ground for refusal of assistance, 
the makers of conventions may wish to consider revisiting their existing 
technique of facilitating law enforcement cooperation, i.e. imposition of 
mandatory obligations to harmonise national justice systems. One alternative 
could be to regulate the use of human rights as a ground for refusal of 
assistance. This strategy would focus on regulating traditional hurdles to 
extradition and mutual legal assistance such as double punishability rather than 
harmonising the entire national justice systems to make them conducive to their 
demands. Since the object of both techniques is the same, i.e. facilitation of 
law enforcement cooperation, the latter being apparently more feasible, merits 
consideration for inclusion in the international conventions regulating 
transnational crimes. It is significant to note that in the context of transnational 
crime states have indicated their willingness to collectively lower the traditional 
barriers to extradition and mutual legal assistance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
185 
 
 
 
 
Part two: Mandatory obligations to implement the 
enforcement mechanisms of aut dedere aut 
judicare and confiscation of the proceeds of crime  
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Chapter 5: Promoting law enforcement cooperation 
through duty to implement aut dedere aut judicare 
 
Introduction 
Aut dedere aut judicare represents a law enforcement mechanism which has 
been specifically designed to deny safe heavens to the offenders. It requires a 
state, in the territory of which the offender is found, to either extradite or 
prosecute him. In this way, it envisages the adoption of alternative measures of 
law enforcement, so that if one fails, the other can be employed to offer inter-
state assistance. Evidently, the mechanism aims at facilitating state cooperation 
in bringing to justice fugitive offenders.    
The application of the mechanism necessitates harmony in the laws of the 
requesting and requested states. In the absence of harmony, a foreign request to 
extradite or to prosecute in lieu thereof could be denied due to the requested 
state lacking enabling procedural rules or the request not being consistent with 
its procedural law. To establish harmony, the international counter-terrorism 
and organised crime conventions impose mandatory obligation upon the parties 
to implement the mechanism of aut dedere aut judicare. This chapter looks into 
the effectiveness of the obligation in harmonising national laws and thereby to 
facilitate the application of the mechanism.   
It will be argued that the alternative measures underlying the mechanism are to 
be enforced subject to the requesting state fulfilling the procedural 
requirements of the requested state’s law. If the laws of the two states 
substantially differ in regard to these requirements, neither of the two measures 
could be enforced, leading to impunity for the offenders. However, the 
international conventions on terrorism and organised crime divest themselves 
from regulating these requirements. Hence, the mandatory obligation to 
implement aut dedere aut judicare may only bring harmony to the extent of 
including the mechanism in national laws, which is insufficient to facilitate its 
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application. To facilitate the application of aut dedere aut judicare, it is 
essential that the conventions regulate the procedures of extradition and 
prosecution. 
The disparity in national procedures of extradition and prosecution frustrates 
the objective of denying safe heavens to the offenders. For example, in 
Lockerbie case, Libya refused to surrender the suspects to the US or the UK 
because its extradition law carried a prohibition against surrender of nationals. 
All three states involved, i.e. Libya, the US and the UK were parties to the 
Montreal Convention 1971 which provided the mechanism of aut dedere aut 
judiare, pursuant to which, if extradition becomes impossible, the parties should 
resort to the option of prosecution. However, the US and the UK refused to 
accept the option of prosecution in Libya. Libya could have surrendered the 
suspects by considering Montreal Convention 1971 instead of its domestic law as 
a legal basis of extradition, however, it chose not to do so, because the relevant 
provision of the Convention was non-mandatory. Consequently, a stalemate 
occurred in the application of the mechanism which ultimately led to Security 
Council’s interventions. Hence, due to the deferral of the Montreal Convention’s 
aut dedere aut judicare provision to national rules of extradition and 
prosecution, neither of the two alternative measures could be enforced, despite 
the Convention having established a mandatory obligation to implement the 
mechanism. Clearly, therefore, international regulation is needed with respect 
to procedure of enforcing aut dedere aut judicare with a view to make national 
legal systems conducive to its application. 
Although the international counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions 
establish some rules to regulate the procedure of extradition, they are 
insufficient to facilitate the application of aut dedere aut judicare as a whole, 
particularly, in the specific context of borderless criminality. Furthermore, the 
conventions include multiple versions of aut dedere aut judicare which differ 
with respect to matters such as the trigger mechanism, the non-extradition of 
nationals and the prosecution of foreigners. Since the parties are allowed to 
implement any of these versions, enforcement of aut dedere aut judicar may 
become problematic where it involves states following different formulas.  
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As opposed to the international conventions on terrorism and organised crime, 
some bilateral treaties and domestic laws focus on simplifying trial in lieu of 
extradition and modernising extradition procedures. For example, they 
recommend states to take measures such as allowing observers to witness the 
trial and adopting a rule of reasonableness. Similarly, they encourage states to 
create new powers such as provision of mutual legal assistance in extradition. 
These recommendations are designed to make trial in lieu of extradition more 
effective and bringing extradition procedures in conformity with the demands of 
multi-jurisdictional and financial crimes. Their inclusion in national laws 
minimises the possibility of a foreign request being refused due to the requested 
state lacking the enabling procedural rules or the request not being consistent 
with its national law. This technique not only represents a progressive 
development of the ancient mechanism of aut dedere aut judicare, but also 
exemplifies a more effective system of bringing transnational offenders to 
justice. It will be suggested that provisions patterned on those contained in such 
laws and treaties should be included in the international conventions on 
terrorism and organised crime in order to facilitate the application of aut dedere 
aut judicare, as opposed to merely expressing the maxim. 
This chapter has been divided into four sections. Section 1 analyses the 
expression of aut dedere aut judicare in the international counter-terrorism and 
organised crime conventions and in national laws and bilateral treaties on 
extradition. Section 2 considers the requirement to enforce the mechanism in 
accordance with the requested state’s law. Section 3 examines the regulation of 
the procedure of extradition under the international conventions on terrorism 
and organised crime. Section 4 makes recommendations about simplifying trial in 
lieu of extradition and bringing extradition laws in conformity with demands of 
multi-jurisdictional and financial crimes.  
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 Section 1: Expression of aut dedere aut judicare in 
the international conventions on terrorism and 
organised crime and its implementation in national 
laws and bilateral treaties on extradition 
1.1)  Evolution of aut dedere aut judicare 
The maxim aut dedere aut judicare represents the modern adaptation of the 
ancient phrase aut dedere aut punier which was introduced by Dutch scholar, 
Grotius, in 1625.1  According to Grotius, international law imposed a duty on the 
state, to the territory of which an alleged offender had escaped after 
committing his crime elsewhere, either to return him to the state of 
commission, or to punish him according to its own law.2  It therefore symbolises 
a measure of law enforcement to bring to justice fugitive offenders.3 
The modern equivalent of Grotius’s phrase replaces the verb ‘punier’ with 
‘judicare’ to give recognition to the fact that the alleged offender may be found 
innocent, thereby restricting the scope of the obligation to prosecution rather 
than punishment.4  Thus, in contemporary legal instruments, the maxim is 
denoted ‘aut dedere aut judicare’, creating an obligation on a state in the 
territory of which an offender is found to either extradite or prosecute him. 
As of 2010, the obligation found expression in over 70 international law 
instruments including multilateral conventions focusing on law enforcement 
cooperation, as well as resolutions of the General Assembly and Security Council 
                                         
1 See M.Cherif Bassiouni & Edward M Wise, Aut dedere Aut Judicare: The Duty to Extradite or 
Prosecute in International Law (Netherlands: Matinus Nijhoff Publishers 1995) 3 
2 M.Plachta, ‘Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: An Overview of Modes of Implementation and Approaches’ 
6 Maastricht J. Eur. & Comp. L. (1991) 331  
3 Bassiouni & Wise (n 1) 3 
4 ibid at 4; See also Zdzislaw Galicki, ‘Preliminary Report on the Obligation to Extradite or 
Prosecute presented in the 58th Session of the International Law Commission (ILC) held in 
Geneva,1 May-9 June and 3 July-11 August 2006’. A/CN.4/571 at 6 
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of the United Nations.5  Furthermore, it is widely applied in municipal laws on 
extradition.6 
1.2)   Meanings of the maxim   
Aut dedere aut judicare mechanism as contained in the international 
conventions on terrorism and organised crime has two parts. The first part 
involves the verb dedere. It requires a state, in the territory of which the 
alleged offender is found, to extradite him to a state having jurisdiction over 
crime and willing to prosecute.7  Extradition is a proceeding whereby one state 
surrenders to another an individual, accused or convicted of an offence for 
which the requesting state is seeking to subject him to trial or punishment.8  In 
1878, Cardaillac defined extradition as: 
the right for a state on the territory of which an accused or convicted 
person has taken refuge, to deliver him up to another state which has 
requisitioned his return and is competent to judge and punish him.9 
The second part of the mechanism relates to the gerund judicare which demands 
prosecution of the offender.10  This entails, if the extradition is not possible, a 
state in the territory of which the offender is found is required to prosecute him 
itself, in accordance with its own law.11  The mechanism therefore sets forth 
two law enforcement modalities in the alternative, so that if one fails, the other 
can be employed to offer inter-state assistance.12  According to Plachta, the 
obligation is meant to ensure that the offender is brought to justice, regardless 
                                         
5 Amnesty International’s Report on the Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute 2009 
<http://www.amnesty.org/ar/library/asset/IOR40/001/2009/en/a4761626-f20a-11dd-855f-
392123cb5f06/ior400012009en.pdf> [Date accessed 21/03/13]  
6 ibid 
7 Bassiouni & Wise (n 1) 3, 4; See also Plachta (n 2) 
8 Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Ideologically Motivated Offenses and the Political Offenses Exception in 
Extradition- A Proposed Juridical Standard for an Unruly Problem’ 19 DePaul L. Rev.(1969-
1970) 217 at 221-222 
9 Blackesley, ‘The Law of International Extradition: A Comparative Study’  62 Revue Internationale 
De Droit Penal (1991) 381 
10 Plachta (n 2) 
11 ibid 
12 Bassiouni & Wise (n 1) 3 & foot note 2  
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of the place where his trial might take place.13  It is thus directed towards 
ending impunity for persons involved in international crimes.14 
The mechanism is now regarded as the world community’s most effective 
weapon against transnational criminality. For example, Security Council’s 
binding resolution on counter-terrorism 1373 (2001) obliges states to deny safe 
heavens to terrorists.15  According to the International Law Commission (ILC), the 
obligation can be carried out in the best and most effective way through duty to 
extradite or prosecute the offender.16  The subsequent resolutions of the 
Security Council including 1456 (2003) and 1566 (2004) confirm this view by 
suggesting that the obligation to bring terrorists to justice is to be carried out on 
the basis of the principle of extradite or prosecute.17 
 The effectiveness of the mechanism, however, depends to a great extent upon 
harmony in national laws. Harmony is needed because the alternative measures 
underlying the mechanism, i.e. extradition and prosecution are required to be 
enforced in accordance with procedural requirements of the requested state’s 
law.18  If the requested state lacks the enabling procedural rules or the request 
is not in conformity with its procedural requirements, both measures could be 
refused. To establish harmony, the international conventions on terrorism and 
organised crime impose mandatory obligation upon parties to implement the 
mechanism domestically. 
                                         
13 ibid 
14 Bassiouni & Wise (n 1) 3 
15 See para 2(c) S/RES/1373 (2001) 
16 See Zdzislaw Galicki, ‘4th Report on the Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute submitted in the 63rd 
session of the ILC’ A/CN.4/648 at 9 
17 See para 3, S/RES/1456 (2003) adopted by the Security Council at its 4688th meeting, on 20 
January 2003; See also para 2, S/RES/1566 (2004) adopted by the Security Council at its 
5053rd meeting, on 8 October 2004 
18 See (n 228) Chapter 3 above. For the requirement to conduct prosecution in accordance with the 
requested state’s law, see joint declaration of Judges Evensen, Tarassov, Guillaume and 
Aguilar Mawdsley in Lockerbie Case 1992 I.C.J 136 (Apr 14) para 2 
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1.3)   Expression of aut dedere aut judicare in the 
counter- terrorism and organised crime conventions 
A crucial factor in assessing the harmonising impact of an international 
obligation is its consistent expression in the instruments containing it. I will now 
analyse the expression of aut dedere aut judicare in various international 
conventions on terrorism and organised crime with a view to determine whether 
a dominant approach emerges.   
1.3.1)  Counter-Terrorism Conventions 
Counter-terrorism conventions follow the so-called ‘Hague formula’ in 
establishing the obligation of aut dedere aut judicare.19  The formula is said to 
represent a strict version of the obligation leaving little room for 
interpretation.20  It was first used in the Hague Convention 1970 which provided 
in its article 7:    
 [t]he Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender 
is found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without 
exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed 
in its territory, to submit the case to its competent authorities for the 
purpose of prosecution. Those authorities shall take their decision  in 
the same manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a serious 
nature under the law of that State.21 
The above formula, with slight modifications, was adopted in a series of 
subsequent counter-terrorism conventions. These include the Montreal 
Convention 1971,22  the Protection of Diplomats Convention 1973,23  the 
Hostages Convention 1979,24  the Nuclear Materials Convention 1980,25  the 
Rome Convention 1988,26  the Terrorist Bombings Convention 1997,27  the 
                                         
19 Bassiouni & Wise (n 1) 18 
20 ibid 
21 See article 7 the Hague Convention 1970 
22 See article 7 the Montreal Convention 1971  
23 See article 7 the Protection of Diplomats 1973 
24 See article 8 the Hostages Convention 1979 
25 See article 10 the Nuclear Materials Convention 1980 
26 See article 10 the Rome Convention 1988 
27 See article 8(1) the Terrorist Bombings Convention 1997 
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Terrorism Financing Convention 1999,28  the Nuclear Terrorism Convention 200529  
and the Beijing Convention 2010.30  For example, article 10(1) of the Rome 
Convention 1988 provides: 
 The State Party in the territory of which the offender or the alleged 
offender is found shall, in cases to which article 6 applies, if it does 
not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and 
whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit 
the case without delay to its competent authorities for the purpose 
 of prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with the laws of 
that State. Those authorities shall take their decision in the same 
manner as in the case of any other offence of a grave nature under 
the law of that State.31 
The difference between the Hague and Rome Convention’s formulas is that the 
Rome Convention requires a state in the territory of which the offender is found 
to submit the case ‘without delay’, whereas the Hague Convention makes no 
such demand. Moreover, in suggesting how the authorities shall make their 
decision with respect to prosecution, the former uses the word ‘grave’ instead 
of ‘serious’ to refer to the crime to be prosecuted. Additionally, the Rome 
Convention uses the term ‘the offender or the alleged offender’ in place of ‘the 
alleged offender’ as used by the Hague Convention. This is meant to clarify that 
the obligation applies not only to ‘suspects’ but also to ‘convicts’.32  Clearly all 
these differences reflect improvements upon language rather than the substance 
of the obligation. 
                                         
28 See article 10(1) the Terrorism Financing Convention 1999 
29 See article 11(1) the Nuclear Terrorism Convention 2005 
30 See article 10 the Beijing Convention 2010 
31 See article 10(1) of the Rome Convention 1988 
32 For example, article 1 of 1990 UN Model Treaty on Extradition provides: 
Each Party agrees to extradite to the other, upon request and subject to the provisions of the 
present Treaty, any person who is wanted in the requesting State for prosecution for an 
extraditable offence or for the imposition or enforcement of a sentence in respect of such an 
offence. 
The provision makes it plain that extradition can be granted in respect of both, the person wanted 
for imposition of sentence and the one required for trial.   
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1.3.2)   Organised Crime Conventions 
Organised crime conventions under consideration include the Drugs Convention 
1988,33  the Organised Crime Convention 2000,34  and the UN Convention against 
Corruption 2003.35 These conventions follow the approach taken in the treaties 
entered into force prior to the Hague convention 1970 such as the UN 
Convention against Counterfeiting 1929 and the European Extradition Convention 
1957 in establishing the obligation to implement aut dedere aut judicare.36  For 
example, article 16(10) of the Organised Crime Convention 2000 provides: 
 A State Party in whose territory an alleged offender is found, if it 
does not extradite such person in respect of an offence to which this 
article applies solely on the ground that he or she is one of its 
nationals, shall, at the request of the State Party seeking 
 extradition, be obliged to submit the case without undue delay to its 
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those 
authorities shall take their decision and conduct their proceedings in 
the same manner as in the case of any other offence of a grave nature 
under the domestic law of that State Party. The States Parties 
concerned shall cooperate with each other, in particular on 
procedural and evidentiary aspects, to ensure the efficiency of such 
prosecution.37 
The above provision has been reproduced word for word in the UN Convention 
against Corruption 2003.38  While the Drugs Convention 1988 employs a different 
formula, the difference mainly relates to the language and not the substance of 
the obligation. Thus, article 6(9) of the Drugs Convention 1988 provides:   
 Without prejudice to the exercise of any criminal jurisdiction 
established in  accordance with its domestic law, a Party in whose 
territory an alleged offender is found shall: 
 a) If it does not extradite him in respect of an offence established in 
accordance with article 3, paragraph l, on the grounds set forth in 
article 4, paragraph 2, subparagraph a), submit the case to its 
                                         
33 See (n 40) Chapter 1 above  
34 See (n 42) Chapter 1 above 
35 See (n 44) Chapter 1 above 
36 See article 6(2) of the European Convention on Extradition 1957 and articles 8 & 9 of the 
International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency, adopted  in Geneva on 
20 April 1929 [hereinafter the  UN Counterfeiting Convention 1929]  
37 See article 16(10) the Organised Crime Convention 2000 
38 See article 44(11) the UN Convention against Corruption 2003 
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competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, unless 
 otherwise agreed with the requesting Party;  
 b) If it does not extradite him in respect of such an offence and has 
established its jurisdiction in relation to that offence in accordance 
with article 4, paragraph 2,subparagraph b) submit the case to its 
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, unless 
otherwise requested by the requesting Party for the purposes of 
 preserving its legitimate jurisdiction.39 
1.3.3)   Dissimilarities in the aut dedere aut judicare formula as 
contained in the Hague Convention 1970 and three organised 
crime conventions 
a)  Obligation to prosecute triggers once a request for extradition is received 
and rejected 
The first dissimilarity between the two formulas is that aut dedere aut judicare 
mechanism, as contained in the organised crime conventions, stipulates that the 
obligation of the requested state to prosecute the offender is activated only 
once a request for extradition has been made to it and rejected.40  In other 
words, the requested state is not bound to prosecute merely because the 
offender is present in its territory. Similar provisions can be seen in the 
European Convention on Extradition 1957 and the UN Counterfeiting Convention 
1929.41  By contrast, the Hague Convention 1970 does not make prosecution 
conditional upon the denial. 
b)   Refusal of extradition on specific grounds activates duty to prosecute  
                                         
39 See article 6(9) of the Drugs Convention 1988  
40 See for instance article 16(10) of the Organised Crime Convention 2000; See also article 44(11) 
of the UN Convention against Corruption 2003:  
A State Party in whose territory an alleged offender is found, if it does not extradite such person in 
respect of an offence to which this article applies solely on the ground that he or she is one of 
its nationals, shall, at the request of the State Party seeking extradition, be obliged to submit 
the case without undue delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. 
Those authorities shall take their decision and conduct their proceedings in the same manner 
as in the case of any other offence of a grave nature under the domestic law of that State 
Party. The States Parties concerned shall cooperate with each other, in particular on 
procedural and evidentiary aspects, to ensure the efficiency of such prosecution.  
41 See article 9 the UN Counterfeiting Convention 1929: 
…The obligation to take proceedings is subject to the condition that extradition has been 
requested and that the country to which application is made cannot hand over the person 
accused for some reason which has no connection with the offence. 
 See also article 6(2) European Convention on Extradition 1957 
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The second difference is that, according to the organised crime conventions, 
prosecution is necessary only where extradition could not take place solely on 
the ground of nationality of the offender. Thus, article 15(3) of the Organised 
Crime Convention 2000 provides:  
For the purposes of article 16, paragraph 10, of this Convention, each 
State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to 
establish its jurisdiction over the offences covered by this Convention 
when the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not 
extradite such person solely on the ground that he or she is one of its 
nationals.42 
The Drugs Convention 1988 enlarges the scope of this obligation by requiring 
prosecution not only when the extradition is refused due to the nationality of 
the offender but also when it is refused because of the offence having occurred 
in the territory of the requested state or on board an aircraft belonging to the 
requested state.43  Corresponding provisions can be seen in the European 
Convention on Extradition 1957 and the UN Counterfeiting Convention 1929.44 
Conversely, the Hague Convention 1970 does not make obligation to prosecute 
conditional upon denial of extradition on any specific ground. It rather enjoins 
the parties to prosecute regardless of the ground of refusal of extradition.  
c)  Prosecution of non-nationals for crimes committed abroad  
The third discrepancy lies in the organised crime conventions not requiring 
mandatory prosecution of non-nationals for crimes committed abroad. As per the 
language used in these conventions, states ‘may’ submit the case against non-
nationals for crimes committed abroad.45  According to Bassiouni and Wise, the 
use of word ‘may’ in the obligation to prosecute non-nationals, is meant to 
address a situation where the national law of the requested state does not cover 
                                         
42 See article 15(3) of the Organised Crime Convention 2000; See also article 42(3) of the UN 
Convention against Corruption 2003 
43 See article 4(2)(a) of the Drugs Convention 1988 
44 See article 9 of the UN Counterfeiting Convention 1929 and article 6(2) of the European 
Convention on Extradition 1957 
45 On the other hand, the word ‘shall’ has been used in the provision establishing obligation to 
prosecute nationals. See for instance article 42(3) & (4) of the UN Convention against 
Corruption 2003, article 15(3) & (4) of the Organised Crime Convention 2000 and article 4(2) (a) 
& (b) of the Drugs Convention 1988.  
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the extraterritorial crimes committed by non-nationals.46  This scenario is 
explicitly recognised by the UN Counterfeiting Convention 1929 and the 
European Convention on Extradition 1957.47  By contrast, the Hague Convention 
1970 makes no distinction between nationals and non-nationals while 
establishing the obligation to prosecute. It rather enjoins the parties to 
prosecute the offender found present in their territory irrespective of his 
nationality or the place of the commission of crime.   
In view of the above, it is clear that at least three different versions of aut 
dedere aut judicare can be found in counter-terrorism and the organised crime 
conventions. The versions differ with respect to matters such as trigger 
mechanism, extradition of nationals and prosecution of non-nationals. States are 
free to implement any of these versions in their national laws and bilateral 
treaties on extradition. Each measure underlying the maxim, i.e. extradition or 
prosecution, depend upon correspondence in the laws of the requesting and 
requested state. If cooperation is to take place between states following two 
different formulas, application of the mechanism becomes problematic. This 
contradicts the goal of facilitating law enforcement cooperation through 
harmonisation. Accordingly, in some circumstances, the obligation to implement 
aut dedere aut judicare may only bring harmony to the extent that state parties 
include the maxim in national laws, not in relation to its application.  
1.4)  Expression of aut dedere aut judicare in domestic 
laws 
In line with different formulas used by the international conventions on 
terrorism and organised crime to express aut dedere aut judicare, its expression 
in national laws also reflects variation. For example, the criminal code of 
                                         
46 Bassiouni & Wise (n 1) 20  
47 See article 9 UN Counterfeiting Convention 1929: 
Foreigners who have committed abroad any offence referred to in Article 3, and who are in the 
territory of a country whose internal legislation recognises as a general rule the principle of the 
prosecution of offences committed abroad, should be punishable in the same way as if the 
offence had been committed in the territory of that country…  
This may be compared with article 7(2) of European Convention on Extradition 1957: 
When the offence for which extradition is requested has been committed outside the territory of the 
requesting Party, extradition may only be refused if the law of the requested Party does not allow 
prosecution for the same category of offence when committed outside the latter Party's territory 
or does not allow extradition for the offence concerned. 
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Azerbijan applies the ‘Hague formula’. It, therefore, neither requires any trigger 
mechanism, nor makes any distinction between nationals and non-nationals 
while imposing the obligation to extradite or prosecute.48  This may be 
compared with the Australian Extradition Act 1988 which, besides making 
prosecution conditional upon the refusal of extradition,49 stipulates that 
prosecution may only be conducted if extradition has been refused because of 
the offender’s nationality.50  Clearly, Australia applies the formula as contained 
in the organised crime conventions.  
In view of this, if Azerbaijan seeks the prosecution of a suspect from Australia, it 
must first establish that it had made an extradition request which was denied 
because the offender was an Australian national. Furthermore, Azerbaijan 
cannot demand prosecution by Australia of an Azerbaijani national for crimes 
committed in Azerbaijan because Australian law does not cover crimes 
committed abroad by non-nationals.   
Conversely, if Australia seeks prosecution from Azerbaijan, it does not need to 
prove that it had previously made an extradition request which was refused by 
Azerbaijan. Moreover, Australia can demand prosecution by Azerbaijan of an 
Australian national for crimes committed in Australia because Azerbaijan’s law 
covers crimes committed abroad by non-nationals. 
In the same way, Indian law adopts the formula as contained in the Drugs 
Convention 1988.  Whereas the Indian Extradition Act requires the government 
to prosecute the offender regardless of the place of the commission of crime or 
nationality of the offender,51 its penal code provides that Indian courts may only 
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction when the commission of the crime involves 
an Indian national or the crime has been committed on a vessel or aircraft 
owned or operated by India.52  Thus, the option of prosecution in lieu of 
                                         
48 See Articles 12 (3) and 13 (3) of Criminal Code of the Azerbaijan Republic 2005 
<http://www.legislationline.org/download/action/download/id/1658/file/4b3ff87c005675cfd74058
077132.htm/preview>[Date accessed 21/03/13] 
49 See article 45(4)(a)&(b) of Extradition Act 1988, Act No.4 of 1988 [hereinafter Australian 
Extradition Act 1988] 
50 See article 45(4)(c) & 45(5) Australian Extradition Act 1988 
51 See article 34 A & 2*34 Indian Extradition Act 1962 
52 See article 4 Indian Penal Code 1860; See also section 6 of Anti- Hijacking Act 1982 of India 
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extradition is closed if the offender happens to be a non-national who 
committed his crime abroad or on a foreign aircraft or vessel. By contrast, the 
Penal Code of Panama makes no distinction between nationals and foreigners 
while imposing the obligation to extradite or prosecute.53 
Due to the foregoing, it is plain that the expression of aut dedere aut judicare in 
national laws reflects discrepancies similar to those in counter-terrorism and 
organised crime convention.  
1.5)  Expression of aut dedere aut judicare in bilateral and 
regional treaties on extradition 
The extradition laws of a majority of states require the existence of a bilateral 
or regional treaty for the surrender of suspects or to prosecute them instead of 
surrender. For instance, Israel’s extradition law provides that a person may only 
be extradited from Israel if ‘there is an agreement between Israel and the 
requesting state on the extradition of offenders.’54  Since these treaties enshrine 
national legal principles of states parties to them, they provide useful insights 
into the way aut dedere aut judicare rule is being implemented in different 
parts of the world.55  A survey of selected bilateral and regional treaties reflects 
that multiple formulas are being used to express the rule. 
For example article 3 of Canada-France Extradition treaty 1988 provides: 
 2. If the request for extradition is refused solely because the person 
sought has the nationality of the requested State, that State shall, at 
the request of the requesting State, refer the matter to its competent 
authorities for prosecution. For this purpose, the files, documents and 
exhibits relating to the offence shall be transmitted to the requested 
State. That State shall inform the requesting State of the action taken 
on its request.56 
                                         
53Código Penal de Panamá, Ley No.14, of 18 May 2007 
<www.gacetaoficial.gob.pa/pdfTemp/25796/4580.pdf>  [Date accessed 21/03/13] 
54 See article 2a Extradition Law 5714-1954 and the  Extradition Regulations of Israel (Law, 
Procedures and Rules of Evidence in Petitions) 5731-1970 
55  See Edward M. Wise, ‘Some Problems of Extradition’ 15 Wayne State Law Review  (1968-69) 
709 at 716 
56 See article 3(2) of Canada-France Extradition Treaty 1988; For identical provisions see article 
IV(1) Canada-Spain Extradition Treaty 1989; article 6 European Convention on Extradition 
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Clearly, the provision follows the aut dedere aut judicare formula as contained 
in the organised crime conventions.57  It stipulates that prosecution is necessary 
only if the extradition has been refused on the ground of nationality of the 
offender.58 
This may be compared with the Australia-China Extradition Treaty 1993 which 
makes it optional for the requested state to submit the case for prosecution 
even if the extradition is refused on the ground of the nationality of the 
offender. The relevant provision reads:      
 (1) The Government of Australia reserves the right to refuse the 
surrender of its nationals. The Government of Hong Kong reserves the 
right to refuse the surrender of nationals of the state whose 
Government is responsible for its foreign affairs. 
 2) Where the requested Party exercises this right, the requesting 
Party may request that the case be submitted to the competent 
authorities of the requested Party in order that proceedings for 
prosecution of the person may be considered.59 
A slightly different version of aut dedere aut judicare can be seen in the UK-UAE 
Extradition Treaty 2008. According to it, duty to prosecute arises only if the 
extradition is refused on the ground of nationality and the act charged against 
the offender constitutes a criminal offence under the law of both the requesting 
and requested state.60  This illustrates the application of double criminality in 
trial or extradition proceedings. 
Another variation of the formula can be seen in the Thailand-China Extradition 
Treaty 1993. According to it, the obligation to prosecute arises only if the 
extradition is refused on the ground of nationality. However, the requested state 
shall not be bound to prosecute if it has no jurisdiction over the offence.61 
                                                                                                                           
1957; article 4 UN Model Treaty on Extradition 1990; article 5 China-Korea Extradition Treaty 
2002 
57 See text to (n 37 & 39) above 
58 See article 3(2) of Canada-France Extradition Treaty 1988 
59 See article 3 Australia-China Extradition Treaty 1993 
60 See article 3 UK-UAE Extradition Treaty 2008 
61 See article 5, Treaty between the Kingdom of Thailand and People's Republic of China on 
Extradition. Signed at Beijing on 26 August 1993 [hereinafter Thailand-China Extradition Treaty 
1993]. 
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Pursuant to this provision, the requested party is neither required to extradite 
nor to prosecute if the internal law does not recognise the principle of 
nationality as a valid basis of exercising jurisdiction over extraterritorial 
crimes.62 
Two further unusual expressions of aut dedere aut judicare can be seen in 
China-Korea Extradition Treaty 2002 and India-Australia Extradition Treaty 2008. 
According to the former, extradition may be refused where the offence has been 
committed in whole or in part in the territory of the requested state. If so 
refused, the requested state shall be bound to submit the case against the 
offender to its competent authorities to consider prosecution.63  The latter, on 
the other hand, allows the refusal of extradition on the ground that the offence 
is prosecutable in the requested state. If so refused, the requested state shall be 
bound to submit the case against the offender.64  These provisions illustrate the 
implementation of aut dedere aut judicare in accordance with the formula 
contained in the Drugs Convention 1988.65 
These may be compared with article 7 of the European Convention on 
Extradition 1957. It allows the parties to refuse extradition on the ground of the 
offence having wholly or partly occurred in the requested state, but it does not 
impose the corresponding obligation to prosecute the offender. Under article 
6(2) of the Convention, the duty to prosecute only arises if the extradition is 
refused on the ground of nationality of the offender.  
In light of the above, it can be suggested that owing to the absence of any single 
formula of aut dedere aut judicare in the international conventions on terrorism 
and organised crime, its expression in bilateral treaties differs. These 
differences run counter to the objective of facilitating law enforcement 
cooperation through establishing a universal regime of aut dedere aut judicare. 
                                         
62 It is significant to note that none of the organised crime conventions obliges the parties to 
establish jurisdiction on the basis of nationality. See text to (n 147-161) Chapter 2 above and 
article 42(2)(b) of the UN Convention against Corruption  2003 
63 See article 4 China-Korea Extradition Treaty 2002 
64 See article 6 India-Australia Extradition Treaty 2008  
65 See article 16(9) of the Drugs Convention 1988  
202 
 
In the next section, I shall explain that, according to the existing scheme of the 
conventions, the conditions and procedure of both extradition and prosecution 
are to be determined in accordance with national law of the requested state. 
Since the conventions do not attempt to regulate national law, they can only 
bring harmony to the extent that they require states to include the maxim in 
national laws, which is insufficient to facilitate its application. To facilitate the 
application of aut derere aut judicare, it is essential that the conventions 
regulate the conditions and procedures of extradition and trial. 
 
 Section 2:  Application of aut dedere aut judicare 
in accordance with national law 
A key factor which facilitates the performance of an international obligation is 
its over-riding effect. If an international obligation supersedes the contrary 
provisions of national laws and bilateral treaties, its performance is likely to be 
consistent. For example, the European Convention on Extradition 1957 provides, 
‘[t]his Convention shall, in respect of those countries to which it applies, 
supersede the provisions of any bilateral treaties, conventions or agreements 
governing extradition between any two Contracting Parties.’66  The Convention 
facilitates the performance of its obligations by over-riding contrary provisions 
of national laws and bilateral treaties.67 
The international conventions on terrorism and organised crime stand in stark 
contrast to the European Convention in this respect. According to them, 
conditions and procedure of extradition including grounds of refusal are to be 
determined in accordance with the national law of the requested state. In the 
same way, the conventions desist from regulating national rules on prosecution 
of the offenders. Since these rules differ, it cannot be said that the obligation to 
implement aut dedere aut judicare as contained in the conventions facilitates 
the application of the mechanism. I shall now explain discretion afforded to 
                                         
66 See article 28(1) the European Convention on Extradition 1957 
67 Nonetheless, the Convention makes allowance for reservation owing to which its implementation 
is unlikely to be consistent. See article 26 of the European Convention on Extradition 1957; Also 
see Bassiouni & Wise (n 1) 11 
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states as regards applying different components of the mechanism in accordance 
with national law.   
2.1)  Duty to apprehend the suspect 
2.1.1)  Duty under the international conventions on 
terrorism and organised crime  
According to the international conventions on terrorism and organised crime, the 
primary duty of a state in the territory of which the offender is found, is to take 
him into custody to ensure his presence for trial or extradition.  This duty went 
through a process of evolution. In earlier conventions, such as the Protection of 
Diplomats Convention 1973, the duty was to take appropriate measures to 
ensure the presence of the offender.68 The word ‘custody’ was deliberately 
avoided so that it would not be misinterpreted as permission to put the offender 
in distress.69  However, from the Hostages Convention 1979 onwards, the use of 
the word custody has been persistent. Thus, article 7 of the Rome Convention 
1988 sets forth the obligation in these words: 
 Article 7 
 1. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, any State 
Party in the territory of which the offender or the alleged offender is 
present shall, in accordance with its law, take him into custody or 
take other measures to ensure his presence for  such time as is 
necessary to enable any criminal or extradition proceedings to be 
 instituted.  
 2. Such State shall immediately make a preliminary inquiry into the 
facts, in accordance with its own legislation.  
 3. Any person regarding whom the measures referred to in paragraph 
1 are being taken shall be entitled to:  
                                         
68 See article 6, the Protection of Diplomats Convention 1973 
69 Abraham Abramovsky, ‘Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure and 
Interference with Aircraft part-II: The Montreal Convention’ 14 Colum.  J. Trannsnat’l L. (1975) 
268 at 291 
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 (a) communicate without delay with the nearest appropriate 
representative of the State of which he is a national or which is 
otherwise entitled to establish such communication or, if he is a 
stateless person, the State in the territory of which he has his habitual 
residence;  
 (b) be visited by a representative of that State.  
 4. The rights referred to in paragraph 3 shall be exercised in 
conformity with the laws and regulations of the State in the territory 
of which the offender or the alleged offender is present, subject to 
the proviso that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect 
to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under 
 paragraph 3 are intended.  
 5. When a State Party, pursuant to this article, has taken a person 
into custody, it shall  immediately notify the States which have 
established jurisdiction in accordance with article 6, paragraph 1 and, 
if it considers it advisable, any other interested States, of the fact 
that such person is in custody and of the circumstances which warrant 
his detention. The State which makes the preliminary inquiry 
contemplated in paragraph  2 of this article shall promptly report its 
findings to the said States and shall indicate whether it intends to 
exercise jurisdiction.  
According to this provision, as soon as the offender steps into the territory of a 
state party, it automatically assumes the obligation to take him into custody to 
ensure his presence for trial or extradition. However, the obligation is to be 
performed in accordance with the domestic law of the requested state.70 
2.1.2)  Implementation of the duty in extradition treaties 
The national implementation of the obligation reflects that a majority of the 
states are unwilling to accept an automatic obligation to arrest the suspect. For 
instance, article XII of the US-Italy Extradition Treaty 1983 provides:  
 ARTICLE XII 
 Provisional Arrest 
 1. In case of urgency, either Contracting Party may apply for the 
provisional arrest of  any person charged or convicted of an 
extraditable offense. The application for provisional arrest shall be 
made either through the diplomatic channel or directly between the 
                                         
70  See article 7(1) Rome Convention 1988 
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United States Department of Justice and the Italian Ministry of Grace 
 and Justice, in which case the communication facilities of the 
International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) may be used. 
 2. The application shall contain: a description of the person sought 
including, if available, the person's nationality; the probable location 
of that person; a brief statement of the facts of the case including, if 
possible the time and location of the offense and the available 
evidence; a statement of the existence of a warrant of arrest, 
 with the date it was issued and the name of the issuing court; a 
description of the type of offenses, a citation to the sections of law 
violated and the maximum penalty possible upon conviction, or a 
statement of the existence of a judgment of conviction against that 
person, with the date of conviction, the name of the sentencing court 
and the sentence imposed, if any; and a statement that a formal 
request for extradition of the person sought will follow. 
 3. On receipt of the application, the Requested Party shall take the 
appropriate steps to secure the arrest of the person sought. The 
Requesting Party shall be promptly notified of the result of its 
application. 
 4. Provisional arrest shall be terminated if, within a period of 45 
days after the  apprehension of the person sought, the Executive 
Authority of the Requested Party has not received a formal request 
for extradition and the supporting documents required by Article X. 
 5. The termination of provisional arrest pursuant to paragraph 4 of 
this Article shall not prejudice the re-arrest and extradition of the 
person sought if the extradition request and the supporting documents 
are delivered at a later date.71 
Pursuant to this provision, there is no automatic duty to apprehend the suspect 
once he arrives in state territory; the obligation of the custodial state begins 
once a formal request is made to it for the arrest of the suspect. The request 
must be accompanied by documents relating to the offence such as the warrant 
of arrest and a copy of the judgment of conviction. The requesting party is 
further obliged to give undertaking that an extradition request will follow and to 
understand that the offender will be set free if the request is not received 
within a specified time. Additionally, the requested party is not bound to arrest, 
it is merely required to notify to the requesting state of the result of its request. 
                                         
71 See article XII of US-Italy Extradition Treaty 1983. For corresponding provisions, see article 12 
Australia-China Extradition Treaty 1993; article 12 Australia-Germany Extradition Treaty 1988; 
article 11 US-Israel Extradition Treaty 1962; article 11 UK-UAE Extradition Treaty 2008; article 
11 UN Model Treaty on Extradition 1990; article 9 Thailand-China Extradition Treaty 1993 and 
article 9 China-Korea Extradition Treaty 2002 
206 
 
While the international conventions on terrorism and organised crime envisage 
an automatic duty to arrest, its implementation under US-Italy Extradition 
Treaty 1983 suggests that states may be unwilling to accept it. Nevertheless, the 
parties to such bilateral treaties cannot be held liable for breach of their 
international duty because the duty is required to be performed in accordance 
with the procedural requirements of the requested state’s law or the bilateral 
treaties to which it is bound.72 This implies that the duty can be tailored to suit 
the needs of national justice systems.  
A different approach is taken under the UK-UAE Extradition Treaty 2008. This 
treaty establishes two obligations for the party in the territory of which the 
offender is found. The first obligation demands that the offender must be taken 
into custody when a request for his arrest is made by a state having jurisdiction 
over crime.73  The obligation is entitled ‘provisional arrest’ and is to be carried 
out in cases of urgency only. The second obligation requires arrest of the 
offender in every case where a request for extradition is received, even though 
no separate application for arrest is made. The obligation is entitled ‘remand’ 
and is reproduced below:     
 Upon receipt of the request for extradition, the Requested Party 
shall arrest the person sought in accordance with its domestic laws. 
The person shall be held on remand until the Requested Party decides 
on the request for extradition. If the request for extradition is 
granted, the remand period shall continue until the person sought is 
 handed over to the authorities of the Requesting Party.74 
The establishment of two separate obligations of ‘remand’ and ‘provisional 
arrest’ does not indicate the exact fulfilment of the automatic duty to arrest as 
intended by the makers of the international counter-terrorism and organised 
crime conventions. However, it may facilitate the application of aut dedere aut 
judicare by simplifying the procedure of seeking arrest of the fugitive. For 
example, it relieves the requesting party of the additional burden to make a 
separate request for arrest and to wait for its decision. At the same, it makes 
allowance for immediate arrest in cases where extradition request cannot be 
                                         
72 See for instance, article 7 of the Rome Convention 1988. See also (n 228) Chapter 3 above 
73 See article 11 UK-UAE Extradition Treaty 2008 
74 See article 10 UK-UAE Extradition Treaty 2008  
207 
 
made forthwith and there is a threat of the offender fleeing the territory of the 
requested state. Needless to say that the provision merits to be tested at 
international level.    
 
2.2)  Judicare part of the obligation  
2.2.1)  Duty to submit the case to competent authorities for 
consideration 
According to Bassiouni and Wise, the use of the term judicare is improper 
because it means to ‘judge’ or to ‘try’ which implies full trial.75  What the 
conventions require from states is to submit the case for prosecution to their 
competent national authorities for the purposes of prosecution.76  The 
authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any 
ordinary domestic law crime of a serious nature.77  Thus, the authorities are not 
bound to prosecute but are equally competent to drop the proceeding if so 
required by their national law. Hence, the obligation is to take steps towards 
prosecution or to conduct an inquiry into the accusation which may result in 
prosecution or termination of proceedings.78  This view is in accord with the 
language used by the international conventions on terrorism and organised crime 
to express the obligation. For instance, article 7 of the Hague Convention 1970 
provides: 
The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is 
found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without 
exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed 
in its territory, to submit the case to its competent authorities for the 
purpose of prosecution. Those authorities shall take their decision in 
the same manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a serious 
nature under the law of that State.79 
                                         
75 Bassiouni & Wise (n 1) 4 
76 See article 7 the Hague Convention 1970 
77 ibid 
78 Bassiouni & Wise (n 1) 4 
79 See article 7 of the Hague Convention 1970 
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In the words of Abramovsky, the drafters of the conventions refrained from 
establishing an absolute obligation to prosecute, in order to preserve the 
discretion of national authorities to differentiate between offenders on the basis 
of individual circumstances and of political climate.80  He noted further that 
article 7 of the Hague Convention 1970 substantially weakens the obligation by 
allowing states to fulfil their duty merely by submitting the case to their 
prosecuting authorities for final decision.81  It can be argued therefore that the 
obligation to prosecute implies that the requested state, in case it chooses not 
to extradite, is only required to investigate the charges against the offender. 
The investigation may either lead to trial or pre-trial discharge of the offender. 
In any case, a state in the territory of which the offender is found would be 
relived of its obligation, once the case is submitted for consideration of 
competent authorities to make a decision about prosecution. Significantly, 
during the drafting of the Montreal Convention 1971, a proposal was made by 
Israel for mandatory prosecution. However, this was rejected after having been 
put to vote.82 
Some bilateral and regional treaties further clarify the discretion afforded to the 
requested state in the matter of conducting prosecution in lieu of extradition. 
For example, article 6(2) of the European Convention on Extradition 1957 
provides: 
 [i]f the requested Party does not extradite its national, it shall at 
the request of the requesting Party submit the case to its competent 
authorities in order that proceedings may be taken if they are 
considered appropriate...83 
The expression ‘if they are considered appropriate’ indicates that the competent 
authorities are not bound to prosecute but are equally competent to drop or 
terminate the proceedings. 
Similarly, article 4 (b) of the UN Model Treaty on Extradition 1990 provides that 
extradition may be refused: 
                                         
80 Abramovsky (n 69) 294 
81 ibid 
82 ibid 
83 See article 6(2) of the European Convention on Extradition 1957 
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 if the competent authorities of the requested state have decided not 
to institute or to terminate proceedings against the person whose 
extradition is requested.84 
Likewise, article 6(3) of India-Australia Extradition Treaty 2008 provides, ‘if the 
competent authorities decide not to prosecute, the request for extradition may 
reconsidered in accordance with this treaty.’85 
Clearly, therefore, duty to prosecute in lieu of extradition is limited to 
submission of the case to competent authorities for consideration who shall 
make their decision whether or not to prosecute, in accordance with national 
law. 
2.2.2)   Prosecution to be governed by national rules on 
prosecution of offenders 
In case, the competent authorities choose to prosecute rather than to extradite, 
prosecution shall be performed in accordance with national rules on the 
prosecution of offenders. Thus, it is provided under the Organised Crime 
Convention 2000: 
Nothing contained in this Convention shall affect the principle that 
the description of the offences established in accordance with this 
Convention and of the applicable legal defences or other legal 
principles controlling the lawfulness of conduct is reserved to the 
domestic law of a State Party and that such offences shall be 
prosecuted and punished in accordance with that law.86 
The provision categorically states that the crimes established by the Convention 
shall be prosecuted and punished in accordance with national law of state 
parties. Similar provisions can be seen in the Drugs Convention 1988 87 and the 
UN Convention against Corruption 2003.88 
National rules on prosecution are usually found in domestic constitutions and 
criminal procedure codes. For example, Pakistan’s Constitution, as well as its 
                                         
84 See article 4 (b) of the UN Model Treaty on Extradition 1990 
85 See article 6(3) of India-Australia Extradition Treaty 2008 
86 See article 11 (6) of the Organised Crime Convention 2000 
87 See article 3(11) of the Drugs Convention 1988 
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criminal procedure code, prohibits prosecutions in contravention of the double 
jeopardy rule.89  Likewise, Swiss penal code precludes time- barred 
prosecutions90  and prosecutions in contravention of the rule of legality or 
nullum crimen.91  In the same way, the UK gives immunity from criminal 
prosecution to foreign heads of states and diplomats and their families and 
servants.92  Since these laws and constitutions establish diverse conditions for 
trial, a case deemed prosecutable by one state will not necessarily be treated as 
such by the other.  
The enforcement of prosecution in lieu of extradition depends upon the 
requesting state fulfilling the domestic law conditions of the requested state 
pertaining to trial. In the case of these conditions not being met, the request for 
prosecution might be refused. Since prosecution is conducted in place of 
extradition, if it cannot be carried out, the offender may escape punishment for 
his crime, altogether. 
2.3) Dedere part of the obligation 
As explained above, dedere part of the obligation requires a state to extradite 
the offender found in its territory to a state having jurisdiction over crime and 
willing to prosecute.93  Although it appears first in the scheme of the maxim, 
there is no priority between the two alternative obligations.94  In other words, a 
state in the territory of which an alleged offender is found is not required to 
consider the option of extradition first.95 
                                         
89 See article 13 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 as amended in 2012; See also section 403 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure, Act V of 1898 as amended by Act II of 1997 [hereinafter Code 
of Criminal Procedure of Pakistan 1898]   
90 See article 97 Swiss Criminal Code 1937 
91 See article 1 Swiss Criminal Code 1937:  ‘No one may be punished for an act unless it has been 
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92 See section 20 State Immunity Act 1978, 1978 Chapter 33 [hereinafter State Immunity Act 1978 
of UK]; See also articles 31 and 37 of Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964, 1964 Chapter 81 
[hereinafter Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964] 
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94 Plachta (n 2) 334 
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Each counter-terrorism and organised crime convention under consideration lays 
down extensive provisions on extradition.96  I shall now discuss some of these to 
establish the point that the obligation to extradite, just like the obligation to 
prosecute, is required to be performed subject to the requesting state fulfilling 
the domestic law conditions of the requested state governing the extradition of 
offenders. 
2.3.1) Obligation to consider the crimes extraditable 
In the first place, the international counter-terrorism and organised crime 
conventions declare that the offences established by them shall be included in 
the existing and future extradition treaties between states parties. Thus, article 
8(1) Montreal Convention 1971 provides: 
 The offence shall be deemed to be included as an extraditable 
offence in any extradition treaty existing between Contracting States. 
Contracting States undertake to include the offence as an extraditable 
offence in every extradition treaty to be  concluded between them.97 
The provision is meant to ensure that the offences set forth by the conventions 
are deemed extraditable by state parties.98 
Bilateral treaties adopt different methodologies to reflect their applicability to 
the crimes set forth by the international conventions. A majority of them 
indicate this by pronouncing that the political offence exception shall not be 
applicable to the offences set forth by the international conventions establishing 
                                         
96 See article 8 the Hague Convention 1970, article 8 the Montreal Convention 1971, article 8 the 
Protection of Diplomats Convention 1973, article 10 the Hostages Convention 1979, article 11 
the Nuclear Materials Convention 1980, article 11 the Rome Convention 1988, article 9 the 
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98 Omer Y. Elegab, ‘The Hague as the Seat of Lockerbie Trial: Some Constraints’ 34 The 
International Lawyer (2000) 289 at 297 
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the obligation to extradite or prosecute.99 For instance, article 6(2) of the 
Australia-China Extradition Treaty 1993 provides:  
  For the purposes of paragraph (1) an offence of a political character 
does not include any offence in respect of which both Parties have an 
obligation in accordance with a multilateral agreement either to 
surrender the person sought or to submit the case to their competent 
authorities for decision as to prosecution.100 
Some of them signify it by stating that their provisions shall not affect the 
obligation of either contracting party under multilateral agreements to which it 
is a party.  For instance, article 1(2) of Canada-France Extradition Treaty 1988 
provides: 
 The provisions of this Treaty shall not affect the obligations of either 
Contracting State under any multilateral agreements to which it is a 
party.101 
Apparently, the obligation leaves the requested state with no choice but to 
grant extradition if requisitioned by another state party which has an extradition 
treaty with it. However, little can be gained from such a provision in situations 
where the cooperating states do not have any extradition treaty between them 
and the national law of the requested state demands one for the surrender of 
suspects.102  This is not just a theoretical proposition: a majority of the counter- 
terrorism and organised crime conventions are ratified by at least three-quarters 
of the UN members, not all of which have bilateral treaties with each other.103  
Accordingly, it was held by four Judges of the ICJ in their joint declaration in 
Lockerbie case that Libya was under no obligation to extradite pursuant to 
article 8(1) of the Montreal Convention 1971, since it had no extradition treaty 
with the US or the UK and its national law required such a treaty for the 
surrender of Libyan nationals.104  The declaration makes it clear that despite the 
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imposition of a mandatory obligation under an international convention to 
consider certain crimes extraditable, the requested state is, in fact, under no 
obligation to extradite where it has no extradition treaty with the requesting 
state and its national law requires one. Thus, the determining factor as to 
whether or not extradition takes place remains the fulfilment of the national law 
condition of the existence of an extradition treaty, not the offences having been 
made extraditable by the international conventions on terrorism and organised 
crime.   
2.3.2)  Obligation to consider the international conventions as a 
legal basis of surrender 
Another common provision of the international counter-terrorism and organised 
crime conventions stipulates that if a contracting party that makes extradition 
conditional on the existence of a treaty, receives a request for surrender from 
another contracting party with which it has no extradition treaty, it ‘may’, at its 
own option, consider the conventions as legal basis for surrender.105  This implies 
that the international conventions may constitute temporary extradition treaties 
in certain situations.106  The provision suggests further that states parties whose 
domestic law does not make extradition conditional on the existence of an 
extradition treaty, ‘shall’ recognise the offences as extraditable between 
themselves.107  However, in each of the two cases, extradition shall be subject 
                                         
105 See article 8 (2) Montreal Convention 1971:  
If a Contracting State which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a 
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to the conditions laid down in the domestic law of the requested state, including 
any applicable grounds for refusal.108 
According to Elegab, the provision reduces the complexities of extradition by 
eliminating the assertion that surrender may not be granted because the 
requesting and requested states do not have an extradition treaty between 
them.109  It nonetheless suffers from two fundamental weaknesses.  
Firstly, it merely gives an option to a party which makes extradition conditional 
on the existence of a treaty, to consider the international conventions as a legal 
basis for surrender.110  Such a party is not bound to do so and may refuse 
extradition on the ground that the requirement in its domestic law of a bilateral 
treaty is in existence, has not been fulfilled. For instance, in the Lockerbie case, 
Libyan domestic law blocked the extradition of nationals in the absence of an 
extradition treaty with the requesting state. Libya still had the option to deliver 
the suspects by relying on the Montreal Convention 1971 as a legal basis of 
surrender; however, it chose not to do so.111  According to the dissenting opinion 
of Judge Bedjaoui, Libya was fully entitled to refuse extradition because there 
was no rule of international law that had imposed a duty to extradite nationals 
in the absence an extradition treaty.112  Notably, the judgement concerned the 
application and interpretation of the Montreal Convention 1971, which 
represents one of the counter-terrorism conventions under consideration.113  It 
therefore makes clear that considering an international convention as a legal 
basis of surrender is purely optional for states whose domestic law makes 
extradition conditional on the existence of an extradition treaty.  
Secondly, the provision has blurred the distinction between the mandatory 
obligation of states not making extradition conditional and the optional 
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undertaking of states making extradition conditional, by subjecting both 
obligations to domestic law.114  Accordingly, whether or not a state makes 
extradition conditional upon the existence of an extradition treaty, the 
surrender shall take place in accordance with the conditions laid down in the 
national law of the requested state.115  Needless to say, domestic law conditions 
such as double criminality, extraterritorial jurisdiction and fair treatment can all 
be used to refuse extradition in either of the two situations.116 
In summary, it is apparent that the enforcement of the dedere part of the 
obligation is subject to the requesting state fulfilling the domestic law 
conditions of the requested state pertaining to extradition. Accordingly, 
notwithstanding the offences having been made extraditable by the 
international conventions, extradition might be refused if the national law of the 
requested state demands the existence of an extradition treaty and there is no 
such treaty between the requesting and requested state. Furthermore, even if 
an international convention is made the legal basis of surrender, the requesting 
state is not relieved from its obligation to satisfy domestic law conditions of the 
requested state pertaining to extradition. 
 On the top of all this, we have seen that where extradition is refused, 
prosecution does not necessarily follow. The non-fulfilment of domestic law 
conditions relating to prosecution provides an equally valid ground to refuse 
prosecution in lieu of extradition. Clearly, therefore, inclusion of the maxim in 
national laws alone does not necessarily facilitate its application; harmony in 
domestic rules pertaining to trial and extradition may yet be required.  
 Section 3: Regulation of the procedure of 
extradition under the international conventions on 
terrorism and organised crime 
To bring about harmony in national laws with respect to the procedure of 
extradition, the international conventions on terrorism and organised crime have 
already set forth certain rules. However, these rules appear to be insufficient to 
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facilitate the application of aut dedere aut judicare as a whole, particularly, in 
the specific context of transnational criminality. In any case, they represent an 
important step towards synchronisation of domestic laws. Accordingly, it seems 
appropriate to first consider these rules and second their impact at national 
level.   
3.1) The fiscal offence exception 
Before the introduction of the international conventions on terrorism and 
organised crime, extradition could be refused on the ground that the crime 
charged constituted a fiscal crime under the law of the requesting state.117  The 
rationale of this exception was the general reluctance of states to enforce the 
internal revenue laws of foreign countries.118 However, the international 
conventions, in particular those establishing crimes having financial implications, 
oblige the parties not to apply a fiscal crime exception to the extradition of 
suspects. For instance, article 13 of the Terrorism Financing Convention 1999 
provides:119 
 None of the offences set forth in article 2 shall be regarded, for the 
purposes of extradition or mutual legal assistance, as a fiscal offence. 
Accordingly, States Parties  may not refuse a request for extradition 
or for mutual legal assistance on the sole ground that it concerns a 
fiscal offence. 
This provision has had a profound impact at the national level. For instance, 
article II (4) of the Canada-Spain Extradition Treaty 1989 provides, ‘An offence 
of a fiscal character is an extraditable offence.’120  Similarly, article 5 of the 
European Convention on Extradition 1957 provides, ‘[e]xtradition shall be 
granted… for offences in connection with taxes, duties, customs and exchange 
only if contracting parties have so decided in respect of any such offence or 
category of offences.’121  Likewise, article 2(3) of the UN Model Treaty on 
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Extradition 1990 provides, ‘where extradition of a person is sought for an 
offence against a law relating to taxation, custom duties, exchange control or 
other revenue matters, extradition may not be refused on the ground that law of 
the requested state does not impose the same kind of tax, custom duty or 
exchange regulations of the same kind as law of the requesting state.’122 
All these provisions illustrate the international regulation of fiscal crime 
exception to extradition. The harmonisation of national laws with respect to 
non-application of this requirement makes it easier for the requesting state to 
obtain extradition of the offenders involved in the acts of transnational 
terrorism and organised crime. 
3.2) The political offence exception 
In the past, a number of terrorist acts went unaccounted for because the 
requested states refused to surrender fugitives on the basis that the crimes 
charged against them were political. For example, the US has on a number of 
occasions refused to extradite IRA fugitives to Britain on this basis.123  Similarly, 
Kuwait refused to extradite Arab suspects involved in the 1973 hijackings of 
PanAm and Lufthansa aircrafts which resulted in the deaths of scores of 
passengers.124  The reason for world community’s silence over these decisions 
was the existence of a political offence exception in extradition law. While 
there was no universally agreed definition of what constituted a political crime, 
it was widely believed that such an exception existed when the offence 
constituted a political crime under the national law of the requested state.125  
According to Abramovsky, domestic laws give recognition to two kinds of 
political offenders: those who resort to a crime in an attempt to escape 
oppressive political system and those who seek international recognition of their 
cause by employing methods such as political blackmail and the destruction of 
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aircraft.126  The limits of the exception were set out in the landmark British case 
of In re Castioni.127  Here, it was held that political offences were acts that were 
incidental to and formed part of a political disturbance in which the offender 
was taking part.128  Thus, to claim the political offence exception, an offender 
must establish that the act for which his extradition was sought had been 
committed in the course of on-going civil strife involving rival parties competing 
for power in a state.129 
The traditional justification for the exception has been the presumption that the 
surrender of political enemies to the requesting state would result in their trial 
being influenced by political considerations.130  The rule frequently appears in 
national laws and bilateral treaties on extradition as a mandatory ground for 
refusal. For example, article 5(2) (a) of Pakistan’s Extradition Act 1972 provides 
'[n]o fugitive shall be surrendered: (a) if the offence in respect of which his 
surrender is sought is of a political character…'131 
However, the makers of the international conventions on terrorism and 
organised crime have rejected this exception by declaring that offences 
established by these conventions shall not be regarded as political for the 
purposes of extradition or mutual legal assistance. For example, article 11 of 
Terrorist Bombings Convention 1997 provides: 
 None of the offences set forth in article 2 shall be regarded, for the 
purposes of extradition or mutual legal assistance, as a political 
offence or as an offence connected with a political offence or as an 
offence inspired by political motives. Accordingly, a request for 
extradition or for mutual legal assistance based on such an offence 
may not be refused on the sole ground that it concerns a political 
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offence or an offence connected with a political offence or an offence 
inspired by political motives.132 
This provision has had a significant impact at a national level. For example, 
article III (1) of the Canada-Spain Extradition Treaty 1989 provides:   
  Extradition shall not be granted in any of the following 
circumstances: 
 [W]hen the offence for which extradition is requested is considered 
by the Requested State as a political offence. For the purpose of this 
paragraph, political offence shall  not include … (b) an offence for 
which each Contracting State has the obligation pursuant to a 
multilateral international agreement to extradite the person sought or 
to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of 
prosecution…133 
Similarly, article 6(2) of Australia-China extradition treaty 1993 provides,  
 … an offence of political character does not include any offence in 
respect of which both parties have an obligation in accordance with a 
multilateral agreement either to surrender the person sought or to 
submit the case to their competent authorities for decision as to 
prosecution. 
In the same way, article V of the US-Italy Extradition treaty 1983 provides that 
extradition shall not be granted for a political offence; however: 
 an offence with respect to which both contracting parties have the 
obligation to submit for prosecution or to grant extradition pursuant 
to a multilateral international agreement …will be presumed to have 
the predominant character of a common crime… 
The above provisions reflect that, although the political offence exception still 
remains intact in bilateral treaties and national laws on extradition, it has been 
made inapplicable to the offences set forth by the international conventions 
establishing the aut dedere aut judicare obligation. Since all counter-terrorism 
and organised conventions under consideration include this obligation, the 
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crimes established by them are automatically excluded from the operation of 
the political offence exception. Because transnational crimes, and in particular 
terrorist crimes, are prone to be regarded as political crimes,134  the non-
applicability of the political offence exception greatly facilitates the extradition 
and interrogation of suspects involved in these crimes. 
However, in spite of the political offence exception having been made 
inapplicable to transnational crimes, a number of provisions contained in the 
international conventions regulating these crimes indicate that political crimes 
can still be treated differently. For example, the provisions on treaties of 
asylum135  and principle of non -discrimination136  suggest that certain 
concessions can be given to the offenders involved in political crimes. 
3.3)   Temporary Surrender 
Modern international conventions on terrorism and organised crime provide that 
where a state is required by its domestic law to extradite its nationals subject to 
the condition only that, if convicted, he will be returned to the requested state 
to serve his sentence, such conditional extradition shall be considered sufficient 
discharge of its duty under aut dedere aut judicare rule. Thus, article 16 (11) of 
the Organised Crime Convention 2000 provides:  
Whenever a State Party is permitted under its domestic law to 
extradite or otherwise surrender one of its nationals only upon the 
condition that the person will be returned to that State Party to serve 
the sentence imposed as a result of the trial or proceedings for which 
the extradition or surrender of the person was sought and that State 
Party and the State Party seeking the extradition of the person agree 
with this option and other terms that they may deem appropriate, 
such conditional extradition or surrender shall be sufficient to 
discharge the obligation set forth in paragraph 10 of this article.137 
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According to Plachta, this provision has tremendous potential to facilitate 
extradition because it overcomes the traditional barrier of non-extradition of 
nationals.138  This view however appears simplistic because only those states 
whose national law allows temporary surrender of nationals may benefit from it. 
States whose national laws impose an absolute prohibition against such 
extraditions will not be in a position to utilise it. Nevertheless, it represents a 
definite improvement upon the usual extradition provisions of the counter- 
terrorism and organised crime conventions and could be further refined in future 
conventions.   
The provision has been applied in some bilateral and regional treaties. For 
example, article 5 of the UK-UAE Extradition Treaty 2008 provides: 
 the provisions of article 4(2)(b) shall not preclude the possibility of 
temporary surrender of the person sought for trial in the requesting 
state in accordance with conditions to be determined by mutual 
agreement. The requesting party shall return the person to the 
requested party after the conclusion of proceedings against that 
 person. The requested party may seek further assurances in any 
individual case.139 
Similarly, article 19 of the European Convention on Extradition 1957 provides,  
 … the requested state may, instead of postponing surrender, 
temporarily surrender the person claimed to the requesting state in 
accordance with conditions to be determined by the mutual 
agreement between the parties.140 
In the light of above, it is apparent that the international conventions on 
terrorism and organised crime have laid down certain rules to simplify and 
harmonise domestic procedures of extradition. The rules are however 
insufficient to facilitate the application of aut dedere aut judicare as a whole in 
the specific context of transnational crimes. For example, no attempt has been 
made under these rules to regulate trial instead of extradition. Furthermore, 
none of these rules, apart from the one concerning fiscal offence exception, 
deals with the technicalities of extradition, peculiar to multi-jurisdictional and 
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financial crimes. To address these, further regulation is needed. In this respect, 
significant advances have been made in some bilateral treaties and domestic 
laws on extradition. A few of these will be analysed below, resulting in the 
suggestion that rules modelled after these should be included in the 
international conventions on terrorism and organised crime in order to facilitate 
the application of aut dedere aut judicare as a whole in the specific context of 
transnational criminality.   
 Section 4: Facilitating the application of aut 
dedere aut judicare as a whole in the specific 
context of transnational crimes 
4.1) Facilitating the application of trial option of aut 
dedere aut judicare 
To paraphrase the words of Plachta, if aut dedere aut judicare is to emerge as 
an effective tool of state cooperation in law enforcement, trial in lieu of 
extradition will have to be made more meaningful.141  This alternative suffers 
from a number of weaknesses; as such it is generally viewed as a second class 
form of criminal proceeding.142  These may include the absence of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction on the part of the requested state to prosecute 
crimes committed abroad by non-nationals and general lack of trust upon 
credibility of trial as a substitute to extradition.  
4.1.1) Lack of extraterritorial jurisdiction to prosecute crimes 
committed abroad by non-national offenders  
One of the major difficulties in conducting trial in lieu of extradition is the 
inability of many states to prosecute non- nationals for crimes committed 
abroad, on account of their laws not having been made applicable to 
extraterritorial conduct.143  This result may lead to impunity.  
Some commentators suggest that the Hague Convention 1970 and the 
conventions modelled after it have resolved this issue by obliging every party in 
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the territory of which the offender is found to establish jurisdiction, regardless 
of his nationality or the place of the commission of crime.144  According to 
Scharf, this represents the principle of treaty based universality which is meant 
to ensure that the offender may not find refuge in the territory of any state 
party.145 The overriding effect of the obligation has been confirmed by the ICJ in 
Belgium v. Senegal. In this case, it was held that the establishment of universal 
jurisdiction represents an integral part of the duty to prosecute as contained in 
the UN Convention against Torture (UNCAT) 1984 and the party failing to do so 
would entail international responsibility.146  At the same time, however, the 
judgement clarified that it related to crime of torture only which entails 
customary law obligations superseding the contrary provisions of national law.147 
The argument that the Hague Convention 1970 gives rise to an overriding duty to 
establish jurisdiction on the basis of offender's presence disregards the flexible 
nature of the duty. As explained in chapter 2, states are fairly autonomous in 
the matter of defining and applying the bases of jurisdiction set out in the 
international conventions on terrorism and organised crime, including the Hague 
Convention 1970.148  In view of this, domestic laws vary as regards 
implementation of those bases.149  For example, some states such as Pakistan, 
have not implemented the jurisdictional basis of offender’s presence; others, 
such as India apply it in a restrictive manner. Yet other states such as the US 
give it a broad interpretation.150  Interestingly, this practise has been endorsed 
by the implementation kits of some counter-terrorism and organised crime 
conventions. For example, the technical assistance guide of the UN Convention 
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against Corruption 2003 provides, ‘states may wish to note that there is no single 
model of implementation.’151 
Furthermore, while commenting upon the nature of the extradite or prosecute 
obligation under the Montreal Convention 1971, four judges of the ICJ held that 
‘...in general international law, there is no obligation to prosecute in default of 
extradition’.152  Thus, the obligation cannot be viewed as independent of 
national law. If this view is taken as correct, a state not establishing jurisdiction 
on the basis of the offender’s presence may not be held responsible for violating 
its international obligation. If prosecution is non-mandatory, so must be the 
obligation to establish jurisdiction or to make the offence punishable under any 
specific theory of jurisdiction. Emphasising this point, Plachta notes, the 
alternative of prosecution in lieu of extradition ‘is meaningful only to the extent 
that courts of the custodial state have the necessary jurisdiction over the crimes 
set out in the particular instrument…’153 
In the light of above, the argument that, pursuant to the Hague Convention 
1970, the parties have assumed an overriding duty to establish jurisdiction 
appears idealistic. Since the rules of the Convention concerning jurisdiction and 
prosecution are subject to national law, whether or not a state implements any 
specific basis of jurisdiction would depend upon authorisation under its national 
law. Accordingly, a state does not automatically become bound to prosecute a 
non- national offender found present in its territory for crimes committed 
abroad, simply because an international convention to which it is a party 
requires it to do so. For such obligation to arise national law must explicitly 
provide for this basis of jurisdiction or else the prosecution will be deemed 
violative of the principle of legality or nullum crimen. The conclusion draws 
support from Abelson’s observation that ‘aut dedere aut judicare treaties 
operate in tandem with the law on extradition and extraterritorial 
jurisdiction’.154  
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Hence, it is clear that the option of trial in lieu of extradition still suffers from 
the problem of states lacking jurisdiction to prosecute crimes   committed 
abroad by non-nationals. The Hague Convention 1970 and the conventions 
modelled after it cannot be said to have resolved this problem because their 
rules pertaining to extraterritorial jurisdiction are subservient to national law. 
 4.1.2) General lack of trust upon credibility of trial as an 
alternative to extradition 
Another important limitation of the reliance upon trial as an alternative to 
extradition is general lack of trust among states as regards credibility of trials 
held abroad.155  The credibility of a trial will suffer when questions are raised 
about its fairness or efficiency. Fairness becomes doubtful when a state in the 
territory of which the offender is found is suspected of being complicit in a 
crime, efficiency may deteriorate if there is a general indifference of a state 
towards the crimes taking place abroad or if practical difficulties exist in their 
prosecution.156  The former issue came to the fore in Lockerbie case where the 
US and UK refused to cooperate with Libya in sharing information regarding the 
investigation, on account of their reservations about fairness of a trial in 
Libya.157 
To address this problem, some scholars recommend that the option not to 
extradite should be forfeited in situations where either of two factors--, i.e. 
complicity or lack of interest-- is established.158  This recommendation is 
impracticable however because it is unlikely that states would accept a limit on 
their sovereign right to determine the fate of the fugitive found in their 
territory.159  Notably, states have consistently shown their reluctance to accept 
an absolute obligation to extradite because of the traditional norms against 
extradition of nationals and that of offenders found involved in political 
crimes.160  In the words of Bassiouni and Wise, ‘the right or privilege to refuse 
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extradition is so deeply rooted in international law that there is something 
fundamentally wrong about trying to compel a state that is unwilling to do so to 
relinquish the privilege.’161  Furthermore, the removal of the option not to 
extradite defies the alternative nature of aut dedere aut judicare. If judicare 
option is taken away, the obligation comes down to mandatory extradition.162 
4.1.3) Alternative options 
I shall now make some suggestions with respect to measures that could be taken 
to minimise difficulties associated with trial in lieu of extradition. These will 
neither be so radical as to compromise the alternative nature of aut dedere aut 
judicare nor so demanding as to appear inconsistent with national laws and 
bilateral treaties. 
A-Conditional extradition 
State parties might be encouraged to allow the surrender of a fugitive, subject 
to the condition that if convicted the offender will be returned to the requested 
state to serve his sentence. This option provides a way out of the situation 
where extradition could not be granted due to concerns such as harsh 
punishments in the requesting state and a trial could not be held because of the 
requested state lacked extraterritorial jurisdiction to punish crimes committed 
abroad by non-nationals. A modified version of this option appears in the 
Organised Crime Convention 2000 and the UN Convention against Corruption 
2003.163  Its scope is, however, limited to extradition of nationals only-- and then 
only where domestic law allows it. Hence, it is recommended that the option 
should not only be disentangled from the limitation of national law permissibility 
but its ambit should also be enlarged to cover non-nationals as well. 
Interestingly, some domestic laws have already incorporated such provisions. For 
example, New Zealand’s extradition law empowers the government to grant 
conditional extradition: (1) when a mandatory restriction on the surrender of a 
person applies under the relevant bilateral treaty or national law, and (2) when 
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it appears that the person, if surrendered, would be subjected to torture in the 
requesting state.164  The law facilitates extradition by overcoming traditional 
hurdles such as the non-extradition of nationals and the fear of human rights 
violations in the requesting state. 
B-Sending observers to custodial state 
This option was presented by the Institute of International law in 1981.165 
According to it, a state in the territory of which the offence is committed should 
be entitled to send observers to the requested state to witness the trial in lieu 
of extradition, unless serious grounds such as preservation of national security 
justify their non-admittance.166  A major difficulty in the implementation of this 
option relates to the cost involved in sending observers. Other challenges 
include inadequate security arrangements for observers.167  Arguably, if the 
option is included in the international conventions on terrorism and organised 
crime, at least the parties which can afford to meet these challenges will have 
an extra tool at their disposal to ensure the application of aut dedere aut 
judicare. 
C-Surrender to third state 
States can be encouraged to surrender the fugitive to a third state which does 
not have an interest in the prosecution that is adverse to that of the requested 
state.168  The legal basis for including such an option already exists under the 
international conventions on terrorism and organised crime as they provide that 
the offence should not only be deemed to have occurred in the territory of the 
state in which it actually takes place but also in the territory of every state 
having jurisdiction under the conventions .169 
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Notably, the option was finally adopted by the parties to the Lockerbie case 
when all other measures had failed to end the standoff between Libya and the 
US and the UK.170 Acting upon this formula, Libya agreed to surrender the 
suspects to Netherlands to be tried by a court comprised of Scottish Judges 
applying Scottish law.171  In the same way, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia had 
nearly struck a deal with respect to surrender of Bin Laden to Saudi Arabia when 
the incident of the bombings of the US embassies took place in 1998. This led to 
airstrikes against Afghanistan resulting in breakdown of talks.172  In this case, the 
surrender was demanded by the US on the basis of an indictment issued by one 
of its courts, however, the host state Afghanistan refused to extradite him either 
to the US or the UK.173  The frustrated negotiations between Saudi Arabia and 
Afghanistan proved that the Taliban, then the government of Afghanistan, was 
willing to consider the option of surrendering the fugitive to a third state, i.e. 
Saudi Arabia. 
4.1.4) The problem of competing jurisdictions and the absence of 
hierarchy in the alternative obligations 
In cases involving ordinary crimes such as murder, the requested state should 
normally have no hesitation in granting extradition because it is unlikely to have 
a parallel interest in the prosecution of the offender.174  However, in 
transnational crimes like hijacking, since the crime spreads across national 
frontiers, the requested state may have a jurisdictional nexus with the crime, 
making it punishable under its own law.175  Such situations may, for example, 
arise when the accused is a national of the requested state, when the crime 
occurs in part in its territory or when the crime is committed on an aircraft or 
vessel owned by it.176  Equally, the requesting state may have its own compelling 
reasons to request extradition, such as the occurrence of the main part of the 
crime on its territory, threats to its national security or injury to its citizens. 
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Thus, the prosecution of transnational crimes may involve an inherent clash of 
jurisdictional interests.177  Although, the international conventions regulating 
these crimes oblige the requested state to submit the case for prosecution if 
extradition is refused, this option may not necessarily satisfy the requesting 
state, particularly when it has suffered greater injury or distrusts the 
proceedings in the requested state.178 
To illustrate the problem, a hypothetical example of two states interacting in 
two different situations is given below. 
4.1.4.1) Hypothetical example    
a)-Suppose the US and India are partners to a bilateral extradition treaty.179 An 
Indian national after committing murder of a fellow citizen in New Delhi, 
escapes to the US. Subsequently, India makes a request for extradition. In this 
situation, the US is expected to have no difficulty in accepting the request 
because the offender and the victim as well as the place of the commission are 
all based in India and the US has no parallel interest in the prosecution of the 
offender. Most importantly, the US has an extradition treaty with India which 
obliges it to extradite, provided, extradition is not barred under the grounds of 
refusal as established by the treaty.180  The grounds of refusal include double 
jeopardy, political offence exception, lapse of time and capital punishment.181 
Assuming none of these issues are at stake, the US will most probably extradite 
the offender. 
b)-A second hypothetical situation involves the crime of hijacking. Suppose the 
offender again an Indian national hijacks an Indian aircraft from New Delhi, 
carrying several American nationals, amongst passengers of other nationalities 
and escapes to the US. India makes a request for extradition on the bases of 
territoriality, nationality and flag state principles. This time the process of 
arriving at a decision is not likely to be as simple as it was in the case of murder. 
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Although, the US is bound by the same extradition treaty, it has its own 
jurisdictional nexus with the act of hijacking, hence its own parallel interest in 
the prosecution. The basis of jurisdiction is presumably provided by the US law 
on hostage taking which makes it a federal crime to take hostages whether 
inside or outside the US when the victims or offender is a US national.182 
The conflicting interests of India and the US in the prosecution may lead to a 
stalemate because the applicable multilateral convention, i.e. the Hague 
Convention 1970,183  does not require extradition in all circumstances; rather, it 
allows refusal of the extradition, where the requested state prefers prosecution 
over extradition.184  Nonetheless, the Convention does not provide guidance as 
to which state prevails.  
 The international conventions on terrorism and organised crime lack a 
mechanism by which the requested state may choose between extradition and 
prosecution in cases involving competing jurisdictional interests. As Clarke has 
observed, the conflict of concurrent jurisdiction has been downplayed in the 
negotiations leading to some of these conventions.185  However, such a conflict 
remains a genuine possibility owing to the nature of offences and the absence of 
priority in the alternative obligations of extradition and prosecution.  
The decision to extradite or prosecute solely comes down to the discretion of 
the requested state. Although modern international conventions on terrorism 
and organised crime encourage the parties to consult with each other, this 
remains a recommendation only. Accordingly, in the Lockerbie case, all 
interested parties admitted before the ICJ that the Montreal Convention 1971 is 
silent on the matter of priority or exclusivity of jurisdiction.186  In this case, the 
US and UK asserted jurisdiction on the basis of flag state and territorial 
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principles respectively, whereas Libya claimed it on the basis of offender's 
presence in state territory. While the Montreal Convention establishes 
mandatory obligations to assert jurisdiction under territoriality and flag state 
principles, it refers to the offender’s presence only as a secondary basis.187  
However, the ICJ in its judgement did not make any distinction between the 
theories of jurisdiction relied upon.188 
Since the parties in this case could not arrive at a negotiated settlement, the 
Security Council had to intervene. This was interpreted by one commentator as 
world community’s substantial loss of faith in the authority of the Montreal 
Convention to settle disputes.189  It can thus be argued that under the existing 
scheme of the international conventions on terrorism and organised crime, the 
state in the territory of which the offender is found assumes de facto priority 
regardless of the strength or weakness of its jurisdictional claim vis-a-vis the 
requesting state.190  As noted by Elegab, in Lockerbie case, the UK and the US 
had superior jurisdictional claims as compared to Libya. However, since Libya 
had custody of the offenders, the US and the UK had no choice but to wait until 
Libya voluntarily forfeited its authority to prosecute.191 
According to some commentators, the decision to extradite or prosecute could 
be regulated by establishing a system of hierarchy amongst the bases of 
jurisdiction.192  A resolution to this effect was actually adopted at the 17th 
Commission of the Institute of International Law at its 2005 Session. Paragraph 
3(c) of the resolution provides: 
 Any state having custody over an alleged offender should, before 
commencing a trial … ask the state where the crime was committed or 
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the state of nationality of the person concerned, whether it is 
prepared to prosecute that person…193 
The idea however has not made its way to the international conventions on 
terrorism and organised crime because of the lack of necessary consensus. For 
example, during the drafting of the Hague Convention 1970, it was proposed 
that state of registration should be given priority, by making it mandatory for 
the requested state to accept its extradition request. The proposal was rejected 
after having been put to a vote.194  Similarly, the Chinese proposal to 
subordinate the permissive bases of jurisdiction to mandatory bases was also 
rejected during the drafting of the Terrorist Bombing Convention.195 
4.1.4.2)  The rule of ‘Reasonableness’ as an alternative 
As an alternative, a rule of reasonableness could be included in the international 
counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions on the pattern of some 
domestic laws. In the words of Clarke, ‘since general international law has not 
established a priority system among various jurisdictional theories, the solution 
is negotiation especially on the basis where the strongest case may be 
mounted.’196 
Rule of reasonableness provides an efficient mechanism to determine the 
proprietary of contradictory jurisdictional claims. According to it, states are to 
weigh their interest in prosecuting a crime, relative to the interest of other 
states having concurrent jurisdiction over the same crime.197  When the interest 
of one state proves stronger, the state having the lesser interest would be 
required to voluntarily abstain from exercising jurisdiction, regardless of the 
strength of its claim under the traditional rules of jurisdiction.198 
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Such a rule would require the state in the territory of which the offender is 
found to weigh its interest in prosecuting him vis-a-vis the interest of the 
requesting state when making a decision to extradite or prosecute. The rule 
appears in the Restatement Third of the US Foreign Policy Law.199  It was also 
applied by the Canadian Supreme Court in the case of Swystun v. United 
States.200 
Section 403 of the Restatement 3rd provides that regardless of the fact that a 
state is competent to establish jurisdiction on any of the bases provided under 
international law the exercise of jurisdiction will be subject to the requirement 
that one state may not act in unreasonable manner towards another.201  Section 
403(2) contains a list of factors on the basis of which reasonableness can be 
determined.202  These are: 
i) The link of the activity to be regulated with the territory of the regulating 
state. 
ii) The connections between the regulating state and the persons responsible 
for activity to be regulated or for whom regulation is designed. 
iii) The character of the activity to be regulated and the importance of such 
regulation to regulating state and degree to which such regulation is 
generally accepted. 
iv) Whether justified expectations would be hurt or protected by such 
regulation. 
v) The extent to which such regulation is consistent with the international 
system and traditions. 
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vi) The extent to which another state may have an interest in such regulation 
and the likelihood it will conflict with regulations imposed by other 
states. 
Based on this approach, the state which has maximum interest in the 
prosecution would get the custody of the offender.     
It has been argued that a majority of these factors are subjective and give 
enormous discretion to national authorities of the requested state to interpret 
them in line with its local interests.203  Furthermore, the factors outlined by 
Restatement 3rd make no distinction between civil and criminal proceedings; 
hence, their utility in the specific context of criminal law is questionable. 
Accordingly, one scholar has proposed an amended list of factors which not only 
appears more precise but is also more relevant in the specific context of 
criminal law.204  These are: 
i) Which state which has suffered the greatest injury as a result of the 
crime? 
ii) In which state were the effects of the crime most felt? 
iii) Which state provides the stronger guarantees of procedural fairness? 
iv) Which state is the place of offender’s or victim’s nationality? 
v) In which state did the major part of the crime occur? 
The above factors alone may not, however, prove sufficient to arrive at a fair 
decision in cases involving transnational crimes. This is so because transnational 
crimes differ from ordinary crimes in that their occurrence does not necessarily 
imply the greatest injury to the territorial state; they may have larger 
repercussions for the targeted state.205  For example, the offence of terror 
financing may have lesser implications for the state in the territory of which the 
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act of financing has been committed as compared to the state in the territory of 
which the actual terrorist attack was to be committed.206  Similarly, in cases 
involving conspiracies to export narcotics, the state where the conspiracy was 
hatched may have a lesser interest in prosecution as compared to the state 
where the narcotics were planned to be received.207  Likewise in hijacking and 
hostage taking, the state which is the object of coercion or whose nationals have 
been targeted may have a greater interest in the prosecution as compared to the 
state of registration of the aircraft or state of the offender’s nationality.208 
To counter these challenges, two additional factors can be added to the list of 
factors indicating reasonableness. Firstly, jurisdiction might be assessed on case 
by case basis by balancing the interest of the requesting and requested states.209 
Secondly, a new factor of forum conveniens, i.e., the place where it would be 
most convenient to hold the trial, should also be introduced.210  Convenience 
may be determined with respect to the collection of evidence, the availability of 
witnesses or the ability to bring together all of the accused and witnesses in one 
place.211 
Notably, the rule of reasonableness does not make it obligatory for the 
requested state to extradite the offender when the interest of the requesting 
state is clearly greater. The power to decide whether or not to extradite still 
remains with the requested state. What it does, however, is invite states to 
consider various factors when making their decision whether or not to extradite. 
It therefore brings harmony in national laws with respect to matters to be 
considered when making a decision to extradite or prosecute the offender in 
cases involving competing jurisdictions. 
Considering the explanation above, it is clear that the application of trial in lieu 
of extradition cannot be facilitated simply by requiring the parties to implement 
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aut dedere aut judicare. It requires further, international guidance with respect 
to resolution of the problems inherent in this option such as, lack of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction to prosecute non-nationals and the issue of 
competing and concurrent jurisdictions.  
4.2)  Facilitating the application of extradition option of 
aut dedere aut judicare 
Since transnational criminality differs from ordinary crimes, the rules of 
extradition governing ordinary crimes may not be suitable for surrender of 
suspects involved in these crimes. To facilitate the extradition of transnational 
offenders, some bilateral and regional treaties include special rules. It is 
recommended that corresponding rules should be included in the international 
conventions on terrorism and organised crime to facilitate the application of 
extradition option of aut dedere aut judicare in the specific context of 
transnational criminality. 
4.2.1)  Restricted application of the principle of speciality 
As explained in chapter 3 above, speciality is a rule of extradition law which 
prohibits the requesting state from trying the offender for an offence other than 
that for which his extradition was granted.212  The rule creates complications in 
the trial of transnational offenders whose crimes tend to aggregate and 
compound.213  For instance, if an accused is extradited for the import of drugs, 
he may subsequently be found to have been involved in organised drug 
trafficking activities. In such cases, the strict application of speciality will 
prevent the requesting state from prosecuting the offender for subsequently 
disclosed offences.  
To counter this difficulty, some bilateral treaties limit the application of 
speciality. For instance, article 18(3) of Canada-France Extradition Treaty 1988 
provides: 
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 When the legal nature of an offence for which a person has been 
extradited is changed, the person shall not be prosecuted or tried 
unless the new description of the  offence … (b) relates to the same 
conduct as the offence for which extradition was granted.214 
Similarly, article 18 (1) of Australia-China Extradition Treaty 1993 provides that 
the rule of speciality shall not prevent the requesting state from trying the 
offender for: 
(b) any lesser offence however described, disclosed by the facts in 
respect of which return was ordered provided such an offence is an 
offence for which the person sought can be returned under this 
Agreement.215 
 Likewise article 18 (1) of the US-UK Extradition Treaty 2003 provides:  
 A person extradited under this treaty may not be detained, tried or 
punished in the requesting state except for: a) any offense for which 
extradition was granted or a differently denominated offense based 
on the same facts as the offense on which extradition was granted 
provided such offense is extraditable or is a lesser included offense; 
(b) any offense committed after the extradition of the person…216 
In the same way, article XVI (1) of the US-Italy Extradition Treaty 1983 provides:  
 A person extradited under this Treaty may not be detained, tried or 
punished in the Requesting Party except for: (a) the offense for which 
extradition has been granted or when the same facts for which 
extradition was granted constitute a differently denominated offense 
which is extraditable…217 
The above provisions make clear that the rule of speciality will not prevent the 
requesting state from prosecuting the offender for new charges arising out of 
the same conduct which led to his extradition. In this way, the provisions 
facilitate the trial of transnational offenders for a broader range of offences. 
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4.2.2)  Surrender of property and mutual legal assistance in 
extradition 
Some extradition treaties impose a mandatory obligation upon the requested 
state to surrender the proceeds and instrumentalities of crime to the requesting 
state along with the accused. For example, article 17 of Australia-China 
Extradition Treaty 1993 provides: 
(1)When a request for surrender is granted, the requested party shall 
as far as its law allows, hand over upon request, to the requesting 
party all articles including sums of money: (a) which may serve as a 
proof of offence (b) which may have been acquired by the person 
sought as a result of the offence and are in that person’s possession or 
discovered subsequently.218 
Similarly, article XVIII of the US-Italy Extradition Treaty 1983 provides: 
1. All articles instruments, objects of value, documents or other 
evidence relating to the offence may be seized and surrendered 
to the Requesting party. Such property may be surrendered when 
extradition cannot be effected. The rights of 3rd parties in such 
property shall be respected.  
2. The Requested party may condition the surrender of property 
upon satisfactory assurance from the Requesting party that the 
property will be returned to the Requested party as soon as 
practicable, and may defer its surrender if it is needed as 
evidence in the Requested party.219 
Apart from this, some bilateral treaties also enjoin the requested state to gather 
evidence in its territory for the requesting state relating to the offence for 
which extradition is sought. Thus, article XX of the Canada-Spain Extradition 
Treaty 1989 provides: 
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 the requested state agrees upon request, to the extent permitted by 
its law, to gather evidence within its own territory for the requesting 
state relating to the offence for which extradition is requested.220 
Since many of the crimes proscribed by the international conventions on 
terrorism and organised crime lead to the generation of proceeds, the 
availability of such proceeds in trial proceedings is necessary to establish a link 
between the crime and the offender.221 The above provisions oblige the 
requested state not only to provide assistance to the requesting state as regards 
the identification and tracing of proceeds, but also to deliver such proceeds to 
the requesting state along with the fugitive.  
Although the two provisions are widely applied in extradition treaties, they do 
not find expression in the international conventions on terrorism and organised 
crime. One reason for this could be that the conventions establish separate 
provisions on mutual legal assistance and surrender of property is regarded a 
matter of legal assistance rather than extradition. However, since extradition 
treaties are much greater in number as compared to mutual assistance 
treaties,222  such provisions should be included in international conventions, so 
that if the requesting and requested states do not have a mutual assistance 
treaty, the conduct of trial will not suffer. Because extradition is to be granted 
subject to the procedural requirements of the requested state’s law, if the law 
of the requested state includes no enabling provision, it will be in no position to 
offer such assistance.  
In view of the above, it is clear that the imposition of a mandatory obligation to 
implement aut dedere aut judicare is not sufficient to facilitate the application 
of the mechanism. To achieve this objective, there must be regulation of trial in 
lieu of extradition with a view to make it a viable option and simplification of 
extradition in the specific context of transnational crimes. For this purpose, the 
above bilateral treaties, domestic laws and practices provide excellent 
                                         
220 See article XX of Canada-Spain Extradition Treaty 1989; See also article XVIII of the US-Italy 
Extradition Treaty 1983 
221 Jimmy Gurule, ‘The 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances-A Ten Years Perspective: Is International Cooperation Merely 
Illusory?’ 22 Fordham International law Journal (1998-1999) 74 at 77; See also Technical Guide 
for implementing the UNCAC 2003 (n 151) at 92  
222 Bassiouni, Multilateral and Bilateral Enforcement (n 103) 14 
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examples. It is suggested that corresponding provisions should be imported in 
the international conventions on terrorism and organised crime to enable the 
parties to apply rather than to merely include the maxim in national laws. 
Conclusions 
The international conventions on terrorism and organised crime aim to facilitate 
state cooperation in bringing to justice the offenders involved in borderless 
crimes. For this purpose, they establish the mandatory obligation to implement 
the mechanism of aut dedere aut judicare. The obligation is designed to bring 
harmony to national laws with a view to facilitating the application of the 
mechanism. 
Pursuant to this obligation, the parties are required to implement domestically 
the alternative enforcement measures of extradition or prosecution, so that the 
offenders involved in these crimes may not find refuge on the territory of any 
state party. However, the application of both enforcement measures depends 
upon the requesting state fulfilling the domestic law conditions of the requested 
state. For there to be an obligation, harmony is needed as regards the domestic 
law conditions governing extradition and trial. If the laws of the two states 
differ substantially in regard to these conditions, the realisation of the 
obligation becomes doubtful. This could result in the offender avoiding 
punishment for his crime altogether. Consequently, it can be argued that the 
obligation in its present form, while bringing harmony to the extent of requiring 
the inclusion of the maxim in national laws, is insufficient to facilitate its 
application. To do so, it is essential that the international conventions on 
terrorism and organised crime must regulate and simplify the domestic law 
conditions of extradition and trial. 
The conditions of law enforcement cooperation, including those of extradition 
and of prosecution in lieu thereof, have been discussed in Chapters 1 2 and 3, 
this chapter has focused on procedure of applying these measures. Although the 
international conventions on terrorism and organised crime have made some 
inroads with respect to regulating the procedure of extradition, these inroads 
have been insufficient to facilitate the application of aut dedere aut judicare as 
whole, particularly, in the specific context of transnational crimes. 
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Furthermore, the conventions include more than one versions of aut dedere aut 
judicare. Since the parties are allowed to implement any of these, the 
application of the mechanism might become problematic whenever it involves 
states following different formulas.   
As opposed to the international conventions on terrorism and organised crime, 
some bilateral treaties and domestic laws on extradition focus on simplifying the 
procedure of extradition and trial in the specific context of transnational crimes. 
In the first place, they require the parties to make trial in lieu of extradition 
more credible by implementing options such as allowing observers to witness the 
trial and to consider holding trial in a third state. Secondly, they recommend 
that parties adopt the rule of reasonableness in order to deal with the problem 
of competing jurisdictions peculiar to transnational crimes. Thirdly, they enjoin 
the parties to create new powers to respond to the requests of extradition 
involving multi-jurisdictional and financial crimes.  
This technique appears to be far more useful in facilitating the application of 
aut dedere aut judicare, than merely requiring the parties to include the maxim 
in their national law. It therefore merits being tested in the international 
conventions on terrorism and organised crime with a view to giving it a global 
effect. 
In sum, it is suggested that the aim of bringing to justice transnational offenders 
cannot be realised effectively just by establishing the international obligation to 
implement aut dedere aut judicare. Doing so requires the regulation and 
simplification of the domestic law procedure relating to extradition and trial.  
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Chapter 6:  Facilitation of law enforcement 
cooperation by imposing duty to confiscate, 
identify and freeze the proceeds or 
instrumentalities of crime 
Introduction 
The UN-sponsored international conventions on terrorism and organised crime 
deal with a kind of criminality which spreads across national frontiers. Since it is 
not possible for any one state to single-handedly prevent and punish these 
crimes, their suppression demands state cooperation in law enforcement.  
Confiscation of the proceeds and instrumentalities of crime represents an 
important tool of law enforcement to combat sophisticated transnational 
criminality. Accordingly, the international conventions proscribing these crimes 
establish mandatory obligation for the parties to implement the mechanism of 
confiscation upon foreign request. The obligation is designed to bring harmony 
to national legal systems in order to ensure that the domestic laws of states 
parties will accommodate foreign requests for confiscation. This chapter is 
concerned with analysing the nature of the obligation and the question of the 
extent to which it contributes to facilitation of state cooperation in confiscation.   
It will be explained that the obligation besides having been left vague is required 
to be implemented to the extent permissible under national laws. Hence, its 
translation into national laws is likely to be inconsistent. The reason is that the 
international counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions are universal in 
scope, and states parties to them represent diverse legal systems. When they 
implement these rules subject to national legal principles, the resultant 
domestic legislation inevitably reflects this diversity. The ensuing dissimilarity in 
national procedures leads to denial of a foreign request of confiscation. Thus, 
the obligation, in its present form, may only bring harmony to the extent of 
including confiscation in national laws as a law enforcement tool, which is 
insufficient to facilitate its application upon foreign request. To facilitate the 
application of confiscation, as a device of inter-state cooperation, it is 
important that the conventions bring harmony in national procedures of 
confiscation. 
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The dissimilar national procedures have time and again led to a foreign request 
not having been accepted or its acceptance having been declared unlawful by 
the courts of the requested state. For example, in Noriega case, when the US 
government, pursuant to a request made by the Columbian government, froze 
the assets of the General Noriega in spite of his difficulties in paying his 
attorney’s fee, the Court regarded it a violation of the sixth amendment to the 
US constitution which protects the right to be defended by the attorney of one’s 
own choice. Consequently, the assets had to be unfrozen.  
The imprecise nature of the obligation and the allowance for implementing it 
subject to national legal principles leave enough gaps in the national procedures 
to make possible the refusal of state cooperation in confiscation, based upon the 
non-existence of enabling provisions in the laws of the requested state or the 
request being inconsistent with its national law. This calls into question the 
effectiveness of the reliance on mandatory obligations to facilitate the 
application of confiscation pursuant to foreign request.  
As an alternative, the makers of the international conventions may wish to 
consider simplifying the procedure of confiscation upon foreign request, by 
including elaborate provisions, giving extra tools to states to offer inter-state 
assistance when their existing procedures prove insufficient. Although states 
have been reluctant to accept absolute and overriding international obligation, 
they are less likely to oppose detailed provisions on the procedure of 
confiscation which are only meant to serve as models for domestic legislation. 
Interestingly, this approach has already been adopted in some bilateral/ regional 
treaties and domestic laws on mutual legal assistance and merits being 
experimented with at international level.  
The chapter has been divided into three sections. Section 1 gives an introduction 
to confiscation and its significance for bringing to justice transnational 
offenders. Section 2 analyses the provisions of the international counter-
terrorism terrorism and organised crime conventions concerning the 
empowerment of national law enforcement authorities and the execution of 
foreign requests of confiscation. Section 3 examines provisions of the 
conventions concerning mutual legal assistance. 
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Section 1: Introduction to confiscation and its 
significance for bringing to justice transnational 
offenders 
1.1)  Transnational criminality and the importance of 
confiscation for its suppression 
The enforcement modality of confiscation targets the financial aspect of the 
crime.1  Its evolution is based on the concept that offenders must be made to 
realise that ‘crime never pays’.2  Punishment in the form of imprisonment is ill-
suited to discouraging sophisticated serious crimes because even if imprisoned, 
the offender will be in a position to benefit from his unlawful wealth.3 
Accordingly, confiscation aims at the permanent deprivation of the property to 
keep the offenders from enjoying the fruits of their crime.4  Since the terms 
‘forfeiture’ and ‘confiscation’ have been used interchangeably in multilateral 
and bilateral treaties, the same approach has been adopted in this chapter.5 
As the crimes established by the international conventions on terrorism and 
organised crime essentially involve the element of border crossing, it frequently 
happens that the crime is committed in one state while its proceeds or 
instrumentalities are transferred to another to avoid their seizure by law 
enforcement authorities.6  For example, when drugs are imported into a 
country, huge financial profits are made by their importers. If an investigation is 
                                         
1 Bruce Zagaris and Elizabeth Kingma, ‘Asset Forfeiture International and Foreign Law : An 
Emerging Regime’ 5 Emory International Law Review (1990) 445 at 448 
2 UNODC’S Technical Guide for the implementation of the UN Convention against Corruption 2003 
at 92 <www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Technical_Guide_UNCAC.pdf > [Date accessed 
21/03/13] 
3 Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Effective National and International Action against Organised Crime and 
Terrorist Criminal Activities’ 4 Emory International Law Review (1990)  9 at 21; See also 
UNODC’S Legislative Guide for implementing the Organised Crime Convention 2000 at 136 
<http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/legislative_guides/Legislative%20guides_Full%20version.pdf>[
Date accessed 21/03/13] 
4 See article 1(f) the Drugs Convention 1988; See also Technical Guide to the UN Convention 
against Corruption (n 2) at  92 
5 See article 2(1) (b) of 2004 Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty among eight far-eastern states. See 
also article 1(f) the Drugs Convention 1988 
6 Jimmy Gurule, ‘The 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances-A Ten Years Perspective: Is International Cooperation Merely Illusory?’ 22 
Fordham International Law Journal (1998-1999) 74 at 77; See also M. Sornarajah, 
‘Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction’ 2 Singapore Journal of  International and Comparative Law 
(1998) 1 at 1,4 
245 
 
launched into the offence, the offenders come to know of it because the due 
process laws of many states allow public access to information concerning the 
investigation of crimes.7  To avoid the seizure of their illicit profits, the 
offenders might immediately transfer them abroad where they are inter-mingled 
with lawful wealth or converted into some other form of property.8  Once 
introduced into banking system or converted into new property, it becomes 
extremely difficult to trace their illicit origin.9 
 To ensure the seizure of funds which are transferred abroad, it is essential that 
states must cooperate with each other in identification, tracing, freezing and 
forfeiture of the proceeds of crime regardless of the place of the commission of 
crime which led to their generation. Accordingly, the international conventions 
regulating the acts of transnational terrorism and organised crime establish 
mandatory obligation for the parties to implement the mechanism of 
confiscation pursuant to foreign request.  
It is thus apparent that confiscation of the proceeds and instrumentalities of 
crime represents an important law enforcement measure to combat 
transnational crimes.10  The cross- border nature of these crimes necessitates 
state cooperation in law enforcement. This in turn demands confiscation of the 
proceeds upon foreign request. Since the object of the international conventions 
regulating these crimes is to facilitate state cooperation in law enforcement, 
they establish mandatory obligation for the parties to implement the mechanism 
of confiscation upon foreign request. 
The international community’s seriousness in putting to use confiscation to root 
out transnational criminality can be gauged from the fact that state cooperation 
in confiscation is not only required by the international conventions on terrorism 
and organised crime, but has also been focused in the Security Council’s binding 
resolutions on countering terrorism and in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
recommendations on money laundering. For example, resolution 1373 (2001) of 
the Security Council requires states to freeze without delay funds and other 
                                         
7 Gurule ibid 
8 Gurule ibid at 75 
9 Technical Guide to the UN Convention against Corruption (n 2) 92 
10 Zagaris ‘Asset Forfeiture’(n 1) 446 
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financial assets belonging to persons involved in terrorist acts.11  Similarly, 
Special recommendation III of FATF calls upon states to target financial wealth 
of the offenders by enabling their courts to exercise power of forfeiture.12  FATF 
is an inter-governmental body whose purpose is the development and promotion 
of policies both at national and international level to combat money laundering 
and terror financing. FATF is in existence since 1989 and its 40 + 9 
Recommendations provide the international standard for combating money 
laundering and terror financing.13 
1.2)   Introduction to the different steps in the process of 
state cooperation in confiscation 
Elaborate provisions on the process of confiscation upon foreign request can be 
found in four international conventions on terrorism and organised crime. These 
include the UN Convention against Narcotics Drugs 1988,14 the Terrorism 
Financing Convention 1999,15 the Organised Crime Convention 2000 16 and the UN 
Convention against Corruption 2003.17  In the other conventions under 
consideration herein, the obligation is implicit in their mutual legal assistance 
provisions.18 
According to the aforementioned four conventions, the obligation is comprised 
of five steps. Firstly, the parties are required to criminalise money laundering.19 
Secondly, they are required to control the movement of money across national 
                                         
11 See paragraph 1 (c) S/RES/1373 (2001); See also paragraph 4, S/RES/1267 (1999) 
12 See Special Recommendation III of FATF  
<www.fatf- gafi.org/document/44/0,3746,en_32250379_43751788_1_1_1_1,00.htm> [Date 
accessed 21/03/13] 
13 See FATF 40 + 9 Recommendations  
<www.fatf- gafi.org/document/44/0,3746,en_32250379_43751788_1_1_1_1,00.htm> [Date 
accessed 21/03/13] 
14 See article 5 the Drugs Convention 1988 
15 See article 8 the UN Convention against Financing of Terrorism 1999 
16 See article 12-13 Organised Crime Convention 2000 
17 See article 31 & 55 UN Convention against Corruption 2003 
18 See for instance article 11 the Montreal Convention 1971, article 11 the Hostages Convention 
1979 and article 12 the Rome Convention 1988. For Corresponding provisions of other 
Conventions, see (n 10) Chapter 4 above  
19 See article 3 the Drugs Convention 1988, article 6 the Organised Crime Convention 2000 and 
article 23 the UN Convention against Corruption 2003 
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borders.20  Thirdly, they are obliged to empower their law enforcement 
authorities to identify, seize, trace, freeze and forfeit the proceeds, property 
and instrumentalities of crimes.21  Fourthly, the parties are required to carry out 
these measures upon the request of another state having jurisdiction over the 
crime.22  Lastly, extensive provisions are laid down on mutual legal assistance 
requiring the parties to apply them as the legal basis for providing assistance to 
each other.23 
The first step regarding criminalisation of money laundering has been discussed 
at length in chapter 3 above.24  The second step relating to the control of money 
movement is outside the scope of this thesis because it relates to the financial 
and administrative aspects of money laundering, whereas, this thesis is 
concerned with its criminal aspects only. A number of scholars make a clear 
distinction between the two.25  According to them, the incompatibility between 
the administrative and penal aspects of money laundering and the necessity of 
blending them together represents one of the greatest hurdles in the 
establishment of an effective control regime.26 
 I shall now consider the remaining three steps, the way they have been 
expressed in the international counter-terrorism and organised crime 
conventions and how far the obligations imposed in relation to them advance the 
cause of facilitating state cooperation in law enforcement. 
 
                                         
20 See article 52 & 58 the UN Convention against Corruption 2003, article 7 the Organised Crime 
Convention 2000 and article 18(b) the Terrorism Financing Convention 1999 
21 See article 5 the Drugs Convention 1988, article 8 the Terrorism Financing Convention 1999, 
article 12 the Organised Crime Convention 2000 and article 31 the UN Convention against 
Corruption 2003 
22 See article 5 the Drugs Convention 1988, article 8 the Terrorism Financing Convention 1999, 
article 13 the Organised Crime Convention 2000 and article 55 the  UN Convention against 
Corruption 2003 
23 See article 46 UN Convention against Corruption 2003, article 18 the Organised Crime 
Convention 2000, article 7 the Drugs Convention 1988 and article 12 the Terrorism Financing 
Convention 1999  
24 See text to (n 143-147 and 159-168) Chapter 3 above 
25 See for instance Zagaris ‘Asset Forfeiture’ (n 1); See also Cherif Bassiouni, International 
Criminal Law Vol II: Multilateral and Bilateral Enforcement Mechanisms (3rdedn. Martnus Nijhoff-
2008) 17 
26 ibid 
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Section 2:  Analysis of provisions of the 
conventions concerning empowerment of national 
law enforcement authorities and execution of 
foreign requests of confiscation 
2.1)  Empowerment of national law enforcement 
authorities to identify, trace, freeze and confiscate the 
proceeds of crime 
As a preliminary measure, the process of state cooperation in confiscation 
demands the empowerment of national law enforcement authorities to identify, 
trace, freeze and confiscate the proceeds and instrumentalities of crime. Giving 
these powers to national authorities is essential to responding to foreign 
requests of confiscation.27  The UN Convention against Drugs 1988 represents the 
forerunner of the conventions establishing the provisions relating to 
confiscation.28  Article 5(1) of the Convention requires the parties to enable 
their judicial and executive authorities to order the confiscation of the proceeds 
derived from drug trafficking, as well as the property and instrumentalities used 
or intended to be used in the commission of the crime.29  Article 5(2) requires 
the parties to authorise their law enforcement authorities to identify, trace, 
freeze and seize the proceeds, property or instrumentalities of crime.30 
The above provisions have been reproduced in the Terrorism Financing 
Convention 1999, the Organised Crime Convention 2000 and the UN Convention 
against Corruption 2003.31 
2.1.1)  Meanings of the terms used in the provisions 
The term ‘proceeds of crime’ refers to the property derived by the commission 
of crime whereas ‘instrumentalities’ mean the property used in the commission 
                                         
27 See also Legislative Guide to the Organised Crime Convention (n 3) at 137  
28 Zagaris ‘ Asset Forfeiture’ (n 1) 456 
29 See article 5(1) the Drugs Convention 1988  
30 See article 5(2) the Drugs Convention 1988 
31See article 8 the Terrorism Financing Convention 1999, article 12 the Organised Crime 
Convention 2000 and article 31 UN Convention against Corruption 2003 
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of crime.32  The expression ‘identification and tracing’ entails securing evidence 
as to the status, location or value of the forfeitable property.33  ‘Freezing and 
seizing’ implies temporarily prohibiting the transfer of the property and 
temporarily assuming its custody or control under the order of the competent 
authority. The word ‘confiscation’ denotes permanent deprivation of the 
property by the order of the court or competent authority.34 
In view of this, it is clear that provisions require the creation of legal powers for 
national law enforcement authorities to secure evidence of forfeitable property, 
to immobilise it temporarily and to take it permanently from the offender.    
2.1.2)  Provisions to be implemented to the extent permissible 
under national law 
The international conventions on terrorism and organised crime require the 
parties to create these powers to the extent permissible under national laws. 
For example, article 31 (1) of the UN Convention against Corruption 2003 
provides: 
 [e]ach party shall take, to the extent possible within its domestic 
legal systems, such measures as may be necessary to enable 
confiscation of: (a) Proceeds of crime derived from offences 
established in accordance with this Convention or property the value 
of which corresponds to that of such proceeds; (b) Property, 
equipment or other instrumentalities used in or destined for use in 
offences established in accordance with this Convention.35 
Similar provisions can be found in the Organised Crime Convention 2000 and 
Terrorism Financing Convention 1999.36  Although the Drugs Convention 1988 
carries no such qualification, its unqualified wording is counter-balanced by a 
separate paragraph of the same article which provides: 
                                         
32 See article 1 the Drugs Convention 1988 and article 1 (a) & (c) Convention on Laundering, 
Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime. Strasbourg, 8.XI.1990 [hereinafter 
the European Laundering Convention 1990] 
33 See article 8 the European Laundering Convention 1990 
34 See article 1(f) the Drugs Convention 1988 
35 See article 31(1) the UN Convention against Corruption 2003 
36 See article 12 the Organised Crime Convention 2000 and article 8 Terrorism Financing 
Convention 1999 
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 Nothing contained in this article shall affect the principle that the 
measures to which it refers shall be defined and implemented in 
accordance with and subject to the provisions of the domestic law of 
a party.37 
In the light of above, it is evident that the obligation to empower national law 
enforcement authorities is required to be discharged in accordance with, and to 
the extent permissible, under national laws.  Accordingly, its domestic 
implementation is likely to be inconsistent pursuant to the diverse national legal 
principles of states parties. In the words of Zagaris, ‘[b]ecause of the rapid rise 
of new asset forfeiture laws, approaches to the legislation differ and pose 
difficulties for cooperation in some cases. Much of the problem is caused by 
divergences among legal systems...’38  This contradicts the common objective of 
the conventions to facilitate law enforcement cooperation through 
harmonisation of national legal systems. The allowance for implementing the 
obligation subject to national legal principles is likely to leave enough gaps in 
national laws as to allow refusal of cooperation based upon non-existence of 
enabling provisions under the law of the requested state. 
2.1.3)  Inconsistent domestic implementation and its implications 
Some states subscribe to a civil forfeiture system according to which the 
conviction of an offender is not a pre-condition for confiscation of the property; 
it is sufficient if the property represents proceeds or instrumentalities of 
crime.39  For example, Indian counter-terrorism law, the Unlawful Activities 
(Prevention) Act 1967 provides: 
(2) Proceeds of terrorism, whether held by a terrorist or [terrorist 
organisation or terrorist gang or] by any other person and whether or 
not such terrorist or other person is prosecuted or convicted for any 
offence under Chapter IV or Chapter VI, shall be liable to be forfeited 
to the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may 
be, in the manner provided under this Chapter.40 
                                         
37 See article 5(9) the Drugs Convention 1988 
38 Zagaris ‘Asset Forfeiture’ (n 1) 447 
39 Ibid at 448 
40 See Sc. 24 (2) of  The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967 of India 
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Similarly, US law enforcement authorities are empowered under various national 
statutes to confiscate criminally tainted property whether or not an offender has 
been previously convicted in relation to its accumulation.41  Conversely, the 
majority of states follow a criminal forfeiture system, according to which, 
forfeiture is applied as a punishment for the commission of crime. For instance, 
the laws of Pakistan apply forfeiture as a penalty and empower courts to impose 
it in addition to deprivation of liberty, upon conviction of the offender.42  
Hence, Pakistani law enforcement authorities lack statutory powers to 
confiscate property in the absence of a previous conviction.  A number of states, 
such as India apply civil forfeiture to a restricted category of offences such as 
terrorism.43 
In view of these discrepancies, if a state like the US makes a request of 
forfeiture without conviction to a state which does not have civil forfeiture laws, 
the request is likely to be denied because the acceptance of such a request will 
violate the domestic law of the requested state.44  According to UNODC’s 
legislative guide to the Organised Crime Convention 2000: 
 [P]roblems may arise when a request from a country with one system 
is directed at a state using the other unless the domestic law of the 
requested state has been framed in sufficiently flexible manner.45 
This possibility puts a question mark on the efficacy of the technique adopted by 
the international conventions on terrorism and organised crime to facilitate 
state cooperation, i.e. harmonisation of national laws by imposing mandatory 
obligations.46  Since the obligations are required to be implemented in 
                                         
41 28 U.S.C 1782; 21 USC 881(1991); 19 U.S.C 1602 est. seq (1991);31 U.S.C 5316,5317 
42 See Sc. 4 Anti-Money Laundering Act 2010 of Pakistan; Sc. 19 of the Control of Narcotics 
Substances Act 1997 of Pakistan and Sc. 12 National Accountability Bureau Ordinance1997 of 
Pakistan. 
43 For example, Indian Money Laundering Law applies criminal forfeiture. Hence, it empowers the 
court to forfeit criminally tainted property when the offender has been charged for having 
committed a scheduled offence. However, its Anti-Terrorism Law applies civil forfeiture. It 
therefore empowers the court to confiscate proceeds of crime whether or not an accused has 
been charged or convicted for an offence. See Sc.5 & 8(6) Prevention of Money Laundering Act 
2002 of India and  section 24 of  The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act of India 1967 
44 According to Zagaris, a central difficulty in judicial assistance in asset forfeiture cases arises from 
civil /criminal dichotomy. See Zagaris ‘Asset Forfeiture’ (n 1) 448 
45 UNODC’S Legislative Guide to the Organised Crime Convention (n 3 ) 144   
46 The adoption of this technique has been confirmed by the UNODC’s Legislative Guide for the 
implementation of the Organised Crime Convention.  See ibid at 130    
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accordance with and to the extent permissible under national laws, state parties 
are entitled to adjust them to suit the needs of their domestic legal system. 
Consequently, discrepancies such as civil and criminal forfeiture systems are 
likely to remain intact despite the imposition of a mandatory obligation to give 
powers to national authorities to identify freeze and confiscate criminally- 
tainted property.  
2.1.3.1) Alternative option  
As an alternative, the international conventions on terrorism and organised 
crime may require a party to include provisions in its domestic law along the 
lines of those contained in the Criminal Code of Canada. This law focuses on 
reducing procedural hurdles to state cooperation in confiscation while preserving 
the fundamental principles of the national justice system.  
According to Canadian Criminal Code, forfeiture is applied as a penalty upon the 
conviction for an ‘enterprise crime’.47  However, if the court does not find that 
an ‘enterprise crime’ was committed in relation to the property but does find 
that the property was a yield of another crime, it ‘may’ forfeit the property.48  
An ‘enterprise crime’ is a crime where each member of an organised group could 
be held individually liable for crimes committed by group within the common 
plan or purpose.49  For example, if three people commit a bank robbery and one 
kills a person in the process, the law considers all guilty of murder. This could be 
considered domestic law equivalent of the crime defined by article 5 of the 
Organised Crime Convention 2000.50 
Clearly, the above law does not require the abandonment of the criminal 
forfeiture system; it rather applies civil forfeiture as an option only. In other 
words, it does away with the rule that forfeiture may only occur after 
conviction. Where a property used in or derived from any crime has been 
recovered but no individual is convicted for an ‘enterprise crime’ involving the 
                                         
47 See Criminal Code of Canada  R.S.C,1985,C.C-46 Sc. 426-37 
48 ibid 
49 See Gunel Guliyeva, ‘The Concept of Joint Criminal Enterprise and the ICC Jurisdiction'  
<http://www.americanstudents.us/Pages%20from%20Guliyeva.pdf>  [date accessed 21/03/13] 
50 See (n 141-142) Chapter 3 above 
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use or accumulation of such property, the court ‘may’ order its forfeiture. The 
existence of such a mechanism would enable a state following criminal 
forfeiture system to act upon a civil forfeiture request, while maintaining the 
individuality of its national legal system. Evidently, the approach taken in the 
Criminal Code of Canada provides a better mechanism to facilitate state 
cooperation as compared to the one adopted by the international conventions on 
terrorism and organised crime.  
Interestingly, the inclusion of such provisions in national laws has been 
advocated by the UNODC’s legislative guide to the implementation of Organised 
Crime Convention 2000. According to it, the drafters need to constantly review 
national laws to ensure that any current procedures which are more expeditious 
or extensive than those required by the Convention are not adversely affected.51 
2.2)  Execution of foreign requests 
The next step in the process of state cooperation in confiscation relates to the 
execution of foreign requests. It represents a multi-task procedure. According to 
it, the parties are first required to confiscate the criminally-tainted property 
upon the request of a foreign state. Secondly, they are obliged to assist foreign 
states in the identification, tracing, seizure and freezing of the proceeds or 
instrumentalities of crime. Thirdly, they are required to provide inter-state 
assistance in the confiscation of converted, transferred or inter-mingled 
proceeds and the income derived there from. Finally, they are called upon to 
protect the rights of bona fide third parties.52  I shall now consider each of these 
requirements in detail, including their subordination to national law, 
complications arising as a result of their inconsistent implementation and 
suggestions to overcome difficulties. 
                                         
51 Legislative Guide to the Organised Crime Convention (n 3) 145    
52 See article 5 the Drugs Convention 1988, article 13 the Organised Crime Convention 2000 and 
article 55 the UN Convention against Corruption 2003 
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2.2.1)  Execution of a foreign confiscation order: either to execute 
or to submit for consideration 
Article 5(4)(a) of the 1988 Drugs Convention stipulates that when a request is 
made by a state having jurisdiction over a crime, the state in the territory of 
which proceeds, property or instrumentalities of crime are located shall either 
(i) submit the request to its competent national authorities for the purpose of 
obtaining an order of confiscation and, if such order is granted, give effect to it; 
or (ii) submit to its competent authorities, with a view to giving effect to it to 
the extent requested, an order of confiscation issued by the requesting party.53 
Similar provisions can be seen in the Organised Crime Convention 2000 and the 
UN Convention against Corruption 2003.54 
The provision requires that parties either execute a foreign request of 
confiscation or submit the same before competent authorities for consideration. 
The first option presupposes a judicial or administrative proceeding wherein the 
competent authorities of the requested state shall consider whether and to what 
extent the request shall be executed.55  According to the second option, the 
competent authorities may straight away execute the request without looking 
into the merits of the foreign confiscation order.  
The provision indicates that states parties were not willing to accept an 
unconditional obligation to execute a foreign forfeiture request. Thus, on the 
pattern of aut dedere aut judicare, they are given a choice either to carry out 
the request or to submit the same for appropriate orders of their national 
authorities.56  The wording ‘[i]f the order is granted, it shall be given effect to’, 
makes evident the discretionary nature of the obligation. 57  Apart from this, the 
subsequent paragraphs make it plain that confiscation is required to be enforced 
                                         
53 See article 5(4)(1) of the Drugs Convention 1988   
54 See article 13(1) the Organised Crime Convention 2000 and article 55(1) UN Convention against 
Corruption 2003 
55  Legislative Guide to the Organised Crime Convention 2000 (n 3) 145    
56 D.W Sproule and Paul ST-Denis, ‘The UN Drug Trafficking Convention: An Ambitious Step’ 27 
Canadian Yearbook of International Law (1989) 263 at 283 
57 David P. Stewart, ‘Internationalizing the War on Drugs’ 18 Denv. J. Int'l L. &Pol'y (1989-1990) 
387 at 395 
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in accordance with and to the extent permissible under the national laws of the 
requested state and bilateral treaties binding it.58 
2.2.1.1) Non-recognition of foreign criminal judgements as a hurdle to the 
execution of a foreign confiscation order 
States tend to follow contrasting approaches with respect to recognition of 
foreign criminal judgements. While a few countries are able to enforce them, 
most are not.59  Since a majority of states view forfeiture as a criminal 
judgement,60  its execution upon foreign request becomes problematic when the 
requested state gives no recognition to foreign criminal judgements. Thus, 
during the drafting of the Organised Crime Convention 2000, one delegate 
pointed out that the national law of his state did not allow the execution of 
foreign penal judgements.61  The following provisions of bilateral treaties bring 
to the fore divergent national approaches with respect to recognition of foreign 
criminal judgements. 
 Article 1(5) (b) of the 1995 Mutual Assistance Treaty between Australia and 
Indonesia provides that the execution of foreign criminal judgements is 
prohibited except to the extent permitted by the law of the requested state.62 
Similarly, article 2(1) (b) of 2004 Mutual Assistance Treaty among eight far-
eastern states provides that the treaty does not apply to the enforcement in the 
requested state of criminal judgements imposed in the requesting state except 
to the extent permitted by the law of the requested state.63  This may be 
compared with the 2009 UK-Philippines Mutual Assistance Treaty which imposes 
no such restriction on the execution of foreign criminal judgements.64 
                                         
58 See article 5(4)(c) and 5(9) of the Drugs Convention 1988 
59 Stewart (n 57) 395 
60 Zagaris ‘Asset Forfeiture’ (n 1) 448 
61 See UN Doc. E / Conf.82 / C.1 / S.R at 5 
62 See article 1(5)(b) of the Australia- Indonesia Legal Mutual Assistance Treaty 1995 
63 See article 2(1)(b) of 2004 Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty among eight far-eastern states  
64 See article 1, Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters between the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Republic of the Philippines. Signed at 
London 18 September 2009 [hereinafter UK-Philippines Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty 2009] 
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2.2.1.2) Solution of the problem under the counter-terrorism and organised 
crime conventions 
The international conventions on terrorism and organised crime attempt to 
resolve this problem by giving a choice to the requested state to either execute 
the foreign request or to submit it before competent national authorities in 
order to obtain an order of confiscation.65  As per the latter option, the 
competent authorities are required to only consider the request in accordance 
with national law. The obligation thus leads to three consequences: execution of 
the request, simple refusal and refusal along with the undertaking that fresh 
proceedings will be held in the requested state. Assuming that the law of the 
requested state bars the enforcement of foreign criminal judgements, its 
competent authorities will have no choice but to refuse the execution.  In case 
the authorities decide to hold fresh proceedings, they will be faced with 
multiple difficulties of procuring evidence from the requesting state and 
deciding afresh the ancillary issues such as rights of third parties and the 
application of value and substitute confiscation.66  The settlement of all these 
issues is likely to be so time consuming as to make the requesting state lose its 
interest or to frustrate the purpose behind confiscation proceedings. So 
practically speaking, apart from the execution of foreign requests, no viable 
option exists and this option may only be exercised if the national law makes 
allowance for the same.  
In light of the above, it is difficult to see how international conventions on 
terrorism and organised crime, by giving choice to states to either execute the 
request or submit it before competent national authorities, may be said to have 
overcome the traditional hurdle of states giving no recognition to foreign 
criminal judgements.  
2.2.1.3) Solution under bilateral treaties on mutual legal assistance 
As a substitute, states might be encouraged to exempt forfeiture from the 
operation of the rule against recognition of foreign penal judgements. As noted 
by Bassiouni, forfeiture not only represents a punishment but also embodies an 
                                         
65 See text to (n 53) above 
66 For definition of value and substitute confiscation see text to (n 82) below. See also Zagaris 
‘Asset Forfeiture’ (n 1) 503 
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investigative proceeding.67  Hence, a sufficient legal basis exists to exempt it 
from the operation of the rule against enforcement of foreign penal judgements. 
Notably, the proposal has already been adopted in certain bilateral treaties on 
mutual legal assistance. For example, article 1(2) of the 1998 Mutual Assistance 
Treaty between the US and France provides ‘this treaty does not apply to: (b) 
the enforcement of criminal judgements except for forfeiture.’ 68  This 
arrangement has also been approved by the UN Model Treaty on Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters 1990.69  Hence, it merits consideration for 
inclusion in the international conventions on terrorism and organised crime. 
2.2.2)   Execution of a foreign freezing, tracing and seizure order 
Article 5(4)(b) of the Drugs Convention requires the parties to identify, trace, 
seize and freeze the proceeds and instrumentalities of crime for the purposes of 
their eventual confiscation, following a request by another state having 
jurisdiction over the crime.70  Corresponding provisions can be seen in the 
Organised Crime Convention 2000 and the UN Convention against Corruption 
2003.71 
The provision requires a party in the territory of which proceeds, property or 
instrumentalities of a crime are located to provide assistance to another state 
having jurisdiction over that crime in securing evidence as to status, location or 
value of such property and to place it under temporary restraint, pending the 
judgement of forfeiture. The purpose of temporary restraint is to prevent the 
                                         
67 Bassiouni ‘Multilateral and Bilateral Enforcement’ (n 25) 13 
68 See article 1(2)(b) of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty Between the United States of America and 
France, Signed at Paris December 10, 1998 [hereinafter US-France Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaty 1998] 
69 See article 1(3) (b) of UN Model Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters 1990 
G.A. Res. 117, 45th Sess., Annex, at 215-19, U.N. Doc. A/Res/117 (1990) [hereinafter the UN 
Model Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance 1990].The article provides that the present treaty 
does not apply to the enforcement in the requested state of criminal judgements rendered in the 
requesting state except to the extent permitted by the law of the requested state and article 18 
of the present treaty. Since article 18 relates to forfeiture, the treaty clearly exempts forfeiture 
from the rule against execution of foreign judgements in the requested state.   
70 See article 5(4)(b) the Drugs Convention 1988 
71 See article 13(2) the Organised Crime Convention 2000 and article 55(1) the UN Convention 
against Corruption 2003 
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offenders from transferring or removing the forfeitable property from the 
territory of the requested state.72 
Unlike the provision on confiscation, this provision does not give an option to the 
requested state to either carry out the request or to submit the same for 
appropriate orders of national authorities. It rather obliges the parties to take 
these measures upon foreign request. However, subsequent paragraphs indicate 
that the obligation is required to be performed in accordance with and to the 
extent permissible, under national laws and bilateral treaties.73 
2.3) Confiscation of intermingled, converted proceeds 
and protection of third party rights 
Article 5(6) of the Drugs Convention 1988 requires the parties to empower 
national law enforcement authorities to identify, freeze and confiscate the 
proceeds and instrumentalities which have been transformed or converted into 
other property, inter-mingled with lawful property and income or other benefits 
derived from such property.74  It further obliges the parties to carry out these 
measures upon the request of a foreign state. Identical provisions can be found 
in the Organised Crime Convention 2000 and UN Convention against Corruption 
2003.75 
In the same way, article 5(8) provides that the provisions of this article shall not 
be construed as prejudicing the rights of bona fide third parties.76 Corresponding 
provisions can be seen in the Organised Crime Convention 2000, the UN 
                                         
72 Gurule (n 6) 77 
73 See article 5(4)(c) of the Drugs Convention 1988; For comparable provisions; see  article 55(4) 
UN Convention against Corruption 2003 and article 13(4) Organised Crime Convention 2000; 
Also See article 5 (4)(d) the Drugs Convention 1988, article 7(6) and 7(12) of the Drugs 
Convention 1988; For corresponding provisions, see articles 46(6) and 46(12) of the UN 
Convention against Corruption 2003 and article 18(6) and 18(17) of the Organised Crime 
Convention 2000   
74 See article 5(6) of the Drugs Convention 1988 
75 See article 31 the UN Convention against Corruption 2003 and article 12 the Organised Crime 
Convention 2000 
76 See article 5(8) of the Drugs Convention 1988 
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Convention against Corruption 2003 and the Terrorism Financing Convention 
1999.77 
Whereas the two provisions themselves leave little room for discretion, they are 
however subject to the general requirements of article 5(4) (c) of the Drugs 
Convention 1988 which provides that the decisions and actions concerning 
confiscation, identification and freezing of proceeds or instrumentalities of 
crime shall be made in accordance with the domestic law of the requested state 
and bilateral or multilateral treaties to which it may be bound.78  Furthermore, 
article 5(4) (d) provides that a state, while taking these measures upon foreign 
request, shall be guided by the provisions of article 7 of the Drugs Convention 
1988, which relates to mutual legal assistance.  Article 7 suggests that the 
assistance is to be provided in accordance with, and subject to the provisions of, 
domestic law and bilateral treaties of the requested state.79 
These paragraphs make it obvious that article 5 as a whole is subordinate to 
national law and each of its requirements, including confiscation of converted or 
intermingled proceeds and protection of third party rights, is governed by this 
principle. 
2.3.1)  Meanings of intermingled and converted proceeds  
The international conventions on terrorism and organised crime oblige the 
parties to enable their law enforcement authorities to order the forfeiture of not 
only the proceeds of crime but also the property into which such proceeds have 
been transferred or converted as well as income derived from such property. 
Furthermore, the parties are required to carry out these measures upon the 
request of another state having jurisdiction over the crime.80  According to this 
requirement, when the property which is eligible for confiscation has been 
                                         
77 See article 8(5) the Terrorism Financing Convention 1999, article 31(9) the UN Convention 
against Corruption 2003 and article 12(8) the Organised Crime Convention 2000 
78 See article 5(4) (c) of the Drugs Convention 1988. See also article 55(4)UN Convention against 
Corruption 2003 and article 13(4) Organised Crime Convention 2000 
79 See article 7(6) and 7(12) of the Drugs Convention 1988; For corresponding provisions see 
articles 46(6) and 46(12) the UN Convention against Corruption 2003 and article 18(6) and 
18(17) the Organised Crime Convention 2000   
80 See article 5(6) of the Drugs Convention 1988, article 12(2)(3)(4)&(5) the Organised Crime 
Convention 2000 and article 31(4)(5)&(6) the UN Convention against Corruption 2003  
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transformed, converted or inter-mingled with other property, governments can 
seize the new property.81  The provision incorporates two modern theories of 
confiscation, namely value and substitute confiscation. Under the substitute 
confiscation theory, the property into which the proceeds have been transferred 
or converted can be confiscated. According to value confiscation, a sum of 
money equivalent to the value of proceeds can be confiscated.82 
2.3.1.1) Impact on national laws and bilateral treaties 
Since the obligation is required to be carried out in accordance with national 
law, its domestic implementation may vary. Whereas some states give power to 
their law enforcement authorities to confiscate the new property, others do not. 
For example, the UK’s Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 allows the court to 
order a person convicted of drug trafficking to pay to the court the value of the 
benefit he or another person has derived in connection with drug trafficking.83 
Similarly, a Canadian Court may fine the convicted party for the value of the 
property subject to forfeiture if the property cannot be located or has been 
transferred outside Canada, has diminished in value or has irretrievably inter-
mingled with other property.84  Likewise, the Australian Proceeds of Crimes Act 
1987 empowers the court to impose a penalty equivalent to the value of the 
benefit derived from the offence.85  All these provisions reflect the 
implementation of value confiscation theory.  
Conversely, the organised crime laws of both India and Pakistan make no 
allowance for either value or substitute confiscation.86  As a result, a request 
made by Canada, Australia or the UK to Pakistan or India to confiscate the 
                                         
81 Zagaris ‘Asset Forfeiture’ (n 1) 499 
82 ibid 
83 See Part I, Sc. 1(4) the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986, 1986 Chapter 32, 12 Halsbury’s 
Stats 933 (1989 re-issue) [hereinafter UK's Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986]   
84 Criminal Code of Canada R.S.C Ch C-46 S 462.37 (1985) 
85 Australian Proceeds of Crime Act 1987 Vol.I S.26, 2 Austl. Acts p. 1764 (1987) 
86 For instance, under the law of Pakistan, the punishment for money laundering is 10 years 
imprisonment and forfeiture of the property involved. Similarly, according to Indian Anti-
Terrorism law, the punishment for holding or possessing the proceeds of terrorism is forfeiture 
of such proceeds. Both these enactments are silent with respect to confiscation of the proceeds 
which have been transferred, converted into new property or inter-mingled with legitimate 
property. See Sc. 4 of Anti-Money Laundering Act 2010 of Pakistan; See also Sc. 24 of the 
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act of India 1967 
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property equivalent to the value of forfeitable property, is unlikely to succeed 
because the laws of the latter states contain no enabling provisions to carry out 
the request.87  However, the parties not implementing substitute or value 
confiscation may not be held responsible for breach of their convention 
obligation because the provisions are required to be implemented in accordance 
with, and to the extent permissible, under national laws. This calls into question 
the utility of the provisions in regard to harmonising national laws and thereby 
to facilitate state cooperation in confiscation.  
2.3.1.2)  Absence of any universal procedure of confiscating intermingled, 
substituted and converted proceeds 
Another area of concern is that the international conventions on terrorism and 
organised crime provide no guidance with respect to the procedure for 
employing value and substitute confiscation. In other words, the conventions are 
silent with respect to procedure to be adopted by states in forfeiting inter-
mingled, substituted and converted proceeds. If a procedure adopted by the 
requesting state when issuing the order of confiscation does not correspond to 
the law of requested state, the latter may be compelled to refuse execution of 
the order.88  For example, it has been asserted that confiscation of attorney’s 
fee violates the presumption of innocence as contained in the ECHR.89  If the 
ECHR applies in the requested state and if the defendant were to raise it as a 
defence against a foreign confiscation request, the execution of the request may 
have to be refused.90 
                                         
87 See section 5 and 8 of Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2002 of India; The two sections only 
relate to attachment and confiscation of the proceeds of crime not to their value or substitution.  
88 It can be so because Mutual Assistance Treaties (MLATs) generally require the provision of 
assistance on the basis of reciprocity which means the requesting state must be in a position to 
provide similar assistance if the circumstances are reversed. See article 3(1) (g) of 2004 Mutual 
Legal Assistance Treaty among eight far-eastern states. The article includes amongst the 
grounds of refusal of assistance the non-fulfilment of the principle of reciprocity ‘the requested 
state shall refuse assistance if … the requesting party fails to undertake that it will be able to 
comply with a future request of a similar nature by the requested party for assistance in a 
criminal matters.’  
89 Zagaris ‘Asset Forfeiture’ (n 1) 511 
90 See article 6(2) ECHR 1950 
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The Noriega case of 1990 highlights the problem.91  Here, the government of 
Panama filed a $6.5 billion law suit in the US against General Noriega, while 
simultaneously seeking in another case to restrain him from transferring his 
assets. The US government froze his assets, despite Noriega’s difficulties in 
obtaining money for legal fee. The US District Court held that the act of freezing 
his assets amounted to a denial of the right to be defended by the counsel of 
one’s choice. Since the right was protected under the Sixth Amendment to the 
US constitution, the Court had no choice but to order the unfreezing of the 
assets.92 
2.3.1.3)  Alternative option 
In contrast to the international conventions on terrorism and organised crime, 
some domestic laws provide specific and detailed rules with respect to 
procedure of forfeiting intermingled, converted and substituted proceeds. For 
example, under Australian law, the Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000, the 
property liable to confiscation has been classified into three distinct categories:  
1) unexplained wealth 2) - criminal benefits and 3)-crime used property.93  The 
Act defines unexplained wealth as any property that is constituent of a 
respondent’s wealth.94  The value of such property would be equal to difference 
between: (a) total value of respondent’s wealth and (b) the value of 
respondent’s lawfully acquired wealth.95  Similarly, the Act defines criminal 
benefits as property derived as a result of respondent’s involvement in the 
commission of confiscable offence.96  If such property is given away or is no 
longer available, its value would be the greater of: (a) its value at the time it 
was acquired and (b) its value at the time it was given away or used or 
                                         
91 See U.S v. Noriega 746 F. Supp. 1541 (1990) 
<http://www.leagle.com/decision/19902287746FSupp1541_12092> [date accessed 21/03/13] 
92 ibid; See also David Johnston, ‘With  Millions Frozen in Banks, Noriega Might Be Tried as a 
Pauper’ NY Times, Nov 14, 1990 at B6, C.13 < http://www.nytimes.com/1990/11/14/us/with-
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93 See Part 3, Divisions 1,2,3 of the Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000, the Act as at 9 
December 2005 [Australian Confiscation Act 2000] 
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94 See Sc. 12 Australian Confiscation Act 2000 
95 See Sc. 13 ibid 
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consumed.97  Likewise, the Act provides that the value of a property used in the 
commission of crime would be the amount equal to value of the property at the 
time the relevant confiscation offence was or is likely to have been committed.98  
The Act provides further that when making a freezing order the court may 
provide for meeting the reasonable living and business expenses of the owner of 
property.99 
Clearly, the above enactment not only lays down a logical formula to confiscate 
intermingled, converted and substituted proceeds, but also empowers the court 
to make allowance for necessary expenses such as attorney’s fee when making a 
freezing order. By following this approach, much needed clarity could be 
brought in the provisions of the international conventions relating to 
intermingled, converted and substituted proceeds. Furthermore, it provides 
better model for modernising national laws in line with the requirements of 
suppressing sophisticated financial crimes.    
2.3.2)  Meanings of third party protection 
The international conventions on terrorism and organised crime, while requiring 
the parties to provide interstate assistance in the confiscation of proceeds or 
instrumentalities of crime, stipulate that nothing in these conventions shall be 
construed to prejudice the rights of bona-fide third parties.100  The provision is 
meant to protect the rights of innocent third parties who have acquired property 
through legitimate purchase without notice of its illicit origin. However, it 
carries no guideline with respect to the extent or manner of protection to be 
afforded. As a result, the laws and treaties implementing the provision diverge. 
2.3.2.1)  Inconsistent implementation 
For example, the UK’s Criminal Justice (International Cooperation) Act 1990 
requires the court to give notice to third parties when the property is seized and 
                                         
97 See Sc. 19 ibid 
98 See Sc. 23 ibid 
99 See Sc. 45 ibid 
100 See article 5(8) the Drugs Convention 1988, article 12(8) the Organised Crime Convention 
2000, article 8 (5) Terrorism Financing Convention and article 31(9) the UN Convention against 
Corruption 2003  
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detained.101  Likewise the Criminal Justice Act 1988 requires that, prior to 
releasing property that is under confiscation order, anyone holding any interest 
in the property should be given a ‘reasonable opportunity’ of being heard.102 
Canada has a very specific protection mechanism for the rights of third parties. 
It provides that before issuing a restraining order a judge may require notice and 
hearing for any person who appears to have a valid interest in the property. To 
dispense with the requirement to provide notice, the Attorney General must 
provide an undertaking with respect to payment of damages for disappearance 
or reduction of the value of property in question. Once property has been 
seized, any interested person may apply for revocation of the seizure order. If it 
is established that the applicant is lawfully entitled and is not complicit in the 
crime, the judge may return the property to him.103  Similarly, the Anti-money 
Laundering Act 2010 of Pakistan provides not only the opportunity of being heard 
but also the right of appeal to third parties aggrieved by the order of 
attachment or forfeiture.104  In the same way, section 30 of the Unlawful 
Activities (Prevention) Act of India 1967 requires, where a claim is preferred 
that a property is not liable to seizure or attachment, the designated authority 
will investigate it unless the authority considers that the claim is designed to 
cause delay. Where the objector establishes his claim, the notice of attachment 
shall be cancelled.105 
Clearly, different levels of protection are afforded by states to third parties. At 
one extreme are states like the UK requiring that the objectors should merely be 
given notice or reasonable opportunity of being heard; at the other are states 
like Canada affording not only the right of hearing and appeal but also 
compensation in case notice of hearing is dispensed with.106  Needless to say, if 
                                         
101 Criminal Justice (International Cooperation) Act 1990 Part III S. 28 
102 Criminal Justice Act 1988, Part II, S 80, 12 Halsbury Stat 1154 (1989 re-issue) 
103 Criminal Code of Canada R. S.C Ch. C-46, S 462.32(5), 462.33(3) 1985     
104  See section 10 and 23 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act 2010 of Pakistan 
105 See also Sc. 8 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2002 of India   
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stipulates that the rights claimed by bona fide 3rd parties over the confiscated assets shall be 
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Mutual legal Assistance 1990 obliges the requested state to protect the rights of bona fide third 
parties at every stage of confiscation process including search and seizure and delivery of any 
material for evidentiary purposes.  
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the requested state provides greater protection as compared to the requesting 
state, this disparity might result in the delay or refusal of a confiscation request.  
This brings into question the rationale of the obligation under the international 
counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions to protect 3rd party rights. If 
the obligation is designed to harmonise national laws with a view to facilitating 
state cooperation in confiscation, it has clearly fallen short of the target by 
failing to prescribe minimum standards of protection.  As per the existing 
arrangement, each party is supposed to have its own standards. A foreign court, 
when making the confiscation order is bound to apply its own law, which may 
substantially differ from that of the requested state. The resulting discrepancies 
may compel the requested state to refuse the execution of the order.   
2.3.2.2) Expeditious determination of third party rights as an alternative to 
the existing provisions 
As a substitute, the makers of the international conventions on terrorism and 
organised crime may wish to consider including provisions which encourage the 
parties to determine third party rights ‘expeditiously’. This technique would not 
require the adoption of similar standards of protection. However, it would 
expedite the determination of third party rights and consequently facilitate the 
execution of foreign requests of confiscation. It would therefore present a more 
convincing technique of facilitating state cooperation in confiscation as 
compared to the existing open-ended obligation. The following proposals might 
be considered when framing such a provision: 
(a)- Taking into account the urgency of attachment and confiscation 
proceedings, states might be advised to fix a certain time period within which 
their courts must hear and determine the claims of third parties. For example, 
section 13 of National Accountability Ordinance of Pakistan 1999 fixes a time 
limit of 14 days for filing claims or objections against orders of freezing 
property.107  Similarly, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967 of India sets 
                                         
107 See Section 13 (a) National Accountability Bureau Ordinance 1999 of Pakistan 
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forth a time limit of one month for any aggrieved person to file an appeal 
against an order of confiscation.108 
(b)- States might be asked to recognise the decision of the court of the 
requesting state concerning the rights of third parties, subject to its fairness. 
This proposal is likely to save time by relieving the requested state of the 
burden of acquiring overseas evidence and deciding afresh technical issues such 
as the application of value and substitute confiscation. Thus, article 22 of the 
European Laundering Convention 1990 provides that a requested state is bound 
to give effect to the court order of the requesting state concerning the rights of 
third party unless the decision was taken without giving opportunity of being 
heard to third parties or it is contrary to the law of the requested state.109 
In the light of above, it is clear that the allowance for implementing the rules 
established by the international counter-terrorism and organised crime 
conventions subject to national legal principles leaves enough disharmonies in 
the national laws to make possible the refusal of state cooperation in 
confiscation based upon non-existence of enabling provisions under the law of 
the requested state or the request not being in conformity with its national law. 
These dissimilarities may for example relate to civil and criminal forfeiture 
systems, the non-recognition of foreign penal judgements, the protection of 
third party rights and the mechanism for and application of value or substitute 
confiscation. As noted by Shehu, one of the central criticisms against the 
international counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions is that most of 
their critical provisions are left to the discretion of states.110 
                                         
108 See Sc.28 the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967 of India 
109 See article 2 of the European Laundering Convention 1990. Paragraph 1 of the article provides, 
when dealing with a request for cooperation concerning asset freezing or forfeiture, the 
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If it was not possible for the makers of the conventions to establish unqualified 
obligations, they could have resorted to simplifying the procedure of 
confiscation by including elaborate provisions, to serve as models for domestic 
legislation. This appears to be a more convincing strategy to facilitate state 
cooperation because it offers guidance to states to modernise their laws in line 
with the requirements of sophisticated transnational crimes.  
Section 3:  Obligation to provide Mutual Legal 
Assistance under the international conventions on 
terrorism and organised crime 
3.1)  Explanation of mutual legal assistance 
The final step in the process of state cooperation in confiscation involves mutual 
legal assistance. Mutual legal assistance denotes a practice among states 
whereby they assist each other in the investigation, prosecution and 
adjudication of crimes which spread across national frontiers. The practice has 
been explained by Bassiouni in these words: 
 [T]he courts of one state address a request to those of another state 
for judicial assistance in the form of taking of the testimony of a 
witness or securing tangible evidence. The [requested] courts then 
transmit the oral or tangible evidence to the requesting court, 
certifying that the evidence has been secured in accordance with the 
legal requirements of the requested state.111 
 The importance of mutual legal assistance can hardly be exaggerated for the 
purposes of combating transnational crimes. As observed by Stewart,  
[the suppression of borderless criminality] … requires a means for the 
acquisition of evidence abroad in a form admissible in the court of the 
requesting state.112 
The confiscation of proceeds upon foreign request embraces two modalities of 
state cooperation: enforcement of foreign criminal judgements and inter-state 
assistance in the collection of evidence.113  The former refers to forfeiture or 
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permanent deprivation of property and the latter to identification, tracing, 
seizure and freezing of the property.114  Both measures are taken by utilising the 
legal device of mutual legal assistance.115 
Mutual legal assistance is usually provided on the basis of mutual assistance 
treaties (MLATs) and unilateral legislation.116  A typical mutual legal assistance 
treaty comprises a list of offences with respect to which the assistance might be 
provided, the respective rights and obligations of the requesting and requested 
states, the rights of the offender and the procedure of making and reviewing a 
request of mutual legal assistance.117  MLATs are generally divided into two 
parts, one dealing with the execution of foreign criminal judgements or 
forfeiture, and the other with the collection of evidence that is identification, 
tracing, freezing and seizure of criminally tainted property.   
3.2)  Mutual legal assistance provisions of the 
international conventions on terrorism and organised 
crime 
The international conventions on terrorism and organised crime, in particular 
those concluded recently, lay down extensive provisions on mutual legal 
assistance.118  These provisions are meant to supplement their provisions relating 
to the execution of foreign requests. Thus, article 13(3) of the Organised Crime 
Convention 2000 provides, ‘[t]he provisions of article 18 of this Convention are 
applicable, mutatis mutandis, to this article.’119  Article 13 deals with the 
execution of foreign requests, while article 18 concerns mutual legal 
assistance.120  This implies that a state, while executing a foreign request of 
confiscation, identification and freezing of the proceeds of crime under article 
13, shall be guided by the provisions of article 18 concerning mutual legal 
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assistance. Corresponding provisions can be seen in the UN Convention against 
Drugs 1988 as well as the UN Convention against Corruption 2003.121 
By virtue of article 18 of the Organised Crime Convention 2000, state parties are 
obliged to provide each other with the widest measure of mutual legal 
assistance in matters concerning investigation, prosecution and judicial 
proceedings relating to the offences set forth by the Convention.122  The 
assistance might be provided on the basis of bilateral and regional treaties or 
unilateral legislation.123  In case the cooperating states do not have a bilateral 
treaty between them and the domestic law of the requested state makes the 
provision of assistance conditional upon the existence of such a treaty, parties 
are obliged to consider the Organised Crime Convention 2000 as a legal basis of 
assistance.124 
Article 18 of the Organsied Crime Convention 2000 further points out the type of 
assistance which might be offered by one state to another. It inter alia includes 
the identification, seizure, freezing and tracing of the proceeds, property and 
instrumentalities of crime, pursuant to a foreign request.125  Apart from this, the 
article requires the parties to enable their competent national authorities to call 
for and seize the records of financial institutions operating within their 
jurisdiction, following the request of another state.126  The contracting parties 
are also obliged to make sure that their bank secrecy laws and laws relating to 
fiscal crimes are not used as an excuse to refuse the production of such 
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records.127  Additionally, the parties are called upon to consider concluding 
agreements concerning sharing and disposal of the proceeds of crime,128  and 
providing voluntary information about money laundering activities.129  Finally, 
article 18 of the Organised Crime Convention 2000 lays down the grounds on 
which the mutual legal assistance could be denied.130  
3.2.1)  Subordination to national law and bilateral treaties 
Provisions of the international counter-terrorism and organised crime 
conventions concerning mutual legal assistance are as much subordinate to 
national law as their provisions on money laundering, confiscation and execution 
of foreign requests although, apparently, they have been expressed in 
mandatory language.  
For example, while article 7(1) of the Drugs Convention 1988 provides that state 
parties ‘shall’ afford to one another the widest measures of mutual legal 
assistance,131  later paragraphs indicate that the assistance is to be provided in 
accordance with national law and bilateral treaties. Thus, article 7(6) provides 
that the convention shall not affect any bilateral or multilateral treaty which 
governs mutual legal assistance between the requesting and requested state.132  
Similarly, article 7(12) provides that the request shall be executed in accordance 
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with and to the extent permissible under the domestic law of the requested 
state.133 
I shall now analyse the impact of mutual legal assistance provisions of the 
counter-terrorism and organised conventions on national law and bilateral 
treaties. For this purpose, only those mutual legal assistance provisions which 
directly relate to state cooperation in the confiscation of the proceeds of crime 
will be discussed.   
3.2.2)  Mutual Legal assistance provisions concerning 
identification, tracing, seizure and freezing 
3.2.2.1)  Mandatory obligation to provide legal assistance in identification 
and freezing 
The international organised crime conventions establish mandatory obligations 
for the parties to assist each other in the identification, tracing, search and 
seizure of the proceeds and instrumentalities of crime.134  These measures are 
required to be taken in accordance with and to the extent permissible under the 
national law of the requested state and bilateral and regional treaties to which 
it is bound.135  The language of the provisions is unclear with respect to 
meanings of the terms ‘identification’, ‘tracing’, ‘search’ and ‘seizure’. 
Furthermore, the provisions leave it entirely up to states to determine the 
procedure of taking these measures. 
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3.2.2.2)  Inconsistent implementations of the obligation  
Due to discretionary and ambiguous nature of the obligation, multiple 
approaches are being followed by states to implement it in national laws and 
bilateral treaties. For example, the US-France Mutual Assistance Treaty 1998 
sets forth the obligation in these words: 
 [a]t the request of requesting state, the requested state based on 
facts that would constitute an offence under the laws of both states, 
and to the extent permitted by its law, may take protective measures 
to immobilize temporarily such proceeds or instrumentalities to 
ensure their availability for forfeiture.136 
As we can see, the obligation to seize or freeze property upon the request of a 
contracting party is subject to the double criminality condition. 
By contrast, 2004 Mutual Assistance Treaty among eight far-eastern states does 
not require the fulfilment of double criminality. Instead, it demands that the 
requesting state must provide all the information which the requested party 
considers necessary for giving effect to a foreign request of forfeiture.137 
These may be compared with the 2009 Mutual Assistance Treaty between the UK 
and Philippines which simply provides that the request shall be carried out in 
accordance with domestic law of the requested state. Article 17(1) reads: 
 [t]he contracting states shall assist each other in proceedings 
involving identification, tracing, restraint, seizure and confiscation of 
the proceeds and instrumentalities of crime in accordance with 
domestic law of the Requested state.138 
So, three different approaches have been adopted to implement the obligation 
concerning the execution of foreign requests of identification, tracing, search 
and seizure of the proceeds and instrumentalities of crime. The first approach 
requires fulfilment of double criminality condition, the second demands 
provision of information concerning the crime and the third only requires that 
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the assistance be provided in accordance with domestic law of the requested 
state. 
This variation in bilateral treaties casts doubt on the utility of mutual legal 
assistance provisions of the international organised crime conventions. If each 
bilateral or regional treaty has separate rules, it will reinforce bilateral rather 
than international approaches to state cooperation. However, the bilateral or 
regional treaties cannot be blamed for deviating from the international 
conventions because the latter leave it entirely up to states to determine the 
procedure of providing inter-state assistance.  
 3.2.2.3) Elaboration of procedure as an alternative 
In contrast to the international conventions, some bilateral and regional treaties 
adopt the technique of laying down comprehensive procedure of providing legal 
assistance in identification, tracing and freezing of the proceeds of crime. For 
example, the European Laundering Convention 1990 divides the process of 
mutual legal assistance into two parts. The first part relates to investigation 
which embraces the measures of identification and tracing. It requires the 
parties to assist each other in securing evidence as to location, movement, 
nature, legal status or value of the property liable to confiscation.139  The 
second part concerns provisional measures. It obliges the parties to assist each 
other in freezing and seizing of the property by imposing prohibition against 
dealing in, transfer or disposal of property which at a later stage may be the 
subject of a request for confiscation.140  It further stipulates that the requested 
party shall, wherever possible, give the requesting party an opportunity to 
present its reasons in favour of continuing the measure, before lifting any 
provisional measures.141 
The procedure of identification and tracing has been elaborated further by the 
UN Model Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance 1990. According to it: 
                                         
139 See article 8 European Laundering Convention 1990 
140 See article 11 European Laundering Convention 1990 
141 See article 12(2) the European Laundering Convention 1990 
274 
 
 The requested state shall upon request endeavour to ascertain 
whether any proceeds of crime are located within its jurisdiction and 
shall notify to the requesting state of the result of its inquiries. In 
making the request the requesting state shall notify to the requested 
state of the basis of its belief that such proceeds may be located 
within its jurisdiction.142 
Clearly, the aforementioned bilateral and regional treaties not only define the 
terms ‘identification’, ‘tracing’, ‘freezing’ and ‘seizure’ but also lay down 
extensive rules for applying them in practice. Accordingly, it can be suggested 
that these treaties establish specific rules whereas the organised crime 
conventions lay down general obligations only.143 Since mandatory obligations 
under the international conventions are as deferential to national laws as the 
above referred provisions of bilateral and regional treaties, the latter at least 
provide better models for framing effective national laws, which amounts to 
creating enabling powers to offer more comprehensive assistance in suppression 
of transnational crimes.    
3.2.3) Voluntary or spontaneous information 
Mutual assistance provisions of the international counter-terrorism and organised 
crime conventions stipulate that the contracting parties may, subject to their 
national law, provide information to each other, without prior request, if the 
information is likely to facilitate criminal proceedings or trigger a request for 
freezing or confiscation under these conventions.144  This is an important 
provision because it enables one party voluntarily to bring to the notice of 
another the existence of property that is liable to confiscation under latter’s 
domestic law.  
 The provision has been criticised for its discretionary nature. As noted by 
Gurule, the use of the discretionary ‘may’ instead of obligatory ‘shall’ has 
turned the provision into a recommendation or suggestion rather than a specific 
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duty. Therefore, it is not likely to have the desired harmonising impact on 
national legal systems.145 
3.2.3.1) Impact on bilateral and regional treaties 
The 1995 Mutual Assistance Treaty between Australia and Indonesia contains no 
provision with respect to the transmission of voluntary or spontaneous 
information. Under this treaty, the information could only be provided pursuant 
to a request made by one of the contracting parties.146  This may be compared 
with the European Laundering Convention 1990, which stipulates that a party 
may, without prior request, forward to another party the information on 
instrumentalities and proceeds when it considers that the disclosure of such 
information might assist the receiving party in the investigation or prosecution 
or lead to initiation of a request by the receiving party for provision of legal 
assistance.147 
The inconsistent national approaches towards the inclusion of voluntary 
information clauses in bilateral and regional treaties runs counter to the 
objective of facilitating state cooperation in law enforcement through 
harmonisation of national legal systems. Seemingly, states not having the 
enabling clauses are not in a position to transmit spontaneous information. 
However, such states cannot be held accountable for violating their convention 
obligation because the relevant clauses of the conventions are only 
recommendatory. 
While the decision as to whether a provision is recommendatory or obligatory 
will depend upon states parties, it is nonetheless possible for the drafters of the 
conventions to make such a provision more precise, with a view to providing a 
better model for domestic legislation. In this regard, the 2009 UK- Philippines 
Mutual Assistance Treaty provides a useful example. This treaty makes it plain 
that the information may not only be provided with respect to proceeds found in 
the informing state, but also those found in the receiving state.  Such 
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information either results in the receiving state initiating proceedings within its 
own territory or forwarding a request for confiscation to the informing state 
under the provisions of this treaty.  The treaty provides further that the 
informing state may impose conditions on the use of such information by the 
receiving state and the latter shall be bound by those conditions.148  It is 
suggested that corresponding provisions be included in international counter-
terrorism and organised crime conventions to simplify the procedure of state 
cooperation in confiscation of the proceeds of crime. This strategy at least 
provides better guidelines to states to legislate effective mutual legal assistance 
laws to offer more comprehensive assistance in the suppression of transnational 
crimes.   
3.2.4) Disposal and sharing of the proceeds 
Article 5(5) of the Drugs Convention 1988 makes recommendations about the 
disposal of confiscated proceeds or property. Identical provisions can be found in 
the Organised Crime Convention 2000, UN Convention against Corruption 2003 
and Terrorism Financing Convention 1999.149  Article 5(5) (a) explains that 
proceeds or property confiscated by a state party shall be disposed of according 
to its domestic law and administrative procedure.  Article 5(5)(b) encourages 
parties to consider concluding agreements: (i) to contribute the proceeds or 
property to inter-governmental bodies specialising in the fight against drug 
trafficking (ii) to share with other parties on a regular or case-by-case basis 
property or proceeds derived from drug trafficking in accordance with their 
domestic law, administrative procedures and multilateral agreements. 
3.2.4.1)  Inconsistent implementation  
The provisions of article 5(5) (b) are designed to enhance the efforts of law 
enforcement officials and concerned governments by offering them the financial 
incentive of sharing in the proceeds of crime.150  Nonetheless, they have been 
expressed in a recommendatory fashion. Consequently, domestic laws reflect 
variation in their implementation. For example, Pakistan’s money laundering law 
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provides that the confiscated proceeds shall vest in the federal government 
exclusively unless it has a bilateral agreement with the requesting state for the 
return of such proceeds.151  Similarly, the Indian law provides that the 
confiscated proceeds shall vest in the Indian government even if confiscation has 
taken place upon the request of a foreign state.152  On the other hand, the 
Australian Proceeds of Crime Act stipulates that while the proceeds of crime 
shall vest in the Commonwealth, the Attorney General is authorised to order the 
disposal of proceeds under a foreign confiscation order.153  This may be 
compared with the Canadian law which provides that the items seized pursuant 
to a foreign request ‘will be’ transferred to the requesting state, if, upon a 
hearing subsequent to the seizure, the judge finds that the warrant was properly 
executed and issued.154 
Thus, at one extreme are domestic enactments such as Indian money laundering 
law which leave no room for sharing of proceeds, at the other are the Canadian 
Proceeds of Crime Act which make it obligatory to return the confiscated 
proceeds to the requesting state or the victims of crime.   
Similar discrepancies exist in bilateral treaties. For example, the 1995 Mutual 
Assistance Treaty between Australia and Indonesia makes it obligatory for the 
requested party to return the confiscated property or its value to the requesting 
state.155  Likewise, 2004 Mutual Assistance Treaty among eight far- eastern 
states provides that the requested party ‘shall’, subject to its national law and 
pursuant to any agreement with the requesting party, transfer to the latter the 
agreed share of the confiscated property subject to payment of the cost 
incurred by the requested state in the enforcement of the forfeiture order.156 
These may be compared with the US-France Mutual Assistance Treaty 1998 which 
only recommends the requested state to return or share the proceeds. Article 11 
of the treaty provides that the requested state shall dispose of the proceeds in 
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accordance with its domestic law. ‘As it determines appropriate’, the requested 
state may also transfer the confiscated property, or the proceeds of its sale, to 
the requesting state.157 
Diverse national approaches towards disposal and sharing of proceeds repudiate 
the convention objective of facilitating state cooperation in confiscation of 
crime proceeds. Obviously, states not having enabling laws or treaties are not in 
a position to offer inter-state assistance in the disposal or sharing of proceeds. 
However, they cannot be held liable for violating their convention obligation 
because the obligation is not mandatory.  
3.2.4.2) Elaboration of procedure as an alternative 
The 2009 UK-Philippines Mutual Assistance Treaty presents a substitute 
arrangement. The treaty divides the obligation to share proceeds into two parts. 
The first part relates to the return of assets to the state where the crime was 
committed or the conviction was obtained.  The second part deals with the 
sharing of the confiscated property with a state whose cooperation has led to 
final confiscation. Thus, article 18(1) of the treaty explains that confiscated 
assets may be returned to the requesting state if the offence is committed and a 
conviction has been obtained in the requesting state. Moreover, it stipulates 
that the return of the confiscated property shall take place in accordance with 
the law of the requested state.158  Articles 20-21 enumerate the circumstances 
under which the confiscated property may be shared with states other than the 
one where the offence was committed or the conviction was obtained. According 
to them, where it appears to the confiscating/holding state that cooperation has 
been extended by another contracting state which has led to confiscation of the 
assets, the confiscating/holding state may upon the request of such cooperating 
state consider whether to share assets. The outcome of the deliberation shall be 
conveyed to the cooperating state.      
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The above provisions bring much needed procedural clarity and serve as better 
models for domestic legislations as compared to the vague provisions of 
international counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions. They are 
expected to facilitate state cooperation in confiscation by assisting states in 
framing enabling laws. Accordingly, their inclusion in the conventions in place of 
the existing provisions would be an improvement.  
3.2.5)  Grounds for refusal of mutual legal assistance 
The mutual assistance provisions of the international counter-terrorism and 
organised crime conventions establish grounds on the basis of which assistance 
may be refused. Article 18(21) of the Organised Crime Convention 2000 provides 
that mutual legal assistance may be refused: (a) if the request is not made in 
conformity with the provisions of the article (b) if the requested state considers 
that the execution of the request is likely to prejudice its sovereignty, security, 
public order or other essential interests (c) if the authorities of the requested 
State Party would be prohibited by its domestic law from carrying out the action 
requested with regard to any similar offence, had it been subject to 
investigation, prosecution or judicial proceedings under their own jurisdiction 
(d) if it would be contrary to the legal system of the requested state party 
relating to mutual legal assistance for the request to be granted.159  
Corresponding provisions can be seen in the Drugs Convention 1988 and the UN 
Convention against Corruption 2003.160 
3.2.5.1)  Non-exhaustive list of grounds 
Whereas some of these grounds are specific, others are fairly general. The latter 
include grounds such as essential national interests and the request being 
incompatible with the national legal system. It can be argued that broad terms 
such as these give open authorisation to states to incorporate any ground of 
refusal in their national laws.161  An interpretive note attached to the Organised 
Crime Convention 2000 supports this argument. According to this note, the term 
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‘essential interests’, includes the political offence exception and non-
discrimination.162 
This implies that the grounds for refusal set forth by the international 
conventions are not exhaustive and can be tailored to suit the needs of domestic 
legal systems.163  The assumption is reinforced by two common provisions of the 
conventions. One stipulates that a request for mutual legal assistance shall be 
executed in accordance with the domestic law of the requested party and to the 
extent it is not contrary to such law.164  The other provides, ‘[t]he provisions of 
this article shall not affect the obligations under any other treaty, bilateral or 
multilateral, that governs or will govern, in whole or in part, mutual legal 
assistance.’165  Both these provisions make it evident that the manner and 
procedure of executing a foreign request of mutual legal assistance is to be 
determined by the national law of the requested state and the bilateral treaty 
to which it is bound. In view of this, the harmonising impact of the grounds for 
refusal listed by the international counter-terrorism and organised crime 
convention is expected to be minimal. 
3.2.5.2)  Additional grounds for refusal under bilateral and multilateral 
treaties 
The European Laundering Convention 1990, in addition to the grounds for refusal 
enumerated by the international counter-terrorism and organised crime 
conventions, authorises the parties to refuse assistance where: (a) in the opinion 
of the requested party the importance of the case to which the request relates 
does not justify the action sought, (b) the offence to which the request relates is 
a political or fiscal offence, (c) the compliance with the action requested would 
be contrary to the principle of ne bis in idem, (d) confiscation may no longer be 
enforced under the law of the requested state due to lapse of time, (e) the 
request for confiscation does not relate to a previous conviction, (f) confiscation 
is not enforceable in the requesting state or is still subject to ordinary means of 
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appeal, and (g) the request relates to a confiscation order passed in absence of 
defendant.166 
Similarly, 2004 Mutual Assistance Treaty among eight far-eastern states lays 
down some new grounds, including non-discrimination, political and military 
crime exception, and double jeopardy.167  The above grounds are also found in 
the 1998 US-France Mutual Assistance treaty,168  the 2009 Mutual Assistance 
Treaty between the UK and the Philippines169  and the UN Model Treaty on 
Mutual Legal Assistance 1990.170 Thus, it is clear that bilateral and multilateral 
treaties do not confine themselves to the grounds for refusal set forth by the 
international conventions; they rather establish new and additional grounds. 
3.2.5.3)  Implications of additional grounds for refusal   
The varying grounds for refusal of mutual legal assistance under bilateral and 
regional treaties raise a question about the utility of the grounds listed by the 
international counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions. Since these 
grounds are non-exhaustive, they are unlikely to bring harmony in national laws 
and thereby to facilitate mutual legal assistance. Consequently, even if the 
requesting state satisfies each ground for refusal identified by the international 
counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions, the request may still be 
denied for not having satisfied the additional grounds expressed under the law of 
the requested state or the bilateral treaty to which the parties are bound.  
As an alternative, the makers of the international counter-terrorism and 
organised crime conventions may wish to shift their focus towards factors on the 
basis of which mutual legal assistance may not be refused. This approach also 
aims at facilitating state cooperation; nonetheless, it takes the route of 
minimising procedural constraints. 
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3.2.6)  Factors on the basis of which mutual legal assistance may 
not be refused 
Besides establishing grounds on the basis of which mutual legal assistance could 
be denied, the international counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions 
also lay down factors which cannot be used as reasons to refuse assistance. 
Thus, article 18(22) of the Organised Crime Convention 2000 provides that states 
parties ‘shall’ not decline to render mutual legal assistance on the grounds of 
bank secrecy 171 and fiscal offence exception.172  The object of this provision is 
to simplify the procedure of mutual legal assistance rather than to restrict the 
freedom of states in refusing assistance. Bank secrecy laws and fiscal offence 
exception provide legal basis to refuse the production of the records of banks 
and financial institutions before the courts and competent authorities. 
Accordingly, these factors make it difficult for the requested state to seize, 
identify, trace, freeze and confiscate the proceeds of crime pursuant to a 
foreign request. 173 
States appear to be more willing to embrace factors on the basis of which 
mutual legal assistance may not be refused instead of common grounds for 
refusal of assistance. For example, prohibition against the use of bank secrecy 
laws finds expression in a majority of bilateral and regional treaties including 
the European Laundering Convention 1990, 2004 Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty 
among eight far-eastern states and the UN Model Treaty on Mutual Legal 
Assistance 1990.174  Similarly, the prohibition against fiscal offence exception is 
widely applied in national laws and bilateral treaties.175 
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So far, the international counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions have 
identified only two factors on the basis of which mutual legal assistance cannot 
be refused: a fiscal offence exception and bank secrecy laws. To make this 
provision more effective, the list of these factors could be expanded on the 
pattern of the European Laundering Convention 1990. The 1990 Convention 
provides that the assistance may not be refused on the ground that the request 
for confiscation is directed against a legal entity.176 Furthermore, it stipulates 
that death of a natural person and insolvency of a legal entity shall not be used 
as reasons to refuse mutual legal assistance.177  The two factors have been 
implemented in the money laundering laws of India and Pakistan which 
constitute unilateral legislations for providing mutual legal assistance upon 
foreign request.178 
The benefit of including these factors can be gauged from the Rodriquez Gachsa 
case. In this case, Gachsa, a notorious drug trafficker was indicted on heroin 
trafficking charges in the Southern District of New York. However, subsequently, 
he was killed by the Colombian law enforcement authorities.179  As a result, it 
became difficult to forfeit his assets worth $ 60 million because the governments 
could not try him in death. Nevertheless, since the US law applied civil 
forfeiture systems, his estate was finally forfeited.180  This led to sharing of 
substantial proceeds of crime between the US and Colombia. 181  Had Gachsa 
been prosecuted by a state applying criminal forfeiture, it would not have been 
possible to confiscate his  assets unless the law of the prosecuting state included 
a provision to the effect that forfeiture shall not be precluded on account of a 
defendant’s death. 
                                         
176 See article 18 (8) (a) the European Laundering Convention 1990 
177 See article 18 (8) (b) the European Laundering Convention 1990 
178 See Section 26 & 38 Anti Money Laundering Act 2010 Pakistan; See also Sc.70 & 72 The 
Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2002 of India 
179  Douglas Jehl, ‘Colombian Police Kill Drug Lord: War on Narcotics: Rodriguez Gacha was a 
leader of the Medellin cartel. U.S. hails the 'first big break we've had.'Los Angeles Times Nov 8, 
1989<http://articles.latimes.com/1989-12-16/news/mn-228_1_medellin-cartel>[date accessed 
21/03/13] 
180  Douglas Jehl and Ronald J. Ostrow, ‘5 Countries Freeze Drug Kingpin's $60 Million : Cocaine: 
Secret funds of Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha are uncovered--the biggest strike yet in the war 
against traffickers’ Los Angeles Times Nov 8, 1989 <http://articles.latimes.com/1989-11-
08/news/mn-929_1_gonzalo-rodriguez-gacha> [date accessed 21/03/13] 
181 Sharing of Proceeds by the US in Gachsa case  
<http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/March/04_crm_180.htm> [Date accessed 21/03/13]; See 
also Zagaris ‘Asset Forfeiture’ (n 1) 510 
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Grounds on the basis of which mutual legal assistance may not be denied would 
be as much subject to national law as grounds for refusal of assistance. Hence 
they might not lead to synchronisation of national laws immediately. However, 
once they would appear in a significant numbers of multilateral treaties and 
model legislations, states might consider it expedient to implement them in view 
of their usefulness in modernising national laws in keeping with demands of 
state cooperation in suppressing sophisticated serious crime. According to 
Zagaris, this represents the process of turning soft law obligations into hard law 
ones.182   
It is pertinent to note that state cooperation in extradition and mutual legal 
assistance has always been a voluntary proceeding and states have jealously 
guarded their right not to cooperate. However, in the wake of borderless crimes, 
they have shown their willingness to collectively lower the barriers to state 
cooperation. For example, states have agreed not to apply political and fiscal 
offence exception to extradition and mutual legal assistance proceedings 
involving these crimes. Listing of the grounds on the basis of which the 
assistance may not be denied represents a step in that direction. 
 
Conclusion 
Transnational crimes represent a criminal phenomenon which spreads across 
national frontiers. Its suppression is only possible through state cooperation in 
law enforcement. To facilitate state cooperation, the international conventions 
proscribing these crimes establish certain mandatory obligations. These include 
the obligation to implement the mechanism of identification, freezing and 
confiscation of the proceeds and instrumentalities of crime upon foreign 
request.  
The purpose of the obligation is to bring harmony in national justice systems, 
which is needed because the absence of compatible rules of procedure under the 
laws of the requesting and requested states leads to refusal of a foreign 
                                         
182 Zagaris ‘Asset Forfeiture’ (n 1) 452 
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confiscation. However, since the obligation is imprecise and is required to be 
implemented to the extent permissible under national laws, its domestic 
implementation varies in line with diverse national legal principles of state 
parties. As a result, enough discrepancies arise in the laws of states parties to 
allow refusal of confiscation based upon the non-existence of the enabling rules 
under the law of the requested state or the request not being consistent with its 
confiscation procedure. These discrepancies may, for example, relate to civil 
and criminal forfeiture systems, sharing and disposal of proceeds, provision of 
voluntary information and the non-existence of a mechanism to undertake value 
and substitute confiscation.   
Clearly, the makers of the international conventions are not in a position to 
impose overriding and unconditional obligations unless the necessary consensus 
builds amongst state parties. As an alternative, they might wish to consider 
shifting their focus towards simplifying the procedure of confiscation upon 
foreign request by including elaborate provisions, to serve as models for 
domestic legislation. Although the implementation of proposed elaborate 
provisions would be as much subject to national law, as that of the existing 
general provisions, states might consider it expedient to implement the former 
on account of their usefulness in modernising national laws in keeping with 
demands of suppressing sophisticated serious crimes. Notably, states have, in 
the context of transnational criminality, shown their willingness to collectively 
lower the barriers to law enforcement cooperation. The inclusion of elaborate 
provisions on confiscation in the international conventions regulating 
transnational crimes represents a step in that direction.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
286 
 
Chapter 7:  Concluding Appraisal 
It has been argued that the UN sponsored International conventions regulating 
the acts of transnational terrorism and organised crime evidence the emergence 
of a new regime of state cooperation, the object of which is to subject sovereign 
discretion to collective law enforcement.1 The argument implies that 
conventions supersede national laws and bilateral treaties on extradition and 
mutual legal assistance. The formulation of the conventions, however, disproves 
this theory, according to which the conditions and procedure of extradition and 
mutual legal assistance are to be determined in accordance with national law of 
the requested state and bilateral treaties to which it is bound. It is thus clear 
that the international conventions are meant to complement rather than 
supersede these laws and treaties. 
The laws and treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance lay down 
certain requirements which necessitate harmony in the justice systems of the 
requesting and requested states. These are: ‘double conditions’ associated with 
principle of reciprocity and similarity in the procedures of applying aut dedere 
aut judicare and confiscation.  Since the object of the international counter-
terrorism and organised crime conventions is to facilitate state cooperation in 
law enforcement and since they do not override national laws and bilateral 
treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance, it can be argued that their 
mandatory obligations are directed towards facilitating the fulfilment of these 
requirements through establishing harmony. However, as we have seen, the 
obligations set forth by the conventions may not produce a level of harmony 
needed to achieve this goal.  
                                         
1 See Kofi A Annan, Foreword to the UNTOC 2000 at p.iii; Neil Boister, 'Transnational Criminal 
Law' 14 EJIL (2003) 953 at  953; Carrie Lyn Donigan Guymon, ‘International Legal Mechanisms 
for Combating Transnational Organised Crime: The Need for a Multilateral Convention’ 18 
Berkeley J. Int'l L (2000) 53 at 86-87; D.W. Sproule and Paul St-Denis, 'The UN Drug Trafficking 
Convention: An Ambitious Step' 27 Canadian Yearbook of International Law (1989) 263 at 266; 
UNODC’s Technical Assistance Guide 2009 to the UN Convention against Corruption 2003 at 
133 <http://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Technical_Guide_UNCAC.pdf>  [Date 
accessed 21/03/13]  
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1.1 Suggestions for improvement 
Recognising that the mandatory obligations set forth by the counter-terrorism 
and organised crime conventions are subject to various limitations, the thesis 
recommends that alternative techniques of facilitating law enforcement 
cooperation should be looked for. One such technique could be to regulate the 
requirements of law enforcement cooperation, i.e.  ‘double conditions’  and 
procedure of applying aut dedere aut judicare and confiscation. 
This technique does not require the abolishment or replacement of the 
requirements necessitating harmony. Instead, it aims at simplifying the 
procedure of enforcing aut dedere aut judicare and confiscation and defining 
with precision and clarity ‘double conditions’, with a view to bringing about 
consistency in their application.  
It is hoped that by adopting this approach, the international counter-terrorism 
and organised crime conventions will achieve their objective of facilitating law 
enforcement cooperation more effectively than the existing technique of 
imposing mandatory obligations. As noted by Bassiouni: 
These values and interests must be defined with sufficient specificity, 
applied with high level of consistency that would provide needed 
predictability in order to contribute to the preservation of world 
public order. The consistent application of uniform standards of 
practice between states and the relator is self-evidently a sound 
policy...2 
The suggestions made here are not required to be expressed in the form of 
mandatory obligations; their purpose is to serve as models for national 
legislation. If states are unwilling to accept unqualified mandatory obligations, 
the international conventions could at least provide comprehensive guidelines to 
modernise national laws in keeping with the demands of bringing to justice 
transnational offenders.  
                                         
2 Cherif Bassiouni, ‘The “Political Offence Exception” Revisited: Extradition between the US and 
the UK- A Choice between Friendly Cooperation among Allies and Sound Law and Policy’ 15 
Denv. J. Int’l L. Pol’y (1986-1987) 255 at 260 
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Although states have traditionally been reluctant to part with their discretion 
not to cooperate, they have nonetheless indicated their willingness to 
collectively lower the barriers to law enforcement cooperation in the specific 
context of transnational crimes. The consensus of states not to apply political 
and fiscal offence exception to extradition and mutual legal assistance 
proceedings involving these crimes provides but one example of their 
willingness. The proposed relaxation of ‘double conditions’ and simplification of 
procedure of applying aut dedere aut judicare and confiscation signifies a step 
in that direction.  
One criticism against the suggestions made here could be that the proposed 
technique suffers from same weaknesses which are found in the existing 
technique. If harmony could not be established with respect to making national 
justice systems conducive to the requirements of law enforcement cooperation, 
how could it be established in regard to relaxing ‘double conditions’ and 
simplifying procedure of applying aut dedere aut judicare and confiscation?  The 
argument overlooks the fact that the existing technique is focused on 
harmonising the entire ‘justice systems’ of states parties which involves 
amendments to their laws on terrorism and organised crime as well as 
constitutions and criminal codes. Since it purports to supersede local norms of 
prosecution, trial, punishment, forfeiture, criminalisation, jurisdiction and 
treatment of offenders, states consider it an interference with their sovereignty. 
On the other hand, the proposed regulation of ‘double conditions’ and procedure 
of applying aut derere aut judicare and confiscation impacts only one aspect of 
national justice systems i.e. state cooperation in law enforcement. This amounts 
to collectively lowering the barriers to law enforcement cooperation which 
cannot be equated to harmonisation of the entire ‘justice systems’. According to 
the existing technique, states are in a way required to surrender their sovereign 
right to conduct criminal proceedings in accordance with their local norms, 
whereas the proposed technique requires them to surrender a portion of their 
sovereignty, to the extent of state cooperation in law enforcement. Summary of 
the measures for improvement suggested in the thesis are set out immediately 
below.  
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1.1.1) Relaxing the application of special use of double criminality 
The thesis recommends that the principle of special use of double criminality 
might be relaxed in view of the specific nature of transnational criminality. 
According to this principle, when assistance is sought in relation to a crime 
taking place outside state territory, the theory of jurisdiction applied by the 
requesting state must correspond to the theory applied by the requested state in 
respect of the crime in question. Simply put, the principle requires that the 
theory of jurisdiction applied by the state seeking assistance in respect of an 
extraterritorial crime must be accepted under the legal system of the requested 
state.  To facilitate the satisfaction of this condition, the international counter-
terrorism and organised crime conventions impose mandatory obligations upon 
states to implement the bases of jurisdiction outlined by them. The obligation 
is, however, inconclusive because there is no rule of international law which 
restricts the right of states to apply their laws extraterritorially under any 
theory of jurisdiction recognised by their national law. Accordingly, it is unlikely 
to produce the level of harmony needed to satisfy the special use of double 
criminality.  
As an alternative, the makers of the conventions may recommend that states 
consider the non-fulfilment of special use condition a mandatory ground of 
refusal only, where it has been expressed in obligatory language in the relevant 
law or bilateral treaty. Likewise, they can encourage states to reserve powers 
for their competent authorities to grant extradition, notwithstanding, the non-
fulfilment of special use condition by the requesting state. A more radical 
approach could be to make it altogether irrelevant for the purposes of 
surrender, which theory is applied by the requesting state to assert jurisdiction 
over crime. Extradition should be granted if the offence is extraditable as per 
the terms of the relevant bilateral treaty or under the law of the requested 
state.  
1.1.2) Relaxing the application of double criminality 
A major complication arises in the surrender or interrogation of suspects on 
account of the requesting state not being able to fulfil the double criminality 
condition of extradition and mutual legal assistance laws. According to this 
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condition, the act in respect of which the assistance is sought must constitute a 
criminal offence under the laws of both the requesting and requested state, not 
only at the date of making of the request but also at the date of alleged 
commission of crime. Since crimes set forth by the modern counter-terrorism 
and organised crime conventions are complex aggregate crimes, it is possible 
that the definition of a crime or its constituent elements may differ under the 
laws of the requesting and requested states. This allows the offender to raise an 
objection of double criminality in extradition and mutual assistance proceedings. 
To address this problem, the recent conventions adopt the technique of 
imposing mandatory obligation upon states to legislate against universal 
definitions of crimes set forth by them. However, the obligation is riddled with 
exceptions and safeguards; hence, it is unlikely to produce the level of harmony 
needed to satisfy the demands of double criminality, which has more than one 
interpretation at the national level.  
As an alternative arrangement, the conventions may require states to apply 
double criminality only in those proceedings which represent steps towards 
punishment, such as extradition and confiscation. In other forms of law 
enforcement cooperation, which are investigative in nature, like asset freezing, 
identification and seizure, states may be encouraged not to insist upon the 
fulfilment of the double criminality rule. Another technique could be to 
encourage states not to insist that the act in respect of which surrender or 
interrogation is sought must have constituted a crime under the laws of both, 
the requesting and requested states, at the date of commission, it should be 
sufficient if the act was a crime at the date of making extradition request. Yet 
another strategy would be to require states not to insist upon exact similarity in 
the definitions of crimes under the laws of the requesting and requested states. 
It should be sufficient if the act in respect of which cooperation is sought 
constitutes a crime under the law of the requested state regardless of its 
denomination.  
1.1.3) Regulating the double punishability requirement 
Extradition and interrogation may be refused when the act in respect of which 
the inter-state assistance is sought is deemed non-punishable under the laws of 
the requested state due to actual or anticipated violation of human rights of the 
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offender in the requesting state. Thus, a requesting state while seeking inter-
state assistance is required to provide such evidence of criminality as would 
justify the trial of the offender in both the requesting and requested states. To 
facilitate the fulfilment of this requirement, the international counter-terrorism 
and organised crime conventions impose mandatory obligation upon states to 
provide fair treatment to the relators in accordance with national and 
international law, including human rights law. However, since the obligation 
does not define the rights to be guaranteed, it is unlikely to produce a level of 
harmony sufficient to satisfy multiple applications of these rights under 
extradition and mutual assistance laws, as grounds for refusal of assistance.   
The thesis recommends that instead of focusing on bringing harmony as regards 
provision of human rights to the offender, the conventions should emphasise on 
the consistent application of these rights, under extradition and mutual 
assistance laws, as grounds for refusal of assistance. The application of human 
rights as grounds for refusal of assistance varies in extradition and mutual 
assistance laws, with respect to matters such as: what constitutes political 
persecution, under what circumstances the possibility of torture represents a 
ground for refusal of assistance, which state’s limitation law is relevant for 
blocking assistance under the rule of time- barred prosecutions and when double 
jeopardy can be raised as a ground for denying assistance. 
To reconcile the use of torture as a ground of refusal with severe punishment 
requirement of transnational criminality, the thesis suggests that states should 
be encouraged to surrender the fugitive subject to obtaining diplomatic 
assurances from the requesting state. To bring consistency in the application of 
time-barred prosecutions as a ground for refusal, the thesis recommends that 
only the requesting state’s limitation law should be deemed relevant for the 
purposes of refusing cooperation on this ground. Since it is the interests of that 
state which are at stake, it should not be forced to comply with the limitation 
law of its treaty partner. Likewise, the conventions may encourage states to 
follow uniform rules with respect to the forum whose previous judgement may 
lead to denial of surrender or interrogation on the ground of double jeopardy. 
Additionally, the conventions may recommend that previous conviction or 
acquittal should block surrender or interrogation in relation to specific offences 
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rather than to an entire criminal transaction. Since the crimes set forth by the 
conventions tend to aggregate, if a previous conviction or acquittal for one 
offence is considered a ground for refusing assistance for the whole transaction, 
the offender may escape punishment for more serious offences. 
1.1.4) Simplifying the procedure of aut dedere aut Judicare 
To ensure the denial of safe heavens, the counter-terrorism and organised crime 
conventions oblige states to implement the mechanism of aut dedere aut 
judicare. The obligation is designed to make sure that states have in place the 
alternative enforcement measures of extradition or prosecution, so that if one 
fails the other can be applied to offer inter-state assistance. Nonetheless, both 
alternative measures are to be applied in accordance with the national law of 
the requested state. Since these laws differ, the obligation is unlikely to bring 
about a level of harmony sufficient to ensure that one of the measures would be 
applied in every situation. As a result, the offender may avoid punishment 
altogether for his crime, under certain circumstances. Furthermore, the 
conventions contain more than one formulas of aut dedere aut judicare and 
states are entitled to implement any one of these. Hence, the obligation may 
only establish harmony to the extent of including the maxim in national laws, 
which is insufficient to facilitate its application.  
To facilitate the application of aut dedere aut judicare, the thesis recommends 
that states should be encouraged to take measures such as sending observers to 
witness the trial and holding trial in a third state. These measures are designed 
to make the option of trial in lieu of extradition-- which currently suffers from 
weaknesses such as the inability of the requested state to prosecute foreign 
nationals for crimes committed abroad and the complicity of the requested state 
in the commission of crime--more effective.  Additional difficulties in the 
application of aut dedere aut judicare include the problem of competing 
jurisdictions and absence of hierarchy in the alternatives of extradition or 
prosecution. To address these, the thesis recommends that states be encouraged 
to adopt a rule of reasonableness with a consensual list of factors to be 
considered when making a decision about surrender or trial in a given situation. 
Likewise, to facilitate the extradition option of aut dedere aut judicare, the 
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thesis recommends that states be encouraged to adopt innovative rules such as 
the provision of mutual legal assistance in extradition. 
1.1.5) Simplifying the procedure of confiscation upon foreign 
request 
To deprive the offenders of their illicit wealth, the international counter-
terrorism and organised crime conventions oblige the parties to implement the 
mechanism of confiscation and asset freezing. The obligation leaves it up to 
states to determine the procedure of confiscation, in accordance with their 
national laws. Moreover, it stipulates that measures prescribed therein should be 
implemented to the extent permissible under national laws. In view of this, it is 
unlikely to produce the level of harmony sufficient to facilitate the enforcement 
of confiscation upon foreign request. At most, it may lead to the inclusion of 
confiscation as a law enforcement measure in national laws. Thus, despite the 
establishment of a mandatory obligation, a request for confiscation remains 
under the threat of being refused on account of national law disparities in areas 
such as civil and criminal forfeiture systems, application of value and substitute 
confiscation and the determination of third party rights. 
To facilitate the enforcement of confiscation upon foreign request, the thesis 
recommends that following provisions might be considered for inclusion in the 
international counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions: 
1. States might be encouraged to include civil forfeiture as an option in 
their national laws. Additionally, it might be suggested that they 
exempt forfeiture from domestic law rule against enforcement of 
foreign criminal judgements. 
2. To determine the value of proceeds which are lost or are no longer 
available, the thesis recommends that a consensual formula be 
provided on the pattern of some domestic laws to apply value and 
substitute confiscation. It further recommends that states be 
encouraged to empower their courts to provide reasonable allowance 
to offenders with a view to avoid human rights complications such the 
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offender having been deprived of the right to choose attorney of his 
own choice. 
3. To minimise the likelihood of a foreign request being delayed on 
account of disparity in national procedures as regards protection of 
third party rights, the thesis recommends that states parties be 
encouraged to determine these rights expeditiously. 
4. As regards mutual legal assistance, the thesis recommends that the 
conventions should elaborate a procedure concerning the sharing and 
disposal of proceeds and the provision of voluntary information. The 
existing provisions of the conventions are silent with respect to sharing 
of proceeds with third parties whose cooperation has led to 
confiscation. Similarly, no guideline exists concerning the scope of 
voluntary information. These deficiencies could be removed by 
borrowing suitable provisions from bilateral treaties and domestic laws 
on mutual legal assistance. 
5. To bring consistency in national approaches towards the refusal of 
mutual legal assistance, the thesis recommends that the conventions 
should focus on the grounds on which the assistance may not be 
refused.  The grounds on the basis of which the assistance may be 
denied are non-exhaustive and are unlikely to produce the desired 
harmony. Conversely, the national implementing laws indicate that 
states are more willing to implement factors on the basis of which the 
assistance may not be denied. So far the conventions have indicated 
only two such factors, i.e. bank secrecy laws and the fiscal offence 
exception. The list might be expanded to include additional factors 
such as involvement of legal entities and the death or insolvency of 
the offender.  
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1.2) Compatibility of the proposed technique with aims 
and purposes of the counter-terrorism and organised 
crime conventions and its utility in regard to 
modernisation of extradition and mutual assistance laws 
It might be argued that the proposed technique of facilitating state cooperation, 
i.e. relaxing ‘double conditions’ and simplifying procedure of aut dedere aut 
judicare and confiscation is not in consonance with the nature of the 
international counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions. Since the 
conventions are multilateral instruments of universal scope, their role is to 
provide broad guidelines only. Thus, the proposed regulation must be carried out 
by other instruments such as the UN Model Treaties on extradition and mutual 
legal assistance. The argument can be refuted on two grounds. Firstly, the aim 
of the counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions is to facilitate state 
cooperation in law enforcement; thus the regulation of the conditions of 
extradition/mutual legal assistance and procedure of applying aut dedere aut 
judicare and confiscation is very much in line with this objective. Secondly, 
model treaties provide guidelines for states having regional and bilateral 
arrangements. Since the counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions are 
universal in scope, not all states parties to them can be expected to have 
bilateral and regional treaties. For states not having such arrangements, 
guidelines have to come from the international conventions.  
The proposed technique offers a further advantage of bringing laws and treaties 
on extradition and mutual legal assistance in consonance with the requirements 
of sophisticated serious crimes. It has been argued that extradition laws belong 
to the age of the horse and buggy and steamship, not to the age of jet airliners 
and high speed communications.3 Hence, they are ill-suited for bringing to 
justice the offenders involved in sophisticated multi-jurisdictional crimes. Under 
these laws several difficulties arise in the surrender of offenders involved in 
borderless crimes. For example, the lack of extraterritoriality, dissimilar crime 
definitions and incompatible human rights safeguards, can all lead to the refusal 
                                         
3 The present extradition laws belong to “the world of the horse and buggy and the steamship, not 
in the world of commercial jet air transportation and high speed telecommunications.” From a 
letter to Senator Edward Kennedy from US Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti. See 126 
CONG.RECORD Sc.13233 at S.13235 Col.2. See also Geoff Gilbert, Transnational Fugitive 
Offenders in International law: Extradition and other mechanics ( Netherlands  Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 1998) 1 
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of surrender. Thus, the technique of relaxing ‘double conditions’ and simplifying 
procedures of aut dedere aut judicare and confiscation offers the added 
incentive of modernising extradition and mutual assistance laws in line with the 
peculiar requirements of transnational criminality. Finally, it is reiterated that 
states have, by agreeing not to apply political and fiscal offence exception to 
extradition and mutual legal assistance proceedings involving the crimes set 
forth by the counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions, clearly shown 
their willingness to depart from traditional rules of surrender and interrogation 
in the specific context of transnational crimes.     
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